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CASES ON PROCEDURE.
The Series.
The present volume, on Trial Practice, is the first of a
series of case-books which the editor hopes to prepare for
the use of law students, covering the broad subject of Procedure. The plan contemplates separate volumes on the
following special topics: — Trial Practice, Code Pleading,
Common Law Pleading, Equity Pleading and Practice,
Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Appellate Practice.
These books are to be prepared as separate and independent treatments of the subjects to which they relate.
Each branch of procedure has its o^vn subject-matter and
its independent problems, and no advantage would result
But
from erasing the lines which mark its boundaries.
while this is so, it is nevertheless important to observe that
an adequate conception of any one of these branches can
be formed only by keeping constantly in mind the scope
and function of procedure as a whole. In a very true and
fundamental sense procedure is single and indivisible. Its
aim is to furnish a mechanism for litigation, to supply a
means and method for applying the law in the solution of
One purpose runs through it all.
legal controversies.
drawn
to present issues for trial; trials are
Pleadings are
What the
had to determine issues raised by the pleadings.
trial demands the pleadings must give. One is the counterpart of the other. Only in view of the trial are the pleadings intelligible ; only by reference to the pleadings can the
And as for
scope and course of the trial l)e determined.
the relation between procedure in nisi priiis and in appellate
courts, the former is moulded to meet tlie requirements of
the latter and the latter is leased strictly upon the foundation laid by the former. Thus ))leading, in its various forms,
trial practice, and apjiellate practice may be correctly
viewed as component parts of a highly developed system
designed to enable parties to successfully resort to courts
of law for the redress of grievan:^os. Together they furnish
a complete mechanism for the administration of the law.
(Hi)
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Note.

the present series of easJQ^bo.oks upon procedure it
is .proposecljto: deyeloj> the snbj&c't, so far as possible, in
this; B'lloa'^/'dajj :CohipK4}Vn§i,Y^ way. Each branch will be
treated sejiarately, and its technical details will be fully
and carefully exhibited, but at the same time it will be the
definite aim to make each volume disclose its place and
])ur])ose as an integral part of an articulated system. In
this way, if at all, may procedure be shown in its true
character, as a logically developed and practically efficient
means for accomplishing a very important end, instead
of a mass of arbitrary and technical rules. No method
Arill work well in the hands of those who lack an adequate
perspective and who fail to take a comprehensive view of
its scope and purpose. If the law schools are to turn out
men able to meet the exacting demands of a critical and
sorely-tried public, they must spare no effort to develop
in their students a thorough, rational and enlightened appreciation of the true function and the basic principles of
The series here proposed is an effort to supprocedure.
ply material to meet this need.

•/•'■in

Edson R. Sunderland.
University of Michigan.

PREFACE.
The teaching of Practice has been neglected to a surprising degree in American law schools. The subject is one
of immense importance to the profession, as all lavN^yers
And yet, in fitting men to practice law the
understand.
schools have seldom accorded it a prominent place in the
curriculum. It is probable that in no profession do the
technicalities of practice lAaj so large a part as in the
law. Indeed, court procedure has really become a public
problem in which the laity, who suffer from its abuses,
are beginning to take a vigorous and aggressive interest.
A subject of such vital concern to both the public and the
profession should be worthy of a careful and discriminating study.
For many years the Law Department of the University
of Michigan has offered an exceptionally large amount
of work in Practice, and this has tended to increase from
year to year as the methods have become better systematized.
This work has consisted of two branches, classroom work in the principles of Practice and a practical
application of these principles in the Practice Court. The
former has proved particularly troublesome because there
were no suitable books available for classroom use. Various general texts on Practice have been employed, and recently the work has been conducted as a research course,
questions being prepared and handed to the students to be
answered by reference to the statutes, digests, reports and
text-books in the library.
But neither the text-book nor
the library method proved entirely satisfactor}^
Eacli
tended to emphasize the rules of practice as such, instead
of developing the reasons underlying them. In a law school
largely devoted to the case system of instruction, it finally
became clear that a case-book in Practice was an urgent
necessity. This book has been prepared to meet that need.
A comparative study of the decisions on Practice in the
(V)

.'rJifferent States will readily' tJispose of the commonly acis'-.jJrimarily a local subject,
'ccj)4;iid fallac.v.tlmt.Ri^aGtica
to'fbe^istLVpi'S!:^^}^ taU^J^t*'^?,?' matter of local education in
preparation for admission to a local bar. In truth, the
principles of trial practice are largely of general applicaThe variations found in different jurisdictions are
tion.
The major problems, inmost of them on minor points.
volving the correlation of functions between judge, jury,
attorney, party and witness, are always the same, wherever the jury system is in use. And the solution of these
problems of trial practice has followed closely parallel
In every
lines in the different American jurisdictions.
instance there were the same elements to work with, the
same results to be reached, and the previous experience
of other courts was at the disposal of each. Logic and
experiment led along the line of least resistance, and resulted in the building up of a systematic and well-ordered
body of principles which, if administered with intelligence
and conscience, are, in the main, admirably adapted to meet
the requirements of modern courts of justice.
The present volume is intended to develop and disclose
the rational basis for the main principles of practice employed in the trial of civil actions at law. Recourse has
l)een had to the whole body of American case law, and the
choice of cases has been determined by the clearness with
which the court has shown a logical justification for the decision made. By this means it is hoped that the book will
lielp the student to analyze and understand the methods
l)y which courts solve problems of practice, to appreciate
the comparative value, importance and bearing of the different elements involved, and to form sound notions of the
underlying ])rinciples goveniing the complex field of modern court procedure.
The cases have been very freely edited, and everything
not gei-mane to the subject for which the case was chosen
has been omitted.
Questions of procedure are usually
raised in connection with questions relating to the substantive law, so that few opinions can be advantageously
used in toto in a work of this kind.
It is believed, however, tliat the facts of the various cases have never been

Preface.

^**

cut so far as to impair their value. The great advantage
of cases over text-books as educational instruments lies in
the presentation of facts out of which the court, by a lo.gical process of demonstration which it develops and exhibits
before the reader, is able to derive its legal conclusions.
Cases with facts eliminated are usually of little more value
than the abstract discussions of the text-books, and great
care has therefore been taken to preserve them in every instance where the legal principles involved depend in any
material degree upon the nature of the facts.
While Evidence is essentially a branch of Trial Practice, it has been entirely excluded from the present volume,
for the obvious reason that it is everywhere recognized
as of sufficient importance and difficulty to warrant an independent treatment.

Edson R. Sunderland.
University of Michigan,

Ann Arbor,

September, 1912.
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WRITS OF SUMMONS.
Section

1.

What is Process.

BEOOKS V. NEVADA NICKEL SYNDICATE.
Supreme

Court of Nevada, 1898,
24 Nevada,

By the Court, Massey,

311,

J. :

The first objection made to the validity of the judgment,
based upon defects appearing in the judgment roll, is that

no summons was ever issued in the action — that the paper
purporting to be a summons is void for the reason that it
runs in the name of "The People of the State of Nevada."

Section 13, article VI of the constitution requires that the
style of all process shall be "The State of Nevada." Is a
summons issued under our law a process within the meaning of the provision of said article?
Under our practice act, which has been in force since
1869, provision is made for the issuance of summons to be
signed by the attorney for the plaintiif, or by the clerk,
and, when issued by the clerk, requiring that it shall be
under the seal of the court. The same act specifically defines the contents of the same. There is nothing in the act
requiring the summons to run in any particular form. It
has never been treated as a process within the meaning of
our constitution either by the legislature or the courts, and,
while there is conflict of authority upon a similar question,
under constitutions and statutes similar to our own, in
other states, we are disposed to hold that a summons is not
a process, within the meaning of our constitution.
Upon this point we quote from a decision of the Supreme
Court of Colorado, in which it says: "As to the first point
raised — that the summons is such a process as may be issued in the name of the people of Colorado — we are strongT. p.— 1

Trial Practice

2

[Chap. 1

ly inclined to follow the conclusion of the Supreme Court
of Florida in Gilmer v. Bird, 15 Fla. 411. In this case the

a
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is,

identical question here presented is discussed at some
'that the summons, as authorized by the
length — that
within the meaning of the constitu"process",
code,
tional provisions which require the style of all process to
be the "State of Florida"; that the summons had no such
style; that this was essential to the validity of thb judgAnd the court
ment, there having been no appearance.'
the notice given by an attorney of the instisaid: 'But
form similar to
tution of
summons, but not
suit, in
"process"
within the meaning of
court,
issuing out of
the constitution? Baron Comyn, in giving the definition
imports the writs which
of the term "process" says
issue out of any court to bring the party to answer, or for
no definition of "process" given
doing execution. There
by any accepted authority, which implies that any writ or
suit
commenced
method by which
necessarily "process." A party
entitled to notice and to
hearing under
the constitution before he can be affected, but
nowhere
declared or required that that notice shall be only
writ
"
issuing out of a court.'
{Comet Consolidated M. Co. v.
Frost, 25 Pac. (Col.) 506; Hamia v. Russel, 12 Minn. 80;
Or. 71; Nichols v. The Planh Road
Bailey v. Williams,
G. Greene, 44.)
Co.,

Designation of Court and Parties.

Supreme

Court
117

of

EGGLESTON V. WATTAWA.
Iowa.

1902.

Iowa, 676.

a

Action on
judgment recovered by default in the cirDer'uit court of South Dakota in and for Brule county.
fendant denmrred on tlie ground tliat the summons in the
action on which the judgment was recovered was not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. The trial court sustained
this demurrer, and, on phiintiff's election to stand on his

Writs of
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petition,

plaintiff

rendered judgment
appeals. — Affirmed.

McClain,

J. — Although

Summons

for defendant,

3

from whicli

action on which the judg
ment was rendered in South Dakota was entitled in the
circuit court, the summons required defendant "to answer
the complaint of N. W. Eggleston, plaintiff, wliich will be
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court within
and for said Brule county, at Chamberlain, Brule Co., S.
D., and to serve a copy of your answer to the said complaint on the subscriber at the office in the city of Chamberlain, S. D., in said county and state, within thirty days
after the service of this summons, exclusive oi the day of
service, or the plaintiff will apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint, besides costs." This summons was served on January 9, 1892. The complaint on
which judgment was rendered by the circuit court of Brule
county was not filed until December 9, 1892, and judgment
by default was entered on that day. The provisions of the
statutes of South Dakota, set out by plaintiff in his petition,
provide, with reference to the summons, that it shall require defendant ' * to answer the complaint and serve a copy
of his answer on the person whose name is subscribed to the
summons, at a place within the state to be therein specified,
in which there is a postoffice, within 30 days after the service of the summons, exclusive of the day of service." It
is evident that under such statutory provision the summons in question was fatally defective in not correctly naming the court in which the complaint would be filed. The
statutes of the state do not, so far as made to appear in
this record, specifically require that the court in which the
defendant is to appear shall be named, but certainly that is
essential to such a notice as would be sufficient to constitute due process of law. Moreover, it is required by the
statutes of that state, if a copy of the complaint is not
served with the summons, that "the summons must state
where the complaint is or will be filed." The summons in
question did not state that essential fact, for no complaint
There was in fact
was ever filed in the "district court."
no such court then in existence, the "district court" as
known under the territorial government, having been replaced by the "circuit court" by the provisions of the constitution under which the state was admitted. This change
the
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is pleaded in the case by plaintiff as an excuse for the mistaken description, but the fact remains
that defendant was not notified that the complaint would
be filed in the circuit court, in which the judgment was
rendered, but was advised that it would be filed in another
Under such circumcourt, which in fact did not exist.
stances we think defendant was justified in assuming
that no valid judgment could be rendered against him. The
circuit court acquired no jurisdiction, and the judgment
on which this action is based was therefore void.
See, as
bearing in general on the question, Lyon v. Vanatta, 35
Iowa 521. Other questions are argued, but, as they involve
the construction of statutes of another state, their decision
would be of no advantage to anyone.
The demurrer was rightly sustained, and the judgment
of courts

is affirmed.

LYMAN
Supreme

V. MILTON.

Court of California.
44

1872,

California, 630.

By the Court, Belcher, J.:
The plaintiff seeks by this action to enforce the execution
of a resulting trust.
The complaint names as defendants, Martha Ellen Milton, administratrix of the estate of Daniel Milton, deceased,
Martha Ellen Milton, and Ida May Milton. It alleges the
death of Daniel Milton, leaving him surviving as his only
heirs at law his widow, Martha Ellen Milton, and his daughter, Ida May Milton, an infant of about the age of three
years, and that Martha Ellen Milton had been duly appointed the administratrix of his estate.
Upon the complaint a summons was issued, entitled: '*W.
Lyman, plaintiff, v. M. E. Milton {administratrix, etc.) et
al., defrjidants."
It was addressed to *'M. E. Milton, administratrix et al., defendants," the name of Ida May Milton nowhere appearing in it. This summons was served
upon both defendants, and afterwards, upon application of

Sec. 2]
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plaintiff, the adult defendant was appointed the guardian ad litem of the infant defendant. The said Martha Ellen accepted the trust of guardian ad litem, and, thereupon,
before filing answer, or otherwise appearing, appeared in
the

court by counsel, stating to the court that she appeared on
behalf of said infant for the purpose only of moving to
quash the summons. The court refused to permit such an
appearance, and refused to recognize counsel, or hear anything they might have to say on behalf of the infant, unless
they entered an unqualified appearance for the general purpose of defense. Having duly entered an exception to this
ruling, counsel then, in obedience thereto, stated without
qualification that they appeared on behalf of all the defendants.
Thereupon they submitted a written motion on
the part of the said infant and her guardian, that the summons be quashed on the ground, among others, that the
same is radically defective in not stating the parties to the
action. The court overruled this motion and the defendants
excepted.

Afterwards, upon answers filed in behalf of each defendant, the case was tried by the court and judgment entered
in favor of the plaintiff.
The statute (Practice Act, Sec. 24) provides that "the
summons shall state the parties to the action, the Court in
which it is brought, the county in which the complaint is
filed, the cause and general nature of the action, and re
quire the defendant to appear and answer the complaint
within the time mentioned in the next section after the
service of the summons, exclusive of the day of service, or
that judgment by default will be taken against him according to the prayer of the complaint, briefly stating the sum
of money or other relief demanded in the complaint."
It is manifest that the summons in this case did not state
the parties to the action. M. E. Milton, in her representative capacity of administratrix, was but one of three parties
defendant. The words ''et al.," in the connection in which
they are used, are of no significance.
They indicate, at
most that there are still other parties who are not named.
Without them, so far as a compliance with the statute is
concerned, the summons would have been as complete as
with them.
Is a summons, in which one defendant onlv is named,

6
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when in fact there are several defendants to the action, a
good summons to the defendants not named in it? Must
one who is served with a summons to which he does not
appear to be a party take notice at his peril that he is
really a party to the action? To hold so we must hold that
the section of the statute referred to is only directory in
But if it be directory and not mandaits requirements.
tory, why may the summons not omit to state the court in
which the action is brought, or the county in which the
complaint is filed, or the cause and general nature of the
action, or the time within which the defendant is required
to appear, or the amount of money or other relief demanded in the complaint, or all of them together, and still
All of these things are stated in the combe held good?
plaint, except the time within which the defendant must
appear, and that is a matter regulated by law, which every
If notice only is required, the
one is presumed to know.
])arty has that when he sees a copy of the complaint and
liimself named in it as a defendant. And yet no one would
contend that a summons which omitted to state the several
matters required by the statute could be held good.
The summons is the process by which parties defendant are brought into Court, so as to give the Court jurisdiction of their persons. Its form is prescribed by law;
and whatever the form may be it must be observed, at least
substantially. It may be that a summons under our system
is required to state more than is necessary for the information of the defendant ; that a copy of the complaint served
by the Sheriff or the attorney would have been all that is
needful. If that be so it is a matter for the legislature and
not for the Courts. We entertain no doubt that a summons must contain all that is required by the statute,
whether deemed needful or not, and, among other things,
must state the parties to the action.
It may be that when the defendant moved to quash the
summons for insufficiency the Court might have entertained
u counter motion to have it amended by inserting the omit
ted names of the defendants, and, on its being so amended,
might have denied the original motion.
In Polack v. Hunt, 2 Cal. 193, it was held that the
court had power to amend the summons so as to make
it conform to the law, when it operated no hardship or

Wbits of Summons
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surprise to the

defendants.
No such counter motion,
was
made in this case, and we cannot pass uphowever,
on that question.
A defendant has a right to appear for the purpose of
moving to dismiss a defective summons, and it is error
in the Court to refuse him that privilege. Nor does the
fact that he afterwards appears and answers waive his.
right or cure the error. {Deidesheimer v. Brown, 8 Cal.
339; Gray v. Haives, id. 569.)
For the error named the judgment must be reversed
and cause remanded for further proceedings, and it is so
ordered.^

iln Saddler v. Smith, (1907) 54 Fla. 671, 45 So. 718, the court said;
"Where there are several parties defendant it would not be suificient to give
the name of one defendant in the tody of the subpoena or copy, followed by
the words et al. Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal. 630.
And so we have held that
in a writ of error or appeal, all parties thereto must be named and cannot
*
*
*
be included in the words et al.
While the words et al. are incapable of
standing in the place of the names of parties required by law to be stated
in a subpoena or writ of error, they may be used in endorsing the title of
the cause on the copy of subpoena where there is no statute or rule requiring
the names of the parties to be indorsed thereon. ' '

Section

3.

Designation of Time for Appearance.

LAWYER LAND COMPANY
Supreme

Court of Washington.
41

Hadley,

J. —

V.

STEEL.
1906.

Washington, 411,

**********

This appeal is from an order quashing a summons and
the service thereof.
The essential part of the summons
reads as follows:
"You and each of you are hereby summoned to appear
within twenty days after the service of this summons, exclusive of the day of service, if served within the state
of Washington, and within sixty days if served out of
the state of Washington, and defend the above entitled
action in the court aforesaid, and answer the complaint
of the plaintiff and serve a copy of your answer on the

8
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person whose name is subscribed to this summons at Spokane, Spokane county, state of Washington, and in case
of your failure so to do, judgment will be rendered
against you according to the demand of the complaint
which will be filed with the clerk of said court, a copy of
which is herewith served upon you."
The summons and complaint were personally served upin the state of North Carolina. The
on respondents
affidavit of service is in all respects regular and sufficient.
Bal. Code, Section 4879, provides as follows:
"Personal service on the defendant out of the state shall
be equivalent to service by publication, and the summons
upon the defendant out of the state shall contain the same as
personal summons within the state except it shall require
the defendant to appear and answer within sixty days after
Fuch personal service out of the state."
It is argued by respondents, and such seems to have been
the view of the superior court, that inasmuch as the summons was so drawn that it contemplated that a service
might be made either within or without the state, it is
fatally defective. It is contended that the duty was upon
appellant in advance to determine whether service was
to be made within or without the state, and that the summons should have been drawn with reference to one or the
other only. It seems to us that the essential inquiry is,
Was the summons by its terms confusing or misleading to
We cannot see that it was. It plainly told
respondents?
them that, if they were served without the state, they were
required to appear within sixty days.
That portion relating to service within the state became mere surplusage
in view of the service that was made, and it was so maniWe therefestly such that it was in no sense confusing.
fore think the court erred in quashing the summons and
its service. Under the above statute, the service was equivalent to service by publication.

The judgment quashing the summons and service is
therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to vacate that part of the order appealed from and
proceed with the action,^
^Return
Dny.
Tn C1ont,'h v. MrDoiialrl, (1877) 18 Kan. 114, the statute
required that the summons should be served and returned by the officer with-
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The sumnione .vas in fact made returnable In six
in ten days from its date.
days, and was served on the day before the return day. The court said:
"Now a suninioii.s of tliis kind wo think is never void. It might l)e voidable
however, if the oilier slioiild take the whole tiir.e (ten days) given him by
law within which to .serve it uj>on the defendant, for in that case the time
given to the defendant withiri which to answer or demur would be shortened.
But V hen tJ'C olficcr serves the summons before the return day thereof, as in
this case, we do not think that either the summons or the service is either
In such a case the defendant has lost nothing. He has
void, or voidable.
his full twenty days after the return day of the summons within which to
It is
answer or demur, and that is all that the law gives him in any case.
the time of the officer, and not that of the kfeudant, that is shortened, by
makinir the return of the summons less th:.i, !(_ti days from its date."
Where the retarn d:iy and ajijearance day arc the same, as in some states,
the argument just quoted would of course not apply.
See, also, Morris v. Uealy Lumber Co., (1903) 33 Wash. 451. 74 Pac. 662.

Section

Desckiption of Cause of Action.

4.

BEWICK V. MUIR.
Supreme

Court of California.
83

1890.

California, 368.

Sharpstein, J, This was an action to foreclose a number of liens npon a mine for labor and materials under the
There were forty-five plaintiffs, each claimact of 1880.
ing a separate lien. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs,
and two of the defendants appealed.
1.
The summons is sufficient. It states the nature of
the action in general terms, and this is all the statute requires. It is apparent from the statements of the summons
that the action in which it was issued was to recover money
and to foreclose liens. This is the general nature of the
action. It is unnecesary to state whether the right to the
money sought to be recovered accrued from work and labor, or from goods sold and delivered, or to state the kind
of lion, or on what property the lien attached. All these
things appear in the complaint on file, of which filing he
is notified by the summons, and if he is not notified he is
bound in law to know it. He is bound to know that a complaint has been filed; for otherwise a summons could not
issue. It makes no difference that a copy of the complaint is not served on the party moving. The above is in
accordance with the dictum in Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal. 631.

3.0
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The summons states what the statute requires and all thai
The cases decided in Lyman v. Milton, supra,
is needful.
as also in Ward v. Ward, 59 Cal. 141, were different from
this, and, as said above, there is a compliance with the
dictum in the former case and with the statute. Why require that to be inserted in the summons which must appear in the complaint ? Our practice is cumbersome enough
without its being made more so by judicial decision. We
cannot understand how it can be said that the summons
does not contain '*a statement of the nature of the action
in general terms." The Code of Civil Procedure provides
(which is equivalent to a command to all of the courts of
the state) that all of its provisions are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect its objects and promote justice. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 4.) The objects of the require-

ments of the statute as to what the summons shall contain
are carried out by serving it with a general statement which
is specialized in the complaint, and it is injustice to turn a
party out of court or reverse a judgment on a view of the
summons merely technical, when the summons points to
the complaint where the particular statement is made, and
if a copy of the complaint is not served on the movingparty, he knows where to j&nd it. When the motion was
made at the bar of the court, the complaint was no doubt
within reach, or it could have been procured in a moment.
King v. Blood, 41 Cal. 316, is precisely in point, and treats
the question as it is here, as a perusal will at once show.
The court did right in denying the motion.

[Reversed on other grounds.]
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Signature, Teste and Seal.

5.

LOWE V. MOERIS.
Supreme Court of Georgia.

1853,

147,

13 Georgia,

Motion to dismiss writ of error.
Lumpkin, J., concurring.
Is a writ of error a nullity without a seal?
My first impression was, that this defect was fatal.
is,

**********

on reflection, my final conclusion

*

the other way.

Up-

*

*

a

a

Lord Coke defines seal to be, wax with an impression,
" Sigillum" says he, "est certa impressa,
(3 Inst. 169.)
quia cera sine impressione non est sigillum." And this has
seal.
been adopted as the Common Law definition of
But
neither an Act of Parliament
17, 30.

Leon. 21.

is

Bra. tit. Faits.

it

129, 134,

2

Perk.

The truth

322,

Halst.

d

2

Watts,

2

63.

1

Ball.

is,

503.

1

a

is

it

is

a

2

5

a

is

a

a

is

curious fact that there
nor an adjudged case, up to Lord Coke's day, to bind the
seal. His opinion was probcourts as to what constitutes
ably founded on the practice of the country in his day.
New York, and most of the States North, have held that
an impression upon wax, wafer or some other
seal
tenacious substance, capable of being impressed.
John.
Caine's Rep. 262. 21 Pick. Rep. 417. But in
Rep. 239,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the Southern and Western
States generally, the impression upon wax has been discircular, oval, or square mark, opposite the
used, and
the
held to have the same effect as a seal,
name of
signer,
the shape of
being altogether indifferent. It
usually
written with
pen, sometimes printed.
Raivle,
Serg.
272.

a

is

is

that this who^e sul)ject, like many others,
founded on the usage of the times, and of the country.
A scroll
just as good as an impression on wax, wafer, or
parchment, by metal, engraved with the arms of
prince,
potentate, or private person. Both are now utterly worthless, and the only wonder is, that all technical distinctions
growing out of the use of seals, such as the Statute of Limitations, plea to the consideration, etc., are not at once uni-
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The only reason ever urged at this,
versally abolished.
day, why a seal should give greater evidence and dignity to
writing is, that it evidences greater deliberation, and therefore should impart greater solemnity to instruments. Practically we know that the art of printing has done away with
this argument. For not only are all official and most individual deeds, with the seals appended, printed previously, and filled up at the time of their execution, but even
merchants and business men are adopting the same practice, as it respects their notes.
Once the seal was everything, and the signature was
Now the very reverse is true: the signature is
nothing.
*
*
*
everything, and the seal nothing.
So long as seals distinguished identity, there was propriety in preserving them. And as a striking illustration
see the signatures and seals to the death warrant of Charles
the First, as late as January, 16-1:8. They are 49 in number, and no two of them alike. But to recognize the waving, oval circumflex of a pen, with those mystic letters to the
uninitiated, L. S. imprisoned in its serpentine folds, as
equipotent with the coats of arms taken from the devices
engraven on the shields of knights and noblemen; shades
of Eustace, Roger de Beaumont, and Geoffry Gifford, what
The reason of the usage has ceased; let the
a desecration!
custom be dispensed with altogether.

**********

With these desultory remarks

I

am content to leave the

law, learning and logic of the case to my brother Warner,
have no doubt,
to whom it legitimately belongs, and who,
will do ample justice to the argument, and with whom
concur, in retaining the writ of error.^

I

I

iThe entire opinion, only a small part of wLich is ^iven liere, is replete
with Avit and learning, and a reading of it will afTi)rd both entertainment and
profit.
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CHOATE V. SPENCER.
Supreme Court of Montana.
13

1893.

Montana, 127.

Action to annul sheriff's deed.

Defendants' demurrer

to the complaint was sustained by Henry,
Pemberton, C. J.

**********

J.

Reversed.

The appellant insists that the summons issued out of the
district court of the fourth judicial district of the territory
of Montana, in and for Choteau county, on the seventeenth
day of June, 1888, in the suit of Jere Sullivan against this
appellant, was absolutely void, because it was not authenticated by the seal of the said court. If this contention is correct, the district court never acquired jurisdiction of this
appellant, who was defendant in that suit, by the issuance
and service of such summons ; and any judgment said court
may have entered in said cause, as well as the execution
issued for the enforcement of such judgment, and all other
proceedings thereunder, including the levy thereof on the
property of appellant, and the sale and execution and
delivery of the sheriff's deed complained of, would necessarily be null and void.
At common law, a writ issuing from a court having a
seal, in order to be considered authentic or of any value,
must be attested by the seal of the court from which it is
issued. The laws of this state provide that the district
courts shall have a seal (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 527) and
that the clerk of the court shall keep the seal (Code Civ.
Proc. Sec. 528). And section 68 of the Code of Civil Pro-

*****

that the summons must be issued under
So that, under our statutes, there is
the seal of the court.
no departure from the common law rule requiring such
writs to be authenticated by the seal of the court from
which they issue. The appellant has cited a number of
authorities holding the common law doctrine that such
writs must be authenticated by the seal of the court from
which they are issued in order to give them validity, and
without which they would be void. The principal case relied upon by appellant in support of his contention
that the summons under discussion was void for want of
cedure requires

M
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the seal of the court is Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall.
556.
This ease went to the supreme court of the United
States, from Indiana, and involved the validity of a deed
executed and delivered by a sheriff to real estate, under an
order of sale, under a statute of that state. The statute required the order of sale to be issued under the seal of the
court. The seal was omitted from the order of sale. In
delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Miller, says :
*'If the paper here called an 'order of sale' is to be treated
as a writ of execution or fieri facias issued to the sheriff,
or as a process of any kind issued from the court, which
the law required to be issued under the seal of the court,
there can be no question that it was void, and conferred no
authority upon the officer to sell the land. The authorities
are uniform that all process issuing from a court which by
law authenticates such process with its seal is void if isCounsel for plaintiffs in error have
sued without a seal.
not cited a single case to the contrary, nor have our own researches discovered one. We have decided in this court
that a writ of error is void for want of a seal, though the
clerk had returned the transcript in obedience to the writ.
We have held that a bill of exceptions must be under the
seal of the judge." This was a collateral attack made upon
the deed executed by the sheriff, under the order of sale
from which the seal had been omitted. Counsel for the
respondents contend that the case just cited is not controlling, and claim that the Indiana courts have declined to
follow the rule therein asserted, and cite a number of IndiFrom an examinaana cases in support of their position.
tion of the Indiana cases cited by respondents we are of
opinion that the departure from the rule asserted in
Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall. 556, has been occasioned
by the legislation in Indiana since the decision in 6 Wall.
556. In support of this view, we quote from State v. Davis,
In this
73 Ind. 360, this case being cited by respondents.
as
appellees
case the court say: "It is undoubtedly true,
insist, that at common law a writ issuing from a court
nmst, in order to be entitled to be considered as regular and
authentic, be attested by the seal of the court from whicli
it issued.
{Williams v. Vanneter, 19 111. 293; State v.
Flemming, 66 Me. 142; 22 Am. Rep. 552; Wheaton r.
Thompson,

20

Minn. 196; Reeder v. Murray,

3

Ark.

450.)
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The case of Insurance Co. v. Hallock, 6 Wall. 55G, does decide that an order of sale issued by a court of this state was
void because not attested by the seal of the court. It has
also been held by this court that, where there is no statute
to the contrary, a writ or record must be attested by the
seal of the court from which it comes.
(Jones v. Frost, 42
Ind. 543; Hinton v. Brown, 1 Blackf. 429; San ford v. Sinton, 34 Ind. 539.)
The older cases did hold that a writ
the
seal
of the court was absolutely void, but there
lacking
is much conflict upon this point among the modern cases,
many of them holding that such a writ is not void but merely voidable. Our court long since held that such a writ was
not void. It is true, as argued by appellees, that a summons so clearly defective as to be insufficient to confer jurisdiction cannot, after judgment, be so amended as to give
jurisdiction. If a summons without a seal be conceded to
be void, then there can be no amendment, for it is axiomatic
that a void thing can not be amended.
The liberal provisions of our statute respecting the summons would take
such writs from under the old common-law rule, even if it
were conceded that it is the rule which must be adopted
respecting other writs. The provisions of the code upon
this subject are contained in article IV., and the provision
which directly bears upon this point is found in section 37,
and is as follows:
'No summons or the service shall be
set aside or be adjudged insufficient where there is sufficient
substance about either to inform the party on whom it may
be served that there is an action instituted against him in
court.' " It must appear as conclusive that the court in
this case would have held the summons void but for the
statute of Indiana, quoted in their opinion.
This case
seems to us to be strong authority for holding that, but for
the statute of Indiana in relation to the essentials of a
summons, that court would have held to the doctrine contained in 6 Wall. 55G, to-wit, that such writs, without the
seal of the court from which they issued, are void.

**********

The appellant further contends that, at the time of the
issuance and service of the summons under discussion, Montana was one of the Territories of the United States, and
for this reason the opinion of the supreme court of the
United States in 6 Wall. 556, is decisive of the question as
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to the validity of said summons, and controlling upon
this court in the determination of this question ; and relies
upon the authority and reasoning in Sullivan v. City of
Helena, 10 Mont. 134. We are of opinion that this position is unassailable, our statute being, in effect, the same
as that of Indiana at the time of the rendition of the opinion in 6 Wall. 556. This reasoning and holding do not in
our opinion, contravene section 119 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that "the court shall in every
stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the
pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the parties; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect." This
section presupposes an action pending, of which the court
has acquired proper jurisdiction, and we are not passing upWe
on the powers of the court under such circumstances.
—
hold in the case at bar that the summons the jurisdictional writ — under the law and decisions in force and controlling in this jurisdiction at the time of its issuance was
If
void, because not issued under the seal of the court.
this case involved a defective process, issued subsequent
to summons, and the acquiring of jurisdiction by the court
thereunder, then the contention of respondents that such
defect or irregularity could be amended or disregarded
Judgment reversed and
might be urged with great force.
cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer.

Harwood,

J.

and DeWitt,

J.,

Reversed.^

concur.

iWliere the requisites of a summons or other writ are prescribed by constitution or statute, it is frequently held that such constitutional or statutory
requirements are mandatory, that the writ is void without all of them, and
Gordon v. Bodthat the want of any one cannot be supplied by amendment.
well, (1898) 59 Kan. 51, 51 Pac. 906; Sharman v. Huot, (1898) 20 Mont.
555, 52 Pac. 558.
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AMBLER
Supreme

V. LEACH.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
15

17

1879.

West Virginia, 677.

the fall term, 1869, an office-judgment was confirmed
the
circuit court of Wood county in favor of James M.
by

At

Stephenson, Thompson Leach and K. B. Stephenson, partners under the firm name and style of Stephenson, Leach
& Co., against John Council and J. G. Blackford for $310.49, with interest from September 25, 1869, till paid, and
*
*
*
Tiie summons, by which this suit
costs of suit.
was commenced, was as follows:

''State of West Virginia.
"To the Sheriff of Wood County, Greeting:

''We command you that you summon John Council

and

J. Gr. Blackford to appear before the judge of our circuit
court for W^ood county at rules, to be held in the clerk's
office of said court, on the first Monday in August next, to
answer James M. Stephenson, Thompson Leach and K. B.
Stephenson, partners under the name and style of Stephenson, Leach & Co., of a plea of debt for $301.75, damages
$20.00. And have then and there this writ.
"Witness, William H. Hatcher, clerk of our said circuit
day
court, at the court house of said county, the
year of the State."
and in the
of
*
*
*
the
time
At
this judgment was rendered J. G.
IMackford owned several parcels of land in said county,
and also a considerable amount of personal property. On
the 23rd day of February, 1876, he conveyed all his property, real and personal, to B. Mason Ambler, trustee, for
This conveyance was
the jDayment of all his debts ratably.
duly recorded the same day, October 12, 1878, that this
trustee instituted this suit.
In his bill he states all the above facts, filing with it a
copy of the record in this common law suit, a copy of this
execution and return thereon and an abstract of this judgment from said judgment lien docket. He alleges in his
bill that this judgment was a mere nullity, as the summons,
which was the commencement of the suit, was not dated
and was not signed by the clerk. But says that it being
T. P.— 2
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claimed to be a valid judgment, and being on the judgment
lien docket, it is a cloud on the real estate conveyed to
him as trustee, and prevents his selling to advantage tlif
real estate conveyed by said deed, as he is thereby author*
*
*
The two Stephensons
ized and directed to do.
their several
Johnson,
bill
makes
Okey
being dead, the
J,
G. Blackford and John Conexecutor, Thompson Leach,
nell defendants, and asks the court to declare said judg*
* *
The court by its final decree
ment null and void.
*
*
*
dismissed the bill and decreed that the plaintiff
pay to said defendants their costs in said suit expended.
From this decree the plaintiff, B, M. Ambler, on March
22, 1879, obtained from this court an appeal and supersedeas.

Green, President, delivered the opinion of the court:
The first question presented by this record is : Was the
judgment of the circuit court of the fall term, 1869, null
and void, because the summons in the suit in which such
judgment was rendered was blank as to its date, and beThe
cause it was not signed by the clerk or his deputy?
appellant's counsel claims that it is absolutely void, and
should be so pronounced by this Court ; while the appellees
claim that it was only voidable by plea in abatement, or
motion to quash it in the original suit, or at furthest by

*

*

In

it

if

a

is

a

a

it,

having the judgment set aside by a motion by the defendor,
ants before the circuit court which rendered
error
refusal
reversafter
such
and
writ of
refused, by
al of this judgment by this Court; and these steps not havlien on the
valid, and
ing been taken, this judgment
real estate of the defendant, Blackford, superior to the
lien created by said deed of trust.

a

it

I

is

*

of the States their constitutions or laws
require that process shall be signed by the clerk of the court,
and sealed with the seal of the court, and as the sealing as
well as signing
clearly intended for the like purpose, of
autlienticating the process, the decision as to the effect
regard as bearof omitting to attach the seal of the court
ing directly on the question under discussion in this case.
In Maine, where the process has to be under the seal of the
writ returnable to the Supreme
was decided that
'!0urt,
Judicial Court, wliirli ought to have had the seal of that
some
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a

it,

but did not have, was to be quashed
Court attached to
term long
on motion of the defendant, though made at

is

(8

a

a

1

a

a

&

9

a

a

3

is

3

a

it

;

it

a

if

a

a

is

a

a

is

it

a

subsequent to the term at which the writ was returnable.
The court say: ''Upon the whole we regard the seal as
matter of su])stance, and the process, being an original
ivrit, not amendable. We regret that the defect was not
pointed out at an earlier stage of the proceedings; but we
now too late to take the objection.
are not satisfied that
We do not abate the proceedings so much for the sake of
the defendants, as because the plaintiff has departed from
public nature, in
substantial requirement of law of
obvious that the court did not
bringing his action." It
regard this process as absolutely null and void, but as
substantial one.
voidable process; but the defect being
the defendant was not confined to the term at which process was returnable to make his motion to quash this prohe
cess, but was allowed to do so long afterwards. Still
the
default,
entered
by
had permitted
judgment to be
court would doubtless have held this judgment valid. All
they did decide was, that at any time pending the case he
was good.
might avoid this process but unless avoided,
mere nullity and absolutely void
was not
That
Greenl.
shown by the case of Sawyer v. Baker,
Me.)
without
29, where the court held that an execution issued
the seal of the court, which the law required, was not abAnd
solutely void, but might be afterwards amended.
Smith,
approved in the case of Bailey v.
this decision
Fairfield, (12 Me.) 196. So in Massachusetts. Upon plea
writ, that the seal of the court was not
in abatement to
attached, the court held the plea good and refused to permit the writ to be amended by attaching the seal. Hall v.
Jones, Pick. 446. But in New York in the case of Pepron
Caine's cases 60, on motion
et al., V. Jenkins, Coleman
because
to quash
not signed by the clerk, the court
writ,
permitted the writ to be amended by the clerk's then signing it. Both these cases evidently treat the writ as not
void, but as voidable only. And in the People v. Dunning,
Wend. 16, the court expressly decide that an execution,
to which the seal of the court was not attached as the law
nullity, but only voidable, and
requires, was not void or
the sureties of sheriff were held liable for money collected
under such an execution. In the case of Stayton v. New-
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comer, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 451, there was a judgment by default
on a writ to which the seal of the court was not attached.
Upon writ of error this judgment was reversed. We could
not from this infer that the writ was a mere nullity, but
rather the reverse, that it was voidable, and was avoided
by the defendants obtaining a writ of error. But Oldham,
Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, used very
strong language to show that the writ was a mere nullity.
He says, ''this writ totally fails to confer any jurisdiction
The writ being unsealed
over the person of the appellant.
is a mere nullity, and as such imposes no legal obligation
upon the appellant to appear and defend against the action. The judgment by default is therefore erroneous and
ought to be reversed."
This language is so specific that
it is obvious that the court intended to hold that a writ to
which the seal of the court was not attached, was an absolute nullity, unless confirmed by the defendant's appearance.
And that a judgment by default based on it would
also be null and void, even had it not been reversed by the

**********

Appellate Court.

In Parson

Sweft, 32 N. H. 88, the court decided that,
though the Constitution of New Hampshire expressly provides that ''all writs shall bear the teste of the chief justice of the court," yet a writ not bearing this teste was not
void, but only voidable by motion to quash made at the
Ijroper time in the progress of the suit. The court say:
"The Constitution of this State, article 87, provides that
all writs issuing out of the clerk's office in any court of
law, shall be in the name of the State of New Hampshire,
shall be under the seal of the court whence they issue, and
bear teste of the chief, first or senior justice of the court,
and shall be signed by the clerk of said court, yet a writ
which issues without the proper teste is not in terms declared by the Constitution to be void, and wo think it is
not to be held so by construction.
In the same article of
the Constitution writs are required to be signed by the
clerk ; but a writ is not void because it wants the signature
of the clerk; and the objection will be overruled, if not
seasona))ly made. LoveU v. Sahin, 15 N. IT. 37. In Massachusetts, upon tlie construction of a similar provision of
their Constitution, it has been decided that the want of ?
v.
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propor iesfe is mere matter of form, and must be taken advantage of by seasonable objection; otherwise it will be
held to be waived. Ripley v. Warren, 2 Pick. 592. In this
ease the want of a proper teste did not make the writ void.
If a motion to quash had been seasonably made, the writ
might have been amended; for it was not void, and the
It was so decided in Bcyuolds v.
court had jurisdiction.
The ordinary process of the court
Donnell, not reported.
never in fact bears the actual signature of the chief justice,
but his name is printed into the blank writs before they
are delivered out of the clerk's office. The teste of a writ
is therefore in practice a mere matter of form."
Yet in HiitcJiins v. Edson, 1 N. H. 139, a sheriff was
held not liable for the escape of a prisoner, whom he held
in custody, because the execution under which he held him
was not under seal, and the court say: "A writ not under
The Constitution
seal is not process warranted by law.
in our opinion has rendered a seal essential to the validity
of all our writs; and no officer can justify anything done
under a writ of execution not under seal. It is no better
warrant for arrest than a piece of blank paper." Commenting on this case the court in Parson v. Sivett, 32 N. H, 89,
say: ''The general language used in that case might tend
to the conclusion that writs of mesne, as well as final, process were void, unless under the seal of the court. It is obvious, however, that there is an important distinction between the two kinds of writs, because to a writ of final process the defendant has no opportunity to object, by plea or
motion that it wants a seal or other constitutional requisite.
It may perhaps be found, when a case shall arise which
presents the question, that the doctrine of Hidchins and
Edson ought not to be extended beyond the point expressly
decided. Foote v. Knowles, 4 Mete. 586; Brewer v. Lihhey,
13 Mete. 175 ; People v. Dunning, 1 Wend. 17 ; Jackson v.
Broivn, 4 Cow. 550."

There has been in the State of Arkansas a very large
number of decisions as to the effect upon a judgment of the
writ being defective in almost all sorts of ways. The decisions at first were quite strong, or the language used in
them strong, to indicate that for many of these defects the
judgments would be void. These cases were all reviewed
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a

is
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is
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a
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is

a

a

a

a

a

a
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however in Mitchell v. Conley, 8 Eng. 414, and the court on
full review of them then held an original summons not run
ning in the name of tlie State is not void, but amendable, and
may be amended after plea in abatement filed. In Rodcl.
surv. V. Thompson d Barnes, 22 Ark. 363, the court held a
writ of summons is not void for want of the official seal
of the clerk. It is voidable only and may be amended on
application to the court; but if no application to amend
has been made, the defect is ground for a reversal of judgment by default. The court say: ''It has been the practice
of this court to reverse judgments by default in cases where
the summons were without the official seal of the clerk, and
such writs were treated as void. But in Mitchell v. Conley, 13 Ark. 418, the court upon review of its previous decisions held that they were not void for such defects, but
voidable, and the court below possessed the power to amend
them on application.
Here no application was made to
the writ is cause of reversal."
the
and
in
defect
amend;
The authorities we have cited show that the decided
weight of authorit}^ is against holding a writ absolutely
void, because not signed by the clerk, or not having the seal
of the court attached to
or not being properly attached,
or for not running in the name of the State, even where
these things, or any of them, are required in the Constituwrit render
tion; but such defects in
only voidable.
In some States
held that these things, or most of them,
are so much
matter of form, that no advantage can be
motaken of them except by
plea in abatement, or by
tion to quash made at the proper time. Others hold that
while none of these defects render
writ void, or the judgment based on
nullity; yet they, or some of them, are
such defects of substance that the writ can be avoided
by motions to quash, though not made promptly, and where
on such
defective writ, at least where some of these defects exist,
obtained against the
judgment by default
will be ;feversed on writ of error. But no
defendant,
decision, which
have been able to find, holds in
collateral
judgment
nullity. It
proceeding that such
true, as
we have seen, that some of the judges use very strong language, from which we m.ight infer, that in their opinion
wi-it
which some of these
judgment by default based on
defects existed was an absolute nullitv; but we are liable
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to mistake their views, as in none of the cases, we have
seen, were they called upon to decide more than that the
judgment might be reversed, or the writ quashed on mo-

tion in the same suit; and it is obvious that this might
properly be done, though the judgment was not a mere

nullity.

In this

in the common law suit had
them by the sheriff, which
served
on
a summons regularly
on its face showed it came from the clerk's office, though
It was served on the 2nd. dav
not signed by the clerk.
of August, 1869, and required them to appear at a specified time to answer the plaintiff's demand. It is true the
summons was not dated, but the law required that a writ
The
should be returned in not exceeding ninety days.
issued
writ
been
had
defendants knew therefore that this
at sometime within the preceding ninety days, and could
not therefore have supposed it was issued in some preceding year, as has been suggested, and must therefore
have known at what specific time they were required to
appear and answer. They also knew in what court to answer from the face of the writ, and at what particular
time to answer. It does seem to me therefore that such a
writ ought not to be regarded as an absolute nullity. It
was no doubt very defective and might have been properly
quashed; but as it really gave with reasonable certainty
all the information to the defendants that a regular and
perfect writ would have done, it cannot justly be regarded
as a

case the defendants

nullity.

For

these reasons the decree of the circuit court of Octo*
*
*
ber 28, 1878,
dismissing the plaintiff's bill at his
* * *
costs, must be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
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Indorsement of Amount Claimed.

CHICAGO,

BURLINGTON

RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
75

&

QUINCY

1905.

Nebraska, 37.

This action was brought by George P. Elmen, as administrator of the estate of Robert Stewart,
deceased, to recover damages for the widow and next of
kin on account of the death of his intestate, which lie alleges was caused by the negligence of the defendant rail
road while the deceased was working in its Havelock shops.
* * * *
On July 17, 1901, one day before the time limited

Letton, C.

*

*

*

*

it,

a

it,

by the statute for the beginning of an action for death
by wrongful act, a petition was filed in this action and a
summons issued. The praecipe for the summons did not
ask for the indorsement of any amount for which judgment would be taken if the defendant did not appear, nor
did the summons which was issued have either upon its face
or indorsed thereupon any amount for which judgment
would be taken in such case. This summons was duly served
No appearance wa**
upon the defendant and returned.
made and no default was entered. On February 10, 1902,
the plaintiff filed a motion requesting to be permitted to
amend the praecipe so as to show the amount for whicli
plaintiff would take judgment, in case of default, to be
$5,000, that the clerk be directed to amend the original
and that an
summons by indorsing that amount upon
alias summons be issued, with that amount indorsed, requiring the defendant to answer on or before March 17,
copy of the mo1902, and that the amended summons,
and the alias summons, be
tion and order allowing
served upon the defendant the same as an original summons. The court, by an ex parte order, sustained the mo*
tion.
*
We have repeatedly held that no judgment can be
rendered in excess of the amount indorsed upon the sum-

9

3

a

is

mons in case of default in an action where the only relief
Neb.
Croivell v. Galloway,
sought
money judgment.
Neb. 105; Co-operative Stove
215; Roggencamp v. Moore,
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Co. V. Grimes, 9 Neb. 123; Forbes v. Bringe, 32 Neb. 757,
The plaintiff in error contends that the amendments to the
summons and praecipe, which were permitted by the court,
relate back to the time of the issuance and service of the
original summons, and that therefore the action was begun
within the two year period, while the position of the railroad company is that, since no judgment could have been
rendered for any amount whatever upon the summons as
it was when issued and served, an amendment which gave
to the writ a force and effect of which it was entirely devoid
was in effect the beginning of a new action, and that, in such
case, if the bar of the statute had fallen, it could not override the same. We have been cited to no cases directly in
point in either this or any other jurisdiction.
This court
has held that a motion to amend an affidavit for attachment
may be sustained, even though a motion is pending to quash
the writ on account of the very defect which it is sought to
cure by amendment. Struthers v. McDowell, 5 Neb. 491;
Rathman v. Peycke, 37 Neb. 384; Moline, Milburn <& Stoddard Co. V. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520; Dohry v. Western Mfg.
In such cases the amendment relates
Co. 57 Neb. 228.
back to the issuance of the writ of attachment. The general rule is that irregular or voidable process may be
amended, but that void process is incapable of amendment.
A void writ is not a
The reasons are obvious.
writ, and an amendment which would give such a writ
force and effect would call the process into being at the
time of the so-called amendment. The courts of other states
have not been uniform in their holdings as to the effect
of the failure to include an ad damnum clause in a summons or to indorse upon the back of the writ the amount
claimed, where required by statute. See Campbell v. Chaffee, 6 Fla. 724:;Kagay v. Trustees, 68 111. 75; State v. Hood,
In Ohio, in such a case, it was held
6 Blackf. (Ind.) *260.
that
such a summons could be amended,
inferior
court
by an
but unless appearance were made the amendment would
Williams v. Hamlin, 1 Handy 95.
have to be served.
such
court in the same state it was held
another
in
While
that a judgment rendered upon the service of a writ with
no amount indorsed was erroneous, but not void, and therefore valid and subsisting, since not directly attacked, Gillett V. Miller, 12 Ohio C. C. 214.
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first position is correct the latter is wrong. Tho
holdings are clearly irreconcilable. This court, however,
in an early case, pointed out the proper procedure and inIn Watson v.
dicated the effect of such an amendment.
enforce
a venMcCartney, 1 Neb. 131, the action was to
indorsed
was
The
summons
lands.
certain
dor's lien upon
with the notice required in cases where a judgment for
The defendants did not appear,
money only is sought.
and the indorsement was by leave of court amended so as
to conform to the nature of the action, and judgment was
rendered accordingly. In that case as in this both the
the

praecipe and the summons were defective as to indorsement. In the opinion Judge Lake says :
''So well am satisfied that this amendment was irreguhave not undertaken to look
lar and unwarranted, that
into the cases relating to amendments cited by counsel for
the defendant in error. Although cases might be found
should deem it unwise, in
to support such a proceeding
the settlement of the practice which is to govern in the
courts of this state, to conform to precedents of that charjjad the defendants appeared, the
acter.
amendment might have been made by order of the court.
The office of the notice indorsed on the summons is to
He then is
advise the defendant of the amount claimed.
tj^^ plainat liberty to consent or resist.
tiff's course was to take judgment for the amount indicated
in the notice, with interest from April 1, 1897. If he
desired a further or greater recovery, he should have obtained leave and issued another summons, such as was
proper in the case." See also Reliance Trust Co. v. Atherton, 67 Neb. 305; Atchison, T. S S. F. Ry. Cc. v. Nicholls.
8 Colo. 188, 6 Pac. 512.
In the instant case the summons was issued in all respects in conformity with the praecipe which was filed, and
in conformity with law. It is not a case where an error
has been made by a clerk of the court or other officer.
In such a case, as, for instance, where an error has been
made in the date of the return day of the summons or
the answer day, we have permitted amendments to be
made, and such amendments relate back to the time of the
issuance of the summons. Barker Co. v. Central West Investment Co. 75 Neb. 43. The court, in such case, has

I

I

I

*****

*****
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prosprve the riglits of tlie defendants by granting such additional time to plead as may be necessary.
In such cases, the defendant is fully advised of the nature
of the judgment which is sought to be rendered against
him, and the only prejudice which he can suffer is being
deprived of the necessary time in which to prepare his defense.
The case here, however, is different.
Upon its
face the summons was valid, but it failed in anjnvise to
apprise the defendant of any money demand against it.
No sum is mentioned either on the face or upon the
back of the writ. This being the case, an amendment to
the praecipe which directs the clerk to indorse a sum of
money upon the writ, and an indorsemnt of the same
upon the summons, the defendant not being in court, injects into the caF.e a liability upon the defendant to which
he was not subject when the writ was issued, and the
effect as to him is the same as the amendment of a petition by setting forth a new cause of action, or the issuance of an alias summons. The defendant may have been,
and evidently was, perfectly satisfied to let judgment go
against him upon the process as it was first issued, but, when
the same was made valid and effectual to charge him with
a money judgment,
it was the same as beginning a new
action, and he had the right to the time prescribed by
law for his answer after the indorsement.
It is a significant fact that the plaintiff did not rely upon
the amended praecipe and summons to bring the defendant
into court, but procured the issuance and service of a new
summons, fixing the answer day at a future date.
Taking
this fact into consideration, we conclude that the action was
begun so far as the liability for the amount indorsed upon
the summons is concerned, at the time the amendment was
made and the new summons issued. If during the interval
between the issuance of the summons and its amendment,
or the issuance of the new summons, the bar of the statute
of limitations has fallen, it cannot be removed by an
amendment or a new summons which virtually begins the
action. Since the bar of the statute had fallen at the time of
the amendment and the issuance of the new summons, no
right of action existed, and the judgment of the district
court is correct.
y^ower to
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of the district court

be affirmed.

Ames and Oldham, CO., concur.
By the court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing
opinion, the judgment of the district court is
A-ffirmed.^

iln Lawton v. Nicholas, (1903) 12 Okla. 550, 73 Pac. 262, it was held
(tyllabus by the court):
"A Bummons in an action for the recovery of
money only should have endorsed thereon the amount for which judgment
will be rendered if the defendant fails to appear. Summons without such endorsement is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the person and of the

subject matter, and the judgment rendered thereon is not void, but voidable
only, and execution to enforce such judgment cannot be enjoined."
Follow-

ing

ELansas

cases.

Section

7.

Alias Writs.

PARSONS V. HILL.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia, 1900.
15

Appeal Cases, 532.

Mr. Justice Morris delivered the opinion of the Court:
This cause comes here by special appeal; and the question involved in it is one of considerable importance in
the practice of the law in this District under existing con-

ditions.

On November 2, 1896, the appellant, Joseph H. Parsons,
as plaintiff, instituted a suit at common law against the
appellee, Alice S. Hill, as defendant, in the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, by filing a declaration in assumpsit to recover from the appellee the sum of ten thousand dollars which he claimed to be due to him for professional services rendered to the appellee and another person in the matter of the location of some land scrip. This
claim was set forth with sufficient minuteness in a bill of
particulars annexed to the declaration, which itself was in
the common counts, but which, from the record before us,
does not appear to have been supported by any affidavit;
and, of course, no affidavit was required, except for the
purpose of a summary judgment, if one should be sought.
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On the same day on wliieh the declaration was filed, a
summons was issued out of the office of the clerk of the
court, in the form prescribed by the rules of the court, requiring the defendant to appear in court on or before the
twentieth day after service of the writ, to answer the plaintiff's suit, and to show cause why the plaintiff should not
have judgment for his cause of action.
This summons,
with a copy of the declaration, according to the rules and
practice of the court, was placed in the hands of the marshal for seryice, and was by him returned to the clerk's
office on November 25, 1896, with the indorsement thereon
It is understood
that the defendant could not be found.
that she was absent from the District at the time, and out
of the jurisdiction.
Nothing further was done for nearly two years. On October 11, 1898, a second summons was issued ; and this was
served on the same day on the defendant, and was returned
by the marshal into the clerk's office with the indorsement
thereon: "Served copies of the declaration, notice to plead,
affidavit, and this summons on the defendant this 11th. day
of October, 1898." * * *
Qjj November 2, 1898, the defendant, by
her attorneys, moved to vacate the second or alias summons issued and returned in the cause, on the ground, a^
alleged, "that the same was improvidently issued, since
the original summons issued in the said cause was not
legally and duly continued, and that therefore there has
been a discontinuance of the said cause." This motion was
allowed by the court, and the second or alias summons was
accordingly vacated.
Thereupon the plaintiff, by his attorneys, moved tlie
court to direct the clerk to enter upon the docket continuances from the date of the original summons.
This motion was denied. Then the plaintiff moved for a judgment
against the defendant for want of a duly verified plea. This
motion also was denied. The plaintiff next moved for a
judgment by default; but this motion likewise was denied.

*****

**********
*****

The error, if any there was, consisted in the

order to vacate the second, or what is called the alias
summons in the case, or else in the refusal of the court
to direct the entry of continuances as preliminary to the
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issue of a second or alias writ. And it was from either one
or both of these orders that the appeal should have been
sought.
Yet, under the special circumstances of the present case,
it does not seem to us that the ends of justice or any good
purpose would be subserved by our refusal in this appeal to
consider the true and substantial question in controversy
*
*
*
between the parties.
suit
declaration in
That question
whether, when
at common law has been filed and
writ of summons has
been issued under
in pursuance of the existing rules of
the Suf)reme Court of the District of Columbia, and
rewrit
defendant
canturn has been made upon that
that the
not be found, either by reason of absence from the jurisdiction or for some other cause, and no further proceeding
had in the case, no further writs issued and no continuances entered, until nearly two years afterwards, when
issued and actually
second or alias writ of summons
served upon the defendant, the suit has become abated or
discontinued, and the plaintiff
compelled to have recourse
he would further prosecute his cause of
to
new suit,
action?
Counsel in this case, with admirable ingenuity and incisive logic, have gone to the very foundations of the common law on the subject of writs, and of continuances, and
especially of proceedings under the old original writ, wherewith, under the ancient English practice, suits in the Court
* *
of Common Pleas were always begun.
We do not think that
necessary to follow counsel
very far in their discussion of the practice under the old
common law. The original writ, by which all civil suits in
the Court of Common Pleas in England were formerly commenced, with its incidents of summons, attachment, disfringas, distress infinite, and outlawry, was never in force
in this country, either during the colonial period or since
While our ancestors
our Declaration of Independence.
brought with them from England not only the substantive
was suited to their circumlaw of that country, so far as
stances, but also their law of civil procedure, there was
never any place in our system for tlie original writ. From
radically differthe very beginning we proceeded upon
In England,
ent theory of jurisprudence in that regard.

Sec. 7]

Writs of

Summons

31

the sovereign was the source of all authority, and the courts
were his courts, and had no right to proceed in any cause

It was the princiwithout his authority and permission.
pal function of the original writ to give that permission.
With us, on the contrary, the judicial power has always in
fact been an independent co-ordinate branch of government; and the Constitutions adopted after the Declaration
of Independence only recognized and emphasized that fact.
It never required any special license or authority from
any executive, by way of original writ or otherwise, to exThe proceedings in England under
ercise its functions.
the original writ are, therefore, no safe criterion for us
in our practice.
In our practice, a simple writ of summons, or a capias
ad respondendum, a form of proceeding derived to us, from
the English King's Bench, was the usual mode for the
commencement of suits; and these two, which were in form
executive, and not judicial writs, although actually issued
by the courts, took the place of the old original writ. But in
neither practice was it sought to have, or was it supposed
that there could properly be, any pleadings whatever, until
both parties, the defendant as well as the plaintiff, were
in court; and the plaintiff's cause of action, although in the
summons or capias, and in the memorandum or praecipe
given to the clerk of the court, as the preliminary to the
issue of the process, it was to a certain extent indicated,
was never formerly stated in the shape of a declaration
until after the appearance of the defendant in court in
response to the summons or capias.
But a very radical departure from ancient usage, and
from the former usage of our own jurisdiction, was effected, when, by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1863,
Chap. 91 (12 Stat. 762), the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia was established, with power given to it in the
act of its creation " to establish such rules as it might
deem necessary for the regulation of the practice of the
several courts organized by the act, and from time to time
to revise and alter sucli rules;" and when, soon after its
new rules of
organization, it accordingly promulgated
pleading and practice to be observed in the conduct of legal
proceedings thereafter to bo instituted in that court. The
radical character of these rules with reference to the ante
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is well recognized by counsel in the statement advanced in argument, that if their validity had been
properly tested in due time after their promulgation, thoy
would not have stood the ordeal of judicial scrutiny. But
this argument is not further insisted on than in the
point made in the brief of counsel for the appellee, that
rules of court cannot be permitted to contravene common
With reference to this, however, it is sufficient to
right.
say here that ordinarily there can be no such thing as a
common right in the retention of existing rules of pleadCourts have made these, and courts
ing and practice.
may unmake them, especially under legislative authority
Alterations in the code of civil
given for the pur^Dose.
procedure must be assumed to have been made, as they are
no doubt always intended to be made, for the better administration of the substantive law, and not to impair individual right. Certainly the change in the civil procedure of the
District of Columbia effected by tlie promulgation of the
rules of the Supreme Court of the District in 1863, being in
line with the general modification of the ancient practice
before and afterwards effected in other parts of our
country, and now, it is believed, become universal throughout the United States, can not well be said to be antagonistic to common right, when the common sentiment everywhere has demanded the change.
cedent practice

**********

Under these rules, as thus modified, it has become the
settled practice for the marshal to make return of all writs
of summons placed in his hands for service at or before the
('X})iration of twenty days. If he makes actual service of
the writ, he returns it forthwith with the indorsement that
he has so served it.
the marshal holds the

If

the defendant cannot be found,
writ for twenty days and then returns it into the clerk's office, with the indorsement thereon
that the defendant is ''not to be found." In either case
Ihe writ by the return becomes functus officio. In the
•3vent tliat it has not been served, it cannot be taken out
again for actual service — a new writ or alias must be resortcf] to for tluit ])nr))Ose. Now, the question is presented
A'hetiier, under the rules of the Supreme Court of the DisIrict of Columbia, as they now exist and as they existed
when the present proceedings were instituted, in order to
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keep a suit alive and to prevent a discontinuance,

successive ^^'Tits of summons without intermission must be issued until actual service is had upon the defendant, each
successive writ to bear teste and to be issued on the date
of the return of its predecessor into the office of the clerk

of the court.
It is not apparent to us what good puriK)se is to be subserved by the continuous and uninterrupted issue of writs
of summons in periods of twenty days, when they cannot
be actually served, and it is perfectly well known to the
plaintiff that they cannot be served, on account of the absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction or for some
A rule of practice that would reother sufficient cause.
quire such continuous issue of process might well become
an intolerable burden, in consequence of the utterly useless
trouble and the unnecessary costs to which the parties might
be put, and which would be of no possible benefit to anyone.

Such process might have to be continued for years, with
the result merely of incumbering the clerk's dockets and the
records of the courts with entries of conspicuous inutility.
When a defendant has gone out of the jurisdiction within
the period allowed for suit by the Statute of Limitations,
and a plaintiff thereafter has brought his suit in due time,
in order to prevent the accruing of the bar of the statute,
as he is undoubtedly entitled to do, there would be neither
justice nor sense in requiring him to have writs constantly
The time
issued periodically until the defendant returns.
of such return being indefinite, the result upon litigation
"Wlien the plaintiff is a trustee,
would be prohibitory.
executor, administrator, guardian, or something of the kind,
and sues in his representative or fiduciary capacity, and it
is not only his right, but perhaps his duty to sue, which
he may not avoid without grave responsibility, a very grave
burden is placed upon him, and a very great impediment is
interposed to his assertion of just right, if he is compelled
at the same time to incur the penalty of indefinite and
interminable costs before the defendant is actually served
with process. We cannot think that the law requires anything so unreasonable.

**********

Undoubtedly, as opposed to the useless incumbrance of
unserved and unser^^able writs and the risk of liability for
T. p.— 3

34
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indefinite and unascertainable costs on the one side, there
is the danger on the other side that, if snits were permitted
for a long time to lie dormant by the failure to have notice
given to defendants when such notice could well be given,
these latter might be greatly and wrongfully prejudiced
by being brought into court long after the subject matter
of controversy has passed out of their minds, when perliaps
witnesses are dead and testimony lost, and yet the Statute
*
*
*
of Limitations might not be available as a defense.

**********

The suing out of successive writs of summons at interN'als of twenty days, each writ to bear teste as of the date
of the return of its predecessor into the clerk's office by the
marshal, is the only mode pointed out to us, and apparently
the only mode that can be pointed out, to effect the actual
continuance of process in the present case. But in the rules
of the Supreme Court of the District we find no requirement
for any such continuance. Those rules, in fact, are entirely
silent on the subject; and we are apparently remitted to the
But the common law fur])ractice of the common law.
nishes no guide, and, in our opinion, no analogy even, for
As we
the determination of such a case as the present.
have seen, the practice under the original writ in England
affords no analogy; and, as we think has been sufficiently
shown, a requirement for the continuous issue of successive writs, when those writs cannot be served, is unreasonable. We are advised that the usage under the rules
of the Supreme Court of the District for upwards of thirtylive years, that is, practically during the whole period of its
existence, has been to the reverse of the contention that a
continuous issue of successive writs is necessary in order to
keep a cause alive, when the first writ has been returned
*
*
*
without actual service on the defendant.
On the
—
contrary the ])ractice has been quite the reverse namely,
that after the return of the first writ that the defendant cannot be found, no second or cdias writ is required, until actual
service can be had. And that this has been the practice, we
understand to be conceded, at all events not to be denied
by the appellee; and it seems to be sufficiently established.
It may Ix; that this ])ra('tice or usage is justly amenable
to the criticism that it does not conform to the rigid rule
of continuity and to the doctrine of continuances as applied
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iu the old common law. But we think that the radical
change in the law of procedure effected by the rules of
the Supreme Court of the District had the effect of dispensing with the requirement of actual continuances in tlie matter of the service of original process to bring a defendant
before the court, after one writ had been issued and returned without effect; and that, at the utmost, all that
could reasonably be required in such a case would be the
entry of fictitious continuances on the record to be made
whenever a writ could be actually issued mth effect, in
accordance with what is understood to have been the practice of the English courts in analogous cases. The making
of fictitious entries, however, is not appropriate in our
American practice ; and it is understood that in the cases
in which they are authorized in England, they are wholly
dispensed wn^th and are unnecessaiy in our legal procedure.
We are not to be understood to be holding that the law
in regard to continuances is not yet in force. On the contrary, we regard it as yet fully in force in many cases ; and
it has been so held. Gait v. Todd, 5 App. D. C. 350 ; Crumhaugli V. Otterhack, 20 D. C. 434; Thompson v. Beveridge,
Mackey, 170. But wherever it has been held that continuance is necessary, actual continuance is meant. There is no
place in our system for the entry of fictitious continuances.
Nicholls V. Fearson, 2 Cranch C. C. Rep. 526 ; Banli v. Brent,
2 Cranch C. C. Rep. 538; Baker v. French, 2 Cranch C. C.
Rep. 539; Thompson v. Beveridge, 3 Mackey, 170.
But the usage which we regard as* having become a rule
of practice under the code of rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court of the District, has its limitations. That
usage has already been stated to be, that when, upon a
declaration at common law, filed in that court, a writ of
summons has been issued, and has been duly returned by
the marshal with the return that the defendant cannot be
found, no further writs are required to be issued in order
to keep the suit alive, until the defendant can actually be
found and a writ can actually be ser\'ed upon him. But
it follows that, when the defendant can be found and the
writ can actually be served upon him, it then becomes necessary' to follow up the proceeding by the issue of a writ
to be actually served; and if the plaintiff fails to have a
3
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writ issued in due time for such actual
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incurs

risk of having his suit discontinued.

It

is open to a defendant, when service of process has
been improperly and unduly delayed, to show, upon a motion to vacate the writ, when it has actually been issued,
that there has been discontinuance in consequence of failure to have it issued in due time. The writ will be presumed to have been duly issued and duly served, until the
contrary is shown; but actual discontinuance of the suit
may be made to appear, upon affidavit or otherwise to the
satisfaction of the court. And when such actual discontinuance has been made to appear, the court may properly
vacate the writ which has been served upon the defendant,
and discontinue the cause, and remit the plaintiff to a new
action, if he chooses to avail himself of it.

**********

Suits at common law, which have been duly commenced
by tlie filing of a declaration and the issue of process
thereunder, cannot thereafter be permitted to remain indefinitely within the control of the plaintiff alone. The suit
should be effectively prosecuted in good faith, or dismissed.
Due diligence in such prosecution is an essential requirement on the part of the plaintiff. If that due diligence is
wanting, effect should be given to the rule of law that works
But under the code of proa discontinuance of the suit.
cedure of the Supreme Court of the District, that question of due diligence is a question of fact to be shown to
the court by the proper proof. This was not done in the
present case ; and we think that it was error to vacate the
writ without such proof.
The cause will be remanded to the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, with din^ctions to vacate or rescind
the order vacating the alias writ of summons issued in the
cause, and to vacate all the orders and proceedings had in
the cause subsequent thereto; and with directions further
to pemiit the defendant to renew her motion to vacate said
alias writ, if slie so desires.^
1 In Johnson v. Mead
"An examina(1885) 58 Mich. 70, the court said:
tion of the authorities will show that the continuance roll for a long time
came to he ni^^.irdod very much as a matter of form, although it is said in
Bonie cases, if the ol)ject is to prevent the statute of limitations from running, a strict compliance should Ixi shown. We have no statute upon the
suhject, but the effect of continuing the suit by the successive issuing of writs
has always been regarded as an arrest of the running of the statute when
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done in good faith with the intent of prosecuting the suit.
Plowell v. Shepard,
* *
48 Mich. 472
*In this case the record shows the longest interval between
the filing of one writ and the issuing of the other was two days; and inasmuch
as the return and filing of the one was precedent to the issuing of the other,
we Bee nothing unreasonable in the time taken for issuing the pluries writ.
It must be regarded as sufficiently regular to save the running of the statute
'
against the plaintiff 's claim. '

CHAPTER

11.

SERVICE AND RETURN OF SUMMONS.
Section

1.

Personal Service.

McKENZIE V. BOYNTON.
Supreme

Court of North Dakota.
19

FiSK,

North Dakota,

1910.

531,

J.

When the owner of the property is a resident of this state
the statute requires personal service to be made on him
of the notice of the expiration of time for redemption.
It is respondent's contention, and the trial court so held,
that the stipulated facts fail to show a compliance witli
the statute in this respect.
In this we think they are correct. It is not contended by appellant that personal service
of such notice was in fact made ; the contention merely being that the stipulated facts show the equivalent of personal service. In this they are in error. The delivery by
the sheriff of a copy of such notice to W. J. Freede, an
employee at the Sheridan House, falls far short of personal
For all that is contained in the
service upon McKenzie.
alleged proof of such service McKenzie may have been
actually in his room in said hotel at the time the Sheriff
left with said employee the copy of the notice. The personal
service required by the statute must, we think, be made in
the manner of making personal service of a summons as provided by section 6888. Kev. Codes 1905. That section so
far as applicable, r(>ads as follows: "The summons shall be
served by delivering a copy thereof as follows;
(7]
III all other cases, to the defendant personally, and if the
df'feiidant cannot conveniently be found, by leaving a copv
tlierc'of nt liis dwelliTig house in the presence of one or more
of his family over the age of fourteen years; or if the de
fondant resides in the family of another, with one of the

*****
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members of the family in which he resides over the ago
(if fourteen years. Service made in any of the modes provided in this section shall be taken and held to be personal
* * *"
Plaintiff had no family nor was he residservice.
ing in the family of another within the meaning of the
statute. His residence was at a public hotel; hence the
service which, under the statute, would be valid and binding on him could be made only by delivering to him personally the notice required. For like reasons the attempted
substituted service by registered mail, even if the proof
thereof was complete, is utterly unavailing. As said by this
court in Bank v. Holmes, 12 N. D. 38, 94 N. W. 764; '^The
term 'personal service' has a fixed and definite meaning in
law. It is service by delivery of the writ to the defendant
personally.^ Other modes of service may be given the force
of such service by legislative enactment. But the use of the
words 'personal service,' unqualified, in a statute means
actual service by delivering to the person, and not to a
proxy"— citing Hohhy v. Bunch, 83 Ga. 1, 10 S. E. 113, 20
Am. St. Rep. 301. See also 19 Encyc. PI. & Pr. 613, 630 et
seq. ; 32 Cyc. 448, 457, and cases cited. See also R. I. Hospital Trust Co. V. Keencij, 1 N. D. 411, 48 N. W. 341. * * *

lln

the absence of any statutory provision on the subject, it was held in
V. Shattuck, (1855) 16 111. 299, that personal service must be by reading
Delivery of a copy is not sufficient.
the writ to the defendant.
Law v
Grommes, (1895) 158 111. 492, 41 N."E. 1080.

Ball

KROTTER

& CO.

V. NORTON.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
84

1909,

Nebraska, 137.

Epperson, C.

Plaintiff instituted

an action in equity to foreclose a
'■battel mortgage given by the defendant, G. W. Norton, to
])laintiff upon a frame dwelling house and frame barn situate on land in the possession of mortgagor under a five
year lease.
The mortgagor and his wife were made defendants, and a summons was issued in which they were
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named as '*G. W. Norton and wife, Mrs. G. W. Norton."
The return of the sheriff showed personal service. * *
* * *
Still later and upon default of defendants, the court
rendered a decree of foreclosure, and directed a sale of the
mortgaged property for the satisfaction of plaintiff's debt.
After the sheriff had sold the property, but before confirmation, the defendants filed an application to set aside the
sale,^

* * *

Objection is made that there was no personal service of
summons upon Mrs. Norton. It appears from the testimony of the sheriff that the summons was not served by
the actual delivery of a copy thereof into the hand of Mrs.
Norton, but such service is not necessary to constitute personal service. According to Mrs. Norton's own testimony,
we are convinced that there was personal service of the
summons upon her.
At the time of the service of the
summons and the notice of application for injunction, she
testified that the sheriff came to their home and into the
room where she and her husband were; that the sheriff

it

is

it,

it

is

it

it,

read the papers aloud, both the notice and the summons, in
the presence of both defendants ; that she heard them read ;
that the sheriff handed the two papers to her husband,
saying one of them was for the husl)and and one for the
wife ; that she knew that there was a paper left there for her,
and that she was named therein as the wife of George W.
Norton. At the time Mrs. Norton told the sheriff that she did
not know what he summoned her for; that she did not sign
any papers, nor have any dealings with the plaintiff. Her
testimony is corroborated by her husband, also by the
sheriff, except the latter testified that he laid the papers intended for Mrs. Norton upon the table, at which she was
employed all the time he was there, attending to the breakfast dishes. As we view
immaterial whether the
sheriff laid the papers intended for Mrs. Norton upon the
table or handed them to her husband. Whichever
was,
was done in Mrs. Norton's presence, with full knowledge
on her part that one of the copies of each paper was intended for her. She so understood
and was as fully informed as tliough the sheriff had actually delivered the
papers into her own hands. This
clearly distinguishable
1

Thi'^ was ajijiarc'iitly (jratitefl, though the report
and the appeal was taken from this order.

does

not expressly say so,
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from Holliday v. Brown, 33 Neb. 657, in which it appears
that the wife was not present, and knew nothing of the attempted service of the summons upon her. If the actual
delivery into the hand of a defendant is necessary to constitute personal service, one might effectively and forever
avoid service of process by refusing to disclose her true
name, and by refusing to take a copy of a summons into her

**********

hands.

We recommend that the judgment of the district court be
reversed.
By the Court: For the reasons given in the foregoing
opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed and
this cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.

BOGGS V.

INTER-AMERICAN MINING AND SMELTING COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
105

1907.

Maryland, 371.

ScHMucKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first of the cross appeals in this case is by William
R. Boggs, the plaintiff below, from an order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City striking out upon terms a
final judgment theretofore rendered in his favor against
* * *
the Inter- American Mining and Smelting Company.
Tliie Mining Company was incorporated in the District
of Columbia, but for some time prior to March 7th, 1906,
its office, where its records were kept and from which its
general business was transacted was in the Calvert Building in Baltimore, and during that time H. C. Turnbull, Jr.,
who did business in Baltimore City and resided in Baltimore County, was president of the corporation. During
the time that the company was thus located in Baltimore
City, its president, purporting to act in its behalf, employed the plaintiff, Boggs, as a mining engineer at a salary of $200 per month and personal and traveling expenses.
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28th, 1906, Boggs sued the company in the Superior Court to recover his salary and expenses for October, November, and December, 1905, and January, 1906,
amounting in the aggregate to $1,188. The suit was brought
under and in conformity to the Rule Day Acts in force in

On

Ma}^

Baltimore City, and the defendant having been returned
summoned, and having failed to appear to the action or
plead, judgment by default was entered against it on June
27th, 1906. On the same day the judgment by default was
duly extended for $1,188 and costs.

*****

P. M. Gober, a deputy sheriff of Baltimore
City, then testified that having been directed to serve the
writ in the case upon Mr. Turnbull he went over to the
Calvert Building and asked Turnbull if he was one of the
officers of the company, and he replied that he was not, but
To the best of witness'
had formerly been its president.
he
knew
recollection Turnbull said that
the plaintiff Boggs
The
and would like to see him get what was due him.
deputy reported this interview to the sheriff, who told him
to serve the writ on Turnbull, as he was one of the directors
and the deputy went back to do it but Turnbull shut the door
in his face and would not let him serve it. The deputy further swore that he explained his object to Mr. Turnbull and
the latter saw the writ, and said he was doing what he
could to get Mr. Boggs righted in the matter, or something
He, the deputy, did not read the writ to Mr.
to that effect.
Turnbull, but he explained it to him and Turnbull looked
at the writ.
Thatcher Bell, another deputy sheriff, testified that he
was told by the sheriff to go over to the Calvert Building
and serve the writ on Mr. Turnbull, that Gober had not
Witness went over to Turnbeen able to get a service.
hull's office with the copies ready to serve and said to
Turnbull, '*! have a paper to serve on you." Turnbull
said, "I know what you have," and started to go out. Witness reached for Turnbull with the copies and when the
latter kept running, he commenced to read them, but Turnbull got into the next room and slammed the door. Witness
then laid the copies on the table and returned to the sheriff's office. He left the copies of the narr., notice to plead,
anil wi'il in this case on the table in Turnbull's office. Mr.
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TurnbuU was put on the stand and his account then given
of the vists of the two deputy sheriffs to him substantially
corrofDorated tlieir testimony except he denied that he
said to the deputy Bell that he knew what he had or that
he (TurnbuU) saw or looked at the writ.
There was also
to
evidence tending
show that Mr. TurnbuU never reported
the service of the writ on him to the company or took any
steps himself looking to a defense of the action, and that
the motion had been promptly made by the company when
it learned of the suit and judgment.
Assuming that TurnbuU was a proper person upon whom
to serve the writ and other papers, we are indisposed
to consume much time in discussing the sufficiency of the
service. It is apparent from the evidence that TurnbuU
was fully informed as to the institution of the suit by Boggs
against the company and the desire of the sheriff to summon the company b}- serving the papers on him as one of
its directors and knew that the deputy was about to make
that service when he attempted to elude him and evade the
service by running out of the room and slamming the
door in the officer's face.
Neither he nor the company
he represented, if he did represent it for the purpose of the
service, can be permitted to set up such a state of facts in
He
support of the motion to strike out the judgment.
well
have
in
remained
his office and put his fingers
might as
in his ears while the deputy read the writ to him, and then
claim to be without information as to its contents or purDefendants have frequently sought to evade or depose.
feat service of process upon them by flight or refusal to
accept the process handed them by the serving officer
but the courts have held such efforts futile. Davison v.
Baker, 24 How. Prac. 42; Slaught v. Bobbins, 13 N. J. L.
349 ; Borden v. Borden, 63 Wis. 377; Baker v. Carrecton, 32
Me. 334.
The laws of this state do not prescribe precisely how a
summons shall be served upon an individual defendant.
The service must be a personal one, 2 Poe, Pleading and
Practice, section 62, but the sheriff is not required to read
the writ to the defendant, although it is usual for him to
read it or explain its nature and leave a copy of it with
the person served. Sees. 409 to 412 of Art. 23 of the Code
provide for service of process upon corporations.
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The court below in our opinion acquired jurisdiction over the defendant in this suit by the service of the
process upon its resident director, Mr. TurnbuU.
Order striking out the judgment reversed with costs.

Section

2.

Substituted Service.

BARWICK V. ROUSE.
Supreme Court of Florida.
53

Cockrell, J.

Florida,

1907.

643.

The action is in assumpsit on promissory
notes and the return of the sheriff upon the summons ad respondendum is as follows: "The within summons came to
hand this 21st day of February, 1906, J. W. Smith, sheriff,
and executed on the 22nd. day of February, 1906, by delivering a true copy on Mrs. Melvina Barwick, the wife of
the within named Jnraes M. Barwick, this 24th day of February, 1906. J. W. Smith, Sheriff of said Wakulla couniy,
Fla." The summons was returnable March 5, 1906, on
which day a default for want of appearance was entered,
reciting that service was had February 24th. On the April
rules, no alias summons having been issued, a judgment
final was entered reciting that the defendant had failed to
appear at the March rules, and had further failed to plead,
answer, or demur.
The question, therefore, is, does the return of the sheriff
show sufficient service upon James M. Barwick, to bring
him into court in invituni, there being no amendment or
offer to amend the return and tliere being nothing in iiie
return of a voluntary appearance?
Aa ancillary thereto
it may be asked if the defects are such as to avail upon this
appeal.

:

Undoubtedly if the actual date of the service on Mrs.
Barwick was the 24th day of February, as recited by the
clerk, it was too late for the return day of the summons, it
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not being '' served at least ten (10) days before the rule
day." This, however, is not a fair construction of the
language; it is evident that the service was made on the
22nd., while the return was endorsed on the 24th.
The serious defect, however, is in the statement of the
manner and place of service.
The statute, Revised Statutes of 1892, section 1015, provides that "service of the
original writ or summons shall be effected by reading the
writ or summons to the person to be served or by delivering
him a copy thereof or leaving such copy at his usual place
of abode with some person of the family above fifteen
years of age, and informing such person of the contents
thereof." A cursory inspection of the return will disclose
several particulars wherein this statute was not complie^^
with. Service was not made upon the person to be served,
but a copy was delivered to his wife ; where such copy was
delivered does not appear; non constat the sheriff may
have met her in Georgia, where she was living apart from
her husband, and not "at his usual place of abode in Wakulla county, Florida, with some person of his family above
fifteen years of age." It does not necessarily follow that
because Mrs. Melvina Barwick is the wife of James M. Barwick that she is a member of his family at his usual place of
abode and above fifteen years of age.
Again, when another than the defendant himself is served, the law is not
satisfied by merely delivering a true copy of the writ. It is
further required that such other person be informed of the
contents tliereof. This provision is not mere idle words,
but is founded wisely, and must be given effect.
We do not intend to hold that every criticism we have
made upon this return is separtely to be taken as a decision
that the defect pointed out would necessarily render the
judgment void upon collateral attack, but there is a duty
upon those charged with the entry of judgments before a
clerk to see that there has been at least substantial compliance with the statute necessary to bring the defendant
into court. We do hold that the return here is fatally defective and that tlie judgment based thereon will be set
aside.
The defendant lias, however, subjected himself to tlie
jurisdiction of the court by prosecuting this writ of error,
and further process is as to him unnecessary.
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The other assignments will not be considered.
The judgment is reversed.

Shackleford, C. J., and Whitfield, J., concur.
Taylor, Hooker, and Parkhill, J., concur in the opin

J

ion.

Section

3.

Constructive Service.

HARNESS V. CRAVENS.
Supreme

Court of Missouri.
126

1894.

Missouri, 233.

lived in Barton county; had lived there
some seventeen years, having previously lived in Newton
county five years or more on a farm, all in cultivation. That
farm consisted of a piece of ground, to-wit: The southwest quarter of the northeast quarter, and the west half
of the southeast quarter, less ten acres off the west side
thereof (seventy acres) all in section 7, township 24, range
29.
The portion in litigation is the seventy acres, which
has a house and orchard on it.
The plaintiff

In March,

**********

Harness paid the taxes on the land for
the year 1888, and took a recipt therefor, from Gracy, the
collector in the tax suit controversy, and when in the collector's office on that occasion, Harness says he "called
for all the taxes against the land." That suit was begui»
September 14, 1889, and was for the taxes on the lana lor
the year 1886, a duly certified tax bill accompanying the
petition, which alleged defendant to be a non-resident of
1889,

the state. An affidavit as to non-residency was also made.
On the filing of the petition a summons was issued, and
the sheriff having returned non est on the writ, publication

was made, etc. Judgment was rendered in the suit thus instituted, July 11, 1891. Execution was issued August 24, 1891,
and on September 24 next thereafter a sale of the land in
controversy occurred, at which the defendant became the
purchaser at the i»vir'f of twenty-five dollars.
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On hearing of the sale of his land, plaintiff applied to
defendant for permission to redeem
but defendant refused to do so, whereupon plaintiff instituted the present
proceeding, in January, 1892, to cancel the sheriff's deed
cloud on plaintiff's
made to defendant as aforesaid, as
title and for other and further relief.
a

**********

of

a

1.

As appears from the record in this
Sherwood, J. —
cause, the plaintiff herein, the defendant in the back tax
non-resident of the state.
suit, was proceeded against as
The petition alleged his non-residence and so did the accompanying affidavit. But, instead of taking out an order
publication before the clerk in vacation as authorized by

is

it

;

a

it

a

is

a

a

section 2022, Revised Statutes, 1889,
summons was issued
to Harness returnable to the next November term.
That
summons was returned non est, October 25, 1889. This
non est return was followed by an order of publication
based on that return, and then judgment by default took
place at the May term, 1891, followed by
sale and sheriff's deed to defendant Cravens, September 24, 1891.
As will be seen by sections 2013 and 2023, Revised Statsummons in such cases
utes, 1889,
only authorized to
issue against
resident defendant. And
provided in
section 2024 that when summons has been properly issued
and return of non est made thereon, then the court, being
first satisfied that the defendant cannot be found, makes
an order of publication as required in section 2022.
Of
course such an order of publication made in the circumstances mentioned would recite, among otL
things, the
fact
that
issuance of the summons, and the
the defendant
could not he found, etc. because the court could not make
this class of publication unless "in conjunction with the
return," and
must be "founded thereon." State ex rel.
V. Finn, 87 Mo. 310.^
iThe statutes involved are as follows: "Sec 2022. Orders of Publication.
suits in partition, divorce, attachment, suits for the foreclosure of
mortgages and deeds of trust, and for the enforcement of mechanics' liens,

— In

all other liens against either real or personal property, and in all actions
at law or in equity, which have for their immediate object the enforcement
or establishment of any lawful right, claim or demand to or against any real
or personal property within the jurisdiction of the court, if the plaintiff or
other person for him shall all(?ge in his petition, or at the time of filing the
same, or at any time thereafter shall file an affidavit stating, that part or all
of the defendants are not residents of the state, or
a corporation of another
state, kingdom or country, and cannot be served in this stat« in the manner
is

and
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So that here we have presented a defendant sued as a
'lon-resideni , summons issued against him as a resident,
and publication issued against him as a resident who could
not he found. In short, the order of publication was a clear
departure from the allegations of the petition and affidavit.
The issuance of the summons was, therefore, unwarranted
by the statute, and the publication, being based thereon,
necessarily partook of the writ's inceptional infirmity, and
this is so, because, in the language of Mr. Justice Field,
"the court is not authorized to exert its power in that way."

Windsor v. McVeagh, 93 U. S. 283.
This doctrine is abundantly established, that, where a
mode of securing jurisdiction differing from that of the
common law is prescribed by statute, nothing less than a
rigid and exact compliance with the statute is an indispensable requisite to obtaining jurisdiction, 1 Elliott's Gen.
Prac, sec. 247. Thus in Granger v. Judge, 4:4: Mich. 384,
Campbell, J., says :
''Where cases and proceedings are not according to the
usual course, and are special in their character, they are
held void on slighter grounds than regular suits, because
the courts have not the same power over their records to
So, where there has been no personal service
within the jurisdiction, the doctrine prevails that proceedings not conforming to tlie statutes are void. But this is
on the ground that there has been no service whatever,
and the party, therefore, has not been notified, in any proThe purpose of the statutory
per way, of anything.
correct them.

prescribed in this chapter, or have absconded or absented themselves from their
usual place of abode in this state, or that they have concealed themselves so
that the ordinary j)rocess of law can not be served upon them, the court in
which said suit is brought, or in vacation the clerk thereof, shall make an
order directed to the non-residents or absentees, notifying them of the commencement of the suit, and stating briefly the object and general nature of
the iietition, and, in suits in partition, describing the property sought to be
partitioned, and requiring such defendant or defendants to appear on a day
to be named
therein and answer the petition, or that the petition will be
in any case there shall not he sufficient time to make
taken as coiifcF^ed.
jHiblication to the first tei-m, the order shall be made returnable to the next
term thorenfter, thnt will allow sufficient time for such publication.
' '
in such case, part or
Sec. 202.3.
Process against resident defendajits.—
the defendants are residents of the state, process shall be issued against them
afl in other cases.
"Hec. 2024.
Pvblication to issiie on return of non est. — When, in any of
in section 2022, summons ^hall be issued against any dethe caHCB cont;iine<l
fendant, and the sheriff to whom it is directed shall make return that the
defendnnt or dffcndants cannot be found, the court, being first satisfied that
process cannot be served, shall make an order as is required in said section."

If

If
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methods is to furnish means from which notice may possibly or probably be obtained. But, as a court acting oucside of its jurisdiction is not recognized as entitled to obedience, the special statutory methods stand entirely on thenown regularity, and, if not regular, cannot be said to have
been conducted under the statutes. The distinction is obvious and is not imaginary."
In a case which arose in Alabama, Brickell, C. J., observes: "The statute not only defines the cases in which the
court may take jurisdiction of non-resident or absent defendants, but it appoints and orders the mode of proceeding against them, and declares the effect of the decree rendered, if they do not appear and defend. The jurisdiction
and authority, like all jurisdiction and authority derived
from, and depending upon statute, must be taken a'nd accepted with all the limitations and restrictions the statute
These restrictions and limitacreating it may impose.
tions the courts are bound to observe; they cannot be disl^ensed with, however much they may seem to embarass, or
however unnecessary they- may seem to be in the administration of justice in particular cases. The statute is in derogation of the common law, is an essential departure from
the forms and modes a court of equit}" pursues ordinarily,
and must be strictly construed. Proceedings under it must
be closely watched, or it may become an instrument for the
infliction of irreparable wrongs upon defendants to whom
notice is imputed bv construction." Sayre v. Land Co., 73

Ala.

85.

On this point. Wade says: "As this manner of serving
process depends for its validity more upon its strict conformity to the statute by which it is authorized than upon
any inherent probability of its couve^'ing intelligence of
the impending suit to the party whose rights are to be
affected, the fact tliat it has actually come to the knowledge
of defendant cannot be shov;n to supply any material deviation in the publi(;atioii fi'om what the statute ])rescribes.
The statute, being in derogation of common law, is always
strictly construed," Law of Notice (2 Ed.) sec. 1030.
This is the vrell settled doctrine of this court, as shown
Thus, in Sfeicart v. Stringer, 41
in numerous instances.
Mo. 400, it was ruled that where the statute provides for
constructive service of process, the terms and conditions
T. P.— 4
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prescribed for such service must be strictly complied with.
A striking exemplification of this principle is afforded
by ScheJl v. Leland, 45 Mo. 289. There, the statute, 2 Wagner's Stat., p. 1008, sec. 13, was the same as section 2022,
supra. There, the plaintiff, seeking to enforce a mechanic's
lien, filed his petition and had summons issued in the ordinary way, which was returned non est, Thereupon he
made affidavit before the clerk in vacation, of the defendant's non-residency, who, on such affidavit, r-.-^ued an order
of publication which was followed by a judgment. Speaking of this proceeding and of its insiiffjeiency, Wagner, J.,
observed: ''The order can only be made by strictly complying with the statute; for. in all cases where constructive
notice is substituted for actual notice, strict compliance is
The section contemplates and directs that the
required.
authorize the publication shall be either stated
which
facts
in the petition, or an affidavit embodying them shall be filed
at the commencement of the suit. This was not done in
this case, and, therefore, no order was allowable in vaca
tion under the foregoing section. The fifteenth section of
the same act enacts that when, in any of the cases contained
in the thirteenth section, summons shall be issued against
any defendant, and the sheriff to whom it is directed shall
make return that the defendant or defendants cannot be
found, the court, being first satisfied that process cannot
be served, shall make an order as required in the thirteenth
section. But this section gives no countenance to the proceeding in the case at bar. It does not authorize an order
of publication in vacation at all, but intends that it shall be
made by the court at the regular return term. I conclude,
therefore, that the publication was a nullity."
It will be noticed that the principal difference between
the case just instanced and the one at bar, is that there
the summons was issued first, returned non est and followed by the affidavit and publication, while here, the affidavit was made first, followed by the unauthorized issuance
of the summons, return thereon, etc.
In Quigley v. Bank, 80 Mo. 289, an order of publication
was held invalid because the affidavit against unknown
parties, under the ])rovisions of section 3499, now section
2027, was sworn to by the attorney for plaintiff, instead of
by the plaintiff himself, that section requiring that the
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plaintiff should make the oath, therein differing from section 2022, where the oath may be made by the ''plaintiff or
some person for him," which difference was in that case

pointed out.
So in State ex rel. v. Staley, 76 Mo. 158, where the petition did not set forth the interests of the unknown parties,
nor did the order of publication do so, as required by
section 2027, it was ruled that, in consequence, no jurisdiction was acquired over such unknown parties.
In Charles v. Morrow, 99 Mo. 638, a similar ruling was
made in similar circumstances on the same section of the
statute last aforesaid, and the principle was there reiterated that, "In all cases where constructive or substituted
service is had in lieu of that which is personal, there must
be a strict compliance with statutory provisions and condi-

tions."
The more recent case of Wilson v. Railroad, 108 Mo.

588,

confirms the views on this subject heretofore expressed
in other cases: "Mere notice of service, not according to
law, brings no one into court, nor does mere knowledge on
the part of the party notified, of the pending proceedings
have any more valid effect. P olivine's Appeal, 31 Conn.
381; Smith Merc. Law, 322."

It

**********

cannot be doubted that the lower court would have
been justified in disregarding the issuance and return of the
summons, and in proceeding to order publication on the
allegation of non-residency; this it did not do; its whole
action was based on the writ and its return, which course
On the contrary,
was wholly unsanctioned by the statute.
right in the teeth of the allegations of non-residency contained both in the petition and affidavit, the trial court
made an order of publication adapted alone to the case
of a resident who cannot be found.
It will not do to say that the unauthorized order of
publication would be just at likely to apprise the then defendant of the suit against him as if he had been proceeded
against according to the specific method prescribed by law,
because if this were all that is required, then a printed
circular or letter sent out by the clerk would answer the
The test is,
end and accomplish the purpose just as well.
was the method used in the given instance the one pre-
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scribed by the statute?
If the answer is in the negative,
that answer, without more, condemns the method employed,
and announces its nullity. Whether that method actually
The end
notified the party, is of no importance whatever.
of the law has been attained when, and only when, its
forms have been observed. Wade on the Law of JSotice,
and Brown on Jurisdiction, supra.
Of course, if the order of publication, by reason of the
facts aforesaid, is to be deemed invalid, then the judgment grounded thereon must share the same fate and fall
with it. And the writ of summons and the order of publication being part of the record, are competent witnesses of
that judgment's invalidity, and by them it can be impeached collaterally. Laney v. Garhee, 105 Mo. 355, and

cited; Russell v. Grant, 122 Mo. 161.
Since the judgment thus rendered must be regarded as
null, of course the defendant acquired no title in consequence of the sale which occurred under the execution
which issued on the judgment. 1 Freem. on Judgments, section 117. On this ground alone, the decree should be afcases

firmed.

[Gantt, p. J., filed

a

dissenting opinion.]

D'AUTREMONT V. ANDERSON IRON
Supreme

Court of Minnesota.
104

Browk,

CO.

1908,

Minnesota, 165.

J.

Proceedings to register title to real property under the
Torrens system of land transfer. Respondent Gaylord had
judgment confirming an asserted interest in the land, and
applicants appealed.
The sole question involved is whether the court acquired
* * *
.iurisdiction of George W. Leslie in the partition suit
The summons in that action was served by publication, and,
as already mentioned, designated "George H. Leslie" as
defendant. It is the contention of appellant that the error
in the name, the use of the initial "H" instead of "W",
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was an irregularity not going to the jurisdiction of the
court; while respondent contends that the error was fatal,
and the publication of the summons conferred no jurisdiction upon the court to adjudicate the rights of "George W.

Leslie."

*****

^^d we have

for consideration

the ques-

tion whether the publication of the summons in the form
stated was a valid service thereof upon "George W. Leslie," the real party in interest.
As a general rule the common law recogTiizes but one
Christian name, and failure in judicial or other proceedings in giving the name of the party to state his middle name, or the initial thereof as commonly used, is not
fatal to their validity. But the rule, like most rules of
judicial procedure, is not without exceptions. Steivart v.
Colter, 31 Minn. 385, 18 N. W. 98; State v. Biggins, 60
Minn. 1, 61 N. W. 816, 27 L. R. A. 74, 51 Am. St. 490. It
had its origin during the early times in England, when a
person had but one name, and that his Christian name.
His further identification was indicated by some designated
physical characteristic, place of residence, or deed of valor
or virtue. Even since the adoption of the system of family names, the first or Christian name has been held by the
courts of England as the true name, in legal proceedings,
for the designation of persons ; the middle name or the initial thereof, being regarded as wholly unimportant. The
rule has been followed and applied in j)roceedings both
judicial and extrajudicial in this country, with occasional
exceptions based upon special circumstances.
In all proceedings where an error in the name may be
corrected by appropriate application to the court, or the
particular person may be identified by extrinsic evidence, a
mistake in the name appearing in the proceeding or writing
involved is not ordinarily fatal to its validity. Our statutes, as do the statutes of nearly all the states of this
country, provide for the correction of mistakes in the names
of parties in judicial proceedings. R. L. 1905, Sec. 4157;
Casper v. Klippen, 61 Minn. 353, 63 N. W. 737, 52 Am. St.
604; Kenyan v. Semon, 43 Minn. 180, 45 N. W. 10. In respect to similar mistakes in conveyances of land, mortgages, contracts, or statutory proceedings for the foreclosure of mortgages, the rules of evidence permit the full
and complete identification of parties misnamed by error
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Massillon E. S T. Co. v. Holdridge, 68 Minn.
399 ; Ansley v. Green, 82 Ga. 181, 7 S. E. 921.
Of course, to authorize such amendments in judicial proceedings, the court must have jurisdiction of the parties and
afford them an opportunity to be heard, and in other proceedings those interested in the subject-matter must also be
before the court, with opportunity to be heard on the
question of identity.
It has often been held that the failure in any proceeding, judicial or otherwise, to include the initial of the middle name is unimportant, and not fatal to its validity.
Cleveland v. Peirce, 34 Ind. App. 188, 72 N. E. 604; State v.
Hughes, 31 Tenn. 261; King v. Clarke, 7 Mo. 269. The
rule has been declared otherwise, however, where a wrong
initial is used, particularly in deeds or other instruments
affecting the title to land. A^nbs v. Chicago, St. P. M. S 0.
Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 266, 46 N. W. 321; Burford v. McCue,
53 Pa. St. 427. And there has been a tendency in some of
the courts to break away from the old rule, and to hold the
full true name of all parties essential in all proceedings.
Parker v. Parker, 146 Mass. 321, 15 N. E. 902; Com. v.
Buckley, 145 Mass. 181, 13 N. E. 368; Button v. Simmons,
65 Me. 583, 20 Am. Rep. 729 ; Ming v. Gwatkin, 6 Rand. (Va.)
551; Boiven v. Mulford, 10 N. J. L. 230. In most states it
is held, in both civil and criminal actions, that an omission
or the use of a wrong initial does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court, where the right party is actually served with
process and brought into court. Casper v. Klippen, 61 Minn.
353, 63 N. W. 737, 52 Am. St. 604; 14 Enc. PI. & Pr. 301, and
or mistake.

393, 71

N. W.

cases cited.

There is reason and sound sense in that view of the law
In such case the right party is actually served, and the
error may be corrected without prejudice to any of his
rights.
Only an extremely technical view sustains the
position that in such cases the error is fatal. Casper v.
Klippen, supra, overruling Atwood v. Laridis, 22 Minn. 558,
But should the same liberal view be taken where the de
fendant is only constructively served witli summons, as in
the case at bar, by publication? We tliink not.
The reasons for disregarding the error wliere tliere i ;
personal service u])()n Hie I'ight ]iarty do not ai>ply where
the only ser\ice is by 2)ublication against a non-resident of
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tlie state. In a case of that kind tlie true name of the party
becomes of especial importance. It is well known that there

are numerous persons having the same christian and surname, but with a different middle name, such aa John 0.
Johnson, John A. Johnson, and John M. Johnson, James A.
Green and James E. Green, and they are each identified and
distinguished by the initial of the middle name. It would
be intolerable in the practical affairs of life if persons by
the name of Johnson, Green, or Brown, or even the numerous Jones family, should be required to take notice of
every action brought by the publication of summons iu
which a part of his name appeared as the party defendant. No personal service is made in such cases, and that the
real defendant has knowledge of the pendency of the action
is an inference of tha law only, and the use of a wrong
initial is naturally misleading and likely to result to his
prejudice.
The statute authorizing this form of process is
in derogation of the common law, and the mode prescribed
must be strictly pursued.
Reno, Non-residents, Sec. 190;

Gilmore v. Lampman, 86 Minn. 493, 90 N. W. 1113, 91 Am.
St. 376 ; Duxhury v. Dalile, 78 Minn. 427, 81 N. W. 198, 79
Am. St. 408. This method of acquiring jurisdiction and
adjudicating the rights of parties constitutes due process of law only when the statutes providing therefor have
been fully and completely complied with.
Corson v. Shoemaker, 55 Minn. 386, 388, 57 N. W. 134; Clary v. O'Shea,
72 Minn. 105, 75 N. W. 115, 71 Am. St. 485.
Some of the courts have held that the use of a wrong
initial, or other error in defendant's name, not coming
within the rule of idem sonans, where the summons is
served by publication, is not a compliance with the statute,
and is fatal to the jurisdiction of the court. 66 Cent. Law. J.
338; 14 Enc. PI. & Pr. 302, and cases cited in note; Cleveland V. Peirce, 34 Ind. App. 188, 72, N. E. 604; State v.
Hughes, 31 Tenn. 261 ; King v. Clarke, 7 Mo. 269 ; Fanning
V. Krapfl, 61 Iowa 417, 14 N. W. 727, 16 N. W. 293 ; Enewold
V. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59, 57 N. W. 765, 22 L. R. A. 573, 42 Am.
St. 557; Skelton v. Sackett, 91 Mo. 377, 3 S. W. 874; Freeman V. Hawkins, 77 Tex. 499, 14 S. W. 364, 19 Am. St. 769;
Fitzgerald v. Salentine, 51 Mass. 436; Parker v. Parker,
146 Mass. 320, 15 N. E. 902; Davis v. Steeps, 87 Wis. 472,
58 N. W. 769, 23 L. R. A. 818, 41 Am. St. 51; 1 Black on
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Judgments, Sec. 232. The cases just cited are not all precisely in point, but they are analogous, and bear out the
claim that a service by publication, (where there is a substantial error in the name of the defendant, confers no
jurisdiction on the court. We are not prepared to say that
the mere omission of the middle narne, or the initial thereof,
would wholly nullifj^ the proceedings; but where, as in this
case, there is an attempt to give the full name of the defendant, and a wrong initial is used, it must, in view of
the very common practice of identifying particular individuals by adding their middle name, be held that the
error is misleading, and likely to result in prejudice to
those who may perchance notice the same as published in
the newspaper.
It would be straining the rule requiring a
strict observance of the statute permitting service of
process in this manner to hold an error so likely to mislead
and prejudice an irregularity only.
As bearing upon the question of jurisdiction, numerous instances are reported in the books where errors and defects of
far less significance than the one here presented have been
held to wholly vitiate a judgment based upon this form of
constructive service. In Barber v. Morris, 37 Minn. 194, 33
N. W. 559, 5 Am. St. 836, and Brown v. St. Paul £ N. P. Eij.
Co., 38 Minn. 506, 38 N. W. 698, judgments were held void
on collateral attack for the failure of the plaintiff to file his
affidavit for publication within the time prescribed by
statute. In the first of these cases the affidavit was not filed
until the day of the entry of judgment. In tho second case,
a condemnation proceeding, the affidavit was not filed until
after tlie summons had been published. An affidavit filed
two days after the first publication was held insufficient in
Murphy v. Lyons, 19 Neb. 689, 28 N. W. 328. If the affidavit be technically, in point of substance, not in compliance with the statute, a judgment rendered on service by
publication is void. Carrico v. Tarivater, 103 Ind, 86, 2 N.
E. 227, where the affidavit fails to show that the action is
one in which service by publication is authorized; Harris
v. Claflin, 36 Kan. 543, 13 Pac. 830; Nelson v. Roundtree,
Insufficiently
23 Wis. 367; Forhes v. Hyde, 31 Cal. 342.
specific as to due diligence in ascertaining the residence of
the defendant.
Little v. Chambers, 27 Iowa, 522. In Illinois the statute requires the issuing and return of process
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judgment rendered
upon such service without the return was held void in Chickering v. Failes, 26 111. 507, and also in Firebaugh v. Hall, 63
If the affidavit be not made by all the plaintiffs,
111. 81.
where two or more join in bringing the action, the judgment rendered is void.
Kane v. Rock River Canal Co.,
15 Wis. 179; Mecklem v. Blake, 19 Wis. 397.
And also
where the sheriff fails in observance of the statutory requirement to continue in an effort to find the defendant in
Israel v. Arthur, 7 Colo. 5,
the state pending publication.
1 Pac. 438; Kennedy v. Lamb, 182 N. Y. 228, 74 N. E. 834,
108 Am. St. 800.
And where the summons is defectively
addressed to the defendant. Durst v. Ernst, 45 Misc. 627,
91 N. Y. Supp. 13.
See also, Van Fleet, Collateral Attack,
sections 331, 348 ; 6 Current Law, 1090, and cases cited.
There is a conflict in the adjudicated cases upon the question whether defects of the nature of those here mentioned
are jurisdictional.
Many courts hold to the doctrine that
a judgment rendered in the face of such defects is not rendered absolutely void, but irregular, and that the irregularity may be corrected by motion. But the two Minnesota cases above referred to settle the rule in this state, and
are in harmony with the general principle that to confer
jurisdiction in cases of this kind the statutes must be strict1 Black, Judg. Sec. 232.
ly complied with.
But we need not pursue this subject. Reference is made
to it only to emphasize the importance given by many
courts to errors and defects in the proceedings leading up
The affidavit of
to the service of summons by publication.
publication in such cases is not filed, nor required to be
filed, for the information of the defendant. He receives no
benefit therefrom by way of notice of the suit or otherwise,
nor by the sheriff's certificate of "Not foimd," nor from
the order for publication, where an order is required; and
if a judgment rendered on service by publication is void for
want of jurisdiction, for errors in these respects, and in
others pointed out in the decisions referred to, for a
stronger reason should the error of misnaming defendant be fatal, where the error does not come within the rule
of idem sonans, and is such as is likely to mislead and result in his prejudice.
In A7tibs v. Chicago, St. P. M. £ 0. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 266,
a
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N. W. 321, it appeared that the land there in question
was at one time conveyed to '^ William H. Brown," and the
chain of title disclosed a subsequent conveyance from "WilThe court there held, Judge Dickinson
liam B. Brown."
writing the opinion, that there was no presumption that the
If that be
two Browns were one and the same person.
sound as to private writings, and we have no reason to
question the decision, it follows naturally that the same
rule should be applied to a judicial proceeding like that at
bar, and, if so, we have no right to assume that "George W.
Leslie" and "George H. Leslie" are one and the same
46

person.
It is urged by appellant that inasmuch as, in cases
where the summons in an action is served by publication,
the defendant, may, upon good cause shown, which has been
construed as an answer stating a defense, come in and defend the action within a year after notice of its entry, the
court should be more liberal in the consideration of errors
of the character of those here involved, citing Qiiarle v.
Abbet, 102 Ind. 233, 1 N. E. 476, 52 Am. Rep. 662. But we
are not persuaded by this argument.
If the error in the
as
name is jurisdictional,
we hold, judgment entered is void,
and to adopt the contention of appellant would result in
compelling a defendant in a particular case to waive the
want of jurisdiction in the court to enter judgment against
him, and to come to this state and litigate the cause on its
merits. This the court has no right to do. The law providing for the manner of acquiring jurisdiction over non-residents is plain, and should not be ignored, even in a case of
apparent hardship. We are sustained in this view by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Granger v. Judge,
44 Mich. 384, 6 N. W. 848, where the court speaking through
Justice Campbell, said, "Where cases and proceedings are
not according to the usual course, and are special in their
character, they are held void on slighter grounds than regnhxr suits, because the courts have not the same power over
their records to correct them. So where there has been no
personal service within the jurisdiction, the doctrine prevails that proceedings not conforming to the statutes are
void. But this is on the ground that there has been no service whatever, and the party therefore has not been notified
in any proper way of anything."
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Counsel called attention to the case of Illinois v. Hasenwinkle, 232 111. 224, 83 N. E. 815. While the court in that
case in the course of the opinion said that the use of a
wrong initial of the middle name of a non-resident defendant in condemnation proceedings would not necessarily
render the judgment therein void, the real ground of the
decision there made was that the defendant, so erroneously named, had permitted the judgment to remain unquestioned for over fifty years during which time the railroad
f'ompany had occupied the premises granted by the judgment as its right of way.
We therefore hold, in harmony with the views of the
learned trial court, that the publication of the summons in
the partition suit directed to "George H. Leslie" did not
confer jurisdiction upon the court to adjudicate the rights
of ** George W. Leslie."

Judgmen

NELSON y. THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON
RAILROAD CO.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
225

Illinois,

t

affirmed.

&

QUINCY

1907.

197.

Mr, Justice Hand delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant, Lars R. Nelson, on the 21st day of April,

filed a praecipe in the office of the clerk of the Circuit
Court of Kane county for a summons in an action on the
case against the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway
Company, an Iowa corporation, and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, an Illinois corporation.
A summons was issued against both companies and delivered to the sheriff of said county to serve, which summons
was returned by said sheriff not served as to the railroad
company, because the president or any other of the officers
or agents of said railroad company with whom the statute
provides a copy of the summons may be left to effect service of process on the company, could not be found by him
in said county. The praecipe and summons were then
1906,
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amended and the case discontinued as to the railway company, and the railroad company was served with process
by publication and mail, as in chancery cases, as is authorized by paragraph 5 of the Practice Act, (Kurd's Stat.
1905, Chap. 110), and a declaration was filed against the
railroad company.
* * * *
The railroad company entered a special appearance and moved to quash the service of process had
upon it by publication and mail, which motion was sustained, and the appellant electing to stand by the service of
j)rocess and refusing to proceed further, the court dismissed the suit, and the appellant has prosecuted this appeal.
It is * * * contended by the railroad company that
* * * *
if service of process by publication and mail is
authorized by said paragraph 5 upon a defendant railroad
company that has its principal office in this state in a suit
where a judgment in personam is sought against the railroad company, the statute is unconstitutional and void, as
such service of process, it is said, does not constitute due
process of law.

The law provides for two methods of service of process ;
the one actual and the other constructive.
Actual service
of process is made by reading the original process to the
defendant or by delivering to him a copy thereof ; and constructive service of process, which is a substituted service of
process, is made by leaving a copy of the process at the defendant's residence when he is absent, or by posting or
publishing notice of the pendency of the suit, and mailing
a copy of the notice posted or published to the defendant,
his postoffice address is known. It is held that the service of process, either actual or constructive, upon a nonresident defendant outside the limits of the state where
the action or proceeding is pending will not authorize the
rendition of a personal judgment or decree against a defendant, but that such service of process is sufficient upon
which to base a decree changing the marital status in a
proceeding for divorce, or a judgment or decree disposing
of property situated within the jurisdiction of the court
wherein the action or proceeding is pending.
It is also
lield that each state may determine for itself in what

if
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method process may be served upon its citizens within its
own boundaries, and while such legislation will have no
force outside the state, service of process within the state
in the manner pointed out in the statute regulating- the
method of obtaining such constructive service of process,
if the method of service of process provided for is such as to
amount to due process of law, as these terms are used in the
State and Federal constitutions, will be sufficient to authorize the courts of the State within whose jurisdiction the
service of process is had to pronounce a personal judgment
or decree against a defendant so served with process, although cases may arise in practice upon such constructive
service of process where a personal judgment or decree
might be obtained against a defendant without such defendant having received actual notice of the pendency of the acConstructive service of
tion prior to judgment or decree.
process, it is said, is authorized in a certain class of cases,
such as when the defendant has gone out of the State, or
when he cannot be found, or when he conceals himself so
that process cannot be served upon him, as the result of
such constructive service of process
necessity — that
substituted for actual service of process when actual service
In this case
defendant.
of process cannot be had upon
actual service could not be had upon the defendant although
the suit was properly brought in the court from which the
resident of, and
process was issued and the defendant was
to this
narrowed
the
State,
the
in
and
question
here
was
Can the legislature provide
constructive or substituted
service of process by publication and mail, in lieu of actual
case where the process cannot be
service of process, in
actually served upon the defendant in the county where the
statute expressly authorizes the suit to be commenced,
in the State?
although the defendant resides and
Scam. 536, was an acThe case of Bimeler v. Dawson,
tion of debt upon
judgment rendered by the Court of
Common Pleas of Stark county, in the State of Ohio,
There was service of process
against Welch and Dawson.
upon Dawson only, and he pleaded nul tiel record and that
The record
he was not personally served with process.
service
Welch
and service on Daw
upon
showed personal
son by leaving
copy of the summons at his residence, ana
rendition
the
of
judgment by default against both de-
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fendants. The trial court held that for want of personal
service upon Dawson the judgment was not evidence of indebtedness against him, and rendered judgment in his
favor. Upon an appeal to this court the judgment was reversed, and in an opinion prepared by Justice Treat, on
l)age 542, it was said: "The laws of the several states provide different modes of bringing parties into court.
In
some states personal service of process is required, while in
other states that mode is not indispensable, but a part}may be required to appear and defend an action on notice
by iniblication or by the leaving of process at his residence.
It is doubtless competent for each state to adopt its own
regulations in this respect, which will be binding and
obligatory on its own citizens. "We can not doubt the right
or power of the State of Ohio to provide that the kind of
service which it appears was made in this case shall be
sufficient to authorize its courts to take jurisdiction of the
person of a defendant and proceed to hear the case and
render judgment.
A judgment thus rendered against one
of its citizens would be binding and conclusive on him,
for owing allegiance to the State, he is bound by its law
and amenable to its judicial tribunals. That State, however, cannot in that way get jurisdiction over the people
of other States. Its laws can only operate within its own
territory and on its own citizens.
They cannot be made
to operate extra-territorially, or on the citizens of other
States unless they go voluntarily^ within its limits."
And in Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gilm. 197, on page 201, it was
said: "It is competent for each State to prescribe the
mode for bringing parties before its courts.
Although its
regulations in this respect can have no extra-territorial
operation, tliey are nevertheless binding on its own citi-

zens."

In

iS^nilJi V.

Smith,

17

111.

482, on page 484,

it was said : " A

State may nnd()u])tedly provide for bringing its own citizens
or subjects before its tribunals by constructive notice, which
may not in all cases come to the actual knowledge of the
party; still tlie presumption is that he has actual notice, or
might liave such notice by the exercise of proper care and

diligence."
W'liat is

du<'

jirocess of law in all instances is not easilv
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but as applied to this case it clearly means proceeding according to the course of the common law, and the
common law has from time immemorial required that a defendant be personally notified of the pendency of an action,
if he was within the jurisdiction of the court and could
be found, before judgment or decree was rendered against
him. The common law, however, never required actual
service of process in all cases, but has always provided for
a constructive service of process when actual service thereof could not be had, such as the leaving of a copy of the summons at the defendant's residence, and latterly a posting or
publishing of notice of the pendency of the suit or proceeding, when the defendant was out of the State or upon due
inquiry could not be found, or when he concealed himself
so that process could not be served upon him.
In Bardwell v. Anderson, 9 L. R. A. 152, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota said (p. 154) : "We think that from
the earliest period of English jurisprudence down to the
present, as well as in the jurisprudence of the United
States derived from that of England, it has always been
considered a cardinal and fundamental princiiDle that in
actions in personam proceeding according to the course of
the common law, personal service (or its equivalent as by
leaving a copy at his usual place of abode), of the writ,
process or summons must be made on all defendants resident and to be found within the jurisdiction of the court. We
do not mean that the term 'proceeding according to the
course of the common law,' as used in the books, is to be
understood as meaning, necessarily and always, personal or
actual service of process, for although service by publication
is of modern origin, there has always been some mode by
which jurisdiction has been obtained at common law by
something amounting to or equivalent to constructive service, where the defendant could not be found and served
personally ; but what we do mean to assert is, that the right
to resort to such constructive or substituted service in j^ersonal actions proceeding according to the course of the common law rests upon the necessities of the case, and has always been limited and restricted to cases where personal
service could not be made because the defendant was a nonresident, or had absconded, or had concealed himself for
the purpose of avoiding service. As showing what means
defined,
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were resorted to as amounting or equivalent to constructive
service, and how strictly it was limited to cases of necessity
by both courts of common law and courts of chancery, reference need only be had to 3 Blackstone's Com. 283, 444."
While the authorities are not in entire harmony upon
the subject, the Illinois cases and the greater weight of
authority clearly establish, we think, the proposition that
a personal judgment in an action at law may be rendered
against a defendant residing in and who is in the State
where the suit or proceeding is pending, who has been
notified of the pendency of the suit by constructive service
of process, where it appears actual service of process could
not be had upon the defendant, if the constructive service
provided for was required ^^ be had in such manner that
the reasonable probabilitie
re that the defendant would
receive notice of the pendiu^ action or proceeding before
judgment or decree was rendered against him.

**********

Reversed and remanded.^
1 In Bardwell v. Collins,
(1890) 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, quoted above
in Nelson v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., the statute authorized service of summons by publication, in actions to foreclose mortgages, as to
all parties to the action against whom no personal judgment was sought. The
court held (1) thjit such actions were not «i rem but in personam, since they
determined the rights and equities of the parties interested in the mortgaged
premises; (2) that such actions were strictly judicial in character, proceeding
according to the due course of the common law; (3) that it is a cardinal
principle of "due process of law" that in actions in personam proceeding according to the course of the common law, jiersonal service of process must be
had uj)on defendants resident and to be found within the jurisdiction of the
court; (4) the statute is uuconstitutionfil in so far as it attempts to authorize
service by mere publication upon resident defendants capable of being per-

sonally

served.

KENNEDY

V. LAMB.

Court of Appeals of New York.
182 Neiu

1905

York, 228.

Vann, J. The purchasers at the sale in this action,
whicli was bronglit to partition lands in the borough of
]*rooklyii. rcfiisod to complete their purchase upon the
groiiiid that the title was defective. By an order, made at
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Special Term and affirmed by the Appellate Division, they
were directed to comply with the terms of sale and they now
appeal to this court for relief from what they consider an
unlawful command. They claim that the court which rendered the judgment in partition did not acquire jurisdiction of several persons, each a necessary party defendant,
because they were not personally served with process and
the effort to serve them by publication was void, owing to
a vital defect in the affidavits upon which the order to publish was made.
From the affidavits presented to the justice who granted
the order of publication, one made by the plaintiff and the
other by his attorney, it appeared that six of the defendants
resided in the State of New Jersey, four at Jersey City and
The only attempt to show compliance
two at Plainfield.
with the command of the statute in reference to ^^due diligence to make personal service of the summons" was an
allegation in the affidavit of the attorney that ''the plaintiff will be unable with due diligence to make personal service of the summons within the State as appears by the
affidavit of Peter J. Kennedy hereto annexed." The affidavit thus referred to contains nothing whatever upon the
subject of diligence, discloses no effort to serve the summons in this state, and gives no reason for not making the
It does
effort, aside from the bare fact of non-residence.
not appear that the summons had been issued or that it was
placed in the hands of anyone for service upon the defendants named, and for aught that appears they could have
They were
been served in this state without difficulty.
nephews and nieces of the plaintiff and had visited and
corresponded with him "for several years past," as he
stated in his affidavit. He did not state how recently they
had visited him, when he last heard from them, nor where
he himself resided. Four of them lived just across the state
All
line and two of them but a short distance therefrom.
may have been engaged in business in the State of Xew
York and in daily attendance there for that purpose, as is
the case with so many residents of the State of New Jersey.
The affidavit did not state that they were not in New York
or that they were actually in New Jprsey when the affiant
swore to it.
Aj> «rder may be made for service by publication upon a
.

p.— 5

-
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defendant who is a non-resident of the state, provided ''the
plaintitf has been or will be unable with due diligence to
make personal service" within the state. (Code Civ. Pro.
Sections 438, 439.)
The bare fact of non-residence is not
enough to authorize the order, for the plaintiff must also
show due diligence to make personal service, or state facts
tending to show why personal service cannot be made. The
statute now in force differs from the one which formerly
governed the subject when some of the cases cited were
decided, in that the latter authorized service by publication
when the person to be served could not "after due diligence
be found within the State."
(Code of Pro. Section 135.)
The old statute was satisfied with due diligence to find the
defendant, while the present statute requires either due
effort to serve, or sufficient reasons for not making the
effort.
In the case now before us there was no attempt to make
personal service and no reason was given for not trying to
serve personally, except the fact of non-residence.
Even if
residence in a distant state or in a foreign country permits
the inference that the person to be served cannot be found
in this State, residence in an adjoining state, just across the
line, with no evidence that the non-resident is not in business in this state, or that he does not sojourn here, and no
explanation whatever for not trying to serve him here, is
not sufficient. As was said by this court in Carleton v.
Carleton, (85 N. Y. 313, 315): "It is a well known fact
that many persons who are residents of one state have
places of business and transact such business in a state
different from that in which their residence is located.
They are frequently in the latter state, and pass most of
their time there. Such persons could be readily found in
the state where they do business if due diligence was used
for that purpose and non-residence, of itself, does not necessarily show that they cannot be found within the state, or
raise a presumption that due diligence has been used, or
that it was not required."
In a latel- case it was said: "Where the proof of nonrosi donee is clear and conclusive, and that the defendant is
living out of the state and in a distant state, there may be
strong reasons for holding that proof of diligence is not
required;" and as it appeared that the defendant resided
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in Maryland, and that the summons, which had been duly
issued and some effort made to serve
could not be served
owing to that fact, the affidavit was held sufficient. {Ken
nedy v. Neiv York Life Ins.
Trust Co., 101 N. Y. 487).
In McCracken v. Flanagan, (127 N. Y. 493),
appeared
that
summons had been issued against the defendant and
''that defendant
non-resident of this state, nor can be
found therein, but has
place of residence at Matewan, in
the state of New Jersey."
careful review of the
After
leading cases
was held that the affidavit, which was made
when section 135 of the Code of Procedure was in force, was
insufficient to give jurisdiction. The court said: "Some
degree of diligence must be exercised to find the party, and
what
due degree depends upon circumstances surrounding each case, and the simple averments in the affidavit that
the defendant
non-resident and cannot be found within
the state are not alone sufficient to support an order for
the service of
summons by publication.
Those facts do
not imply that any diligence has been exercised to find and
serve the defendant personally with process. It needs no
argument to show that the averment in the affidavit that
the defendant cannot be found in the state does not tend to
prove the exercise of due diligence to find the defendant,
for the statute in question not onlj^ requires that be stated
in the affidavit that the defendant cannot be found, but expressly requires the averment that he cannot be found after
due

diligence."

In Belmont

N. Y. 256), the order was sustained upon proof of non-residence, followed by an averment that the summons had been issued to the sheriff of
v. Cornen,

(82

covered by the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed, were situated; that the sheriff
"had used due diligence to find the defendants and after
such due diligence and inquiry they could not be found within said county or state."
In router v. Crouter, (133 N. Y. 55) an affidavit was
held sufficient which stated the non-residence of the defendants that they had no place of business in this state that
summons could not, with due
plaintiff believed that
diligence, be served personally within the state and that he
had present knowledge of defendants' movements, and was
satisfied that they frequent no place in the state.
a

;

;

C

the county where the premises,
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In Fetes

v. Vohner, (28 N. Y. St. Kep. 317), the court said :
Though a non-resident, the defendant may be at the time
temporarily in the state to the knowledge of the plaintitf,
**

and within easy reach of personal service of the summons.
No such proof was made by the plaintiff in this case. The
affidavit of his attorney, upon which the order was procured, states only that the action has been commenced, that
a summons has been issued, and that the two defendants
named are non-residents of the state and that they reside at
Marion, Washington County, Iowa. The affidavit was, in
this respect, plainly insufficient and the county judge was
without jurisdiction to grant the order,"
While any evidence having a legal tendency to show compliance with the statute, even if inconclusive, would warrant the exercise of judgment and thus confer jurisdiction
to make the order, in this case there was no evidence as to
the use of diligence, or to excuse the omission of effort to
serve in this state. Even if a judge reached a wrong conclusion upon the facts presented, so that his order would be
set aside on direct attack by motion to vacate, still if he
had some legal evidence to act upon, the order would be
protected from collateral attack after the entry of judgment.
There was no evidence presented to the justice who
made the order now before us which authorized him to act
judicially or to decide that the plaintiff would be unable
with due diligence to make personal service in this state.
An affiant who simply repeats the words of a statute merely
states his opinion upon a proposition to be proved. Proof
requires that facts be stated from which the conclusion
We find no case in this
sought may be logically drawn.
case
in any court which suscourt and no well considered
tains an order founded simply on proof of non-residence
in an adjoining state with no effort n de to find or serve,
and no reason given why such effort if made would be useless.

Tlie purchasers were entitled to a marketable title, free
from reasonable doubt and they were justified in refusing
to cotiiplete their purchase because the affidavits upon which
the order of publication was based were insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
The order of the Appellate Division, as well as that of
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Terin should bo reversed and the motion denied,
with costs in all courts.
CuLLEN, Ch. J., Gray, O'Brien, Bartlett, PTaight and
the Special

Werner,

JJ.,

concur.

Order Reversed.
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UNITED ELECTRIC COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
211

1905,

Pennsylvania State, 473.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Brown, April 17, 1905.
The first prayer of appellant's bill is for full discovery.

A

* * *

for discovery is

personal one to be enforced
against the person decreed to make it ; and, if the appellee
was properly brought within the jurisdiction of the court
below personally, a decree that it make discovery could be
enforced against it personally by the appellant as his first
In view of
move to obtain the ultimate relief asked for.
this, the proceeding must, as was held by the learned judge
below, be regarded as in personam as to the appellee ; and
tlie question whether the Act of April 6, 1859, P. L., 387,
even if it does authorize extra-territorial service of process
from a court of this state, is effectual to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant residing and served in
another state, is not an open one.
Before the passage of that act, Chief Justice Gibson, in
discussing the attempt to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the extra-territorial service of process, said in Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447: "Jurisdiction
or the person or property of an alien is founded on its
presence or situs within the territory. Without this presence or situs, an exercise of jurisdiction is an act of usurpation. An owner of property who sends it abroad subjects it
to the regulations in force at the place as he would subject
his person by going there. The jurisdiction of either springs
decree

a

70
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from the voluntary performance of an act, of whose conseBut a foreigner may
quences he is bound to take notice.
choose to subject his property, reserving his person; and it
is clear that jurisdiction of property does not draw after
it jurisdiction of the owner's person; consequently, there
can be no rightful action by the tribunals on the foundation
of jurisdiction acquired by the attachment of property,
which reaches beyond the property itself.
What, then, is the right of a state to exercise authority over
the persons of those who belong to another jurisdiction, and
who have, perhaps, not been out of the boundaries of it!
'The sovereignty united to domain,' says Vattel, 'establishes the jurisdiction of the nation over its territories or
the countries which belong to it. It is its province, or that
of its sovereign, to exercise justice in all places under its
jurisdiction, or the country which belongs to it; to take
cognizance of the crimes committed and the differences that
arise in the country.' 'On the other hand,' adds Mr. Justice Stoey (Confl. Ch. 14, §539), no sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject other persons or property to its judicial decisions.
Every exertion of authority beyond these limits is a mere
nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property
in other tribunals.' And for this he cites Picquet v. Swan
(5 Mason, 35-42). Not to multiply authorities on a point
so plain, it will be sufficient to add the name of Mr. Burge
(1 Confl. 1), who says it is a fundamental principle, essential to the sovereignty of every independent state, that no
municipal law, whatever its nature or object, should, proprio vigore, extend beyond the territory of the state by
which it has been established.' And again (3 Burge Confl.
1044), 'that the authority of every judicial tribunal, and
the obligation to obey
are circumscribed by the limits of
the territory in which
established.' Such
the familiar,
reasonable and just principle of the law of nations; and
scarce sujiposable that the framers of the constitution
designed to abrogate
between states which were to remain as independent of each other, for all but national purposes, as they wore before the revolution. Certainly
was
not intended to legitimate an assumption of extra-territorial jurisdiction which would confound all distinctive
I)rinciples of separate sovereignty; and there evidentl\^
it

it
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it
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it

it,

******

Sec. 4]

Seevice and Betuen of Summons

71

was such an assumption in the proceedings under considerSpeaking of the act of 1859, under which the court
made the order for the extra-territorial service of process

ation,"

upon the appellee, Sharswood, J., in Coleman's Appeal, 75
Pa. 441, in stating that it has not been the policy of our
.jurisprudence to bring non-residents within the jurisdiction
of our courts, unless in very special cases, said: ''In proceeding against them for torts, even property belonging to
them cannot be reached by process, and in cases of contract
nothing but the property can be affected unless the defendant voluntarily appear and submit to the jurisdiction. We
may congratulate ourselves that such has been the policy,
for nothing can be more unjust than to drag a man thousands of miles, perhaps from a distant state, and in effect
compel him to appear and defend under the penalty of a
judgment or decree against him pro confesso. The act of
1859 ought, therefore, to receive a construction in harmony
with this policy. There exists no good reason why courts
of equity should be invested with a more enlarged jurisdiction against non-residents than courts of law." This was
followed by the case of Scott v. Noble, 72 Pa. 115, in which
we held that Noble was not bound by process directed to be
served upon him by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts outside the state, though he had accepted service
of the writ in the state of Pennsylvania. By the Act of
March 13, 1815, P. L. 150, regulating proceedings in divorce, the act provides for service upon the respondent
"wherever found," but in Ralston' s Appeal, 93 Pa. 133,
we said of that act: "It declares 'upon due proof at the
return of the said subpoena that the same shall have been
served personally on the said party wherever found, or that
a copy had been given to him or her fifteen days before the
return of the same,' a divorce may be decreed. It is contended in case the libellee in divorce is not found within
the bailiwick of the sheriff, the latter may, under this act,
depute some person to make the service in another state.
If a legal service could thus be made in Delaware it can be
in California.
Such cannot be a true construction of the
statute. The language 'wherever found' cannot be so construed as to give to a court of this state extra-territorial
power to bring within its jurisdiction the person of a citizen and resident of another state.
The property found
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non-resident may be reached and
charged and sold in the enforcement of a debt resting on a
contract without an}^ personal service on the debtor.
In
the case of an ordinary debt, the person of a non-resident
defendant not fonnd within the state cannot be reached by
any process issued by a court of common law. In cases
where the language of the statute would seem to give extraterritorial power this court has denied its exercise. Thus
the 16th section of the Act of 13th June, 1836, relating to
the removal of paupers, authorizes them to be removed 'at
the expense of the district to the city, district or place
where he was last legalty settled, whether in or out of
It has, however, been held the provision
Pennsylvania.'
for a removal into another state is of no force or effect:
Overseers of Limestone v. Overseers of Ohillisqiiaque, 6
Norris 294. The first section of the Act of 6th April, 1859,
authorizes any court of this commonwealth having equity
jurisdiction, in any suit in equity instituted therein concerning property within the jurisdiction of the said court,
to order and direct that any subpoena or other process to
be had in such suit be served on any defendant therein
'then residing or being out of the jurisdiction of said court
wherever he, she or they may reside or be found.' It further provides for the proof of service both within and without the limits of the United States. It was held in Coleman's Appeal, 75 Pa. 41, that process thus issued in this
state and served in another state on a resident thereof
could not give jurisdiction of the person thus served." In
the federal courts the same view is entertained.
By a
statute of the state of Oregon provision was made for service upon a non-resident by publication. In Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, it appeared that judgment had been
entered against Neff on process which the plaintiff undertook to have served upon him extra-territorially,
by
I)ublication, in conformity to the statute. Judgment was
entered in the proceeding against him, and, in holding that
he was not bound by
was
through Mr. Justice Field,
said: ''Where the entire object of the action
deterto
mine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants,
that is, where the suit
merely in personam, constructive
service in this form upon
ineffectual for
non-resident
any j^urpose. Process from the tribunals of one state can-
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not run into another state, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings
against them." In the Circuit Court of the United States,
for the western district of this state, in the case of McHenry
V. New York P. & 0. B. R. Co., 25 Fed. Repr. 65, the Court
of Common Pleas of Westmoreland county had made an
order of service on aliens in pursuance of the act of 1851),
but it was said by the Circuit Court: *'It is, indeed, true
that pursuant to an order of the Court of Common Pleas,
claimed to be authorized by the Pennsylvania Act of April
6, 1859, P. L. 387, process has been served on those defendants in England, where they reside, but, clearly, such extraterritorial service was ineffectual to bring them within the
jurisdiction of the court or make them parties to the suit:
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714."
The service upon the appellee was ineffectual to bring it
into this jurisdiction, and the order of the court below setting it aside was properly made. That order is now affirmed
and this appeal dismissed at the costs of appellant.

BARRY
Supreme

V. WACHOSKY.

Court of Nebraska.
57 Nebraska,

1899.

534.

Ragan, C.

James M. Barry, J. M. Brannan, and C. D. Ryan, made
their promissory note for $500 and delivered the same to
one D. F. Clarke.
The note was payable to Clarke only. It
was non-negotiable. Before the note matured Clarke seems
to have sold it to Michael Wachosky.
At any rate he wrote
his name across the back of the note, and over that he recited in writing that he guaranteed the payment of the
note, and delivered it to Wachosky.
The latter, in the county court of Douglas county, brought a suit against Clarke,
Barry, Brannan, and Ryan and set out in his petition the
execution and deliver}^ of the note by the makers thereof to
Clarke, and then that Clarke wrote his name on the back
of the note, and wrote over his name his contract guaran-
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teeing the payment of the note, and delivered it to him,
Wachosky. Clarke resided and was summoned in Douglas
count5\ The makers of the note were found and summoned
in Dakota county. The makers of the note on being
brought into the county court, appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court over them, upon the
grounds that they were found and summoned in Dakota
county, where they resided, and that Clarke was summoned
in Douglas county. This objection of the makers to the
jurisdiction of the county court over them was by it overruled. The makers of the note then answered to the merits
of Wachosky 's petition, and interposed as a defense to the
court's jurisdiction the fact that they were residents of and
found and summoned only in Dakota county. Wachosky, by
a reply to this answer, admitted that the makers were found
and summoned only in Dakota county.
Wachosky had a
verdict and judgment in the county court, and the makers
prosecuted a petition in error to the district court to reverse that judgment.
The district court affirmed the judgment of the county court, and its judgment is now before
us on a petition in error.

**********

Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides,
in substance, that every action not otherwise specifically
provided for must be brought in the county in which the
defendant, or some one of the defendants, resides or may be
summoned. Section 65 of the Code provides that when an
action is rightly brought in any county a summons may be
issued to another county against any one or more of the
defendants at the plaintiff's request.
Now Clarke was
made a defendant to this action, and he was served with
a summons in Douglas county, and therefore it was proper
to summon the other defendants to the action in Dakota
county, if the action was riglitly brought against Clarke in
Douglas county. The test for determining whether an action be rightly brought in one county against the defendant
found, and served therein, so that the other defendants may
l)e served in a foreign county is whether the defendant
served in the county in which the action is brought is a
bona fide defendant to that action — whether his interest in
the action and in the result thereof is adverse to that of the
plaintiff. [Banna v. Emerson, 45 Neb. 708, and cases there
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cited; Miller v. Meeker, 54 Neb. 452.) Pearson v. Kansas
Mfg. Co., 14 Neb. 211, is no longer regarded as sound, but
has in effect long been overruled.
So that, looking at this
action as a suit upon the promissory note executed by the
plaintiffs in error to Clarke, we have the question, Did
Clarke, by assigning this note to Wachosky become liable
upon the note? We think not. The note was non-negotiable.
It was merely a chose in action. It was assignable, and
when assigned by Clarke, the payee, his assignee, Wachosky, could maintain an action upon it in his own name, and
to this action Clarke was not a necessary party. (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 30.) Clarke, by assigning this note to
Wachosky, did not become liable to him or his assignee on
the note, and therefore, viewing this action as a suit upon
the note, Clarke was not interested in the result of that
action adversely to Wachosky, and therefore the action was
not rightly brought on the note in Douglas county and
the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs in error.
Of course, if the payee of a negotiable promissory note
writes his name across the back thereof, without more, and
delivers it to a third party, the law will write over that
signature the promise on the part of such payee that, if the
holder thereof presents it to the maker when due for payment, and it be dishonored, and he be given due notice
thereof, he will pay the note to the holder. But the payee
of a non-negotiable note who sells
writes his name across
the back thereof, and delivers
to the vendee, without
more, does not thereby become liable upon the note. His
assignment and delivery of the note simply amounts to
quit claim upon his part of his interest in the note to his
vendee.
Such
payee of such
non-negotiable note may,
of course, make himself liable to his assignee for the payment of the said note by
writing evidencing such
contract over his signature. But in that case such
contract
would be a separate and independent one from the contract
evidenced by the note and would not affect the makers of
the note nor their liability; nor enable the holder of the
note to unite in one action the makers and the payee. In
the case at bar Clarke did write over his signature on this
note
guaranty of pajTuent, and by so doing he became
liable to Wachosky as
guarantor of this note. But the
makers of the note were not parties to the contract of
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of guaranty was Clarke's contract, and a senarate and independent contract from the contract made by plaintiffs in error. Clarke was not, and is not,
liable to Wachosky on the note. The makers of the note
are not liable to Wachosky on Clarke's guaranty. Therefore, if we regard this as a suit upon the note, Clarke was
not a proper party thereto, and the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs in error. It we regard it as a suit
upon the guaranty, Clarke was the only proper party thereto and the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs in
error. Wachosky has, perhaps, two causes of action. One
cause of action is on the note and against the makers thereof. The other cause of action is against Clarke on his
guaranty of pajTuent. These two causes of action cannot be
united, for the obvious reason that each one does not affect
all the parties to the action. {Mowery v. Mast, 9 Neb. 445 ;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 88.) The judgment of the district court is reversed and the action, so far as it affects the
plaintiffs in error, is dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.
guaranty.

The contract
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JONES V. BIBB BRICK COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
120

Georgia, 321.

1904.
^*

Before Judge Hodges.
Motion to set aside judgment.
City Court of Macon. October 17, 1903. [Judgment set
aside.

**********

Plaintiff excepted.]

Lamar, J. A summons of garnishment directed to the
Bibb Brick Company was served, August 23, 1902, the return of tho officer showing that he had served the summons
on "Bibb Brick Co., by handing the same to John T.
* * *
The motion to
Moore, its secretary and treasurer."
sot tliis judgment aside is verified by Moore, and does not
deny tliat he was in charge of the office or of the business
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of the company in the county. * * * We are therefore to
deal with a case in which the return of the officer, who had
made good service, was incomplete and defective in its
failure to allege that Moore, "secretary and treasurer,"
was "in r-hnt-g'e of the office or business*' oi the garnishee
at the time the summons was handed to him in person.
i-7. Process and service are essential. But the return,
being only evidence of what the officer has done in serving,
Still it is manifest that a
the writ, is not jurisdictional.
court ought not to proceed without having a legal return of
record to show that its process had been actually served,
and that it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If there is an entire absence of a return, or if
the return made is void because showing service on the
wrong person, or at a time, place, or in a manner not provided by law, the court cannot proceed.
Callaway v.
Douglasville College, 99 Ga. 623. If, however, the fact of
service appears, and the officer's return is irregular or incomplete, it should not be treated as no evidence, but rather
The
as furnishing defective proof of the fact of service.
irregularity may be cured by an amendment which does
not make or state a new fact, but merely supplies an omission in the statement as to an existing fact. Where there
has been valid service and no return, the deficiency may be
supplied before taking further steps in the cause. If there
has been service and a voidable or defective return, it may
be amended even after judgment, so as to save that which
has been done under service valid in fact but incompletely
For in its last analysis it is the
reported to the court.
fact of service, rather than the proof thereof by the return,
Ordinarily service is either
which is of vital importance.
good or bad. But process and return existing in writing
may vary between void, voidable, and perfect. If either is
void, the judgment predicated solely thereon is a nullity.
Where process and return are not void, some classes of defects therein are cured by judgment. For many things are
sufficient to prevent a judgTaent from being rendered which
would be insufficient to set aside a judgment actually rendered. Hence the Civil Code, section 5365, declares that
"a judgment cannot be arrested or set aside for any defect
in the pleadings or record that is aided by verdict, or
amendable as matter of form." This right to amend a
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it conform to the facts is allowed
principles and by our statute. If the officer is
in commission and liable on his bond, he may make this
amendment voluntarily.
Civil Code, section 5116. If he
is dead or out of commission, or refuses to make the return
so as to make

on general

which the facts require, then the amendment may be ordered
* * *
by the court nunc pro tunc.
* * * *
In Hargis v. E. T. Va. S Ga. Ry. Co., 90 Ga. 42,
the return was attacked before judgment; there was no
offer to amend, and no proof that the agent was in charge,
or that service upon him would have bound the company.
The court therefore properly declined to enter judgment
against the garnishee. In Southern Ry. Co. v. Hagan, 103
Ga. 564, the original record shows that the process was
void, and the garnishee attacked the judgment not on the
ground that the return was defective but because it had
never been served with a summons of garnishment.
But
none of these cases determine what would have been the
effect of valid process and perfect service, with an incomplete or defective return where the judgment rendered
thereon was attacked and the motion to set aside and evidence thereunder showed valid service in fact.
Such was
the case of Third National Bank v. McCullough, 108 Ga.
249, where the service was perfect, but the return failed to
recite that Hawkins, president, was in charge ; and yet the
judgment against the garnishee by default was allowed to
stand, there being no allegation in the attack thereon that
Hawkins was not in fact the agent of the bank, in charge
of its affairs in the county. In support of this ruling the
court cited Sou. Ex. Co. v. Skipper, 85 Ga. 565, determined
under a statute where service upon an agent was only allowed when the president of the garnishee company resided
out of the State. The return was silent as to the residence
of the president, and yet after service upon the local agent
alone the default judgment was held sufficient, the court
saying, tliat "in rendering judgment based on the service
its sufficiency was adjudicated at least in an incidental
way." Tlie same principle was involved in Holbrook v.
Evansville Co., 114 Ga. 2, where the return did not follow
the language of the statute, and was therefore not perfect
in its ver))iage.

Under the autliorities, therefore, it is evident that the

Service and Return of Summons

Sec. 5]

79

defective return might have been amended to conform to
the facts, and that such amendment when made vrould have
related back so as to make the record complete and the
But it may be claimed that here the
judgment perfect.
defect was never cured, since no amendment was ever
made.
None was necessary. Whatever may be the rule in
ordinary cases, both the allegations and the silence of this
motion make it certain that the garnishee had been duly
served.

Judgment reversed.

All

the

justices concur.

SMOOT V. JUDD.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
184

Marshall,

1904.

Missouri, 508.

J. — This

is a bill in equity to set aside a judgment of the circuit court of Barton county rendered on
September 18, 1891, in favor of G. S. Judd and against Ella
G. Smoot and Samuel N. Smoot, and the execution issued
thereunder, and the sheriff's deed to certain land in that
county made to said Judd as purchaser at such execution
sale.

* * *

Ella

N. Smoot are and at all times
hereinafter mentioned were husband and wife, Mrs. Smoot
owned lots 4, 5, and 6, in Jasper, Missouri, but it does rot
appear whether it was her separate estate or only a legal
Being such owner, she and her husband, on April
estate.
15, 1887, executed and delivered to G. S. Judd their promissory note for $683.61, payable one day after date. * * * The
G. Smoot and Samuel

debt was not paid, and on July 28, 1891, the debt being then
over four years past due, Judd instituted suit in the Barton
Circuit Court against Mr. and Mrs. Smoot. The petition
did not describe the defendants as husband and wife. A
summons was regularly issued, and was returned by the
sheriff as having been served personally upon both Mr. and
Mrs. Smoot. * * * The case was allowed to go by default,
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and on September 18, 1891, a personal judgment was renOn the
dered against Mr. and Mrs. Smoot, for $925.13.
brother,
Peter A.
3rd. of February, 1891, Mrs. Smoot 's
Gordon, died leaving certain land in Barton county, and
Mrs. Smoot inherited an undivided one-fourth interest
On January 20, 1892, an execution was issued on
therein.
said judgment and was levied on Mrs. Smoot 's interest in
* * *
The land was then sold on March 10, 1892,
the land.
and Judd became the purchaser of Mrs. Smoot 's interest
therein for $510.00, and received a sheriff's deed therefor.
The matter stood thus until October 30, 1893, when, the
time for redemption having expired and the Smoots having
done nothing, Judd instituted a suit for the partition of
*
the land. * *
On April 14, 1894, a decree in partition was
rendered and on September 3, 1894, the land was sold under
that decree, and the defendants Brand and Jackson became
the purchasers and received the sheriff's deeds therefor,
entered into possession and have remained in possession
ever since. It is conceded that at some time, the date is
not disclosed by the record, Mrs. Smoot sued the sheriff on
his official bond, for $3,000 damages, for the loss of her
land, by the sale under said personal judgment, alleging
that his return upon the summons that he had served it
upon her personally was false, and that upon a trial of that
case she recovered a judgment for nominal damages.
On August 18, 1895, Mrs. Smoot instituted this suit in
equity.
The petition alleges nearly all the facts hereinbefore set out, and predicates a right to recover upon the
falsitv of the sheriff's return aforesaid.
The nction was
brought against Judd, Brand, Jackson, and Mr. Smoot.
Judd and Smoot though personally served made default,
and the action is defended by Brand and Jackson, the purchasers of the property at the partition sale. * * *

I.
At

definitely stated, the plaintiff sued the
sheriff for damages for false return, and recovered a
judgment.
Tf tliat action was instituted before this suit
was begun, it would clearly be a bar to this suit, for even if
some time, not

it should be conceded that the plaintiff was entitled to both
remedies, the election to take one, would preclude a right
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thereafter to pursue the other. [Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo.
Nalle v. Thompson, 173 Mo. 1. c. 616.) In any
1. c. 345;
event, without regard to which action was begun first, it now
appears that the plaintiff prosecuted her suit against the
sheriff to a final and successful result. This being true,
whatever wrong or loss she suffered in consequence of thr
alleged false return of the sheriff, has been compensated
for, and she has obtained satisfaction therefor. So that
even if it could be conceded that her remedy was double,
her wrong and loss was single and she could have only one
satisfaction, and having received that in the other action,
she is no longer entitled to pursue this remedy.
{Rivers v.
Blom, 163 Mo. 1. c. U8:Bank v. Bank, 130 Mo. 1. c. 168.)
am of opinion that
But, as hereinafter pointed out,
her remedy was confined to an action on the sheriff's bond,
for false return, and that she cannot maintain a suit in
equity to set aside the judgment or its consequences, because
of the falsity of the sheriff's return showing personal service on her.

I

n.

T. p.—

6
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a

it

it

I

I

it,

When the case was here on former appeal, it was held
that while the adjudications in this State had held that a
sheriff's return is conclusive, except in an action against
the sheriff for a false return, still in some other jurisdictions, a bill in equity would lie to set aside a judgment, by
default, based upon a false return of the sheriff showing
service of the summons upon the defendant, and accordingly it was then held that the return of the sheriff was
not conclusive, and that this action would lie.
{Smoot
V. Judd, 161 Mo. 673.)
With the greatest respect for the learned judge who
wrote that opinion and for the equally learned judges who
concurred in
am constrained to say,
think
does
not announce the true rule of law in this State, and that
should be overruled.
Ever since the decision of this court in Hallowell v. Page,
24 Mo. 590, the law has been uniformly declared in this
State to be that ''the return of
sheriff on process, regular on its face, and showing the fact and mode of service,
conclusive upon the parties to the suit. Its truth can
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only in a direct action against the sheriff
* *

*

for false return."
In Steivart v. Stringer, 41 Mo. 1. c. 404, Wagner, J. ^id:
' '
The courts of some of the States have held that a sheriff's
return is merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated; but the law is firmly settled in this State that a
defendant cannot controvert the truth of the sheriff's return. If the return of a sheriff to a process is regular on
its face, it is conclusive upon the parties to the suit, and
the remed}^ for the party injured is an action against the
sheriff for a false return."
But it is said that, in all the cases cited, the attack upon
the sheriff's return was made in the original case, either
before or after judgment and that while it was held that
the sheriff's return was conclusive upon the parties in the
original case, it was not held that such a return could not
be attacked by a direct proceeding in equity, and upon
former appeal it was pointed out that in Alabama, Tennessee, Kansas, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado and Illinois, it is held that a false return of the sheriff can be
attacked and set aside by a direct proceeding in equity.
iVccordingly it was held upon former appeal of this case
that the alleged false return of the sheriff in the original
r-ase of Jiidd v. Smoot could be attacked and set aside in
this suit in equity.
This raises the question whether or not a return of a
sheriff can be attacked and, if found to be false, a judgment at law by default founded thereon, can be set aside
in a direct proceeding in equity.
Gw\Tine on Sheriffs, page 473, thus states the law: *'It
is a well settled principle of the English law, that the sheriff's return is not traversable, and the court will not try
on afTidavits, whether the return of a sheriff to a writ is
false, even though a strong case is made out, showing
fraud and collusion, but the party must resort to his
remedy by an action against the sheriff for a false return.
In Conneftif'ut, the return of the sheriff on a mesne pro
cess is held to be only prima facie evidence, but even ir
that State, he cannot falsify it by his own evidence. In
most, and y)robably all of tlie other States in the United
States, llie rule is established, that as botweon parties to
the suit, in whidi the icturn is made, and privies, and the
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except when the latter is charged in a direct pro
ceeding against him for a false return, the sheritf's return is conclusive and cannot be impeached. A party or
privy may not aver the falsity of a return made by the
proper officer, without a direct proceeding against the officer, even in chancery."
Walker v. Bobbins, 14 How. (U. S.) 584, was an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a judgment, based upon
and which the
a marshal's return of personal service,
testified
was false.
deputy marshal who served the process
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Mr. Justice Catron, said: "Assuming the fact to
be that Walker was not served with process, and that the
marshal's return is false, can the bill, in this event, be
The respondents did no act that connects
maintained?
tliem with the false return; it was the sole act of the
marshal, through his deputy, for whi^^h he was responsible
to the complainant, Walker, for any damages that were
sustained by him in consequence of a false return. This is
free from controversy; still the marshal's responsibility
does not settle the question made by the bill, which is, in
general terms, whether a court of equity has jurisdiction
to regulate proceedings, and to afford relief at law, where
there has been abuse, in the various details arising on execution of process, original, mesne and final. If a court o'
chancery can be called on to correct one abuse, so it
may correct another; and in effect, to vacate judgments,
where the tribunal rendering the same would refuse relief, either on motion, or on a proceeding by audita querela,
where this mode of redress is in use. In cases of false
returns affecting the defendant, where the plaintiff at law
is not in fault, redress can only be had in the court of
law where the record was made, and if relief cannot
be had there, the party injured must seek his relief against
Accordingly equitable relief was denied.
the marshal."
officer,

**********

Hunter v. Stoneburner, 92 111. 75, was a bill in equity to
set aside a judgment in partition and a sale thereunder,
on the ground that the plaintiff had not been served with
The sheriff's return was
process, and for other reasons.
personal service. The plaintiff succeeded in the lower
court and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court

84
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of Illinois said: ''It, then, appearing that appellee was
served with process, he must be bound by the officer's return. It is in rare cases only that the return of the officer
can be contradicted, except in a direct proceeding by suit
In all other cases,
against the officer for false return.
almost without exception, the return is held to be conclusive. An exception to the rule is where some other portion of the record in the same case contradicts the return,
but it cannot be done by evidence dehors the record." Accordingly the decree of the lower court was reversed.
Stewart v. Stewart, 27 W. Va. 167, was a bill in equity
to set aside a judgment at law, and the question arose on
a motion for rehearing by a defendant who had made default that the sheriff's return was false. The relief was
* * *
We see no readenied, the Supreme Court saying: "
son for departing from the rule of the common law. If
it is thought wise to permit the return of a sheriff on
mesne or final process in any case, where the suit is not
against him and his sureties for a false return, to be contradicted, the Legislature should furnish the remedy. We
think the rule of the common law was founded in wisdom.
Others besides the defendant to the suit are interested,
that the return of the sheriff should be regarded as absolutely true. Rights of property would suffer under any
other rule, and there is sufficient protection against fals'
returns of sheriffs in the right of action directly against
him and his sureties.
this rule is rigidly adhered to,
sheriffs will be much more careful, and the rights of the
citizens much better preserved, than if his returns either in
mesne or final process could be contradicted.
The only
benefit, that could be given to the petitioner, would come
tliroiigli permitting her to contradict the sheriff's return,
that she was served with process in the suit. lie had no
authority to serve the process as such officer outside of
the State. If he had done so, such correction would entirely
liave destroyed his return.
As we said in Bowyer v.
Knapp, 15 W. Va. 291, we do not mean to decide, whether
under our statute the return of the sheriff on process may
not be contradicted })y plea in abatement filed in the suit
at the proper time. The court was justified in decreeing
that the bill should be taken for confessed upon the return

If
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The petition was properly dismissed."

Thomas v. Ireland, 88 Ky. 581, was a suit in equity to
enjoin the enforcement of a judgment at law on the ground
that the sheriff's return was false and that there was in
fact no service. The court said: "It is well settled by
this court that where the plaintitf acts in good faith in
obtaining a judgment upon the return of the sheriff, en
dorsed upon the summons, that it was executed on the
defendant, though in fact it was not, the return is conclusive as between the plaintiff and defendant.
The stability of judgments require this rule; otherwise, judgments
settling the rights of parties and giving remedies for the
enforcement of these rights could never be regarded as
permanent, but would be liable to be set aside, and the
rights settled thereby be reopened, when the facts, not only
appertaining to the service of the summons, but the merits
of the controversy, had been forgotten or rendered unavailing by reason of the death of the parties or witnesses.
Of course, if the plaintiff induces the sheriff to make a return that he had served the summons, when he had not,
whereby the plaintiff is enabled to obtain judgment against
the defendant, the chancellor would not hesitate to set the
judgment aside, upon the ground that it was fraudulently
obtained. Also, if he knew the sheriff had made a false
return and took judgment against the defendant, notwithstanding, he would be regarded as an aider and abettor of
the fraud, and the chancellor would set aside the judgment.
But as long as the plaintiff is an innocent party, no false
return of the sheriff, though procured by one of the defendants, and that defendant the husband of the wronged
defendant (which is exactly the case here if what the sheriff
says as to the first return is true), will justify setting aside
His protection lies
the judgment as against the plaintiff.
in the fact that he is an innocent party. When the plaintiff
is an innocent party the sheriff and his coadjutor, if he has
one, are the wrongdoers, and the wronged party may have
an action against them, or either, for damages commensurate to the injury he has sustained growing out of the
wrongful act. Also as the sheriff is tne wrongaoer ana p^
a party to the judgment, the proceeding to impeach his return is collateral; and it is well settled that his re-
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turn cannot be impeached in a collateral proceedins: for the
purpose of setting aside or of getting rid of a judgment au-

thorized by such a return."
The petition in that case alleged that the husband of the
plaintiff had induced the sheriff to return the summons as
personally served on his wife, the plaintiff in that action,
so as to conceal from her the fact that there was danger of
her land being sold.

Numerically, the State courts outside of Missouri appear to be equally divided upon the subject, but the Supreme Court of the United States and the English courts
have always adhered to the rule that the officer's return is
conclusive upon the parties to the suit and cannot be attacked even in equity, except where the plaintiff in the
judgment has aided or abetted in the false return.

**********

Upon principle and for practical purposes this is the
better and wiser rule, and has become too deeply imbedded
in the jurisprudence of this State, and the rights of too
many purchasers at sheriff's sales have become fixed upon
the faith of the rule, to permit it now to be changed. For
it must be apparent that if judgments, and rights acquired
under them by third persons, can afterwards be upset by a
suit in equity, no one would risk money by buying at an
execution sale, or, at best, would discount the risk by giving
only a small proportion of the true value of the property.
This would result in injury to the debtor and creditor
both, for the debtor's lands would not sell for their true
value, and the creditor would not realize on his claim in
full. But in addition to this consideration, such a rule

I
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a

it,

would offer a premium to a defendant to make default, let
judgment go against him, let his land be sold, and a third
party buy
and thus have his debt paid, and then sue in
cfiviity to set aside the deed and recover his land by disproving the sheriff's return. Thus his debt would be paid,
his creditor would be satisfied, the debtor would recover his
land, and the only sufferer would be the purchaser at the
judicial sale. Under such
rule, judicial sales would not
amount to much when the people once understood the risks
inr-iirred. Tliis
exMftly the status of the case at bar. For
tliese reasons
think this case was improperly decided on
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former appeal and that the former decision should be overruled.

Robinson, C. J., concurs; Brace, J., concurs in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 12 and 13, and in the result ; Burgess, J.,
concurs in toto; Gantt and Fox, J. J,, concur in the result
for the reasons expressed in the separate opinion of Fox, J. ;
Valliant, J., dissents in an opinion filed by him.

CROSBY V. FARMER.
Supreme

Court of Minnesota.
39

1888.

Minnesota, 305.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the municipal
court of St. Paul, setting aside a judgment by default.
Mitchell, J. Judgment- by default was rendered
against defendant in the municipal court of St. Paul, upon
the return of a police officer that he had served the summons upon defendant in the city of St. Paul, Ramsey
county, by leaving a copy at his last usual abode, with a
person of suitable age and discretion then resident therein.
Subsequently the judgment was vacated,' on motion of
defendant made on affidavits showing that he was not and
never had been a resident of Ramsey county, but at the
time of the alleged service was and ever since has been a
The plaintiff presented no
resident of Steele county.
but
relied on the conclusiveness of the
counter-affidavits,
—
officer's return, contending that it could not be impeached ;
that, if false, defendant's only remedy was by action
against the officer.
This question has never been squarely decided by this
* * *
court, — at least as to a return on original process.
* * *
The rule of the English common law is that, as
between the parties to the process or their privies, a sheriff's return is conclusive, and that the court will not try the
truth of it on motion to set aside the proceedings, or allow
any averment against it to be taken in pleading; that, if
false, the only remedy is against the sheriff by action.

88
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Com. Dig. tit. ''Eetorn" F 2 and G. The reason usually
given for the rule is that it is necessary to secure the rights
of the parties, and give validity and effect to the acts of
ministerial officers. In England, process could only be
served by the sheriff, who was the only ministerial officer
known to the courts for that purpose. Moreover, under the
common law practice which obtained there, it was almost
impossible for judgment to be rendered against a party
without actual personal notice to him. Under such a system, the rule might be convenient, and without much danger

of working injustice.
But, under the practice which obtains in this and other
states, most of the old safeguards have been removed ; and
the necessity for modifying the rule, and adapting it to the
changed condition of the law, has been often felt and frequently acted upon, especially in the case of original
In the
process by which the court acquires jurisdiction.
district court a summons may be served by any person not
a party to the action, and his affidavit of service is placed
virtually on the same footing as the return of the sheriff.
In the municipal court of St. Paul the summons may be
The remedy by action for false
served by any policeman.
return, under such a system, would often be inadequate or
wholly fruitless. Again, the manner of service has been in
other respects so materially changed that actual personal
service is unnecessary, and the officer making service must
often return as to facts not within his personal knowledge, but in the determination of which he must frequently
rely upon information received from others. For example,
service may be made by leaving a copy of the summons at
the house of defendant's usual abode, with a person of
suitable age and discretion then resident therein.
In
case of corporations service may be made, not oniy on
certain specified general officers, but also, in certain cases,
upon a managing or general agent, or even upon an acting
ticket or freight agent.
In case of minors under 14
years, the service must be both on the minor personally,
and also upon his father, mother, or guardian, or, if none,
upon tlie person having the care or control of the minor, or
with whom he resides, or by whom he is employed. How can
a slifriff determine where a man resides, or who resides
with him, or who is the ticket or freight agent of a railway
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company, or who has the care or control of a minor, or by
whom he is employed, except upon information? And why
should his return as to these facts be conclusive?
If the'^
officer makes a mistake, why should the defendant be compelled to allow the judgment against him to stand, and resort to his suit against the officer, instead of being permitted to apply in a direct proceeding in the action to set
aside the false return!
We can see no good reason why
the plaintiff should have a sum of money to which he is
not entitled, and the officer be compelled to pay the defendant a like sum for making what may have been an
honest mistake. If somebody must suffer loss for the mistake, it is right it should fall on him who made it; but, if
discovered in time to prevent loss to anyone, why should
not the mistake be corrected on motion! There are very
good reasons why the return of a ministerial officer should
be held conclusive in all collateral proceedings, but we can
see none, either upon principle or considerations of policy,
why it may not be impeached for falsity in direct proceedings in the action; assuming always, of course, that no
rights of third parties have intervened. Any evils or inconvenience which can possibly arise from permitting this
to be done would, in our judgment, be greatly outweighed
by the injustice that would often result from prohibiting it.
The general tendency, especially in states having a Code
practice like ours, is to allow the return to be impeached
by an affidavit, on motion or other direct proceedings to
vacate. Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kan. 228; Walker v. Lutz, 14
Neb. 274, (15 N. W. Eep. 352) ; Wendell v. Mugridge, 19 N.
H. 109; Carr v. Commercial Bank, 16 Wis. 52; Stout v.
Sioux City d Pacific Ry. Co., 3 McCrary, 1, (8 Fed. Rep.
794) ; Van Rensselaer v. Cliadivick, 7 How. Prac. 297; Wallis V. Lott, 15 How. Prac. 567 ; Watson v. Watson, 6 Conn.
334; Rowe v. Table Mt. Water Co., 10 Cal. 442.
Some of the cases seem to make a distinction between
mesne and final process and the original process, like a
summons, by which the court acquires jurisdiction of the
defendant. We confess that we cannot see at present why
there should be any such distinction ; but, without deciding
that question, we are of opinion that, upon a motion madr
in the action to vacate a judgment by default on the ground
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of no service of the summons, the return of the officer may
be

impeached by affidavits, as was done in this case.

Order affirmed.^

There is a great diversity of judicial
iConclusiveness of Sheriff's Betnrn.
rules and their
ot)inion upon this subject, and a close inquiry into the various
illustrate the
above
given
cases
The
here.
value
little
limitations -would be of
antagonistic views which lead to the extreme positions on each side of the
The following
Between these there are numberless gradations.
question.
which
quotations will illustrate the extent and variety of the considerations
subject.
this
control the decisions upon
sound public
Kochman v. O'Neill, (1903) 202 ill. 110, 66 N. E. 1047:
policy, the security of litigants and the stability of legal proceedings demand
that the return of the sworn officer shall not be set aside or impeached except
Every presumption in favor of the return is
upon satisfactory evidence.
indulged, and it will not be set aside upon the uncorroborated testimony of the
(Davis v. Dresback, 81
party upon whom service purports to have been made.
111. 393.) Justice, however, requires that the rules shall not be so strict as to
prevent all relief against a return which is untrue through fraud, accident
or mistake, and if it is clear from the evidence that the defendant has not
' '
Similar statement in Westbeen served the judgment should be set aside.
man V. Carlson, (1910) 86 Nebr. 847, 126 N. W. 515.
Waterbury National Bank v. Eeed, (1907) 231 111. 246, 83 N. E. 188:
is, however, the law of this state that when a judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction recites that there was actual service of process upon the defendant in apt time and there is nothing in the record to contradict such record
or return, the finding or return cannot, at law, be impeached by evidence
dehors the record, (Rust v. Frothingham, Buese, 331; Barnet v. Wolf, 70 111.
76; Zepp v. Hager, id. 223; Harris v. Lester, 80 id. 307; Hunter v. Stoneburner, 92 id. 75;) although in a proper case a false return may be set aside
in equity; (Owens v. Ranstead, 22 111. 161; Hickey v. Stone, 60 id. 458;) and it
may be questioned before judgment by plea in abatement, (Mineral Point
Railroad Co. v. Keep, 22 111. 9; Holloway v. Freeman, id. 197; Sibert v. Thorp,
77 id. 43; Ryan v. Lander, 89 id. 554; Union National Bank of Chicago v!
First National Bank, 90 id. 56; Chicago Sectional Electric Underground Co. v.
('ongdon Brake-Shoe Manf. Co.,
id. 309); or in case of default entered
ni.on such return, on motion promptly made, the same may be set aside

"A

"It

Ill

(Brown

v.

Brown,

59 111.

315.)"

"If,

Meyer v. Wilson, (1906) 166 Ind. 651, 76 N. E. 748:
however, the
pjocess was not served by the officer, and false return was procured by the
fraudulent acts of the plaintiff, or by a conspiracy between him and the
o.Ti^tr, the same is not conclusive."
Hilt V. Heimberger, (1908) 235 111. 235, 85 N. E. 304: "Where rights of
third persons have been acquired in good faith, the return of an officer showing the service of summons cannot be contradicted, but as against parties acquiring rights Mith notice of the facts the return is not conclusive."
"As to the fact
Schott V. Linscott, (1909) 80 Kan. 536, 103 Pac. 997:
of service, the general rule is that as between the parties to an action the
return of the sheriff is conclusive; but if his return is of a fact not within
his personal knowledge but dependent upon information received from others,
a party is not jtrecluded from an inquiry into the facts on which jurisdiction de" Snme rule stated in Krutz v, Isaacs, (1901) 25 Wash. 566, 66 Pac.
pends.
141.

Motion to set aside decree
v. Locke, (1894) 18 R. I. 716, 30 Atl. 422:
had no notice of
defendant
that
ground
the
for
trial
on
the
case
roinstiite
and
"While it is true that an officer's return upon a writ
the [lending thereof.
is conclusive and cannot be controverted incidentally by motion or plea except in cases especially provided for by statute, Angell v. Bowler, 3 R. I. 77,
yet, as \inder section 2 of chapter 26 of the Judiciary Act, the court has
control over its decrees for the period of six months after the entry thereof,
'
may, for caus« shown, set aside the same and reinstate the ease, or
and
Lofke
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new entry and take other proceedings, with proper notice to the parties,
with or without terms, as it may by general rule or s]iecial order direct,' it is
clearly within the power of the court to grant the relief asked for in this
ease without any infringement of the rule above stated, and without any rc' '
ilection upon the officer who served the writ.
Michels v. Stork, (1883) 52 Mich. 260, 17 N. W. 833.
This case contains
an extended review of the authorities on this question in an opinion by Justios
Oooley.
make

Section

6.

Privilege from Service.

PARKER

V. MARCO.

Court of Appeals of New York.
136

1893,

New York, 585.

Maynard, J. The defendant is a resident of South Carolina and an action had been brought there against him in
the Federal Circuit Court, by the plaintiff, who is a resident of this state. On April 6, 1892, the defendant came
to the city of New York at the instance of the plaintiff to
attend an examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses before a notary public, which by the agreement of the counsel
for the respective parties had been set down for that date.
The plaintiff procured the defendant's assent to the examination upon the statement that he desired to be in readiness
to try the cause at the ensuing April Circuit, to be held at
When the time for taking the testithe city of Charleston.
mony arrived the defendant was informed by plaintiff's
counsel that he had abandoned his intention to take the evi-

dence as proposed, for the reason that on account of sickness in his, the counsel's family, the plaintiff would not be
prepared to go to trial at the April Circuit, and he expected
to be able to produce his witnesses in court when the trial
should take place at a subsequent term. It was then late

in the afternoon and the defendant returned to his hotel
and remained over night, and the next morning started for
liis home in South Carolina. He was intercepted at the
ferry by a process server, who served him with a summons
in this action brought by the plaintiff in the supreme Court
of this state for the same cause of action at issue in the
Federal Court in South Carolina. The defendant had no
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business in New York except that which related to the proThe defendant has appealed from an
posed examination.
order of the General Term, reversing an order of the Special Term, which set aside the service of the summons upon
the ground that, when served, he was privileged from
service.
Under Section 863 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States the plaintiff had an absolute right to take the testimony of his witnesses in this state to be used upon the
trial of the action in South Carolina upon giving reasonable notice to the defendant.
The compulsory character of
the proceeding was not affected by the waiver of notice
and the fixing of the time by the agreement of parties.
{Plimpton V. Winslotv, 9 Fed. R. 365.) The same section
provides that a person may be required to appear and
testify before the notary in the same manner as witnesses
in open court, and section 915 of our own Code authorizes
any state judge to issue a subpoena to compel the attendance of a witness in such a case. In the trial of the action
the notary thus becomes the arm of the court, and, as was
held In re Rindskopf (24 Fed. R. 542) represents the court
pro hac vice.
The privilege of a suitor or witness to be exempt from
service of process while without the jurisdiction of his residence for the purpose of attending court in an action to
which he is a party or in which he is to be sworn as a witness is a very ancient one.
(Year Book 13, Hen. IV., I. B.

Viner's Abr. "Privilege.")

It

has always been held to extend to every proceeding of
judicial nature taken in or emanating from a duly constituted tribunal which directly relates to the trial of the
issues involved. It is not simply a personal privilege, but
it is also the privilege of the court, and is deemed necessary for the maintenance of its authority and dignity and
in order to promote the due and eflicient administration of
justice.
(Person v. Grier, QQ N. Y. 124; Mattheivs v. Tufts,
87 id. 568.)
At common law a writ of privilege or protection would be granted to the party or witness by the court
in which the action was pending, which would be respected
l)y all other courts. We cannot find that the power to issue
Huch a writ has been abrogated by legislation, and it doubtless exists, and the writ may still be granted by courts

a
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possessing a common law jurisdiction; but while the granting of the writ is proper, it is not necessary for the enjoyment of the privilege, and the only office which it can perform is to afford "convenient and authentic notice to those
about to do what would be a violation of the privilege, and
to set it forth and command due respect to it."
{Bridges
Sheldon,
V.
7 Fed. R. 4-1:.) The tendency has been not to restrict but to enlarge the right of privilege so as to alford
full protection to parties and witnesses from all forms of
civil process during their attendance at court and for a
reasonable time in going and returning. {Lamed v. Griffin, 12 Fed. Rep. 592.)
Hearings before arbitrators, legislative committees, registers and commissioners in bankruptcy, and examiners and
( ommissioners
to take depositions, have all been declared to
je embraced within the scope of its application. (Bacon's
Abr. "Privilege"; Sand ford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381; Matthews V. Tufts, supra; Hollender v. Hall, 18 Civ. Pro. 394;
19 id. 292; Thorp v. Adams, id. 351; Bridges v. Sheldon;
Plimpton V. Winslow; and Lamed v. Griffin, supra.) It has
even been extended to a suitor returning from an appointment with his solicitor for the purpose of inspecting a paper
in his adversary's possession in preparation for an examination before a master, {Sidgier v. Birch, 9 Ves. 69) and
while attending at the registrar's office with his solicitor, to
settle the terms of a decree {Neivton v. Askeiv, 6 Hare, 319) ;
and while attending from another state to hear an argument in his own case in the Court of Appeals {Pell's case,
1 Rich. L. 197.)
No good reason can be perceived why the
privilege should not be extended to a party appearing
upon the examination of his adversary's witnesses, where
the testimony is taken pursuant to the authority of law,
and can be read upon the trial with the same force and
effect as if it had been taken in open court. It is a
proceeding in the cause, which materially affects his rights,
and the necessity for his attendance is quite as urgent as
it would be if the examination was had at the trial. But
we do not think that the question of the necessity of his
It is the right of the party, as wpU
presence is material.
as his privilege, to be present whenever evidence is to be
taken in the action, which may be used for the purpose of
It is essentially a part
affecting its final determination.
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of the trial, and should be so regarded so far as it may be
necessary for the protection of the suitor. There have
l)een many analogous cases in the Federal Courts where
In Bridges v.
the right to the privilege has been upheld.
Sheldon, (supra), the action was pending in the U. S. CirA reference had been ordered to a
cuit for Vermont.
The master on
master to take and state an account.
motion of the plaintiff had made an order for the taking of
a deposition before a commissioner in the state of Iowa.
The defendant, while attending before the commissioner in
Iowa, was served with process in a suit brought by the plaintiff for the same cause of action as in the Federal court.
Judge Wheeler, in very strong terms, condemned the procedure, and held that the defendant was absolutely privileged from service, and that the conduct of the plaintiff in
causing such service to be made was a contempt of court,
and could be punished as such. It seems that in such a case
He may move in the court,
a party has a two-fold remedy.
whose privilege has been violated, to punish the party in
that court who has been guilty of such violation, or he may
move in the court out of which the process has been imand the motion will be granted.
properly issued to vacate
it,

**********

It

is

a

may be assumed that the plaintiff acted in entire good
device to secure the
faith, and that his procedure was not
within
territorial jurisdicof
the
defendant
the
presence
tion of the courts of this state. In the view we take of the
of no
privilege of the defendant, the plaintiff's motive
importance.
The order of the General Term should be reversed, and
the order of the Special Term affirmed, with costs.
All concur except Gray, J., dissenting.
Order reversed.
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GREENLEAF Y. PEOPLE'S BANK OF BUFFALO.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
133

1903.

North Carolina, 292.

Clark, C. J., concurring.

The defendant

Morey was
served with summons in this case while at a hotel in this
State. He contends that because he was a lawyer, resident
in another State, and was attending court in this State as
counsel in a cause therein pending, the service should be
struck out. The proposition is a novel one in a land where
equality before the law is the ruling principle and where
special privilege to any class of our citizens is not only not
recognized by law but is prohibited by the Constitution.
A careful examination shows no ground for the alleged exemj^tion of lawyers from service of summons. There is no
precedent in England to sustain the proposition, and none
in this country save a single case, a very recent one — Hoffman V. Circuit Judge, 113 Michigan, 109 ; 38 L. R. A. 663 ;
67 Am. St. Rep., 458 — which holds that a lawyer, resident
in the same State, is privileged from service of a summons
while attending the Supreme Court of the State or going
or returning therefrom, but none of the authorities cited in
The reason given in
that opinion sustain its conclusion.
the opinion is that while by statute in that State the prohibition of the arrest of counsel in a civil suit is restricted
to the actual sitting of a court at which he is engaged, that
this does not repeal the common-law exemption of counsel
from service of summons. But, on the other hand, the most
eminent lawyer which that State (Michigan) has produced.
Judge Cooley, in a note to his work on Constitutional Limitations (5th Ed.), p. 161, says: "Exemption from arrest
is not violated by the service of citation or declaration in
civil cases." Besides, there was at common law no exemption of lawyers from service of process other than arrest,
and the reason for the latter was that it would be an in-

jury to clients whose

cause had been prepared

for trial

by

such coansel to suddenly deprive them of his services, but
service of a summons does not have that effect.
In Bobbins v. Lincoln, 27 Fed. Rep., 342 (United States

Circuit Court for Illinois), it is well said: "Inasmuch as
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resident attorneys may be served with summons while in
attendance upon court, an attorney from another State has
no greater privilege. " This is exactly in point here. It is
well known that no lawyer in this State has ever in its history been privileged, or contended even that he was privileged, from service of summons while attending court. If
he were, as the Constitution, Art. IV., sec. 22, now provides
that "the courts are always open," no lawyer or judge
could ever be served with summons. In England, Blackstone says (3 Bl. Com., 289), that lawyers could not be arrested on civil process while in attendance upon court, but
could be served with a bill, without arrest, which was equivalent to service of a summons. The same is stated in 8
Bacon's Abr. ''Privilege" B., with the modification that if
an attorney is sued with another (as in this case), "he is
not privileged from arrest, even though it is during his
attendance in court," the evident reason being to prevent
class discrimination. The exemption of lawyers from arrest, it seems, has now been repealed in England. In this
State the English privilege of exemption of lawyers from
arrest has never been recognized. It is well known that
one of the most distinguished lawyers and judges of this
State, whose portrait now hangs on the walls of this chamber, was arrested and imprisoned for debt, and long prevented from attending upon court.
This barbarous proceeding of imprisonment for debt, handed down from the
common law, should have been repealed long before it was,
but while it was in force our predecessors applied it impartially, and the bench did not hold their own members or
their profession exempt. There was not at common law,
and has not been in this State, any exemption of any one
from service of summons, and the exemption from arrest
under our statute is conferred only upon witnesses and
jurors.
Tlie Code, sees. 13G7 and 1735. And even witnesses and jurors are not exempted from service of summons, since such service would not deprive the court of
their presence. There is no reason why lawyers should be
privileged from either arrest or service of summons any
more than other oHicers of the court, as sheriffs, clerks,
criers and the like, and the legislative power has therefore
seen fit to make the exemption apply only to witnesses and
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jurors, and, as to them, to make the exemption extend to
freedom from arrest only.
As to non-residents, in Cooper v. Wyman, 122 N. C, 784,
this Court held that non-resident witnesses and suitors
coming into this State solely for the purpose of litigation
were exempt from service while here for that purpose only.
This was put upon the ground of necessitv, because the
State could not compel their presence, and that since no
one else could fill their functions it was in the interest of
justice to give them "a safe conduct." But this reasoning
has not obtained in some States, notably Illinois, which
holds that neither are exempt from service of summons.
Greer v. Young, 120 111. 184, citing authorities. In Nichols
V. Goodlieart, 5 111. App., 574, it was held that a defendant
involuntarily in the State, by virtue of criminal process, is
not exempt from service of summons, citing Williams v.
Bacon, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 636. Other States hold that the
rule is restricted to witnesses only. Shearman v. Gunlatch,
Other States extend the exemption to
37 Minn., 118.
parties also, since they have become competent as witnesses
{Mitchell v. Huron, 53 Michigan, 541), and our State has
adopted that rule, but restricts the exemption to those two
— "non-resident witnesses and parties." An exhaustive
brief of all the authorities, showing that the privilege ex-

tends only to non-resident witnesses and parties, will be
found in the notes (eighteen pages) to Mullen v. Sanborn,
25 L. R. A., 721-738.
No court whatever has in any case
The
lawyers.
extended the exemption to non-resident
Fed,
nearest approach to it is Trust Co. v. Railroad, 74
Rep., 442, in which a subpoena served upon non-resident
counsel, which prevented his returning home and attending
to business he had left unprovided for, was set aside. That
case is not sustained by any previous authority, and evidently rests more upon the ground stated therein, that the
non-resident subpoenaed was president of a railway company, than because he was also a lawyer, but, if sound, it
is very far from sustaining an alleged exemption from service of summons, which did not prevent Morey from returning home and adjusting his business, for the trial of
his case is for a subsequent term.
The United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 6, prohibits
the arrest of a member of the House of Representatives or
T. p.— 7
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Senator during the session, except for treason, felony
and breach of the peace.
There is a similar provision as
to the members of the Legislature in Nebraska.
The numerous and uniform authorities that such privilege from
arrest does not exempt from service of process without
arrest are collected in a very recent and able opinion (1903)
in Berlet v. Weary, 93 N. W., 238 (Neb.) ; 60 L. R. A., 609;
and in Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn., 542 ; 23 L. R. A., 632 ;
Gentry v. Griffith, 27 Tex., 461. For a stronger reason this
is so where, as in most States as well as in this, lawyers are
not exempt even from arrest.
In Lyall v. Goodivin, 4 McLean, 29, a service of a summons from a United States
Court upon a judge of the State Supreme Court, in his own
court and while actually on duty, was set aside because
being a supposed indignity to the court and interference
with its business. Even if this can be sustained and extended to counsel, neither the dignity of the court nor the
despatch of business in this case could be interfered with
by the service of summons upon Morey at the hotel.
Nor, in the nature of things, is there any reason why a
non-resident lawyer, coming here for a consideration in the
pursuit of his profession, should be exempt from the service of summons any more than a non-resident physician
or minister or a member of any other calling. The plaintiff sues for services rendered to the defendants in this
State at their request. If Morey is exempt from service
because here in the exercise of his profession, a ''commercial tourist" is by the same right exempt from being
served with summons in an action for a hotel bill incurred
while prosecuting his calling.
Indeed, his ground for exemption would be more plausible, for he is engaged in
Service of
interstate commerce and the lawyer is not.
summons upon neither will interfere with the dignity of
the courts or their despatch of business. Our State extends
no preference to non-resident lawyers over those living
liere. The Code, sees. 18 and 19; Manning v. Railroad, 122
a

N. C, p. 828.

As far back

III.,

England
Orlando
f)assed
Bridgeman in Benyon v. Evelyn Tr., 14 Car., 2 C. B. Roll,
over a century before (1661), and cited in Knoivles' Case,
12 Mod., at p. 64 (1694), that the privilege which members
as 1769 (10 George
ch. 50),
a statute confirming the ruling of Sir
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of Parliament enjoyed of being exempt from arrest did not
exempt them from being sued or from service of ordinary
The privilege was deemed too inprocess without arrest.
vidious a class privilege even for that age and country, and
the claim was denied by Parliament itself and the contention put at rest. Cassidey v. Stewart, 2 Man. & Gr. 437. It
is not for an American court to reverse the process and
hold that because lawyers were formerly privileged from
arrest during attendance upon court, therefore, they are
exempt from being sued and being served with a summons.
By the census of 1900 there were 114,703 practicing
lawyers in the United States, of whom 1,263 were in North
Carolina. If, during all these years, lawj^ers had possessed
the privilege of exemption from the service of summons,
assuredly more than one case could be found to assert it.
If it had been so asserted it would have been promptly repealed by statute, seeing that the Parliament in England
passed an act denying a similar claim that its own members were exempt from service of summons because privileged from arrest, and that members and Senators in Congress are not privileged from service of summons, though
expressly exempted from arrest on civil process by the Constitution.
Even the former privilege of lawyers from arrest has been modified in some States and expressly repealed in others, and in others still, as in North Carolina,

it has never

been recognized or acknowledged.
unfounded
is the claim that service upon the
Equally
other defendant, the officer of a corporation {Jester v.
Steam Packet Co., 131 N. C, 54), was invalid because made
when he was attending a sale of land under a decree of
court. Such sale may, like other acts, come before a court
for review, but the sale itself is not a judicial proceeding,
and no exemption from service of process extends to it.
Such exemptions are restricted to non-resident witnesses
and parties, and are permitted, not on their own account
or for their own benefit, but for the benefit of the court in
obtaining evidence at a trial, when the court cannot compel
the presence of those who can testify to facts in issue in
This can have no application to the attend
the litigation.
ance of a party at a sale, under a decree in the cause, for
his own convenience or benefit.
In the days of Privilege, under the rule of Ecclesiastics
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'q England, they held their own profession exempt from
the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and set apart certain
places where all men were exempt from service of process
under the * 'Privilege of Sanctuary."
The last remnant of
21
repealed.
such class privileges was
James I. Judges
have never claimed for the legal profession or the courts
any similar exemption, either as to persons or places. With
lawyers for judges, justice knows neither class nor caste,
and admits no special privileges, and for its administration "every place is a temple and all seasons summer."
The judgment setting aside the service of summons must
])e reversed.
Douglas, J., concurs in the above concurring opinion.

CHAPTER

III.

APPEARANCE.
Section

1.

What Constitutes

a

Special Appeakance.

BELKNAP V. CHARLTON.
Supreme Court of Oregon.

1893,

25 Oregon, 41.

This action was commenced by H. A. Belknap, H. P.
Belknap and S. I. Belknap, partners, in the Circuit Court
for Crook county against C. M. and Mamie Charlton, residents of Morrow county, to recover the sum of sixty-one
dollars and twenty cents upon an account for goods, wares,
and merchandise sold and delivered, and for services rendered. A writ of attachment was duly issued and served
in Crook county by attaching in the hands of one J. F.
Moore certain moneys belonging to the defendants, but
the summons in the action was not served on the defendants. Some three months after the action was commenced,
and the writ of attachment had been served, the defendants
appeared specially by their attorney for the purpose of
.applying to the court to discharge the attachment because
the action had been commenced in the wrong county, and
because no service had been made upon them, which motion
l)eing overruled, judgment was rendered against them by
default. They now appeal, claiming that such appearance,
being special, gave the court no jurisdiction to render a
judgment against them.
Reversed.
Opinion by Me. Justice Bean.
1.
It is admitted that the voluntary appearance of a
defendant in an action is equivalent to the service of a
summons, and waives all defects in the process (Code, §
(52), but the contention for defendant is that no appearance, except as provided in section 530 of the Code, — that
is, either by answer, demurrer, or giving plaintiff written
notice, — can be deemed an appearance within the meaning of
101
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section 62 of our Code. Section 530 provides, that a defendant appears in an action wiien lie answers, demurs, or gives
plaintiff written notice of his appearance, and until he does
so appear he shall not be entitled to be heard, or be served
with notice of subsequent proceedings in such action or suit,
or in any proceeding pertaining thereto, except the giving of
an undertaking in the provisional remedies of arrest, attachment, or the delivery of personal property.
The arrangement of this section in the Code under the title of
"Notices and Service and Filing of Papers," as well as its
language, indicates clearly that its only purpose is to define
what shall constitute such an appearance in an action as
will entitle the defendant to be heard, as a matter of right,
and entitle him to the service of notice of motions and subsequent proceedings in the action required by law to be
served : Bank v. Rogers, 12 Minn., 529 ; Grant v. Schmidt,
22 Minn., 1.
It was not, we think, intended to define a
voluntary appearance within the meaning of section 62,
and has no bearing upon the question of jurisdiction.
A
defendant may appear and submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court in many ways, without either answering,
demurring, or giving i^laintiff written notice of his appearance. He may do this by appearing in person, or by attorney in open court, by attacking the complaint by motion, or
by an application for a continuance, and in many other
ways which will readily suggest themselves to one familiar
with the course of judicial proceedings.
But before he is
entitled, as a matter of right, to be heard in the action, or
in any proceedings pertaining thereto, or to be served with
notice, he must appear in one of the ways provided in section 530. The question before us, therefore, must be determined without reference to that section, which, as we conceive, has no bearing upon tlie question as to whether a
special appearance for the purpose of applying for the discharge of an attachment is a submission to the jurisdiction
of the court so as to authorize it to proceed to judgment in
the action without the service of summons.
2.
It is claimed by the plaintiffs that while a defendant
may appear specially to object to the jurisdiction of the
court over him on account of the illegal service of process,
(Kinkade v. Myers, 17 Or. 470, 21 Pac. Bep. 557), he must
keep out of court for every other purpose, and that any
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appearance which calls into action the power of the court
Tor any purpose except to decide upon its own jurisdiction.
is a general appearance, and waives all defects in the ser
vice of process, and many authorities are cited to sustain
The principle to be extracted from the dethis position.
cisions on this subject is, that where the defendant appears
and asks some relief which can be granted only on the
hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and
the person, it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the
court as completely as if he had been regularly served with
process, whether such an appearance by its terms be limited
to a special purpose or not:
Coad v. Coad, 41 Wis. 26;
Blackburn v. Siveet, 38 Wis., 578; Pry v. Hannibal S St.
Jo. R. R. Co., 73 Mo., 126; Sargent v. Flaid, 90 Ind., 501;
Layne v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 35 W. Va. 438, 14 S. E. Rep.
123; Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St., 366; Bucklin v. Strickler, 32 Neb., 602, 49 N. W. Rep., 371; Burdette v. C organ,
26 Kansas, 102; Aidtman & Taylor Co. v. Steinan, 8 Neb.,
109.
This seems to be a reasonable rule, and one which
will adequately protect the rights of the parties, and it determines the effect of defendant's appearance from the
nature of the relief which he seeks to obtain. If he asks
the court to adjudicate upon some question affecting the
merits of the controversy, or for some relief which presupposes jurisdiction of the person, and which can be
granted only after jurisdiction is acquired, he will be
deemed to have made a general appearance, and to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot, by any act of his, limit his appearance to a special
purpose.
But, if granting the relief asked would be consistent with a want of jurisdiction over the person, he may
appear for a special purpose without submitting himself to
the jurisdiction of the court for any other purpose. It has
consequently been held that an attachment and the action
out of which it issues, are so inseparately connected that
the defendant cannot appear and question the validity of
the attachment by a traverse of the facts alleged in the
affidavit, or by contesting the truth of the grounds upon
which it issued, without submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court in the action, because by so doing the
court is called upon to entertain and determine questions
which can be considered only after jurisdiction has at-
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Greenivell v. Greenwell, 26 Kan. 530; Bury v.
Conklin, 23 Kan., 460; Wood v. Young, 38 Iowa, 102; Duncan V. Wkkliife, 4 Met. (Ky.) 118. But where a defendant
appears, and without questioning the merits of the action,
or the truth of the grounds upon which the attachment
issued, moves to discharge the attachment for want of the
he asks no relief the grantjurisdictional facts to sustain
ing of which would be inconsistent with an entire want of
jurisdiction over the person, and hence does not appear in
the action so as to authorize the court to proceed to judgment against him
112
Glidden v. PackDrake, Attach.
28
ard,
Cal., 649; Johnson v. Buell, 26 111., QQ; Bonner v.
;

:

§

it,

taclied:

it

it

a

it

Brown, 10 La. Ann. 334.
Now, in the case at bar, the appearance of the defendants was not for the purpose of contesting the truth of the
grounds upon which the attachment issued, or the merits
of the action, but to vacate the attachment for the reason,
as appears from the affidavit accompanying the motion,
that the action had been commenced in the wrong county,
was
and that
great injustice and wrong to them to have
their property thus held under an attachment when there
was no means of obtaining jurisdiction over their persons.
This appearance was, therefore, not for the purpose of subto
mitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or asking
entertain or determine any question which could only be
considered after jurisdiction had attached, but
was for
the sole purpose of objecting to the validity of the attachment for irregularities in the proceedings, the granting of
which would have been entirely consistent with the claim
that the court had no jurisdiction of the person. By their

a

a

a

a

motion to discharge the attachment for the reason stated,
the defendants appeared for no purpose incompatible with
the supposition that the court had acquired no jurisdiction
over them on account of
want of service of the summons, and we therefore think there was no waiver of prostatute,
cess. Nothing less than the express language of
or the necessary implication therefrom, or the overbearing
weight of autliority, will justify
court in holding that
defendant in an action commenced in the wrong county, in
violation of section 44 of the Code, could not appear and
apply for the discharge of an attachment against his property, for irregularities, without being required to submit
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himself to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of
the entire action; and it is not material in such case,
whether the motion happened to be well founded or not,
but the question is, did it go to the merits, or was it based
upon some technical grounds supposed to be sufficient to
render the attachment invalid. If a defendant may not
thus appear and resist what he supposes to be a wrongful
attachment without subjecting his person to the jurisdiction of the court, he must either suffer his property to be
held under a pretended attachment for an indefinite time,
or waive a statutory right to be sued in the county where
he resides or may be found.
This the law will not exact or
require.
4.
It was suggested that the remedy of the defendants
in such case is by motion to dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction, but such a motion would be unavailing. The
court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and an action is
commenced by filing the complaint, and there is no provision of the law authorizing it to be dismissed because the
summons has not been served: Code, <§ § 51, 59. It follows,
therefore, that the action of the court below in entering
judgment against the defendants without service of process
upon them was unauthorized, and the judgment must be
reversed.
Reversed.

FULTON V. EAMSEY.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
67

PoFFENBAEGER,

J.

1910.

West Virginia, 321.

The solo qucstlou iu this cause, name-

ly, whether Joseph Eamsey, Jr., George J. Gould, and William E. Guy, non-resident defendants, proceeded against by
order of publication, appeared herein, in the court below,
by attorneys, so as to enable that court to render a personal
decree against them, grows out of the operations of what
is styled in an agreement, and popularly known, as "the
Little Kanawha Syndicate," which agreement is dated De-
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cember 2, 1901, and was signed by said Ramsey, Gould, Guy,
and others.
That syndicate seems to have been formed for the purpose of purchasing the Little Kanawha Railroad, large
areas of coal lands, and other properties in this state. * * *
In anticipation of the launching of this enterprise, Mr.
Edward D. Fulton had acquired an option on the Little
Kanawha Railroad as well as the title to, and options upon,
large areas of coal and coal lands and other property in
the counties of Braxton, Gilmer, and Lewis. Under certain
agreements, and with intent to dispose of the same to the
syndicate, he assigned the option on the railroad, at the option price, and assigned his coal and coal land options, and
conveyed his coal and coal lands, at certain prices named
in the assignments and deeds, to the St. Louis Union Trust
For some
Company, to hold as trustee for the syndicate.
reason, the syndicate concluded to abandon its plan and sell
all its property. Accordingly, it failed to carry out its contemjDlated arrangements with Fulton, and he brought this
suit, in the Circuit Court of Braxton county, to compel
specific performance of his alleged contract with the syndicate.

*

* *

On the 1st day of December, 1908, the following order,
relied upon by Fulton as showing a general appearance,
was entered:
''This day R. W. McMichael and John B.
Morrison, attorneys practicing in this court, appeared and
asked the court to permit them to appear specially for
Joseph Ramsey, Jr., George J. Gould, and William E. Guy,
as managers of the Little Kanawha Syndicate, and ask a
continuance of this cause for thirty or sixty days to enable
them to prepare their defense, or to determine whether
they would desire to appear generally, and stating that
they did not desire to appear generally for said parties at
this time, but that they desired to move the court to continue the cause without appearance otlier than specially for
the purposes of the continuance.
The plaintiff, by his
counsel, resisted the said motion to continue the hearing,
and thereupon said counsel for said defendants Ramsey,
Gould, and Guy, announced that it was their desire to withdraw and not appear to the case, and thereupon counsel for
plaintiff, and while said counsel for defendants were present, asked that the cause be submitted for hearing and ac-
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cordingly the said cause was submitted for hearing."

* • *

We think the order was nothing more than an inquiry,
addressed to the court, for information as to what could
be done by way of obtaining a postponement of action in
the cause, without submitting to the jurisdiction of the
court for all purposes, or a conditional, not an absolute and
unqualified, motion for a continuance.
The motion, as recorded, if it can be regarded as a motion, signified a desire
for a continuance, if it could be had without a waiver of
service of process upon the defendants, but distinctly declared unwillingness to ask or take a continuance, if it involved such a waiver. It does not say in express terms
that a motion to continue was made.
On the contrary, it
says McMichael and Morrison asked the court to permit them to appear specially for their clients and ask a

a

it

a

a

a

if

a

if

it

a

it

it,

continuance, to enable them to determine whether they
would desire to appear generally, and stated that they did
not desire to appear generally at that time. It then says
counsel for plaintiff resisted "said motion to continue."
That means the motion or request made. It was not in
terms a motion, and, read in the light of the protest, subcannot be regarded as anything
mitted along with
more, in substance and effect, than an offer to move for
could be done without waiving process,
continuance,
declaration of intent not to move at
accompanied by
such action involved waiver, and an immediate decall,
laration of determination not to say or do anything more,
after having been informed that
motion for
continuance, so made and described upon the record, would be in
law submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
We apprehend no dissent from the pro^DOsition that the
establishment of the jurisdiction of
court, whether over
the person or the subject matter, must be affirmatively
shown by the record.
Groves v. Grant County Court, 42
W. Va., 587, 600, 26 S. E. 460. Something must be done to
confer it. Jurisdiction of the person may be acquired by
implication, arising out of some act done, or by direct and
positive acknowledgement thereof; but in either event
should clearly appear. It ought to be reasonably free from
uncertainty and doubt. A favorite statement of the rule,
respecting the acquisition of jurisdiction by implication or
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appearance to the action in any case,
for any other purpose than to take advantage of the defective execution, or non-execution, of process, a defendant
places himself precisely in the situation in which he would
be if process were executed upon him, and he thereby
waives all objection to the defective execution or non-execution of process upon him." State v. Coal Co., 49 W. Va.
143, 38 S. E. 539; Lumber Co. v. Lance, 50 W. Va. 640, 41
S. E. 128; Layne v. Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 438, 14 S. E.
123; Blankenship v. Railivay Co., 43 W. Va. 135, 27 S. E.
355; Mahany v. Kephart, 15 W. Va. 609; Bank v. Bank, 3
W. Va. 386. This is a declaration of a general principle,
to be read in the light of the facts and circumstances under
which it is applied, in seeking its true meaning. Some attention must also be paid to its terms. It must be an appearance for a purpose in the cause, not one merely collateral' to it. In this state, litigants have put themselves
within this rule, for the most part, by asking or accepting
some sort of relief in the cause, consistent with the hypothesis of a submission and inconsistent with any other view,
No instance can be found in which
such as a continuance.
a party has been held to have impliedly bound himself to
submission, without having asked or received some relief in
the cause or participated in some step taken therein. Mere
presence in the court room when the case is called, or examination of the papers in it filed in the clerk's office, is not
enough. Nor could a conversation with plaintiff's counsel
or the judge of the court, about the case, be regarded as an
appearance. No decision goes that far. Under this text in
3 Cyc. 504, ''Any action on the part of defendant, except to
object to the jurisdiction, which recognizes the case as in
court, will amount to a general appearance," a long list of
decisions is cited, but, in every one of them, something was
done in the cause — some affirmative act was done to delay,
In every instance the conduct,
speed, or defend the cause.
deemed a waiver, amounted to more than a mere inquiry or
conversation about it. The test, according to a late decision
of the Federal Supreme Court {Merchant's Heat & Light
Co. V. Cloiv S Sons, 204 U. S. 286, 27 Sup. Ct. 285), is
The
whether the defendant became an actor in the cause.
instances of the assumption of the role of actor in a suit
disclosed by the federal decisions, are such as the taking
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of a continuance; filing a demurrer to plaintiff's pleadings,
without limiting it to the question of jurisdiction; filing a
plea of intervention, pleading to issue or to the merits in
the first instance ; or filing sets-off, counter-claims, or notices
of recoupment. Broad as is this doctrine of waiver, it does
not cover all acts done by a defendant. He may talk even
to the court about the merits of the cause without subjecting himself to it. In Citizens' Saving £ Trust Co. v. Railroad Co., 205 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 425, argument upon the
merits of the cause was indulged in, at the hearing upon
the sufficiency of the pleas to the jurisdiction, and this was
relied upon as constituting a general appearance; but Mr.
Justice Haelan, speaking for the court, said: "This is too
harsh an interpretation of what occurred in the court below. There was no motion for the dismissal of the bill for
The discussion of the merits was perwant of equity.
mitted or invited by the court in order that it might be informed on that question in the event it concluded to consider the merits along with the question of the sufficiency
We are satisfied that the
of the pleas to the jurisdiction.
defendants did not intend to waive the benefit of their qualified appearance at the time of filing the pleas to the jurisdiction." * * * In Fairhank S Co. v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry.
Co., 54 Fed. 420, 4 C. C. A. 403, 38 L. R. A. 271, the court
""Where a defendant appears specially
held as follows:
for the purpose of moving to quash the return on the summons, the fact that, in such motion, it also prays judgment
whether it should be compelled to plead, for the reason that
it is a non-resident corporation, does not constitute a
waiver of the objection to the service." These precedents
amply sustain the view that something substantially beneficial to the defendant or detrimental to the plaintiff, relating to or affecting the progress of the cause, asked, done,
or accepted by the former, is essential to the establishment
of a waiver of process or service thereof.
There must be
mere
than
more
a
for
the
pretext
claim of jurissomething
diction over him. He must either enter an appearance, ask
some relief in the cause, accept some benefit as a step therein or do something from which the necessary implication of
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over his person
arises. "The principle to be extracted from the decisions
on the subject as to when a special appearance is converted
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into a general one is that, where the defendant appears and
asks some relief which can only be granted on the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and the
person, it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
as completely as if he had been regularly served with process, whether such an appearance, by its terms, be limited
to a special purpose or not." 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 625. ''The
expression 'for any purpose connected with the cause,' however, is not to be taken as wholly unrestricted in meaning.
The appearance must have some relation to the merits of
the controversy, and the purpose must be to invoke some
action on the part of the court having direct bearing in
some way upon the question of the judgment or decree
proper to be entered." Bank v. Knox, 133 Iowa, 443, 446,
109 N. W. 201. The general principle, upon which we rely,
was applied by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Loivrie v. Castle, 198 Mass. 82, 83 N. E. 1118, under circumstances even more unfavorable to the defendant than those
presented here. The non-resident defendant in that case,
within 10 days after the return day of the writ, applied to
the court for an extension of the time within which he could
appear, in order that he might decide whether to waive the
lack of proper service and voluntarily appear, or to insist
upon his rights as a non-resident, and the court allowed
such extension.
After the expiration of the 10 days, but
within the period of the extension allowed, he moved to dismiss the action, stating in his motion that he appeared only
for the purpose of moving a dismissal, and the motion was
sustained. The appellate court held it to be within the inherent power of the trial court to grant such an extension,
without prejudice to the right to except to the jurisdiction,
and affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
In delivering the
opinion of the court, Hammond, Judge, said: "It is to be
borne in mind that this is not a case where a defendant,
upon whom process has been duly served, and who, therefor, is within the jurisdiction of the court and liable to default if he does not seasonably appear, asks for delay. It is
a case where a non-resident defendant who, for lack of
service upon him, is not within the jurisdiction and cannot
be brought within
fearing lest the court may regard the
service sufficient and default him, comes into court, and
in doubt whether to waive
says, in substance, that he
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proper service and voluntarily appear, or to insist upon liii^
rights as a non-resident, and ask for time to decide. Certainly it is a part of the inherent power in a court to set a
time within which the non-resident must make up his mind
and act accordingly, and that was all the court did. The
motions for dismissal were properly before the court."
Against this express decision of a reputable and able court,
under a state of facts less favorable to the defendant than
those presented here, and other decisions, showing that
something substantial must be asked or done by the defendant, relating to or affecting the merits of the cause, we
have nothing but a generalization, founded upon, and, therefor, to be interpreted by, facts falling far short of those
disclosed here, for the proposition that [a defendant, who
^
makes] a mere offer to move for a continuance provided it
can be done without a waiver of service, accompanied by
his declaration of intention not to appear generally nor to
ask or take such continuance, if it involved such waiver,
and signification of his desire and determination to withdraw the request, for nothing but a request had been made,
on being informed that such a motion would be a general
We feel amply justified,
appearance, is bound thereby.
upon authority as well as upon reason and principle, in
and saying such action
withholding our assent to
*
*
general appearance.
did not constitute

[Beannon and Williams,

J. J.,

Affirmed.
dissent.]

a

1

misprint in the published opinion, which
There appears to be
sought to be corrected bj introducing the words inclosed in brackets.

is here
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Manner of Making Special Appearance.

2.

WALL V. CHESAPEAKE

&

COMPANY.

OHIO

EAILWAY

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit. 1899.
87

Circuit Court of Appeals,

129,

BuNN, District Judge. * * * The summons issued by the
Superior Court of Cook county was returned with an indorsement of service as follows:
"Served this writ on the within-named Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, by delivering a copy
thereof to U, L. Truitt, the northwestern passenger agent
of said corporation, this 12th day of April, 1898. The
president of said corporation not found in my county.
"James Pease, Sheriff.
"By B. Gilbert, Deputy."
After this return was made, and the declaration filed, the
defendant proceeded to remove the case to the United
States Circuit Court for the northern district of Illinois,
and, when so removed, entered its special appearance for
the purpose of moving to set aside the return of the summons on the ground that U. L. Truitt, the person on whom
it was served, was not the defendant's agent, or a person on
whom proper service of summons could be made. The
motion to set aside was founded upon the affidavits of
Ulysses L. Truitt and H. W. Fuller, the general passenger
agent of the defendant, setting forth that at the time of
the service Truitt was jn the employ of the defendant company for the purpose of influencing persons who might be
desirous of travelling from Chicago and vicinity to points
east of Cincinnati and Lexington to patronize those railway lines loading out of Chicago that made connections with
defendant's road at Cincinnati and Lexington; that Truitt
had no other connection with the defendant, and had no
power or autliority from said defendant, either express or
implied, to make any contract or rates for transportation
over the railway of the defendant, and that his authority
was strictly limited to conveying information concerning
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existing rates as established by the officials of the defendant company, and concerning the connections and time
made and facilities possessed by the defendant in and about
its passenger traffic, and had no other authority whatevei- ;
♦hat the defendant was a resident of the state of Virginia,
having its principal office at Eichmond, in that state, and
was not operating any railway in said county of Cook, and
had no place of business therein. Upon these affidavits (no
counter affidavits being filed) the court below, by its order,
set aside the service of the summons, to which ruling the
plaintiff duly excepted.
The contention is that the practice adopted to get rid of
the service by motion to quash and set aside was irregular
and unjustified in law, and that, instead of proceeding by
motion, the defendant should have filed a plea in abatement,
and had a trial of the question by a jury. This is an important and radical contention, and the ground upon which
it is sought to support it is that it is the practice in such
cases recognized and established by the Supreme Court of
the state of Illinois. That court first made such a ruling in
Railicay Co. v. Keep, 22 111. 9, and has in numerous deand
contended that this
cisions since adhered to
court should follow the state practice. But this contention
cannot be supported, either upon reason or authority.
is

it

it,

*****

a

is

a

a a

a

is

is

it

evident that the law vests
Under these decisions,
reasonable discretion in the federal courts to judge in any
f^iven case how far they will feel bound to follow the practice or decisions of the state courts. There can be no doubt
that the rule upon this question of practice prevailing in
contrary to the general rule on
the Illinois state courts
the subject in this country, as well as in England. There
plea in abatement and
no more reason for requiring
of
sufficient service of
jury trial to test the question

a

a

a

is

is

a

a

summons than there would l)e to require the same proceedmotion
jurj^ trial, in ail cases where now
ing, including
The
constitutional right
held to be the proper remedy.
whenever
there
obtains
any question at
trial
jury
to
issue involving the life, liberty, or property of the citizen.
service of summons, or any other
motion to quash
But
process or order, for insufficiency in the service, involves
The setting aside of service
no such substantial right.
8

T. p.—
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does not affect the writ or the status of the action in court.
Another service can be made, and the action proceed. If
the original process were exhausted, a new summons could
be issued.
If the objection were to the writ itself, a plea
in abatement would be the proper remedy, the office of
which is to give the plaintiff a better writ. 1 Chitty PI.
446-457.
But here the plaintiff still has his writ.
The order only sets aside the service, as being unwarranted and insufficient in law. No substantial right
is affected by the decision. There are many matters pending in the progress of a case which are daily determined
upon motion that are much more important in affecting
substantial rights than a motion to set aside an irregular
Take, for instance, the motion for a
service of process.
new trial upon newly discovered evidence after the plaintiff
has recovered a substantial verdict.
The court, in its disthe
verdict upon a motion. Whether
cretion, may set aside
the plaintiff will ever be able to obtain another is uncertain,
and yet no one would think of objecting to trying such a
question before the court upon motion supported and opposed by affidavits.
The practice in the United States Circuit Court for this
circuit was fairly well established by precedent when this
action was begun. So that if the defendant had resorted
to a plea in abatement, instead of making a motion, he
would have subjected himself to the criticism that he was
departing from the usual practice adopted in such cases.
In Fairhank & Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. S T. P. Ry. Co.,
supra, [9 U. S. App. 212, 4 C. C. A. 403, 54 Fed. 420] a similar motion was made and heard before Judge Blodgett at
the circuit without question as to the propriety of the practice, and an order made quashing the service. Judge Blodgett delivered an opinion, holding the service insufficient,
which was affirmed by this court, where no question was
made as to the proper practice being by motion. In American Cereal Co. v. Eli Pettljohn Cereal Co., 70 Fed. 276, the
same practice was adopted, and the service set aside upon

it

is

:

it,

motion; Judge Showalter delivering an opinion justifying
the practice, and giving good and sufficient reason for
as follows
"Tlie determining consideration
that the matter at
issue, however
If
may result, will not end the suit.
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found against the defendant, tlie defendant is in court and
must plead ; if in favor of the defendant, the return of the
writ is vacated or quashed, and the suit remains pending;
whereas a plea, either in abatement or in bar, if made out
The view that a
by proofs, puts an end to the proceeding.
motion to be determined upon affidavits is the proper practice in such cases is sustained by English decisions," —
citing Hemp v. Warren, 2 Dowl. (N. S.) 758; Preston v.

Lamont,

In

1

Exch. Div. 361.

the last of the above-named English cases, Amphlett,
B., in a concurring opinion, gives the reason for having
the question of service determined summarily upon motion, instead of by plea, as follows :
''The decision of the judge at chambers can be contested
on appeal, and, if necessary, in the house of lords. There
is convenience in this, because it is a speedy and inexpensive mode of determining that question before any expense
is incurred upon the merits of the action, whereas, if the
question may be raised by plea, all the expenses of the action may be thrown away * * * Convenience and justhink, require that this question should not be the
tice,
subject of a plea."
In the state courts in this country, while some question
has been made as to the conclusiveness of the sheriff's
return, it has generally been held, that it is only prima
facie true, and that the truth or falsity of the return may
The
be determined upon motion supported by affidavit.
the
sheriff's
rule in England at the common law was that
return was conclusive and could not be disputed, and the
defendant's only remedy was by an action against the
sheriff for a false return. But in this country, where we
have so many different codes of practice, and so many
kinds of substituted service, such a rule would be inconUpon examination of
venient, unjust, and impracticable.
we
believe the general rule
a great many American cases,
in this country, with some dissenting cases like those in
Illinois, to be this: That the sheriff's return stands in the
first instance as the affidavit of the sheriff, but is subject
to be disputed by affidavits on the part of the defendant
showing to the satisfaction of the court, upon motion to
quash, that the return is not true in point of fact, or, as in
the case at bar, is insufficient in law. Carr v. Bank, 16 Wis.

I
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50; Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kan. 228; Crosby v. Fanner, 39
Minn. 305, 40 N. W. 71; Walker v. Lutz, 14 Neb. 274, 15 N.

W.

Wendell v. Mugridge, 19 N. H. 109 ; Stout v. i^aiZroa^ Co., 3 McCrary 1, 8 Fed. 794; Van Rensselaer v. Chadluick, 7 How. Prac. 297; Wallis v. Lo^^, 15 How. Prac. 567;
Watson V. Watson, 6 Conn. 334; i^oi(;e v. Water Co., 10
Cal. 442. In this case the sheriff returned that he had
made service upon U. L. Truitt, Northwestern passenger
agent of the defendant.
If this return had been true, the
service would have been good. But it is very clear from
the affidavits filed that it was not true.
Truitt was not
Northwestern passenger agent of the com^Dany, or any
other agent, but a mere employe for a certain purpose.
The sheriff was mistaken, and there was no need to resort
to the clumsy method of a plea in abatement and a trial
by jury to ascertain this fact.
It has been suggested that, allowing the practice by motion to be correct and preferable, still, in analogy to the
practice under a plea in abatement of giving the plaintiff
a better writ, the defendant should state in his affidavits
on whom the summons may be properly served, or, if there
No
be no such person in the district, to state that fact.
authority is cited for such a rule, and we have searched
*
*
*
There is no
in vain for a precedent to warrant it.
in
the
adjudicated
of
cases
that
this docany
suggestion
trine has any application to a motion to set aside service.
It only applies to a plea in abatement where the objection
*
*
*
The judgment of the circuit
is to the writ itself.
352

;

court is affirmed.

[Dissenting opinion filed by Woods, Circuit Judge.]

GREER V. YOUNG.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
i

120

Illinois,

1887,

184.

Mr. Justice Mulkey delivered the opinion of

the

Court

:

Robert C. Greer, on the 23rd of July, 1884, commenced an
action of assumpsit in the Superior Court of Cook county,
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against George Young. A summons in the usual form,
returnable on the first Monday of the following month, was
served on the defendant, and due return thereof made by
the sheriff of Cook county, on the same day. On the 4th
of August, 1884, the plaintiff filed in the cause a declaration in the usual form, containing the common counts only.
On the 18th of the same month, the defendant filed, by his
attorneys a special appearance in the case, "for the purpose, only, of moving to quash the writ of summons, and
dismiss the suit." On the 19th of the same month the defendant filed a written motion in the cause, "to quash the
service of the writ of summons," for the reason, as is alleged in the motion, "that the defendant is a non-resident
of the State of Illinois, and at the time of said service was
within the jurisdiction of this court for the purpose of attending legal proceedings, and for no other purpose." This
motion was supported by an affidavit of the defendant,
showing, in substance, that both the plaintiff and the defendant were residents of Missouri; that the plaintiff,
prior to the commencement of the present suit, had brought
an action against the defendant, in the circuit court of
Lafayette county, in the State of Missouri, "for the identical cause of action for which this suit is brought," and
that said former suit was still pending and undetermined
in the State of Missouri; that in defending said last mentioned suit, it became necessary to take depositions in Chicago, and that, under the instructions of his attorneys, he
went to Chicago for the sole purpose of assisting his said
attorneys in taking said depositions; that shortly after
the taking of the same, and while in the office of his attorneys, consulting with them as to the probable effect of
the depositions, the sheriff made service of the summons
upon him in the present case.
Upon consideration of the facts set forth in the affidavit,
the Superior Court sustained the motion to quash the service, and entered an order dismissing the suit, which was
affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District. The
case is brought here by plaintiff in error on a certificate
of the Appellate Court, and a reversal of the judgment
of affirmance is asked on a number of grounds.
It is first contended, that as the defence was of a dilatory
character, it should have been made at the verv earliest

118
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opportunity, which it is claimed was not done. Of the correctness of the rule of law suggested there can be no question; but whether the motion was made at the earliest opportunity, is a question of fact, that may be materially
affected by the rules of the court where the action was
pending, of which this court can not take judicial notice,
and as all presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the
correctness of the rulings of that court, in the absence of
anything to the contrary, we are not fully prepared to say
that the motion was not made in time, though it must be
However
confessed the objection is not without force.
our
decision
to
this may be, we prefer
place
upon other
grounds.
The most important question in the case, is whether the
circumstances shown, even if properly pleaded in due time,
warranted the court in setting aside the service of the proThere is clearly no ground
cess and dismissing the suit.
for the claim that the plaintiff or his counsel had any
agency in inducing the defendant to leave Missouri and go
to Chicago, for the purpose of having process served on
him in the latter place, — in other words, it is not claimed,
nor is there any ground for the claim, that service of process upon the defendant was obtained by any artifice,
trick, or fraud, on the part of the plaintiff, his counsel, or
The question then
any one else acting in his interest.
arises, can one who voluntarily leaves his own State, and
comes to this, for the purpose of taking depositions before
a notary, be lawfully served, by reading, with civil process,
while here on such business?
The fact that the plaintiff had sued the defendant in Missouri, on the same cause of action, we do not regard as having any bearing on the question, as it is the settled law in
this State, tliat the pendency of a suit in another State can
not be pleaded in abatement of a suit brought here on the
same cause of action.
{McJilton v. Love, 13 111. 486; Allen
But even where the pendency of a suit
V. Watt, 69 id. 655.)
in a sister State can be made available as a defence at all
it must, by all the authorities, be formally pleaded in abatement, which was not done here. Tlie riglit of the plaintiff
then, to sue the defendant here, was the same as that of
any one else having a claim against him. The ruling of
the court, therefore, must be rested entirely upon the privi-
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immunity which the common law has, from a very
early period, extended to parties and witnesses in a lawsuit
while attending court, including going and coming. This
rule is found in all the text books, and, in most of the cases
we have examined, is expressly limited to cases of arrest
on civil process.
1 Tidd, (1st Am. ed.) 174; 3 Blackstone,
side page 289; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sees. 316, 317; 2
Bouvier's Law Die. 284.
The rule as laid down in the above works, is fully sustained by an almost unbroken current of authority, as is
fully shown by the following cases : Meckius v. Smith, 1 H.
Blac. 635; Kinder v. Williams, 4 Term Rep. 378; Arding v.
Floiver, 8 id. 534; Spence v. Bert, 3 East, 89; Blore v.
Booth, 3 Ves. 350 ; Ex parte Hawkins, 4 id. 691 ; Ex parte
King, 7 id. 313 ; Sidgier v. Birch, 9 id. 69 ; Ex parte Jackson,
lege or

id. 117.
The above authorities are also valuable as throwing light
upon the procedure or practice in cases of this kind. The
arrest of a party to a suit, by civil process, being regarded
as a breach of the defendant's privilege, the usual course
was to appear in the cause in which the arrest was made,
and procure a rule against the plaintiff and his attorney to
show cause why the defendant should not be discharged
out of custody by reason of his alleged privilege, upon his
filing common bail. The rule to show cause was always
supported by affidavit setting up the fact of the arrest, and
On the hearing, the rule, dependattendant circumstances.
ing upon the proofs, was either made absolute or discharged. If the former, the defendant, upon filing common
or nominal bail, was discharged, and if he had given special
bail, the bail bond was ordered to be surrendered and cancelled. Nevertheless, the defendant was in court, and was
bound to answer the action.
While, as we have just seen, the exemption, by the general current of authority, applies only to arrests, yet in
some of the States, notably New York, it has been extended
to cases of service by summons, merely, particularly where
the defendant is a non-resident.
{Person v. Grier, 66 N .Y.
No sufficient reason is
124; Mathews v. Tufts, 87 id. 568.)
perceived for departing from the general current of authority on this subject, merely because some two or throe
of the States have, through perhaps a spirit of comity, more
15
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than anything else seen proper to do so. The mere service of
a summons upon a non-resident, when in another State for
the purpose of taking depositions to be used in an action
to which he is a party in his own State, imposes no greater
hardship upon him than to be served with process out of
his own State when attending to any other kind of business.
In either case, he is usually afforded ample time to prepare
his defence, if he has any.
Parties thus circumstanced
have no difficulty in getting a temporary postponement or
continuance of the causes, when necessary to the attainment of justice, or to avert any serious loss or inconvenience. It is clear that such a case does not come within the
reasons of the rule as laid down in the authorities above
cited.
But outside of this consideration, it is essential that the
party invoking the protection of the rule should come prepared to show that he is clearly within it. The rule, as well
as the principle on which it is founded, is thus expressed
by Tidd, supra: "The parties to a suit, and their witnesses, are, for the sake of public justice, protected from arrest
in coming to, attending upon and returning from the court,
— or, as it is usually termed, eundo morando et redeundo."
The term "court," within the meaning of the rule, has
Greenleaf, in section
received a very liberal construction.
317, above referred to, thus summarizes the result of the
authorities on this subject: "This privilege is granted in
all cases where the attendance of the party or witness is
given in any matter pending before a lawful tribunal having
jurisdiction of the cause. Thus, it has been extended to a
party attending on an arbitration under a rule of court;
or on the execution of a writ of inquiry; to a bankrupt and
witnesses attending before the commissioners, on notice;
and to a witness attending before a magistrate to give his
deposition, under an order of court."
To the last instance, given by the author may be added
the case of a party, or his witnesses, appearing before a
master to give or take testimony, which would fall within
the same principle. Where a master, magistrate or other
person takes evidence in a cause, under an order of the
court wherein the cause is pending, such officer or other
person is the mere instrument of the court, and is subject
In legal effect, such evidence is taken beto its orders.
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fore the court. But a notary public, when taking depositions in one State to be used in a suit pending in another,
can in no sense be regarded as an instrument or agency of
the court wherein such suit is pending. Neither the notary,
nor any of the parties appearing before him, are answerable to the court for anything said or done while there, the
vvhole matter being outside of its jurisdiction.
Not so with
a master, magistrate or other person taking evidence under
an order of the court within its jurisdiction.
In such case,
all parties appearing before him for such purpose, if wilfully guilty of any improper conduct, might summarily
be attached, brought before the court, and punished as for
a contempt in its presence. In taking the depositions, the
notary performed purely ministerial functions.
He could
decide no questions or determine any matter affecting the
rights of the parties to the suit, nor was he, as we have just
seen, connected with any court or other tribunal having
the power to do so. Hence he could in no sense, in the language of Greenleaf, be said to have ''jurisdiction of the
cause," and therefore he does not fall within the category
of any of the tribunals contemplated by the rule in question.
Looking at the action of the trial court from another
point of view, we do not think it in harmony with the decisions of this court. The case was disposed of upon a simple motion to quash the service. The writ, the service and
return, as they appear of record, were in strict conformity
with law, but it was sought to assail the validity of the
service on account of certain matters alleged to exist dehors
the record, and set forth by wa.y of affidavit.
This we do
not think can be done. Had the defendant been arrested,
and it was desired to raise the question of privilege for the
purpose of obtaining his discharge, then, in conformity with
the well settled practice in such cases, a rule nisi should have
been taken against the plaintiff, as heretofore indicated, and
the question would then properly have been heard on affidavit, as was done in this case. But no such case as the one
suggested was before the court. There was simply an attack
upon the service, founded upon extrinsic facts. Whatever
may be the pi^ctice in States where the code system prevails, it is clear the course pursued was not proper. Here,
the common law practice prevails generally, except in so far
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it has been modified by legislative enactment, or perhaps, in some instances, by long and uniform custom; but
we are aware of no change in the practice, by legislation or
otherwise, so far as the procedure in cases of this kind is
concerned. The rule, as recognized here in repeated decisions, and which is in strict accord with the common law
that any defect in the writ, its service or repractice,
apparent from an inspection of the record,
turn, which
may properly be taken advantage of by motion, but where
founded upon extrinsic facts the matter
the objection
is

is

is,

as

a

5

7

6

9

;

;

;

is

is

a

a

a

if

a

is

is

is

a

if

must be pleaded in abatement, so that an issue may be
desired, by
jury, like any
made thereon, and tried,
successful upon such
other issue of fact. If the plaintiff
It
therefore to
quod recuperet.
issue, the judgment
him a valuable right to have the issue thus made up and
tried. To permit the defendant to try an issue of this kind
decided advantage, for
on affidavit, as was done, gives him
he fails, his motion would be simply overruled, and he
would still have right to trial on the merits. To permit
party to thus speculate on the chance of succeeding on
purely technical ground, without incurring any risk, and
without any compensation to the plaintiff in case of failure,
in direct
contrary to the spirit of the common law, and
conflict with the decisions of this court. Holloivay v. Freeman, 22 111. 197 McNah v. Bennett, QQ id. 157 Union National Bank v. First National Bank, 90 id. 56; Rubel v.
Beaver Falls Cutlery Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 282 Holton v. Daly,
Mass. 96; Bean v.
106 111. 131; Hearsay v. Bradbury,
Pick. 368; CharParker, 17 id. 601; Guild v. Richarson,
Lillard,
B. Mon. 340.
Vt. 48; Lilkird v.
lotte V. Webb,
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the courts below are reversed, and the cause remanded to the Superior
Court of Cook county, for further proceedings in conformity with the views here expressed.
Judgment reversed.
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VALLEY INVESTMENT
Supreme Court of Kansas.
60

CO. V.

CORNELL.

1899,

Kansas, 282.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Smith,

J.

:

On January 15, 1897, judgment was rendered in the district court of Bourbon county in favor of plaintiffs below,
Carrie A. Cornell and others, against the Neosho Valley Investment Company, for the sum of $5665, with interest at
the rate of ten per cent, per annum and costs, declaring the
same to be a first lien upon certain real estate located in
said county, and directing foreclosure.
Upon the summons
in the cause was indorsed the following return:
''Received this summons May 17, 1896; executed it by delivering to the Neosho Valley Investment Company, by delivering a true and certified copy of the within summons to
L. M. Bedell, its cashier and treasurer; the president or
other chief officer not found in mv countv. May 19, 1896.
'M. W. Bennett,
''Sheriff Labette County, Kansas."
The judgment was rendered by default, the investment
On April 19, 1897, the
company making no appearance.
investment company filed its petition for a new trial of the
foreclosure case, under section 606 of chapter 95, General
Statutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1889, §4671), wherein it attacked the service of summons in the cause, and alleged
that L. M. Bedell, mentioned in the return of the sheriff,
was not during the month of May, 1896, nor had he ever
l)een, the cashier of the company, and that the vice-president, secretary and treasurer of the company, during the
month of May, 1896, had resided in the city of Chetopa, in
Labette county, Kansas.
Coupled with this attack on the service was an allegation
* *
in the petition for a new trial in substance as follows :
that the judgment was taken in fraud of the rights of the
*
*
*
*
company.
[Proceedings under this petition for a new trial were
apparently dropped, and when the sheriff was about to sell
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(he land upon which the judgment was a lien, this action
was commenced by a petition alleging the same facts as
the petition for a new trial, an injunction being prayed for.
Trial was had and judgment went against the company.]^
Our view of this case renders it unnecessary to consider
the questions raised on the sufficiency of the service of the
summons. That question has been put past our consideration by the act of the plaintiff in error. In the petition
for a new trial the investment company was not content
with an attack upon the service of summons only, but sought
to impeach the validity of the judgment on other grounds
not jurisdictional in character.
This appeal to the court
for relief against the judgment, for reasons other than that
the court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the person of
the party defendant, involved the admission that the judgment was valid, and the plaintiff in error by this act treated
it as such.
In one paragraph of the petition for a new
it
trial is alleged that the court was without jurisdiction by
reason of a fatal defect in the service. In another paragraph the judgment is attacked on the ground that there
was no consider.ation for the note sued on, etc.
In Adolph Cohen v. C. B. Trowbridge, 6 Kan. 385, it is
held that the filing of a motion to set aside a judgment,
based partly on lack of jurisdiction and partly on error in
the judgment itself, is a general appearance.
(2 Encycl.
PI. & Pr. 632). Where a party voluntarily appears in court
it is unnecessary to inquire what, if any, process has been
served upon him. {Carr v. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393.) In Meixell V. Kirkpatrick, 29 Kan. 679, a party filed a demurrer to
the petition upon several grounds, some jurisdictional and
some not, claiming that the court had no jurisdiction of the
person of tlie defendant, that the petition did not state facts
constituting any cause of action, and that several causes
of action were improperly joined. This demurrer was sustained on the ground that several causes of action were im])roperly joined. Justice Brewer, speaking for the court,
said :
"When served with the summons he (the defendant) appeared and filed a demurrer, which, while it alleged a lack
of jurisdiction, presented also a number of other defenses,
and defenses on the merits. Such plea, by the prior adju
iMatter within brackets

is a condensation

by the editor.
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dications of this court, was equivalent to an appearance. A
party who denies the jurisdiction of a court over his person
must first present this single question. He may not mingle with his plea to the jurisdiction other pleas which concede jurisdiction, and thereafter insist that there was error
in overruling his plea to the jurisdiction.
As heretofore
the
stated,
defendant by his demurrer raised a number of
questions other than those which were jurisdictional, and
invoked the judgment of the court thereon. By such other
]ileas he submitted himself and his rights to the jurisdiction of the court, and can no longer be heard to say that
it had no jurisdiction."
The plaintiff in error earnestly contends that this petition for a new trial, being filed after judgment, cannot be
construed into an entry of appearance in the cause, for the
reason that the judgment was originally based upon void
service and was wholly inoperative to affect any rights or
]3roperty of the defendant below. This contention cannot
be sustained under the authorities.
The case of Life Association V. Lemke, 40 Kan. 142, 19 Pac. 337, is substantially
similar in its facts to the case at bar. There, after judgment, defendant filed a motion on jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional grounds to set the judgment aside, and it was
held that he entered a general appearance to the action.
The latest expression of this court is found in Frazier v.
Douglass, 57 Kan. 809, 48 Pac. 36. Douglass was served
with a summons, which he alleged to be void, and moved
the court so to rule. Coupled with this motion was a sworn
statement, in which he alleged ''that he is the owner in
fee, and has the valid title to the land described in the said
plaintiff's petition filed in said cause, and is in the peaceable and rightful possession of the same, and that said
plaintiff has no right or title thereto or to its possession ;
and further says that the said land is of great value, towit, of the value of $3000." In the opinion in that case it
is stated:
"As will be readily seen, the plaintiff [defendant] sets up
matters which were non-jurisdictional and had no bearing
upon the motion he had made. ^Vliere a defendant alleges
and submits to the court matters that are non-jurisdictional
he recognizes the general jurisdiction of the court and
waives all irregularities which may have intervened in
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bringing him into court. Whatever may have been the purpose of the defendant in alleging these matters, it is clear
that they do not relate to the question of service or of jurisdiction. Although not entirely formal, the averments relate
to the merits of the controversy, and amount to a complete
answer to the allegations of the petition. When the defendant set up matters and submitted questions which were not
jurisdictional, he submitted himself and his rights to the
jurisdiction of the court, and he cannot be heard to say
that it had no jurisdiction."
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.

LOUISVILLE HOME TELEPHONE
ADM'X.

CO. V.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
125

BEELER'S

1907,

Kentucky, 366.

Opinion of the Court by Special Judge Clay — Reversing.
This action was instituted by Maggie Beeler, administratrix of her deceased husband, E. C. Beeler, against the
Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company and the
Louisville Home Telephone Company, to recover damages
for the death of her husband, which occurred in Louisville,
Jefferson county, Ky., and which is alleged to have resulted from the joint negligence of the two companies. In
addition to the allegations of negligence, the petition states
that decedent was a resident of Bullitt county, and that
each of the defendants was a common carrier, and passed

into Bullitt county. Summons was served upon the Home
Telephone Company by delivering a true copy thereof to
its president, and also by delivering copies to parties who
were stated in the return to be agents of said company, residing in Bullitt county. * * * Xhe defendant Louisville
Home Teleplione Company filed an answer in three paragraphs. In the first paragraph defendant raised the question of jurisdiction by setting forth that its residence was
in Jefferson county, that it did not have any office or
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agent in Bullitt county, and that it did not pass into said
In the second and third paragraphs defendant,
county.
without waiving its objection to the jurisdiction of the
* *
court, pleaded to the merits of the case. *
[The Bullitt Circuit Court held that the plea to the merits
was a waiver of the plea to the jurisdiction ; a trial was had,
and verdict and judgment were rendered against the
Home Telephone Company.
From an order overruling its
motion for a new trial the Company appeals.]^
At the outset there is presented for our consideration
the question, did the Bullitt circuit court have jurisdiction
of the appellant, Louisville Home Telephone Company?
In passing upon this point, we should first discuss the question whether or not appellant entered its appearance by filing its answer both to the jurisdiction and to the mer*
*
*
its.
Among the cases relied upon by appellee is the case of
City of Covington v. Limerick, 107 Ky. 680, 19 Ky. Law
Rep. 330, 39 S. W. 836, in which the court, after holding
that the circuit court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, added the following: "But, in
addition to the plea of jurisdiction, the answer of the defendant goes to the merits of the controversy, and is a
waiver of any objection to the jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. This is the common law doctrine, and
was held to be the law in this State in the case of Baker
v. L. £ N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623."
In the case of Baker v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 4 Bush 623, we
find, however, that the defendant first answered to the
merits without suggesting any objection to the jurisdiction,
and trial was then had, resulting in a verdict which was set
Next came a hung jury.
aside and a new trial ordered.
About a year and a half thereafter the defendant attempted to plead to the jurisdiction of the court.
The
court very properly held that its appearance had been entered long before.
In the case of Guenther & Bros. v. American Steel Hoop
Company, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 795, 116 Ky. 419, 76 S. W. 480,
the question involved was the construction and validity of
subsection 6 of section 51 of the Code, authorizing service
upon the agent of a non-resident doing business in this
iThe matter inclosed in brackets has

been

condensed by the editor.
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State. In that case the motion to quash the process was
The defendant did not follow the practice adopoverruled.
He did
ted by appellant in the case under consideration.
not file an answer as provided by section 118 of the Civil
Code; but, along with the denial of other facts, simply put
in issue the allegation of the petition that he was a nonresident of the State. Under the circumstances this court
Jield that, having gone into the merits of the case as he did
by his answer, he had entered his appearance to the action.

In favor of

**********

the view that a defendant who files an answer
to the jurisdiction, and in the same answer, without waiving
the question of jurisdiction, pleads to the merits, does not
thereby enter his appearance, we find the following cases:
First, the case of Meguiar v. Rudy, 7 Bush 432, in which
a demurrer, as in the case at bar, to the jurisdiction of the
court was first filed, but overruled because the defect did
not appear on the face of the petition.
The defendant then
filed an answer in which he first pleaded to the jurisdiction
of the court, and then pleaded to the merits, including a
counterclaim.
The circuit court tried the case on all the
issues raised and came to the conclusion that it had no
jurisdiction over the person of defendant. Judgment was
then entered in his favor, and, upon appeal to this court,
the judgment was affirmed.

Now, in the case under consideration, defense could not
demurrer to the jurisdiction because the petition stated facts sufficient to show jurisdiction. Nor could

be made by

defense be made by motion to quash the summons, because,
if the court had jurisdiction at all, the summons had been
served upon the proper officer, the president of the corporation. Under the circumstances, therefore, the only kind
of a defense that could be made by appellant, Louisville
Home Telephone Company, was by answer. This method
is provided for by section 118, which is as follows:
*'A
party may, by an answer or other proper pleading, make
any of the objections mentioned in section 92, the existence
of which is not shown by the pleadings of his adversary; a
faihue so to do is a waiver of any of said objections except that to the jurisdiction of the court of the subject of
the action."
An answer heing the only kind of defensive
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pleading that could be filed, the question arises, what sort
of an answer should be filed? Should a party be required
to file first an answer to the jurisdiction, and afterwards an
answer to the merits, or should he have the right to file
There is certainly no authority in
■^'Oth at the same time?
the Code for filing one answer and then another answer :
any answer subsequent to the original answer must be an
amended answer. While in every case, no doubt, the trial
court would permit an answer to the merits to be filed after
an answer to the jurisdiction had been passed upon, yet
the right to file an amended answer has always been held to
be a matter within the sound discretion of the court.
That
being the case, would it not be the better practice to join
all defenses in the same answer? There is certainly nothing in section 118 to the contrary. All that that section
requires is that the party shall not answer to the merits
without first making objection to the jurisdiction of the
This view is not without authority to sustain it.
court.
Maxwell on Code Pleading, p. 394, speaks as follews: "Atcommon law pleas must be pleaded in their order; that is,
dilatory pleas must be made and disposed of before a plea
Under the code, however, all
in bar could be determined.
the defenses which a defendant may have are to be pleaded
at one time, and in one answer. Therefore, matter in abate
ment may be joined with a plea to the merits."

**********

The New York court of appeals has taken the same view.
In Siveet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465, we have the following:
''The first question is whether a defendant along with other
defenses may set up in his answer the non-joinder of other
parties who ought to have been sued with him. Under the
former practice the non-joinder of defendants could be
pleaded only in abatement, and could not be joined with a
plea in bar; but, under the Code, there is no classification
of answers or defenses corresponding with the distinction
between pleas in abatement and in bar. The distinction
is entirely gone, with the system to which it belongs. The
defendant now answers but once, and he ma}^ set forth as
manv defenses as he thinks he has, but must state them

separately*

* * * *

"

And in the case of Little v. Harrington,
T. P—^

'

71

Mo. 390, we
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find the following: ''It is evident from these statutory provisions that only one answer is contemplated, and this to
contain whatever defense or defenses the defendant may
have, thus dispensing with the common law rule that a
plea in bar waives all dilatory pleas or pleas not going to
the merits."
And the same court, in the case of Johnson v. Detrick,
152 Mo. 243, 53 S. W. 891, says: "A plea to the jurisdiction, even when coupled with a plea to the merits, is permissible under our Code; and the latter plea does not, as at
common law, waive the former."
In view of the foregoing authorities, * * we have reached
the conclusion that a defendant may in one answer plead
It necessarily
both to the jurisdiction and to the merits.
that the deto
the
recites
follows that a plea
merits that
fendant does not waive his objection to the jurisdiction of
the court is not a waiver of the plea of the jurisdiction.
We, therefore, hold that appellant's answer did not enter
* * *
its appearance to this action.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial
consistent with this opinion.

LINTON V. HEYE.
Supreme

Court of Nebraska, 1903.
69

Albert,

Nebraska, 450.

C. This is an action to quiet the title to several
tracts of land, each plaintiff asserting title to a separate
tract. * * * Service on the defendants was had by publication. They appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons, on the grounds that the
affidavit for service by publication and the notice, published
in pursuance thereof, were defective in certain particulars,
and that such notice was not published for the period required by law. The objections were overruled, and the defendants answered.
[In their answer defendants again objected to the juris-
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diction of the court, and also pleaded a counterclaim.]^
* * *

A trial

to the court resulted

in

finding and decree
for the plaintiffs. The defendants prosecute error.
It is first urged that the court had no jurisdiction over
a

the defendants.

a

it

a

1

a

is

a

is

a

&

S

;

&

a

is

if

a

a

if

is,

The general rule, settled by a long line
of authorities,
that
defendant intends to rely on
want of jurisdiction over his person, he must appear,
at all, for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court. If he appear for another purpose, such appearance
waiver of all defects in the origgeneral, and
inal process, and an acknowledgment of the complete jurisdiction of the court in the action. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Bobbins, 59 Neb. 170 Omaha Loan
Trust Co. v. Knight,
50 Neb. 342; Leake v. Gallogly, 34 Neb. 857; South Omaha
Merchants Nat. Bank, 4:5 Neb. 29;
Nat. Bank v. Fanners
Dryfus v. Moline, Milburn
Stoddard Co., 43 Neb. 233;
Hurlburt v. Palmer, 39 Neb. 158, 173. An exception to this
rule is, that,, where the lack of jurisdiction does not appear
on the face of the record, the defendant may unite
plea
to the jurisdiction with his other defenses to the action,
without waiving his rights to insist on the lack of jurisdiction of the court. Hurlburt v. Palmer, supra. But, we think,
such exception must be limited to cases where the plea to
joined only with such defenses as go to
the jurisdiction
recovery by the plaintiff, and should not be exdefeat
tended to cases where, as in this case, such plea
joined
cross petition, or counter-claim, which necessitates
with
trial on the merits of the issues tendered by the petition. Such pleading, though denominated an answer, conpetition or complaint,
tains all the essential elements of
and might be made the basis of an independent action and
It puts beyond the lawful
decree against the plaintiffs.
finding on
power of the court to dispose of the case, by
t!ie issues tendered by the plea to the jurisdiction, and
The defendants,
compels an adjudication on the merits.
having thus compelled an adjudication on the merits, can
not now be heard to question the authority of the court
whose jurisdiction they thus invoked.

**********

By

the

Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing

iThe portion in brackets

has been

condensed by the editor.
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opinion, tlie decree of the district court is affirmed.^
Court of the United States, this case was
U. S. 628. The same rule was announced by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Merchants' Heat and Light Co.
filed a plea of
V. J. B. Clow & Sons, (1906) 204 U. S. 286, where defendant
set-off, under the Illinois practice, after saving an exception to an order overruling its special appearance, though it was conceded that a purely defensive
plea would not have waived defendant 's right to rely upon its objection to the
jurisdiction of the court over its person.
lOn

appeal

aflBrmed.

to

Linton

the

Supreme

v. Heye,

194

WABASH WESTERN RAILWAY V. BROW.
Supreme Court of the United States.
164

1896.

United States, 271.

Joseph Brow commenced suit in the Circuit Court of
Wayne County, Michigan, against the Wabash Western
Railway to recover the sum of twenty thousand dollars for
personal injuries, caused, as he alleged, by defendant's
negligence, by the service, September 24, 1892, of a declaration and notice to appear and plead within twenty days,
on Fred J. Hill, as agent of the company, which declaration
and notice were subsequently filed in that court. On the
7th of October defendant filed its petition and bond for
removal in that court, and an order accepting said bond
and removing the cause to the Circuit court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Michigan, and directing
the transmission of a transcript of record, was entered.

**********

The record having been filed in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, a motion to set aside the declaration and rule to plead was made
in the cause in these words and figures: ''And now comes
Mie Wabash Western Railway, defendant (appearing specially for the purpose of this motion), and moves the court,
upon the files and records of the court in this cause, and
upon the affidavit of Fred J. Hill, filed and served with this
motion, to set aside the service of the declaration and rule
to plead in this cause, and to dismiss the same for want of
•in-is(li(*tion of the person of the defendant in the state
court from which this cause was removed, and in this
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court." The affidavit was

to the effect that Hill, on September 24, 1892, was the freight agent of "the Wabash Railroad Company, a corporation wliich owns and operates a
railroad from Detroit to the Michigan state line, and was
not an agent of the Wabash Western Railway, defendant
in this suit;"

*****

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
This was not a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, but
a personal action brought in the Circuit Court of Wayne
county, Michigan, against a corporation wliich was neither
incorporated nor did business, nor had any agent or property, within the state of Michigan; and service of declaration and rule to plead was made on an individual who was
not, in any respect, an officer or agent of the corporation.
The state court, therefor, acquired no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by the service. Did the application for removal amount to such an appearance as conceded jurisdiction over the person?
We have already decided that when in a petition for
removal it is expresed that the defendant appears specially
and for the sole purpose of presenting the petition, the application cannot be treated as submitting the defendant to
the jurisdiction of the state court for any other purpose.
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518.
The question "how far a petition for removal, in general
terms, without specifying and restricting the purpose of
the defendant's appearance in the state court, might be
considered, like a general appearance, as a waiver of any
objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the defendant," was not required to be determined, and
was, therefor, reserved ; but we think that the line of reasoning in that case and in the preceding case of Martin v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U. S. 673, compels the
same conclusion on the question as presented in the case
before us.
In Goldey v. Morning Neics, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking
for the court, observed: "The theory that a defendant, by
filing in the state court a petition for removal into the Circuit Court of the United States, necessarily waives the
riorht to insist that for anv reason the state court had not
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acquired jurisdiction of his person, is inconsistent with the
terms, as well as with the spirit of the existing act of Congress regulating removals from the court of a State into
The jurisdiction
the Circuit Court of the United States.
of the Circuit Court of the United States depends upon the
acts passed by Congress pursuant to the power conferred
upon it by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be enlarged or abridged by any statute of a State. The
legislature or the judiciary of a State can neither defeat
the right given by a constitutional act of congress to remove a case from a court of the State into the Circuit
Court of the United States, nor limit the effect of such re* * *
moval
Although the suit must be actually pending
in the state court before it can be removed, its removal
into the Circuit Court of the United States does not admit
that it was rightfully pending in the state court, or that
the defendant could have been compelled to answer therein ;
but enables the defendant to avail himself, in the Circuit
Court of the United States, of any and every defense,
duly and seasonably reserved and pleaded, to the action
'in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced
in said Circuit Court.' " 156 U. S. 523, 525.

Want of jurisdiction

over the person is one of these
defenses, and, to use the language of Judge Drummond
in Atchison v. Morris, 11 Fed. Rep. 582, we regard it as
not open to doubt that ''the party has a right to the opin
ion of the Federal court on every question that may arise
in the case, not only in relation to the pleadings and merits,
but to the service of process; and it would be contrary to
the manifest intent of Congress to hold that a party, who
has the right to remove a cause, is foreclosed as to any
question which the Federal court can be called upon, under
the law, to decide."

Moreover the petition does not invoke the aid of the court
touching relief only grantable in the exercise of jurisdiction of the person.
The statute imposes the duty on
the state court, on the filing of the petition and bond, "to
accept such petition and bond and proceed no further in
such suit," and, if the cause be removable, an order of the
state court denying the application is ineffectual, for the

Appeaeance

Sec. 3]

135

petitioner may, notwithstanding, file a copy of the record
in the Circuit Court and that court must proceed in the

**********

cause.

It is conceded that if defendant had stated that it appeared specially for the purpose of making the application,
that would have been su;licient; and yet when the purpose
for which the applicant comes into the state court is the
single purpose oi removing the cause, and what he does has
no relation to anything else, it is not apparent why he
should be called in to repeat that this is his sole purpose;
and when removal is had before any step is taken in the
' '
the cause shall then procase, as the statute provides that
ceed in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced in said Circuit Court," it seems to us that it cannot
be successfully denied that e^ery question is open for determination in the Circuit Court, as we have, indeed, already decided.

**********

We are of opinion that the filing of a petition for removal
does not amount to a general appearance, but to a special

**********

appearance only.
Me.

Justice Bbewer

and

Me.

Justice Peckham

dis-

sented.

FISHER, SONS
Supreme

&

COMPANY V. CROWLEY.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
57

1906.

West Virginia, 312.

[Action of assumpsit. The defendants moved to quash
the summons. After the motion was overruled a plea of nonassumpsit was tendered. Judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendants assign error.] ^
Poffenbarger, J. * * * It has been suggested that, by
tendering the plea of non-assumpsit after the motion to
quash had been overruled and making other defenses, the
defendants submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
iThe matter in brackets has been condensed

hj

the editor.
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* *

is

it,

*
court, waiving the defect in the writ.
No decision of
this court holds that there is a waiver of a defect in a
summons by proceeding to trial after an adverse ruling on
a Emotion to quash and an exception taken thereto. Sears v.
Starhird, 78 Cal. 225, and Desmond v. Superior Court, 59
Cal. 274, so hold, but they are not in accord with the more
carefully considered cases of Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal.
v. Brown, 8 Cal. 339, neither
630, and Deidesheimer
in
of which is noticed
the opinion in the two subseDesmond v. Superior Court
quent inconsistent cases.
went up from a justice court and Sears v. Starhird simply
adopted the rule without comment. In view of this, it may
be fairly said they are not well considered cases. In Michigan, Indiana, Colorado, Nebraska, Florida and Missouri,
it has been held that defective service is waived by going
to trial, 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 631 and cases cited, but the authority for the decisions, in some instances, is found in peculiar statutes, and most of the cases originated in justice's
courts where practically all formalities are dispensed with.
Against this doctrine of waiver in cases of defective service stand the decisions of many states and the high authority of the Supreme Court of the United States. Harkness v.
Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, holds that ''Illegality in the service of
process by which jurisdiction is to be obtained is not waived
by the special appearance of the defendant to move that
the service be set aside; nor after such motion is denied,
Such illegality is considby his answering to the merits.
ered as wavied only when he, without having insisted upon
pleads in the first instance to the merits." Mullen v.
Railroad Co., (N. C.) 19 S. E. 106, says: ''Where a motion
made on special appearance to dismiss for want of service
of summons
overruled, and defendant excepts, his subsequent appearance to the merits, waives none of his

rights."

Ames

v.

Windsor,

19

Pick

247,
(Mass.)
the entry of

it

it,

"So, where the defendant, upon
says:
the action in the court of common pleas, moved that
court to dismiss
on the ground that the writ was
not duly served, and this motion was overruled, and
the defendant thereupon joined in the common demurrer, and the action was thereupon entered in this
court,
was held, that the defendant had not thereby
waived his exception to the legality of the service."
To
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the same effect are State v. Dupre, 46 La. Ann. 117, and
Railroad Co. v. Heath, 87 Ky. 651. Authorities of greater

dignity in this court, however, are its own decisions in
Chapman v. Haitian d, 22 W. Va. 329, (Syl. pt. 3), Price v.
Finnell, 4 W. Va. 296, and Steele v. Harkness, 9 W. Va. 13.

* * *

That pleading to the merits, without previous objection
return, is a waiver of process, defects in
process, defects in return, defective service and total want
of service is in no sense denied. The proposition is asserted
by a vast array of authorities. See 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 646.
It is ancient law in this state. Tuherville v. Long, 3 H. & M.
2>QQ;Winston v. Overseers, 4 Call. 357; Harvey v. Skipivith,
16 Grat. 410; Mahamj v. Kephart, 15 W. Va. 619; Todd &
Smith V. Gates, 20 W. Va. 604; Bank v. Bank, 3 W. Va. 386.
But the principle, as sound in law as it is in reason and
to the process or

a

a

a

is

if

it,

justice, that the appearance, to have such effect, must be
voluntary, has never been departed from except in the
single case of Railway Co. v. Wright, 50 W. Va. 653, and
that, as has been shown, compelled only a waiver of service,
a matter of less consequence than the requisites of a valid
summons. A man may waive perfect defenses to any demand, however large, though without a shadow of merit,
by a mere failure to appear and defend, but, by any law
or decision which would prevent his appearance or cut off
his opportunity to make defense, he would be more effectually robbed of his money than if it were taken from him
It must be voluntary and free from
by a highwayman.
Nor can he be deprived
constraint, else it is not binding.
of any other legal right except by his own voluntary act.
He has a perfect right to remain out of court until regularly and legally brought in, and, if an attempt is made to
bring him in irregularly, he has a perfect right to object,
on the ground of irregularity, in proper time, and manner.
To force him to waive
he does not do so, he
by saying,
can make no defense on the merits,
palpable denial
of
legal right. He must then determine whether he will
risk his whole case on the question of insufficiency of the
writ or return, as the case may be, however full and complete he might be able to make his defense on the merits,
or waive the defect and submit himself to
jurisdiction
not lawfully obtained, in order to prevent his being forever
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deprived of bis defense in case his objection to the writ or
return should prove to be not tenable. A test of the courts
jurisdiction could never be made except at great peril, a
result of which would be that no attempt to do so would
ever be made in a case in which defense on the merits could
be made.
In order to do so it would be necessary to suffer
a judgment by default, then go back to the same court with
a motion to set it aside for insufficiency of process, vainly
ask the court to reverse itself, suffer the same adverse ruling, and then, if possible, obtain a writ of error from this
Court and reverse the judgment for the defect in process
alone, and, on failure of that, to be forever barred of any
defense on the merits. For the court to present to a party
the alternative of waiving a jurisdictional defect or giving
up his defense, and compel him to choose, is not to allow
a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, but to coerce such
submission or a relinquishment of the defense on the merits,
however ample and just it may be, and give to the plaintiff
what he is clearly not entitled to — the appearance of the
defendant without process or relinquishment of defense in
that action. How can the action of a court, in arbitrarily
taking from one man a right, trivial and unimportant
though it be, and conferring it upon another, be justified,
either legally or morally I Is the right to stay out of court
until legally brought in worth nothing? Is process a mere
If so, whj^ allow a default judgment to be
idle formality?
set aside for want of it? That this will be done all admit,
and, in admitting, confess that the acquisition of jurisdiction by process is a matter of substance and not of form.
To say in the same breath that a man may not test it without surrendering his defense to the merits is squarely and
flatly inconsistent, contradictory of the admitted nature of
the right, and violative of law in that it forcibly deprives
the citizen of a substantial legal right. To say that the
office of process is to bring the defendant into court and
that, after his appearance, it is wholly unimportant and
may be disregarded, falls far short of justifying the ruling.
His appearance is involuntary. He must come or risk everything on the question of insufficiency of the process. If he
does not, a judgment by default goes against him, forever
precluding any defense, be it a release, payment, fraud or
what not, unless he can have it set aside for the defect in
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error. It puts him under compulsion from the moment of service. The court has laid
its powerful hand upon him and will render judgment
against him without a hearing if he does not bring to its
attention the defect in its process and ask to be discharged.
the process or some other

For the court to say, upon such compulsory appearance and
protest against jurisdiction, now that you are here, you
must stay, no matter how you were dragged in, is but bitter mockery, utterly inconsistent with the principles of the
law, eulogized in these days of enlightenment for their
justice and fairness even in those periods in which society
was comparatively crude and barbarous.
To test

of the summons, the appearance
must be special, of course, but it is not necessary in a court
of record to make the order, plea or motion expressly state
that the appearance is only for the purpose of excepting
* * *
to the jurisdiction.
Groves v. County Court, 42 W. Va.
587, seems to impliedly hold that if the record show that a
defendant
came into court without saying
he came
for a special purpose, his ajDpearance is presumed and
the sufficiency

taken to have been a general appearance, but the record
showed that the case, commenced by notice, had been docketed and the cause removed to another court, on motion,
after appearance, and before any exception to the notice
was taken. Hence the record showed more than mere presence in court.
Here the record as a whole negatives any
intent to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction. An immediate and direct attack was made upon the writ, and an exception to the action of the court in refusing to quash it put
upon the record. However it may be when the objection
is insufficiency of service, and defectiveness of the summons in a justice's court, the uniform holding by this court
has been that where the writ commencing an action in a
court of record is excepted to before any plea has been
tendered or continuance had, or other step taken, importing a general appearance, the defendant is deemed not to
have waived or lost the benefit of his motion, if an exception
was taken and saved, although he afterward plead to the
merits and went to trial.

For

the

foregoing reasons, the judgment

must be re-
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the summons quashed and the action dismissed,
with costs both in this court and the court below.
Reversed.
Sanders, Judge, dissented in part.

^•el•sed,

CORBETT V. PHYSICIANS' CASUALTY
ASSOCIATION.
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
135

1908,

Wisconsin, 505.

Action to recover on an accident insurance policy issued
on the mutual assessment plan. * * * The answer stated
three defenses, as follows, in effect: (1) The defendant is
a Nebraska corporation which has never complied with the
laws of this state authorizing service of process upon it by
serving ujDon the commissioner of insurance and the only
service made was of that character; (2) without waiving
the plea to the jurisdiction of the court the defendant shows
that it never qualified to do business in this state and, therefore, the making of the insurance contract was prohibited
by sec. 1978, Stats. (1898), and is not enforceable in the
courts of this state; (3) without waiving any right under
the foregoing, the allegations of the complaint as to the
assured being a member in good standing of the association
* * *
at the time he was injured are denied.
The plea to the jurisdiction was tried first and overruled. Defendant by its counsel excepted to the ruling. No
specific objection was made to then proceeding to a trial
* * *
upon the merits, which was done.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from
which this appeal was taken.
Marshall, J. At the threshold in the consideration of
this case is presented the question of whether a defendant
can challenge the jurisdiction of the court in which he is
f'ited to appear, upon the ground that the summons in the
action was not efficiently served, and failing in that can
submit to a trial upon the merits and in case of an adverse
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decision can, on appeal, have the benefit of the objection
* * *
made at the start.
As we view the case we need not follow and endeavor to
answer counsel's argument in detail on the jurisdictional
question, because it is firmly settled in respondent's favor
by numerous decisions of this court. Loive v. Stringhmn,
14 Wis. 222 ; Grantier v. Rosecrance, 27 Wis 488 ; Blackivood
V. Jones, 27 Wis. 498; Anderson v. Cohurn, 27 Wis. 558; 3
Ins. Co. of N. A. V. Swineford, 28 Wis. 257; Alderson v.
White, 32 Wis. 308; Dikeman v. Struck, 76 Wis. 332, 45
N. W. 118. The following language by Dixon, C. J., in
Alderson v. White, supra, referred to by counsel for respondent, is often quoted as an unmistakable indication of
the doctrine prevailing in this state :
"The party seeking to take advantage of want of jurisdiction in every such case, must object on that ground
alone, and keep out of court for every other purpose.
If
he goes in for any purpose incompatible with the supposition that the court has no power or jurisdiction on account
of defective service of process upon him, he goes in and
submits for all the purposes of personal jurisdiction with
respect to himself, and cannot afterwards be heard to make
It is a general appearance on his part,
the objection.
equivalent in its effect to proof of due personal service of

process."

It will be thus seen that the right to proceed to a trial
on the merits after a decision against the defendant on the

jurisdictional question, efficiently saving an objection to
the ruling in that regard, is not recognized as having any
place in our practice.
The quoted language was only a
reiteration, in effect, of what was said in Loive v. StringThere the doctrine which has from the start
ham, supra.
prevailed here, was thus plainly stated in these words:
"We think it is also a waiver of such a defect for the
party, after making his objection, to plead and go to trial
on the merits.
To allow him to do this, would be to give
him this advantage. After objecting that he was not properly in court, he could go in, take his chance of a trial on
the merits, and if it resulted in his favor, insist upon the
judgment as good for his benefit, but if it resulted against
him, he could set it all aside upon the ground that he had
never been properly got into court at all.
If a party
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wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court,
he must keep out for all purposes except to make that
objection. ' '
We recognize that there are very respectable authorities
to the contrary of the foregoing, among which are the following : Harhness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476 ; Miner v. Francis,
3 N. D. 549, 58 N. W. 343; 2 Ency. PI. & Pr. 629, 630, and
note 1. However, it is believed that the great weight of
authority, or at least the better reasoning, is the other way.
These are but a few of the many cases that might be cited
in support of that : In re Clarke, 125 Cal. 388, 392, 58 Pac.
22; Manhard v. Scliott, 37 Mich. 234; Stevens v. Harris, 99
Mich. 230, 58 N. W. 230 ; Union Pac. R. Co. v. De Bush, 12
Colo. 294, 20 Pac. 752 ; Lord v. Hendrie S B. Mfg. Co., 13
Colo. 393, 22 Pac. 782 ; Ruhtj Chief M. S M. Co. v. Gurley,
17 Colo. 199, 29 Pac. 668; Stephens v. Bradley, 24 Fla. 201,
3 South. 415 ; Thayer v. Dove, 8 Blackf. 567 ; Kronshi v. Mo.
Pac. R. Co., 77 Mo. 362.

By

the

Court — The judgment is affirmed.

Section

4.

Withdrawal of Appearance.

ELDRED V. BANK.
Supreme Court of the United States.
17

Error

1873,

Wallace, 545.

to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District

of

Wisconsin.
* * *
The Michigan Insurance Bank, on the 14th of August, 1861, sued Anson Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and Uri
Balcom, trading as Eldreds & Balcom, in the court of
Wayne County, Michigan, as indorsers on a .promissory
note for $4,000. * * * Publication-notice under the laws of
Michigan was given. * * * The defendant, Anson Eldred,
filed a plea of non-assumpsit, with notice of set-off, December 27th, 1861, and demanded a trial.
On the 22nd of April, 1862, as the record of the case
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stated, the cause came on to be heard, and the plea of the
defendants theretofore pleaded by them was withdrawn,
and the default of Elislia Eldred and Uri Balcom entered,
and on the 10th day of May the said default was made absolute. On the 13th of May, the record continues :
"The plea of the defendant, Anson Eldred, heretofore
pleaded by him, having been withdrawn, and the default
of the defendants, Elisha Eldred and Uri Balcom, having
* * *
been duly entered,
therefor, it is considered that said
plaintiffs do recover against said defendants their damages
aforesaid, together with their costs aforesaid to be taxed,
and that said plaintiff have execution therefor."
In this state of things the bank brought this, the present
suit, in the court below, on the same note against the same
Anson Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and Uri Balcom. * * * Ansov
Eldred, who alone was served or appeared, pleaded the
* * *
general issue; and the case came on for trial.
The
* * *
then oft'ered in evidence the record of the
defendant
above mentioned suit on the same note in the Wayne

County Court
1st.
2nd.

* * *

:

**********

As being

a bar to recovery on this note

in suit.

Judgment having gone accordingly for the bank, Anson
Eldred brought the case here on error; the error assigned
being the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that the

******##**

judgment was a bar,

Mr. Justice Miller delivered

opinion of the court.
It is argued by the counsel of the defendant in error that
the withdrawal of the plea of Anson Eldred left the case
the.

as to him as though he had never filed the plea, and that
never having been served with process he was not liable to
the personal judgment of the court.

We do not agree to this proposition.

The filing of the
plea was both an appearance and a defense. The case stood
for the time between one term and another with an appearance and a plea.
The withdrawal of the plea could not
have the effect of withdrawing the appearance of the defendant, and requiring the plaintiff to take steps to bring
that defendant again within the jurisdiction of the court.
Having withdrawn that plea he was in a condition to de-
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mur, to move to dismiss the suit if any reason for that
could be found, or to file a new and different plea if he
chose, either with the other defendants jointly, or for himself. He was not, by the withdrawal of the plea, out of
court. Such a doctrine would be very mischievous in cases
where, as it is very often, the first and only evidence of
the appearance of a party is the filing of his plea, answer,
or demurrer. The case might rest on this for a long period
before it was ready for trial, when, if the party could obtain
leave of the court to withdraw his plea (a leave generally
granted without objection), he could thereby withdraw his
appearance, the plaintiff is left to begin de novo.
We are of opinion that the record of the suit in Michigan
shows a valid personal judgment against Anson Eldred,
and that that judgment was a bar to recovery in the present
suit.

Judgment reversed, but without costs to either party in
this court, and a new trial granted in the Circuit Court.

INSUEANCE TRUST AND AGENCY V. FAILING.
Supreme

Court of Kansas.
66

T

1903,

Ka7isas, 336.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Johnston, C.
.

* * * * *

April

the defendants appeared by their attorney and filed separate demurrers, in each of which the
following grounds were stated:
*'l. That the court had no jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant or the subject of this action.
"2. That there is a defect of parties defendant.
**3.
That several causes of action are improperly joined
and
''4, That the petition does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action."
On June 29, 1900, the defendants, without notice to the
On

3, 1900,
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plaintiff, orally asked and obtained leave to withdraw the
demurrers and appearances previously filed. * * *
* * *
Was jurisdiction lost by the attempted withdrawal
of the demurrers and appearances several months afterward? We think not. The code (<^67; Gen. Stat. 1901,
<^4497) declares that "the voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to service."
Will it be contended
that a defendant served with summons, who has tired of
the litigation, can withdraw from the case and the jurisdiction of the court at will? Where a defendant pleads
and makes a general appearance, he waives the service
of summons and any defect that there may be in the process, and is in court as fully and effectually as though personal service had been made on him. A submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, whether coerced by process or
voluntary as in this case, cannot be retracted or withdrawn
to the prejudice of the plaintiff.
To allow a withdrawal
which would divest the court of jurisdiction obtained by a
general appearance would be a great injustice to a plaintiff
who had relied on the appearance of a non-resident defendant until the time and opportunities to obtain service otherwise had passed. The court may permit a withdrawal, or
rather set aside an appearance made without authority, or
procured by fraud, but under a code provision making a
general appearance co-equal with service, the court has no
more right to permit a withdrawal of such appearance conferring jurisdiction, than it would have to set aside service
of a summons regularly made. Here there was no claim of
fraud, or of misapprehension, as the appearance was made
by counsel who was shown to have full authority to represent the defendants.
The action of the court in permitting
a withdrawal of appearance was unwarranted.

**********

Reversed.

T. p.— 10
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Authority of Attorney to Appear.

HAMILTON

V. WRIGHT.

Court of Appeals of New York.
37 Nerv

This was

[Chap.

York,

1868.

502.

of ejectment, brought in the name
of the appellants [Hamilton and Livingston] and one Gleason, to recover possession of certain lands in the town of
* * *
Judgment in favor of the
Shandaken, Ulster county.
defendant for his costs, was rendered against all of the
jolaintiffs, and was affirmed on appeal to the General Term.
Hamilton and Livingston moved at the Poughkeepsie
Special Term that the judgment against them be vacated,
or, in case Gleason failed to pay the costs, that William
Lounsbury, plaintitfs' attorney, should pay the judgment,
upon the ground that the use of their names as plaintiffs
was unauthorized and unknown to them. The special Term
denied the motion with costs. From this order denying
the motion, Hamilton and Livingston appealed to the General Term, where the order was modified, directing that
the judgment be in the first instance collected, if collectible, of W. S. Gleason, their co-plaintiff, who caused the
action to be brought, and that the question of the liability
of plaintiffs' attorney to Hamilton and Livingston, in
case they are to pay the judgment, be left open : neither of
the parties to have costs, as against the other, upon such
appeal. From this last order, Plamilton and Livingston
appealed to this court.
Woodruff, J. The general rule, that an appearance by
an action

attorney, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, if
there be no collusion, may be recognized by the adverse
deem important to the safe
party as authentic and valid,
well
and
founded in the scheme
justice,
of
administration
and plan of such administration in England and this country ever since such officers were commissioned to represent litigants in the courts.
Receiving their authority from the court, they are
deemed its officers. Their commissions declare them entitled
to confidence, and, in a just sense, their license is an assur-

I
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ance, not only of their competency, but of their character
and title to confidence.
The direct control of the courts over them as officers, by

way of summary discipline and punislunent to compel the
performance of their duty, or to suspend or degrade them,
is retained and exercised as a guaranty of their fidelity. It
is no denial of the rule that, where there are special circumstances calling for its relaxation, the courts may and
do relieve from its rigid application. The exception arising from such special circumstances strengthens, as well
as recognizes the rule itself.
Hence, when an appearance is entered by an attorney
without authority, the inquiry, whether such attorney is
of sufficient responsibility to answer for his unauthorized
conduct to the party injured thereby, is entertained. And
it may be proper always to inquire, whether the injury
to the party is irremediable unless such appearance be set
aside, and the i3roceedings founded thereon vacated.
In exercise of their general equitable control over their
own judgments, the < -t may and should consider whether
they can relieve the party for whom an unauthorized appearance is made, without undue prejudice to the party,
who has in good faith relied upon such appearance and the
official character of the attorney who appears.
But it would be at variance with the scheme and plan
upon which we universally administer the law, if a defendant could be prosecuted by a responsible attorney, in
full authority to practice in our courts, and after having
successfully and in good faith defended, as the case might
be, through all the tribunals of justice, and to final judgment in the court of last resort, be required to submit to an
order setting aside the proceedings, and be left to be again
prosecuted for the same cause of action, on the mere
ground that the plaintiff's attorney had no authority from
the plaintiff to bring the action. The law which gives to attorneys their commissions, must be deemed to guarantee
to defendants protection against such a result. And, at the
same time, the rule should jaeld to equitable considerations,
where they arise, and should permit the courts to give
relief when they can thereby prevent irremediable wrong
to either party.
And if it be asked, why should the party for whom he
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appears be left to seek his remedy against the attorney? —
why should not the party who has been subjected to an unauthorized litigation pursue that remedy, rather than cast
that hazard and burden on one who has done nothing to
deserve it? — the answer lies in the suggestion already
made, that the law warrants a party in giving faith and
confidence to one who, by law, is authorized to hold himself
out as a public officer, clothed with power to represent
others in the courts. And besides this, the consequences of
the contrary rule would often be altogether disastrous.
Evidence would be lost; witnesses die; the statute of limitations bar claims; and death of parties themselves might
often happen. In various ways, to set aside proceedings at
the end of a protracted litigation would be to work inevitable wrong to the party who had relied upon an appearance.

It

is

a

is,

5
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1;
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may be said that proof of the authority of the attorney to appear and prosecute should be demanded, if the
party would be safe. If such demand could in all cases be
insisted upon, it would be only one step toward safety. It
Ex parte evidence
might often be practically, ineffectual.
of authority might be produced, and yet, if the party might
afterward impeach
the question would again arise, in
all its force. Besides,
not the practice to require attorneys to produce their authority, except in special cases.
power in the courts to order it:
No doubt there
has
sometimes been done. {Ninety-nine Plaintiffs v. Vanderhilt,
Duer, 632.)
When, pending
litigation, the authority of the attorney
to appear
made in due season,
denied, and application
probable cause appears, would, in general,
the court,
protect the party applying. Still, the general rule remains,
that
retainer will be presumed; and the adverse party,
having no notice or ground of suspicion, may act on that
Ves.
presumption.
Mylne
Merivale, 12;
Keen,
Johns. 297;
Paige, 496.) And in general where
196;
there are no circumstances of suspicion, of facts indicating
fraud, and no evidence of bad character discrediting the
respectable and
appearance, the courts do not require
responsible attorney to exhibit his authority to appear.
Johns. 34;
Duer, 643.)
It
however, suggested, that, as in ejectment, the
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defendant is authorized by statute to require the attorney
for the plaintiff to produce his authority (2 R. S. 306), this
action should be deemed an exception to the general rule,
and it be held that the defendant's own laches have caused
his misfortune, if it afterward appear that the plaintiff did
not authorize the suit. But it is obvious that the statute
itself does not furnish complete protection. It only makes
the production of apparent written authority, sustained by
affidavit, presumptive evidence. And if the authority do
not actually exist, the same question will arise in ejectment
as in other actions : How far is the plaintiff bound by the
appearance of an attorney for him! And, as respects an
appearance for a defendant, the statute makes no provision.
do not think, therefore, that the omission of the defendant to demand the production of authority, where he has
nothing to put him on his guard, awaken his suspicion, or
to lead him to distrust the good faith of the attorney who
prosecutes the action, should affect his right to insist upon
his judgment, when it is not claimed that the attorney is
not of full and sufficient responsibility to answer to the
plaintiff for any costs or other damage he may have sustained.

I

Judgment affirmed.

DANVILLE,

HAZLETON
AND WILKES-BARRE
RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT, V. RHODES.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
180

1897.

Pennsylvania State, 157,

Appeal by plaintiff from order striking off warrant of
attorney.

David C, Harrington, for appellant.
George L, Crawford, for appellee.
Opinion of Mr. Justice Williams : — On the seventh day of
June, 1892, D. C. Harrington, Esq., an attorney at law regularly admitted to practice in the courts of Philadelphia
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filed tlie bill in equity in this case as the attorney of the

plaintiff.
On the eighteenth day of the same month a rule was
entered in the minutes by the prothonotary, on the direction
of Crawford & Laughlin, attorneys for Rhodes et al. and
the D. H. and W. Eailroad Co., requiring D. C. Harrington
to file his warrant of attorney. No affidavit or statement of
facts tending to throw doubt upon his authority was filed
and no application whatever was made to the court of
which Harrington was a sworn officer. On the twenty-fifth
of the same month Harrington filed a warrant of attorney
in due form executed by the corporation under its seal.
This was a compliance with the rule and it should reguThe court however without
larly have been discharged.
any formal disposition of the warrant of attorney, and
without even a suggestion on the record that it was not
what it purported to be, granted a rule on Harrington to
show cause why the warrant should not be struck from the
This rule it subsequently made absolute and the
records.
For what reason this rule was
w^arrant was struck off.
it was made absolute, it is imwhat
reason
for
granted, or
possible to tell so far as the records in this case are concerned. Having thus disposed of the attorney of the plaintiff, a rule was at once granted requiring the plaintiff" to
show cause why the bill should not be struck from the
records.
This was soon after made absolute. The cause
was sent out of court, after the attorney, in a novel and
peremptory manner. The record shows no reason whatever, given by Messrs. Crawford & Laughlin, for asking
either of these rules, and none given by the court below for
making them absolute. We know of no authority for such
a practice.
It is elementary law that an attorney is an
officer of the court in whicli he is admitted to practice. His
admission and license to practice raise a presumption
])rima facie in favor of his right to appear for any person
whom he undertakes to represent.
When his authority to
do so is questioned or denied the burden of overcoming
this presumption in his favor rests on liim who questions
or denies his authority, and such person must show by affidavit the existence of facts tending to overcome tlie presumption before lie can be called upon to file his warrant
of attorney: Weeks on Attorneys at T^aw, 387 to 400.
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The established practice in this country and England is
to apply to the court by petition stating the facts relied
on to overcome the presumption and asking a rule upon
the attorney to file his warrant. When he has complied
with the rule by filing a warrant sufficient in form and in
the manner of its execution, the rule has been complied
with and is functus officio. If the warrant is alleged to be
defective, or forged, or in any manner insufficient to justify
the court in treating it as authority for the appearance of
the attorney, the defect should be pointed out by exceptions
and its sufficiency passed upon by the court. If the court
holds the warrant sufficient the case proceeds. If it is held
insufficient proceedings therein will be stayed or in a proper
In Campbell v. Galhreath,
case the suit may be dismissed.
5 Watts, 423, Justice Kennedy discusses the practice to
some extent and says at page 430, that after it is ascertained that the attorney for the plaintiff has no authority
to appear for him in the suit pending, the defendant may
The same practice prevails
proceed to have it dismissed.
in the United States courts and in those of most of the
*
*
*
states.
* * *

[Order affirmed on other grounds.]

CHAPTER IV.
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Sueprise at the Tkiax,.

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY V. GROM.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
142

1911.

Kentucky, 51.

Opinion of the Court by Wm. Rogees Clay, Commissioner — Affirming.
Appellee, William Grom, brought this action against the
appellants, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St, Louis
Railway Company and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to
recover damages in the sum of $1,999 for personal injuries,
alleged to have been due to the negligence of the railroad
companies while he was a passenger on their lines of railroad. The jury awarded him a verdict for the full amount
sued for, and the defendants have appealed.
The facts, briefly stated, are as follows : Appellee bought
a ticket from Louisville to Atlantic City and return. The
accident occurred between Pittsburg and Altoona, in the
State of Pennsylvania. At the- time of the accident appellee was sitting in the middle of the sixth seat from the
front end of the car. He was struck by some hard and
heavy substance over the left eye. The frontal bone was
fractured and his eye so seriously injured that the sight
thereof is permanent!}^ impaired. At the time of the acei
Just before and after
dent a freight train was passing.
the injury, witnesses heard something rattling against the
side of the car.
It sounded like a chain. Indentations
were found on the side of the car which looked as if they
had been made by an irregular object in the form of a chain.
One of the witnesses saw the passing shadow of the object
that struck appellee, and it looked like a chain. Immediately after the injury several persons searched the car, and
nothing was found therein which could have caused the
152
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injury. Appellant's testimony was to the effect that on
the freight trains ordinarily used there are no chains in a
position to be swung out so as to strike or enter a train on
an adjacent track, and, even if there were such, they would
hang by the side of the car by reason of their own weight,
and would not swing out from the car by reason of the vel-

ocity of the train. The witnesses, however, had no knowledge of the condition of the particular train in question
and they admit, on cross-examination, that there were numerous chains in and about freight cars.

At

**********

the conclusion

of the evidence for appellee, appel-

lants' senior counsel filed his affidavit and moved for a
continuance on the ground of surprise. In this affidavit
counsel stated, in substance, that he had had sole charge of
the defense of the action that was being tried; that theretofore he had made a most thorough investigation of
the case and had had submitted to him
full reports made by the agents of appellants as to all
facts connected with the injur}-. He had never heard until
the day before the trial that any attempt would be made
to show that appellee was struck by a chain, when he was
then informed in a general waj^ by appellee's counsel that
In all the investigations made
he would show that fact.
and in the reports submitted to him, it had never been suggested that the accident could have happened in that way.
He was, therefore, taken completely by surprise, as were
the appellants, by the evidence introduced by appellee, and
he was not then prepared to rebut such evidence. He had
taken the deposition of the train conductor, but did not ask
him about a chain, because he had never heard it suggested
or thought it possible that a chain could have anything to
If allowed an opportunity to do so
do with the accident.
he could and would procure testimony of witnesses — all
residing in the state of Pennsylvania — which would prove
(1) that there were no marks on the car on which appellee
was injured indicating that it had recently been struck
by anything; (2) that all the persons who were in the coach
and near appellee were asked by the conductor and brakeman as to the cause of the accident, and none of them
and none of them said
could give any explanation of
anything about hearing chain or seeing chain, and none
a

it,

of

a

the facts
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chain had anything to do with the
accident; (3) that at the time there were no chains npon
or attached to appellants' engine or cars, or forming any
part of the equipment thereof that were long enough to
reach into the window of a passenger coach on an adjacent track and strike a passenger, as appellee was struck;
(4) that all chains connected with such equipment were,
however, short chains, and in the event of their breaking
they would drag on the ground, and could not swing out
in a horizontal position so as to come in contact with a train
on an adjacent track; that such a thing is a physical impossibility; (5) that "shortly after the accident to plaintiff the conductor caused telegraphic notice to be given of it
and instructions were immediately given to inspect all westbound freight trains that had met plaintitf 's train to see if
anything was attached to or projected from them that could
have caused the accident, and such investigation was made
and nothing found to explain the cause of the accident;"
that these facts could be established by the testimony of
several witnesses (naming them) and could not be established by any witnesses living in the State of Kentucky.
Did not anticipate, nor did the railroad companies anticipate, and no one could have reasonably anticipated, that
appellee would attempt to prove that his injuries were
caused in such an unusual or unheard-of manner as being
struck by a chain. If the railroad companies had known in
time that such proof would be offered, they could and would
have met it by showing facts to the contrary.
The foregoing affidavit was not filed until appellants'
motion for a peremptory instruction, at the conclusion of
appellee's evidence, had been overruled. Before asking for
a continuance on the ground of surprise, therefore, counsel
for appellants first took the chance of appellee's failing to
make out his case. Though apprised of the fact in a general way on the day before the trial that appellee would
attempt to show that he was struck by a chain, he did not
ask for a continuance of the case when it was called for
trial. At the time of the trial the law of Pennsylvania was
in proof.
Tounsel knew that under that law upon mere
proof of iii.iiiry, unaccompanied by any facts tending to
show a collision or a defect of cars, track, roadway, machinery or other negligence appellee could not recover,
a
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The deposition of the conductor showed that there was
absolutely nothing the matter with the train on which appellee was a passenger. A search was made to find whether
or not the object which had struck appellee was in the car,
and nothing was found. Knowing the law of Pennsylvania,
counsel should have anticipated that appellee would attempt to prove facts tending to show negligence in the
operation or mechanical appliances of the passing train,
as appellee could not recover by merely showing that he
was injured by some object, without showing the source
from which it came. Furthermore, counsel admits in his
affidavit that immediately after the accident, the conductor
caused telegraphic notice of the fact to be given, and instructions were immediately sent out to inspect all westbound freight trains that had met the train on which
appellee was a passenger, to see if anything was attached
to, or projected from them that could have caused the accident and such investigation was made and nothing found
to explain the cause of the accident. This being true, counsel should have taken the depositions of witnesses acquainted with such facts, and should not have gone into the
trial in the hope that appellee would fail to make out his
case, and, in the event that he did make out his case, appellants w^ould be granted a continuance and a further
opportunity to prove facts which they could have established before the trial. We, therefore conclude that the
court did not err in failing to grant the continuance asked

for.

**********

Judgment affirmed.

PETERSON V. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY
COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of Missouri.
211

Lamm,

J. — Peter

1908,

Missouri, 498.

L. Peterson

sued

for damages —his

of action the negligence of defendant's servants manJiing one of its street cars in Kansas City, Missouri, on the

cause
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of December, 1902. Defendant appeals from a
judgment in favor of Peterson for $5,000. Here, his death
was suggested and proceedings had reviving the the cause
in the name of Henrietta, administratrix of his estate.
13th

dsLj

Did the court err in allowing amendments ; and err again
in refusing a continuance? We think not; because;
(a) The statutory right to amend a petition is not open
to discussion.
The right of a court to permit a petition to
be amended is nothing more than plain, everyday, hardheaded sense.
The right to act with good sense may
(modestly) be assumed to be inherent in any court, and (it
is likely) would exist without written law. Counsel make
the point that plaintiff had no right to amend the petition
at the trial, but they give no reason or cite no authority.
All things, says Coke, are confirmed or impugned in one
of two ways — by reason or authority. The point should
not have been made; for the only possible question is one
of terms on which the amendment may go and that question
is not raised.
The principal proposition under this head is the
(b)
It is
refusal to grant a continuance after amendment.
argued that prior to the amendments the petition stated no
cause of action because there was no averment that the car
had stopped to receive passengers who might undertake to
get on; that the amendments supplied that omission; that
after amendment the petition for the first time stated a
cause of action; and that amendments of that character,
made at the commencement of a trial, entitling the defendant to a continuance as of course, much more should one
go in view of the application and affidavit filed in this instance.
But we can agree neither to the premise, nor to the conclusion if the premise were true. The petition did state a
It alleged that defendant's Main street
cause of action.
cars regularly stopped about ten feet north of Twelfth
for the purpose of permitting passengers to get on and off.
That plaintiff on the 13th day of December, 1902, attempted
to enter defendant's car at said point to take passage and
that, while in the act of doing so with his foot upon the
carestep at the back end of the car, defendant's servants
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lessly and negligently started said car forward with a violent jerk.
The allegation that the car '^ started" was by necessary
implication an allegation that the car was stationary at
the time. A thing can't start without a stop. The one includes the other, ex vi termini. We had occasion to discuss
a similar contention in Flaherty v. Railroad, 207 Mo. 1 c.
335, where it was said: "But in ordinary speech, if A
says B 'moved forward,' there is a fair implication, at
least, that A means that B was in a condition of repose
when the movement began. If A was bent on expressing
the idea that B was going at the time, but then and there
began to hasten his pace, he would naturally have inserted
some word to convey the accelerated motion.
The absence
of such modifying word, here, is not without significance."
What was said in the Flaherty case, though in discussing
an instruction, applies here.
If the petition had said that
the car started forward "more rapidly" that would convey
the idea it was moving at the time, but there is no such word
used and the petition is only subject to the criticism that it
defectively or obscurely stated a cause of action — not that
it stated none whatever.
It would have been good after
verdict.
But, if it were conceded that the petition stated no cause
of action before amendment, defendant would not be entitled to a continuance, as of course, on that ground. The
canonized rule is, and all the cases hold, that a continuance
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court — a
discretion to be soundly exercised.
It is trite law that
every intendment exists in favor of the trial court's action
The statute under
on an application for a continuance.
which tliese particular amendments were allowed is Revised Statutes 1899, section 688, reading: "When a party
shall amend any pleading or proceeding, and the court
shall be satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the opposite party could not be read}' for trial in consequence
thereof, a continuance may be granted to some day of the
same term, or at the next regular term of the court."
It will be seen from that statute that an affidavit is not
The court may be satisfied "by affidavit or
essential.
otherwise" that the opposite party could not be ready for
trial in consequence of the amendment.
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There was no attempt, except by the affidavit, to satisfy
the court that the defendant could not be ready for trial;
attending to that affidavit, it does not show defendant had
not subpoenaed witnesses on the issues made by the amendments. Subsequent events showed it had — and all it knew
of. It does not state that the allegations, as amended, are
not true, or that it had a meritorious defense to the new
matter, nor does it point out that defendant could be ready
to meet those allegations at any other time. Hence, we
find no fault with the court's ruling on the application. It
is fully sustained by the following cases cited by counsel
construing section 688, supra: Colhoun v. Craivford, 50
Mo. 458; Keltenhaugh v. Railroad, 34 Mo. App. 147; Pifer
V. Stanley, 57 Mo. App. 516; Keeton v. Railroad^ 116 Mo.

App. 281.
The point is ruled against defendant.

EAHLES V. J. THOMPSON

&

SONS MANUFACTUR-

ING COMPANY.

Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
137

Timlin,

J.

1909.

Wisconsin, 506.

The original complaint was quite inartistic.
But after setting forth the age, nationality, and occupation
of the plaintiff and his lack of knowledge of the English
language and the corporate character and the business of
the defendant, it averred lack of knowledge of machinery
and of tlie dangers attending its operation and lack of exDefendant had and
perience on the part of the plaintiff.
used a described drop hammer, out of repair and defecDefendant, knowing the plaintiff's want of experitive.
ence, and without instructing the plaintiff concerning his
duties except as specified, and without warning the plaintiff that there was any danger in working about the
drop hammer or that it was liable to fall, ordered the plaintiff to assist the operator of tlie drop hammer. Plaintiff,
assisting without knowledge of the danger, was injured by
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dropping upon his hand, which in consequence
of this injury was amputated. That if the said defendant
by its officers or agents, its superintendent and foreman
acting as vice-principals, had warned or in any manner instructed the plaintiff as to the dangers and the use of the

the hammer

said hammer, the precautions to be taken about the same,
plaintiff would not have been injured in any manner and
Again:
would have avoided the said injury.
''That the cause of the injury to this plaintiff was the
* * *
to warn the said plainneglect of the said defendant
tiif of the dangers and of the dangerous condition of the
said machine."
No defect in the machine having been shown, but the
evidence on the part of the plaintitf tending to show that
the plaintiff accidentally stepped on the treadle of the drop
hammer while having his hand in the path of the descending hammer, the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence moved that the plaintiff be non-suited.
Plaintiff then asked leave to amend his complaint, presenting an
amended complaint, which is the same as the original complaint except that therein the negligence of the defendant
was predicated, not upon any defect in the machine, but
of the plaintiii,
upon the ignorance and inexperience
known to the defendant, and the failure of the defendant to
instruct or warn the plaintiff before or at the time of
placing plaintiff to work upon the drop hammer. The court
allowed this amended complaint to be filed, whereupon
counsel for the defendant asked for the ''continuance of
the case over the term, the immediate taxing by the clerk
of this court of the taxable disbursements of the defendant
down to this time, and the usual attorney fee of $25. By
The motion is granted upon the sole ground
the Court:
that $10 costs be paid forthwith." Exception to this ruling
was taken, and error is assigned on this ruling.
We perceive no error in the ruling. It was proper to
allow the amendment on the trial. Gates v. Paul, 117 Wis.
Where the complaint is amended on the
170, 9-1: N. W. 55.
trial, in order to entitle the defendant to a continuance he
must make a showing, if not by affidavit, at least by a
statement to the court based on the pleadings apparently
supporting such statement, that he is unprepared to meet
^nd cannot, with the evidence at hand or available, meet the
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issues raised by the amended complaint.
W'ithee v. Simon,
104 Wis. 116, 80 N. W. 77.
The amendment here brought
about no radical change of the issues and the terms were in
the discretion of the court. III. S. Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis.
499, 82 N. W. 534; Mcllquham v. Barber, 83 Wis. 500, 53

N. W. 902 ; Pellage v. Pellage, 32 Wis. 136, 141 ; Schaller
V. C. & N. W. R. Co., 97 Wis. 31, 71 N. W. 1042. * * *

Section

2.

Absence op Witness.

CAMPBELL

V. DREHER.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
33

1908.

Kentucky Law Reporter, 444.

J. In a collision between appellee, a 16-yearold boy, on a bicycle and appellant's automobile appellee
was injured. Conceiving that his injuries were the direct
result of appellant's negligence in operating his machine,
appellee, through his father as next friend, instituted suit
to recover damages. Appellant denied liability, and pleaded that the injuries, if any, to the boy were the result of
his own carelessness and negligence. Upon the issues thus
joined a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict in favor
of appellee for $500. To reverse this judgment this appeal
is prosecuted.
Appellant relies upon four grounds: * * *; second, because the trial court erred in refusing him a continuance
on his showing, made at the time of the trial, that the witness Dr. Geo. W. Leachman, was absent from the state,
and that his testimony could not be procured at that
Lassing,

time;

* *

* *

Appellant's second ground for reversal is not well taken
First, it is not shown that he used any
diligence whatever to secure the presence of this witness
at his trial. The record show!^ that his answer was filed on
the 15th day of December, 19Q§. The reply was filed on the.

for two reasons:
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The
22nd day of December, 1906, completing the issues.
case was called for trial the 26th of March, 1907, or more
than 90 days after the issues were made up. During all of
this time, save about two weeks prior to the date of the
trial, as shown by the affidavit, the witness. Dr. George W.
Leachman, was within the jurisdiction of the court, and
could have been subpoenaed, and his attendance procured.
This was not done, and the fact that appellant did not know
he was going to leave offers no excuse for his failure to
have a subpoena issued for this witness at a time when he
knew he was within the jurisdiction of the court and could
have been served. The court did not err in refusing to
continue the case because of the absence of this witness for
the further reason that it is shown that his evidence would
He was in the automobile
have been merely cumulative.
with the witness John Straus, and the facts to which he
would have testified, if present, as disclosed by the affidavit, were testified to by the witness John Straus. The
ruling of the trial judge, in permitting this affidavit for
continuance to be read as the deposition of the absent witness, was certainly as favorable to appellant as he could
ask.

Perceiving no error in the conduct of the trial prejudicial
to the rights of appellant, the judgment is affirmed.

TERRAPIN
Supreme

V.

BARKER.

Court of Oklahoma.
26 Oklahoma,

1910.

93.

This action was brought in the District Court of Washington county by defendant in error to recover for services
rendered by him to plaintiff in error as an attorney, of an
alleged reasonable value of $1,000, and for expenses incurred and paid out by him for plaintiff in error in rendering said services. From a verdict and judgment in favor of
defendant in error, hereafter called ''plaintiff," plaintiff
in error, hereafter called ' ' defendant, ' ' brings this proceedT. P.— 11
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ing in error.

The facts alleged in the pleadings and established by the evidence, in so far as they are necessary in
the consideration of the questions presented by this proceeding, will be stated in the opinion.

**********

After anHayes, J. (after stating the facts as above.)
the
court
trial
that they
nouncement of both parties in
were ready for trial, a motion by defendant to strike out
certain 23ortions of plaintiff's reply to his answer was overruled, and he thereupon filed a motion for continuance,
His motion for continuance
which was also overruled.
stated, that he was informed that two certain persons who
were absent had information material to his case; that he
has a right to expect that they would be in attendance at
Section 5836 of the Compiled Laws
the trial of his cause.
of Oklahoma of 1909 prescribes what an application for continuance on account of the absence of evidence shall contain.
It must show the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained ; that due diligence has been used to
obtain it; where the witnesses reside, if their residence is

known to the party; the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time ; and what facts mover believes the witness will prove; and that he believes them
to be true.
The motion in this case fails to contain several of these
essential elements. No showing whatever is made in the
application of any diligence used by plaintiff in error to
obtain the attendance of the absent witnesses ; nor does the
affidavit state the residence of but one of said witnesses.
No showing is made that their testimony can be procured
within a reasonable time; nor is any statement made as to
any facts that can be established by them that would be
material to the case. It is stated that if one of the witnesses was present he would testify that, "so far as he is
informed, defendant in error was not plaintiff in error's
attorney in the matter in which he alleges he rendered the
services for plaintiff in error." But such evidence would
The witness could not be permitted to
be incompetent.
testify as to liis information. The application also fails to
state that applicant believes that the alleged facts which
tlie absent witness will testify to are true. An application
for continuance could hardly be more defective than the
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It

is not an abuse of discretion to
overrule an application for continuance, where no diligence
is shown to procure the attendance of the witnesses. {Siuope
d Son V. Burnliam, Hanna, Hunger & Co., 6 Okla. 736, 52
Pac. 924; Kirk v. Territory, 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 979), and
the party applying must clearly state the facts he expects
to prove, and their materiality must be made to appear
from the application {Murphy v. Hood, et al., 12 Okla. 593.)
And even when all the matters prescribed by the statute are
set forth in an affidavit for continuance, a continuance will
not be granted, if the adverse party consents that on a
trial the facts alleged in the affidavit shall be read and
treated as a deposition of the absent witness. Section 5836.
supra; Chandler v. Colcord, 1 Okla. 260, 32 Pac. 330. Defendant is in no position to complain that his motion was
overruled, for plaintiff would, in all events have been entitled to know what facts he intended to establish by the
absent witnesses, in order that he might determine whether
he would admit that the witness would so testify; and that
such facts might be read to the jury as a deposition of the
absent witnesses, rather than to suffer the inconvenience of
a continuance.

**********

Finding no error in the record requiring
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

All

the

a reversal,

the

Justices concur.

BEAN V. MISSOULA LUMBER COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Montana.
40

1909.

Montana, 31.

Mr. Chief Justice Brantly delivered

the

opinion of the

court.
Contention is made that the court erred in refusing to
grant to defendant a postjionement of the trial because of
the absence of one Wendorf, a witness who was expected
to be present and testify in defendant's favor. The appli-
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cation was made upon affidavit by defendant's counsel. Besides setting forth the facts to which the witness would
testify, the affidavit shows that the witness was a resident
of the state of Idaho; that he was then in that state and
had been for some months; that he was the only witness
who could testify to the facts set forth ; that the defendant
expected to have him present, but that, after the cause was
set for trial, counsel ascertained that he was ill at his home
and was unable to attend ; and that, if granted a postponement, he could secure the attendance of the witness in perHowever meritorious the application may have been
son.
in other respects, it was properly denied, because it wholly
failed to show diligence by defendant in its efforts to seThe cause had been at
cure the evidence of the witness.
issue for several months. The witness was a non-resident
of the state of Montana, and beyond the jurisdiction of the
court. If the defendant chose to rely upon his promise to
attend — if he did make such promise — it did so at its own
risk. Under the circumstances, the only safe course to
pursue was to take the deposition of the witness. The refusal to grant a continuance was, under the circumstances,
not such an abuse of discretion as to call for interposition
by this court. The case of State v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417,
43 Pac. 182, cited by counsel, is not in point.
Though the
application there made showed that the witness resided in
the state of Kansas, it appeared that the defendant knew
not] ling of his whereabouts until within so short a time before the trial that it was impossible to take his deposition,
and the postponement was asked in order that the defendant might be given time to take it.

Let tlie judgment and order be affirmed.
'Afirmed.

Mr. Justice Smith and Mr. Justice Holloway. concur.
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HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY V.
HAMMOND.

THE LIVERPOOL AND LONDON AND GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY V. HAMMOND.
Supreme

Court of Colorado.
41

1907.

Colorado, 323.

Mr. Justice Bailey delivered

opinion of the court :
The same questions are presented in each of these cases,
and we will, therefore, dispose of them in one opinion.
The first contention is that the court should have granted
a continuance of the trial, asked for by defendants, appellants here. It appears that Charles F. Hawkins was a
material witness on behalf of the defendants and that he
was ill and unable to attend the trial. Because of his
the

absence, defendants requested a postponement and filed an
affidavit wherein were stated the facts which Hawkins had
been expected to testify to. Plaintiff objected to a continuance and admitted that if the witness, Hawkins, were present he should testify as stated in the affidavit.
When this

was done the application for a continuance upon that
ground was properly overruled. — Code of Civil Proc, sec.
177; Baldwin Coal Co. v. Davis, 15 Colo. App. 371; Florence Oil Co. V. Oil Well Supply Co., 38 Colo. 124.

We are unable to find any error in the proceedings in
these cases, and therefore, are of the opinion that each of
the judgments

should be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Chief Justice Steele and Mr. Justice Goddard concur.
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BROWN V. ABILENE NATIONAL BANK.
Supreme Court of Texas.
70

18S8.

Texas, 750.

On January 25, 1886, the
Stayton, Chief Justice.
Abilene National Bank brought an action against B. M.
Dangherty on several promissory notes, and sued out a
writ of attachment that was levied on property belonging
to Daugherty. On March 9, 1886, the appellant filed a plea
in intervention, in which he alleged that he had also brought
an action against Daugherty, and caused a writ of attachment to be levied on the property which the appellee had
first caused to be attached. The intervener set up several
grounds on which he claimed that precedence should be
given to the lien acquired through the attachment sued out
by him. On March 12, 1886, a judgment was rendered in
favor of the appellee against Daugherty, whereby the attachment lien was foreclosed and the proceeds of the attached property — the same having been sold and deposited
with the clerk — was directed to be paid to the appellee. By
that judgment no disposition of the intervention was made.
On April 2, 1886, the appellee announced ready for trial
on the matters set up in the intervention, and the intervener made an application for continuance, which was by
the court overruled, and a judgment was then rendered in
favor of the appellee against the intervener, who offered no
evidence. The action of the court in refusing a continuance
is assigned as error.
The ruling of the court refusing a continuance, was on
the ground that the intervener could not delay the appellee
in the assertion and collection of his claim against Daugherty. In view of the grounds on which the continuance was
sought, it is unnecessary to inquire whether an intervener,
in any case, is entitled to a continuance whereby a plaintiff
will be delayed in the collection of a judgment against a
defendant; or, if he be so entitled, to determine on what
terms a continuance upon sufficient showing should be
The a])plication for a continuance was based on
granted.
the absence of witnesses, and it showed that sul)poenas for
them were obtained by the intervenor on the day that he
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filed his pleadings in intervention, but it did not show when
they were placed in the hands of an officer for service. It
showed that the witnesses had been served, but did not state
when they were summoned.
When a first application for a continuance is sought, by
one entitled to ask
for the want of testimony, the
statute requires that such applicant shall state "That he
has used due diligence to procure the same, stating such
diligence." (Rev. Stats., art. 1277.) No such statements
are found in the application, which was verbal, and
contained in
bill of exceptions. On an application for continuance,
court will not assume
necessary fact to exist
when the applicant fails or
unwilling to state its existence. Every fact stated in the application may be true, and
still due diligence not have been used.
The time when the subpoenas were served on the witnesses should have been stated, in order that the court
might determine whether this was such reasonable time
before the trial as would enable the witnesses to be present.
{Conner v. Sampson, 22 Texas 20; Stanley v. Epperson, 45
Texas, 650.) No facts are shown by the application which
can take this case out of the general rule.
There
no error in overruling the application for continuance, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Absence of Attorney.

CICERELLO V. CHESAPEAKE

65

Miller,
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West Virginia.

1909.

West Virginia, 439.

President.
The plaintiff, as personal representative of Frank Olvino,
deceased, seeks recovery of damages from defendant, for
negligently causing the death of decedent on February
8th, 1907, while employed by Rinehart and Dennis, inde-
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pendent contractors, near Scott Station, in Putnam county,
in excavating and widening a hillside cut for another track
along defendant's main line.
Olvino's duty, as alleged,
was to keep defendant's main track cleared of the dirt and
rock which fell from the steam shovel employed in making
the excavation.
The negligence charged
that defendant's servants and employes so carelessly and negligently
and with such great force and violence drove and struck
against the said Frank Olvino,
certain locomotive with
cars attached, thereby inflicting upon him such severe and
fatal wounds and injuires, that he then and there died.
On the trial there was
verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff for $1,500.00, and for errors alleged to have been
committed preliminary to and during the progress of the
trial, and for refusal of the court below to set aside the verdict and award defendant
new trial, the defendant seeks
reversal of the judgment below.
Of the preliminary rulings complained of, the first is,
that the court refused to continue the case on motion of defendant, when called for trial, because of the absence of F.
B. Enslow, defendant's leading counsel; and because of the
absence of J. B. Thomas, one of its witnesses and the second
the rejection of defendant's special plea number
two tendered.
The motion to continue was supported by
the affidavits of said Enslow and R. M. Baker, another attorney for the defendant. Baker was also cross examined
on the matter of his affidavit, and the clerk of the court was
also examined in relation to the issuance of subpoenas for
the witnesses, and the want of service and return thereof.
This evidence shows that Enslow was necessarily absent
in attendance upon the United States Circuit Court of Appeals at Richmond, on the day this case was set for trial,
but that Baker, who assisted in the conduct of the trial
on behalf of the defendant, was present.
The record of
the trial shows that Enslow was
member of the well
known firm of Simms
Enslow, or Simms, Enslow, Fitzpatrick and Baker, that defendant's special plea number
two was signed by Alexander
Barnhart and R. M. Baker,
Attorneys, and not by either of the other firms of which
Enslow was
member, and that Mr. Alexander was also
present and assisted in the trial, and that the defense was
conducted with skill and ability. In the case of Rossett v.
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Gardner, 3 W. Va. 531, relied upon, upon the question of the
absence of counsel, it was shown that appellant had used
due diligence to be prepared for trial ; that one of his counsel was unavoidably absent, and that the other, though

present on a preceding day, was for some cause, not explained in the record, absent when the cause was heard,
and the appellant was left without the aid of any counsel. In the present case defendant had able counsel present to conduct the trial. In the case of Myers and Axtell,
Receivers, v. Trice, 86 Va. 835-841-2, the absence of leading
counsel on account of sickness, in connection with the absence of an important witness, not summoned by reason of
mistake in name, was held good cause for continuance, and
denial of the continuance was, on writ of error, held sufficient cause for a reversal of tlie judgment.
Several cases
are cited by the Virginia court in support of its ruling, two
from Georgia, one United States Circuit Court decision,
and the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 11 Peters
226.
In the latter case, says the Virginia Court, a continuance was granted by the Supreme Court of the United
States upon the ground that the leading attorney for the
state of Rhode Island was ill, although the attorney general
of that state was present. The case was of exceptional importance says the court, and that the inference was that
the court was influenced more by the deep concern and the
high importance of the case than by any purpose to exemplify the rule in such cases. ''In all such cases, however,"
says the Virginia court, *'the application should be watched
with jealousy, and the discretionary power of the court exercised with caution; but if there is no sufficient reason to
induce the belief that the alleged ground of the motion is
feigned, a continuance should be granted, rather than to
seriously imperil the just determination of the cause by
refusing it." This court further says: "Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, and especially in
view of the very harsh ruling on the preceding motion, we
are clearly of opinion that the circuit court erred in refusing to continue the case on the ground of the absence
of the leading counsel of the defendants, by reason of sick-

ness."

With respect

of the witness Thomas, the
evidence shows that he was or had been in the emploj^ of the
to the absence
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defendant company, was in fact the fireman on the engine
at the time of the killing of Olvino; that a subpoena for
him and another witness was secured from the clerk only
six days before the case was called for trial and sent to
the company's counsel at Huntington; that no return of
service thereof on Thomas was made, and the testimony of
Baker, counsel for defendant on cross-examination, shows
that he sent the subpoena for Thomas to the company's
superintendent requesting him to secure the presence of
Thomas, who, he was told, was at Hinton, and gave directions that an order be given him on the ticket agent there
for transportation. He did not know whether Thomas had
We do not
been served or provided with transportation.
think the record shows due diligence on the part of defendant to secure the presence of Thomas. Besides he was only
one of the numerous witnesses present at the time of the
killing of the deceased, including the engineer, and who were
present and examined as witnesses on the trial and gave
Motions for continuance are generally adtestimony.
The
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
judgment of the court thereon not being reviewable on
writ of error and appeal unless there has been manifest
abuse of such discretion. Mullinax v. Waybrig-ht, 33 W. Va.
84; Halstead v. Eorton, 38 W. Va. 727; State v. Lane, 44
W. Va. 730. It was not shown what was proposed to be
proven by the witness. Where the motion to continue is
based on the absence of a witness it must be shown that
proper diligence to secure his presence has been used, and
if there is any ground to suspect that the continuance is
for delay, it must appear what evidence the absent witness
is expected to give. State v. Broivn, 62 W. Va. 546. In
Thompkins v. Burgess, 2 W. Va. 187, and Dimmey v. Wheeling, etc., R. Co., 27 W. Va. 33, it is said that on such motion
it must be shown that the same facts cannot be proved by
any other witness in attendance and that the party whose
witness is absent cannot proceed in the absence of such
witness. The affidavit of Baker, is that the witness is material and that defendant cannot prove the same facts by any
one else, as he is informed; but on cross examination it is
shown that he does not know what Thomas will swear, except from his report. It is not shown what this report was.
U is suggested in brief of counsel, however, that as Thomas
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was fireman on the engine that killed deceased, he would
be a material witness, he and the engineer being the only
two persons on the engine, and that each seeing what occurred from different points of view, this rendered Thomas
a most important witness.
But other witnesses were present and gave testimony as to what was seen and heard by
them from their several view points, including the ringing
of the bell and the blowing of the whistle, and we cannot see
that the defendant was greatly prejudiced by the absence
of Thomas. We cannot say from this record that there was
any abuse of the discretion of the court on the motion to
continue. We do not think this a parallel case to the Virginia case. Evidently the court there was more influenced
by the arbitrary ruling of the trial court in refusing to continue on the ground of the absence of an important witness
than because of the absence of counsel.

Affirmed.

RANKIN V. CALDWELL.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
15

1908.

Idaho, 625.

Stewart, J. This is an action to recover possession of
two diamond rings, alleged to be of the value of $250 each.
The plaintiff alleges that she is the owner and entitled to the
possession of said property. The plaintiff did not file the
affidavit provided for by the statute, where immediate delivery is claimed. The defendant answers the complaint
and denies the plaintiff's ownership and right of possession
of said rings, and denies that they are of the value of $250
The defendant
each, or any greater sum than $125 each.
admits that he holds and detains said property from the
possession of plaintiff, but denies that he does so unlawfully, and alleges that said rings were pledged to him as
security by one Harry Noyes, and that such pledge was
made by and with the consent and approval of the plaintiff.
The case was set for trial before a jury sometime prior
to February 5,. 1908, and when the case was called for trial
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February 5th, the defendant made a motion for a continuance and filed his affidavit made on that day in which
he swears "that he cannot safely go to trial at this term
of the above-entitled court on account of the absence of his
attorney, John Green, who is confined to his bed with illness in Culdesac, Nez Perce county, state of Idaho, and
conduct the trial of this case ; that affiant did not know that
the said Green would be unable to appear in court at the
time this case was set for trial until yesterday morning,
the 4th day of February, A. D. 1908; that affiant has consulted no other attorney regarding this case, and had retained no other attorney, and it would be an injustice to
affiant to compel him to go to trial without the presence of
his attorney.
"That affiant expects to have present for the purpose of
testifying in this cause at the trial of the same one George
Martin, who is the cashier of the Bank of Culdesac, and
who is confined to his bed with illness, and unable to appear to attend the trial of this cause; that affiant did not
have a subpoena issued for the said George Martin, for the
on

said Martin agreed and intended to attend upon the trial
of this cause, and would have been present had he not been
detained on account of illness."
The affidavit then continues to set forth what the affiant
claims Martin will testify to if present at the trial. An
affidavit of Dr. E. L. Burke was also filed, to the effect that
Mr. Green was suffering with la grippe, confined to his bed
under the instruction of the physician, and that it would be
injurious and probably fatal for him to leave his bed or
make any effort whatever to appear as an attorney on the
The affidavit of Mr. Green, made
5th day of February.
February 4th, was also filed to the effect that he was attorney for the defendant in the above action, and that the
defendant had consulted no other attorney concerning his
interest in said action, and that he was unable to appear in
the district court on the 5th as attorney for the defendant,
because of illness.
The district court overruled the motion for a continuance,
and tlie cause went to trial before a jury and a verdict returned for the plaintiff, assessing the damages at $450. A
motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and this
appeal is from the judgment and from the order overruling
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for a new trial. The first error assigned is,
that the trial court erred in overruling the motion for a
the motion

continuance.
It will be observed from an examination of
the affidavit that the continuance was asked for upon two
grounds : first, because of absence of counsel on account of
illness; second, on account of absence of witness, Ijecause
of illness and failure to attend. The affidavit shows that
John Green, defendant's counsel, was ill and unable to attend the trial of said cause ; that defendant had knowledge
of this fact on the 4th day of February, the day prior to the
day upon which the cause was set for trial. The defendant made no effort to secure other counsel and there is no
showing in the affidavit that the case was in any way complicated or difficult, or that other counsel could not have
been procured who could have familiarized himself with
and properly tried said case on the 5th. In this respect the
affidavit is insufficient. A party to a suit cannot have a postponement of the trial upon the ground of illness of counsel, without showing diligence on the part of such applicant
to secure other counsel or to consult other counsel as to the
merits of the case for the purpose of ascertaining whether
or not other counsel can be secured who can properly try
said case. If the mere fact that counsel for the applicant
is ill is sufficient to secure a continuance, then it might be
possible to prevent a cause from ever reaching trial. The
applicant must show diligence on his part in supplying the
place of the counsel who is ill, or show some reason why it
is not done. A motion for a continuance is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and his ruling thereon
will not be disturbed on appeal, unless it appears that there
has been an abuse thereof.
(Herron v. Juiy, 1 Ida. 164;
Lillienthal v. Anderson, 1 Ida. 676; Cox v. Northwestern
Stage Co., 1 Ida. 376; Richardson v. Ruddy, 10 Ida. 151, 77
Pac. 972; Robertson v. Moore, 10 Ida. 115, 77 Pac. 218; Holt
V. Gridley, 7 Ida. 416, 63 Pac. 188; Reynolds v. Corhus, 7
Ida. 481, 63 Pac. 884.)
It is not an abuse of the legal discretion vested in the
trial court to deny an application for a continuance upon the
sole ground that applicant's counsel is ill, where no affidavit
of merits is filed showing that the applicant has a meritorious cause or defense and that other counsel cannot be procured who are able to try said case. {Condon v. Brockway,
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N. E. 634; Earloe v. Lambie, 132 Cal. 133, 64
Pac. 88; Berentz v. Belmont Oil Co., 148 Cal. 577, 133 Am.
St. Rep. 308, 84 Pac. 47; Thompson v. Thornton, 41 Cal.
As to the sufficiency of the affidavit on account of the
626.)
absence of a witness, the affidavit as to the absence of the
witness Martin does not show the facts upon which the
statement is made that the witness is ill and unable to attend said trial. The affidavit does not allege that the applicant knows this as a fact, or disclose from whom he procured the information, or that he himself or the person
from whom he procured the information was qualified to
say that such witness was too ill to attend said trial. It
157

111.

90, 41

does not disclose whether the statement is made upon perNeisonal knowledge of the affiant or upon information.
ther does the affidavit show any diligence exercised by the
applicant to procure the attendance of the witness. The
fact that the witness agreed to be present is not such a
showing of diligence as will be sufficient to secure a continuance for failure of such witness to attend. A party is
not entitled to a continuance of a cause without showing
due diligence and the use of legal means to procure the
desired evidence. A bare request to furnish the evidence is
in no sense a compliance with the requirements of the law.
{Alvord V. United States, 1 Ida. 585; Kuhland v. Sedgwick,
For these
17 Cal. 123; Lightner v. Menzel, 35 Cal. 452.)
reasons the court committed no error in overruling the
motion for a continuance.

**********

We find no error in the record in this case, and the judg-

ment will be affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.
AiLSHiE, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.
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Absence of Party.
V.

LILIENTHAL.

Supreme Court of California.

1894.

101 California, 175.
—
Haynes, C. On the 21st of December, 1891, this cause
was set for trial for January 6, 1892. On that day plaintiff's attorney moved for a continuance upon affidavits of the
plaintiff and his physician showing in substance that the
plaintiff, who then and for about a year prior thereto resided in Seattle, Washington, was confined to his room by
an attack of acute rheumatism to which he was subject, and
was wholly unable to move or leave his room, and in the
opinion of his physician would not be able to leave his room
in less than two months. The affidavit of plaintiff further
stated that his presence at the trial was indispensably necessary; that he was the only person who knew the whereabouts of the witnesses necessary to be called on his behalf;
that their names had not been communicated to his attorney, nor the matters to which they would testify. D. M,
Delmas, Esq., attorney for plaintiff, also presented his own
affidavit that plaintiff's presence was necessary, that he did
not know the names of plaintiff's witnesses, nor the details

of the case.
No counter-affidavits were presented.
The continuance
was denied, plaintiff's attorney left the courtroom, and a
judgment was entered for nonappearance of the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff appeals.

think the court erred in not granting a continuance.
Respondent suggests that it does not appear that plaintiff
was a witness, nor that his attorney used any diligence to
prepare for the trial.
It seldom happens that a trial can be properly liad in thS
absence of the plaintiff, even where he is disqualified as a
witness, especially where it is to be tried upon oral testimony. With all the care that can reasonably be taken' by
both attorney and client, some matter of vital importance
is liable to be overlooked by them until the trial calls it to
the recollection of the plaintiff, and this is especially true
in relation to matters purely in rebuttal.
It is the right
"VVe
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of parties tb be present at the trial of their cases. This
right may be waived, and should be held to be waived
where the absence of the party is voluntary and under circumstances which ought not to induce a reasonable man
having a due regard for the rights and interests of others
and of the public, all of whom are interested in the due
and prompt administration of justice, to absent himself.
So far as the want of preparation on the part of the attorney is concerned, the most laborious and painstaking
preparation on his part would not have prevented the sickness and absence of his client; nor does it appear that if
the plaintiff had not been sick the necessary preparation
could not have been made after the case was set for trial.
Eespondent further contends that the affidavits do not
show the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained.

The application for continuance was not made under section 595 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but under section
594, which authorizes the court ''for good cause" to postpone the trial in the absence of a party. The consequences
of a dismissal of an action because of the absence of a

plaintiff should always

be considered, especially where any
reasonable excuse is shown for his absence, as where a plea
of the statute of limitations could be interposed to a new
action. In such case the dismissal is the absolute destruction of the plaintiff's right, and so serious a penalty should

not be imposed unless the due administration of justice
clearly requires it.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed.
Vanclief^ C, and Searls, C, concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment appealed from is reversed.
Fitzgerald, J., De Haven, J.
McFarland, J. — concur in the judgment.

I
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Withdrawal of Jurob.

USBORNE V. STEPHENSON.
Supreme Court of Oregon.

1899.

36 Oregon, 328.
*

*

On the day set for the trial, but before the jury
was called, the plaintiff moved for a continuance on account
of the absence of material testimony; basing his motion
upon an affidavit of his counsel to the effect that he could
not safely proceed to trial without the depositions of several
residents of London. The motion being denied, a jury was
impaneled and sworn; but, before any evidence had been
given, the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to withdraw a juror, based upon an affidavit of his counsel substantially the same as the one filed in support of the motion
for a continuance, except that it contained a statement to
the effect that the cause had been set down for hearing
in violation of a verbal understanding and agreement with
counsel for defendants, which, however, was denied by a
counter affidavit. This motion was likewise denied, and the
cause proceeded to trial, resulting in a judgment in favor
of defendants for the sum of $537. Oi, from which the plaintiff appeals, assigning as error the overruling of his mofion
to withdraw a juror, and certain instructions given to the
*

jury.
Ajjirmed.

Mr. Justice Bean, after stating the facts, delivered

the

opinion of the court.
1.
This is the first attempt, so far as we are advised,
to invoke in this state the practice of withdrawing a juror.
There is but little satisfactory information to be obtained
from the books in regard to the ancient practice, which
used to be resorted to when a party was taken by surprise
on a trial, of withdrawing a juror, and thus causing a mistrial, and, of necessity, a postponement of the case. It was
originally confined to criminal cases, and seems to have
been adopted for the purpose of avoiding a rule which once
obtained, based largely upon a dictum of Lord Coke, that a
jury sworn and charged in any criminal case could not be
T. p.—

12
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discharged without giving a verdict. To escape the effect
of this rule, and yet apparently observe it to the letter, the
courts resorted to the fiction of directing the clerk to call a
juror out of the box, when it appeared that the prosecution
was taken by surprise on the trial, whereupon the prosecution objected, or was supposed to object, to proceeding
with the eleven jurors, and the trial went over for the term:
2 Hawk, P. C. 619; 2 Hale, P. C. 294; Wedderburn's Case,
Fost. 22; People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301 (1 Am. Dec.
168); United States v. CooUdge, 2 Gall. 363 (Fed. Cas.
It was nothing more, however, than a means
No. 14,858).
of obtaining a continuance or postponement of the trial
after the jury had been impaneled and sworn. At first it
was thought this could be done only by the court ordering
the discharge of one of the jurors, and then holding that,
as the case could not be tried before the remaining eleven,
it must be continued. But after the doctrine of Lord Coke
had been repudiated, and it became the settled rule that
it was within the power of the court, in a proper case, to
discharge the jury after it had been impaneled and sworn,
and continue the cause, the device of withdrawing a juror
seems to have become practically obsolete, and but little,
if any, reference to it as a substantive practice is to be
thereafter found in the books. That it ever prevailed at
common law in civil cases is very doubtful. No case has
come under our observation in which it was resorted to in
England. Indeed, the only reference we have been able
to find to the question in the early authorities is a note to
Chedwick v. Hughes, Carth. 464, in which it is stated that
Lord Chief Justice Holt, in a case of perjury tried before
him, said that it was the opinion of all the judges of England, upon debate between them, that in civil cases a juror
cannot be withdrawn but by consent of all parties. And
while the authority of this note underwent a critical examination in the subsequent case of Sir John Wedderhurn,
Fost. 28, from which its authority is rendered rather questionable, it seems to be the only reference to the practice in
civil cases. It was early ruled, however, in this country,
by the courts of New York, after some hesitation, that a
court may allow a juror to be withdrawn in a civil case,
when necessary to save the plaintiff from the consequence
of a fatal mistake in his testimony:

People

v.

Judges of
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York, 8 Cow, 127. And we believe it is still regarded
proper practice in that state, and is open to either
party: Bishop, Code PI. sec. 428; Dillon v. Cockcroft, 90
N. Y. 649; Messenger v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 48 How. Prac.
542. But, so far as we have been able to ascertain, it does
not prevail elsewhere in this country; the same result being
accomiDlished by a direct application to the court for a postponement of the trial: 4 Enc. PI. & Prac. 863. We are
therefore of the opinion that the motion was properly
denied on the ground that no such jDractice prevails in this
'Bew
as a

state.

But, however that may be, whatever authorities there
are on the subject all agree that the practice can be resorted to only when a party finds himself taken by surprise
on the trial, and when further proceeding therewith would
be productive of great hardship or manifest injustice to him.
Mr. BishojD, in the section of his work on Code Pleading already recited, in speaking of the New York practice, says :
'*
Instead of submitting to a nonsuit, the plaintiff, if he finds
himself taken by surprise on the tiral, — as by the absence
of a witness who has been in attendance, or by the unexpected presentation of evidence by his adversary which he
is not prepared to meet, or by any accident which might
render the further progress of the trial disastrous and unfair to him, — may ask the court to withdraw a juror. The
result of this application, if granted, will be to produce a
mistrial; and the court may then continue the pending action, and set the trial over to a future da}^, when the plaintiff
'
may come properly prepared to try the case afresh. ' Within this rule, the plaintiff's motion was likewise properly
denied, because it is not based upon anything occurring at
the trial, but upon matters happening long prior thereto,
and which could be, and were, properly submitted to the
court in support of the motion for a continuance made before the jury was empaneled.
2.

**********

This disposes of the questions made on the appeal, and,
there being no error in the record, we have no alternative
but to affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.^
^The

states.

a juror in civil causes is familiar in several
practice of withdrawing
Eosengarten v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, (1903) 69 N.
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L. 220, 54 Atl. 564; McKahan v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., (1909) 223
Pa. St. 1, 72 Atl. 251; Smith v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co., (1906) 127 111,
App. 89; Crane v. Blaekman, (1901) 100 111. App. 565; Cattano v. Metropolitan
Street Ry. Co., (1903) 173 N. Y. 565, 66 N. E. 563; Rawson v. Silo, (1905)
105 N. Y. App. Div. 278, 93 N. Y. Suppl. 416.
In Planer v. Smith, (1876) 40 Wis. 31, the court said: "The power of the
circuit court, in a proper case, to permit a juror to be withdrawn, or to order a

nonsuit, is undoubted; but there is no necessary connection between the two
processes. The withdrawal of a juror operates to continue the cause, and does
not of itself entitle the defendant to a judgment of any kind.
a nonsuit
be properly granted, the withdrawal of a juror as preliminary thereto is entirely superfluous and harmless.
But if judgment of nonsuit be rendered
merely because a juror has been withdrawn, such judgment is founded upon a
misapprehension of the legal effect of withdrawing a juror, and is erroneous."

If

Section

6.

Teems.

MAUND V. LOEB.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
87

1888.

Alabama, 374.

Clopton, J. The continuance
tion of the court, and such terms
rule of iDractice, as to the court
Fall term, 1888, of the Circuit

of a case is in the discre-

may be imposed, under the
may seem proper. At the
Court, defendant obtained
a continuance, upon payment of all the costs as a condition
precedent, to be paid in ninety days, or judgment to go
against him at the next term. The costs were not paid until
the first day of the next term, and after the case was called
for trial, which was more than ninety days from the time
of the order. Defendant having applied for, obtained, and
accepted the continuance, we must infer that he consented
to the terms upon which it was granted. It was no excuse,
that an itemized bill of costs had not been furnished, when
it is not shown that defendant otfered to pay the costs, or
applied for such bill; and the court was not bound to accept payment after the expiration of the prescribed time,
as a compliance with the condition upon which the continuance was obtained. The court was authorized to render
judgment nil dicit against defendant.
Waller v. Sultz-

lacher,

38

Ala.

318.

Afirmed.

CHAPTER V.
THE JURY.
Section

1.

Eight to

LEE
Supreme
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Juey Trial.

V. CONRAN.

Court of Missouri.
213

1908.

Missouri, 404.

Woodson, J. — This suit is based upon section 650, Eevised Statutes 1899, to determine and quiet title to the lands
described in the petition.

**********

1.
The first insistence of appellant is that the action of
the trial court in refusing him a trial by jury was error.
So far as am aware, this court has never jDassed directly
upon the question as to whether or not the parties to a suit
based upon section 650, Revised Statutes 1899, are entitled
to a jury.

I

In order

to properly determine that question we must
first ascertain the nature of the issues joined and the remIf
edy the parties are entitled to under the pleadings.
the issues joined entitled the parties to an ordinary judgment at law, then, under the Constitution and the laws of
the State, the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury; but
if the issues tendered are equitable in their nature and
call for equitable relief, then the cause is triable before the
chancellor.
Section 28 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1875 provides that "The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enThis court, in the case of
joyed, shall remain inviolate."
State V. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 1. c. 358, held that the constitutional guaranty of "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed" has reference to the status of that right as
it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
And this court, in the case of State ex rel. v. Withrow, 133
181

182
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1. c. 519, held that said section 28 ''means that all the
substantial incidents and consequences which pertained to
the right of trial by jury are beyond the reach of hostile
legislation, and are preserved in their ancient substantial

Mo.

extent as existed at common law."
In order to determine whether the case at bar comes
within the meaning of that section of the Constitution,
as interpreted by those adjudications, we must first determine what the issue tendered by the pleadings is, and,
after doing so, we must then ascertain how that issue was
triable before the adoption of that constitutional provision ; if by jury, then either party is entitled to a trial of that
issue by a jury regardless of any statutory provision; but
if it was not triable by jury prior to that time, then the
Constitution does not govern, and we would then look to the
statutes and the common law for a rule by which to solve
the question.
We will first determine the nature of the issue presented
The petition charges that the plaintiff
by the pleadings.
is the owner of the land described therein, and that defendant claims some interest or estate therein, the nature
of which is unknown to plaintiff, except that it is adverse
The answer denies the
and prejudicial to his interests.
allegations of plaintiff's ownership, and alleges that the
lands are accretions; that plaintiff claims that they accreted to his patent land on the Missouri side of the Mississippi river; that he claims and charges the fact to be that
they are accretions to an island formed and located in the
Mississippi river ; that under an act approved April 8, 1895,
the title to such lands vested in the county for the use of
the public schools ; and that he purchased them from the
county of New Madrid. When reduced to its final analysis,
the issue is plainly one of accretion — that is, was the land
in question accreted and added to the shore line of plaintiff's land, by gradual and imperceptible alluvial deposits,
or was it added by that means to the lands of the island?
Tf to the former, then the title is in plaintiff as charged
in bis petition; but if to tlie latter, tlion they belong to the
defendant.
That is the sole and only question presented
by the pleadings; and that was the finding and judgment
of tlie trial court.
Having rk'teiniined that the issue is one of accertion, we
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in what manner that issue was triable

at common law and under the statute of this State prior
to the adoption of the constitutional provision.
have been

I

unable to find a case in this State where that precise question has been decided, yet by an examination of numerous
cases, which fill our reports, involving the question of acfind that they were invariably tried before a jury,
cretion,
except in a few cases where a jury was waived. In addition to that,
might add that during the thirty years
have been practicing law and occupying the bench,
have
never seen or heard of a case in which it was contended that
the question of accretion was not triable by a jury. Clearly
that was the practice prior to the passage of section 650,
Kevised Statutes 1899, which was enacted in the year 1897.
All suits in this State prior to that enactment involving
questions of accretion were possessory actions, and were
for the recovery of specific real property. In fact, without
know of no way in which the question of acthat section,
cretion could be tried, except by ejectment, which has always been triable by jury, excepting, of course, those cases
where the answer set up an equitable defense and crossbill
and asked for affirmative relief, which were and are triable
before the chancellor without the aid of a jury. If it be
true that prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision mentioned the question of accretion was triable alone
in some action involving the recovery of the specific land
accreted, then under the express provisions of section 691,
Kevised Statutes 1899, which was enacted long prior to the
adoption of the Constitution of 1875, the issue was triable
by a jury. That section of the statute provides that, ''An
*
*
*
of
issue of fact in an action for the recovery
specific real or personal property must be tried by a jury,"

I

I

I

I

I

etc.

From

observations it seems to be clear that the
question of title by accretion was one triable by a jury prior
to the adoption of said section 28 of the Constitution; and,
consequently, in obedience to its mandate, any action involving that issue must still be triable by a jury regardless
of any subsequent legislation upon the subject.
We are, therefore, of the opinion the court erred in refusing defendant a trial by a jury.
these
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We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment
shoiild be reversed and the canse remanded for a new trial.

It

is so ordered.

AU concur, except Valliant, P. J., absent.
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Pound, C.
Although a number of difficult and interesting questions
were argued, we need only consider the assignment that the
court erred in denying the plaintiff a jury trial. The action
is in ejectment. After the defendant had answered, plaintiff moved that the cause be transferred to the equity docket,
for the reason that certain equitable defenses were set up.
This motion was granted, the cause was transferred, and
at the May term, 1900, the whole case was tried to the
At
court, without objection, and a judgment rendered.
the same term this judgment was vacated and the cause resubmitted, without further trial, after which a new judgThereupon the plaintiff moved for a
ment was entered.
new trial under section 630, Code of Civil Procedure, and
an order was entered, pursuant to said section, sustaining the motion and continuing tlie cause to the next
term. At the February term, 1901, as the cause was coming on for trial, tlie plaintiff filed a written motion or demand that a jury pass upon the issues of a legal nature,
namely, whether he had a legal estate in the premises in
controversy and was entitled to possession thereof. The
motion was overruled, and the request was denied, to which
the plaintiff excepted. Thereafter, in due course, the whole
cause was tried to the court, over plaintiff's objection, and
findings and judgment were entered, from which he prosecutes error.
We are satisfied that the order transferring the cause to
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the equity docket because of the equitable defenses set up in
the answer did not preclude the party who procured the
order from demanding that the purely legal issues be tried
by jury, if his request for a jury trial was timely and was
insisted upon. It has been decided that an order transferring a cause to the equity docket is not an adjudication
that the parties are not entitled to a jury trial, and that
if demand is made prior to the time the cause is called for
trial, it is error to deny a jury. Lett v. Hammond, 59 Nebr.
339.
In that case, the cause was transferred at the instance
of one party, while the other demanded a jury. But the
distinction would not be material unless it could be said
that the application to have the cause transferred was an
assertion that there was nothing for a jury to trj^, and estopped the moving party from assuming a contrary position subsequently. This car not be true, for the same reason that the order transferring the cause is not a decision
whether the parties are entitled to a jury. The whole case
is not of necessity triable to the court without a jury because there are incidental issues which are equitable in
their nature. Lett v. Hammond, supra; Yager v. Exchange
Nat. Bank, 52 Nebr. 321. By asking for the transfer,
plaintiff merely asserted that there were equitable issues
proper for the court to decide. He did not assert that there
was nothing for a jury. Under a practice not unlike ours,
it has been held more than once that consent that a case
in which the facts require both equitable and legal relief
should be placed on the equity docket for trial does not of
itself waive the right to have the issues requiring purely
legal relief tried bv a jury. Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 495 :
Underhill v. Manhattan R. Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.),
478; Eggers v. Manhattan R. Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.),
463. This must be so, since the practice of trying to the
court the equitable defenses, by reason of which the right
to maintain the action at law is challenged, and thereafter,
if the disposition of the equitable defenses makes it necessary, trj'ing the purely legal controversy, which is the gist
of the case, to a jury, is well settled. Arguello v. E dinger,
10 Cal. 150; Sicasey v. Adair, 88 Cal. 179, 25 Pac. Rep.
l\V^',Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. (U. S.), 670; Smith v.
Bryce, 17 S. Car. 538, 544. AVe think, therefore, that the
motion to transfer the cause to the equity docket and the
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order in accordance therewith, did not, of themselves,
amount to waiver of a jury, especially as the equitable defenses in this case were relatively of little moment. There

can be no doubt, however, that the plaintiff waived a jury
at the first trial by going to trial upon all the issues without demanding a jury as to any of them. The statutory
method of waiving a jury is not exclusive. Any unequivocal
acts or conduct which clearly show a willingness or intention
to forego the right, and are so treated by the trial court
without objection, will have that effect. McCarty v. Hopkins, 61 Nebr. 550; Poppitz v. German Ins. Co., 85 Minn,
188, 88 N. W. Rep. 438. AYhen the whole case was tried
and submitted to the court without objection, the right to
a jury was waived.
Baumann v. Franse, 37 Nebr. 807;

Gregory v. Lancaster County Bank,

16

Nebr. 411.

It becomes necessary to consider next whether waiver of
a jury at the first trial operated to prevent the plaintiff
from demanding one at the second trial, after the judgment had been set aside under section 630, Code of Civil
Procedure. The waiver arose by implication only, and was
not made by stipulation or agreement in open court. But
we do not think that circumstance material.
In either
event, when a trial has been had to the court, pursuant to
the waiver, the waiver has done its work and lost its force ;
and when subsequently, for any reason, an entirely new
trial becomes necessary, neither party is precluded by the
action taken with reference to the former trial, but may deIn
mand a jury, or not, as he is advised or may elect.
Cochran v. Stewart, 66 Minn. 152, 68 N. W. Rep. 972, this
very question was presented under circumstances not without analogy to the case at bar. The action was one in ejectment, and it was claimed that a waiver of a jury at the
first trial operated to waive a jury at the second trial, obThe court held
tainable as of course under the statute.
'^
Conthat it was of no force at the second trial, saying:
ditions may be wholly different at the second trial from
what they were at the first. There may be a different judge,
and the jury to be obtained may also be different in charactor. Then it is hardly fair to presume that by waiving
a jury for one trial the parties intended to waive a jury
for any further trial that may be had under the statute,
and we can not hold this to be the meaning of their agree-
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ment." In Cross v. State, 78 Ala. 430, the court held
for substantially the same reasons, that such a waiver
should be construed, ordinarily, to apply only to the particular trial with reference to which it is made. And it seems
to be well settled that the waiver will not prevent a demand for jury trial at a second trial after the cause has
been remanded from an appellate court.
Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N. W. Rep. 39; Benhoiv v. Bobbins,
72 N. Car. 422; Osgood v. Skinner, 186 111. 491, 57 N. E.
Rep. 1041; Burnliam v. North Chicago St. B. Co., 32 C.
C. A. 64, 88 Fed. Rep. 627. The many cases which bold
that a waiver of jury trial may not be withdrawn are not
in point, since, until the trial has been had, it may be said
plausibly that the parties are bound by their election as to
the form of trial.
Moreover, there are well-considered
authorities to the contrary. Ferrea v. Chabot, 121 Cal. 233,
53 Pac. Rep. 689, 1092; Wittenberg v. Onsgard, 78 Minn.
342, 81 N. W. Rep. 14, 47 L. R. A. 141; Broivn v. Chenoivorth, 51 Tex. 469. Neither is our conclusion affected by
Boslow v. Shenberger, 52 Nebr. 164, QQ Am. St. Rep. 487.
In that case, there had been a waiver, at a previous term,
and it was presumed that the waiver was general, and not
limited to the term at which it was made, in the absence of
anything in the record to the contrary. No trial had been
had, and until there was a trial, the waiver entered into
with reference thereto remained in force.
We recommend that the judgment be reversed and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
Bar^stes and Oldham, CO., concur.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing
opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed and
the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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Objections to the Panel.

LOUISVILLE, HENDERSON

&

ST. LOUIS RAILWAY

COMPANY V. SCHWAB.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
127

1907,

Kentucky, 82.

Opinion of the Court by Judge Carroll —Reversing.
Appellee, alleging that she was injured in a collision between a freight train operated by appellant Louisville,
Henderson & St. Louis Railway Company and one of the
cars of appellant Louisville Railway Company, caused by
the negligence of the companies, brought this action to recover damages from each of them. A trial was had before
a ju-ry, and a verdict rendered against both appellants.
The principal error assigned by appellants is the failure
of the trial court to sustain the motion made by them at the
beginning of the trial to discharge the panel for misconduct of the jury commissioners in failing to select the jurors
in the manner prescribed by the statute, "in that the commissioners did not write the name of each juror on a slip
of paper and place them in the drum wheel, but merely
checked off names on the assessor's book and employed
others not under oath to do the really important work of
writing off the names and putting them in the wheel; the
persons so employed not being under the direct supervision
of the commissioners, who did not know whether they did
*
* *
the work assigned to them right or wrong."

Ky.

St. 1903, section 2241, provides in part that ''the circuit judge of each county shall at the first regular term of
circuit court therein after this act takes effect, and annually thereafter, appoint three intelligent and discreet housekee})ers of the county, over twenty-one years of age, residing in different portions of the county, and having no action in court requiring the intervention of a jury, as jury
commissioners for one 3'ear, who shall be sworn in open
coiii't to faithfully discharge their duty. They shall hold
their meetings in some room to be designated by the judge,
and while engaged in making the list of juries and selecting the names, writing and dej^ositing or drawing theit
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from the drum or wheel case, no person shall be permitted
in said room with them. They shall take the last returned
assessor's book of the county and from it carefully select
from the intelligent, sober, discreet and impartial citizens,
resident housekeepers in different portions of the county,
over twenty-one years of age, the following number of
names of such persons, to-wit:
(then follows the number
that shall be selected from each county, graded according
to the population.) Each name so selected they shall write
in jDlain handwriting on a small slip of paper, each slip
of paper being as near the same size and appearance as
practicable ; and each slip with the name written thereon
shall be by them enclosed in a small case made of paper or
other material and deposited unsealed in the revolving
drum or wheel case hereinafter provided for."
In answer to the argument made for appellants, it is

said for appellee that the record does not show that the
substantial rights of appellants were prejudiced by the
action of the court in overruling the challenge to the array ;
* *
*
The record does not disclose that the members of
the panel from which the jurors were selected to try the
case were in any respect objectionable, and in this particular the substantial rights of appellants were not prejudiced by the rulings of the trial court ; but, in a matter that
strikes at the very foundation of our system of selecting
jurors, we do not deem it material or necessary that any
prejudicial error shall be made to apj)ear, other than a
substantial one committed in failing to select the juries in
the manner pointed out in the statute. It is probable that
the jurors selected to and that did try this particular case
were men who possessed all the statutory qualifications;
and it may also be conceded that they were entirely acceptable to counsel and parties on both sides. But back of
this is the more important question that litigants have the
unqualified right to demand that juries shall be selected in
the manner prescribed in the statute, and in passing on this
right the individual qualification of the juror or the fact
that he may be entirely acce]itable to the parties is not to be
If the contention of appellee was sound, the
considered.
careful and elaborate scheme devised for selecting juries
would be nullified, the statute would be a dead letter, and
no inquiry could be made into the manner in which jurors
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were originally chosen, if those selected to try the particular
case possessed the statutory qualifications and were personally satisfactory. The Legislature, in obedience to a popular demand that a radical change be made in the manner
of selecting juries, after long delay and much discussion,
enacted the statute now in force; and this court in more
than one case has given to this law the sanction of its approval and declared that its efficiency shall not be impaired
or destroyed by the failure of public officers to observe its
requirements.
Thus, in Curtis v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 267, 62 S. W.
886, a motion was made to discharge the entire panel of
petit jurors, because the names of the jurors were not
drawn from the jury wheel as they should have been, but
were selected from a list regularly summoned in a previous
month. This being a criminal case, this court had no power
to review the action of the trial court in overruling the
challenge to the array, but in the course of the opinion
said: "These men so selected may have been, and doubtless were, of the very best citizenship in the county; but
they were not drawn impartially from the body of legally
The mode provided by
qualified jurymen of the county.
law for the selection of qualified and impartial jurymen
was ignored, and the jury were selected by the judge of the
He
circuit court himself. This was clearly erroneous.
it
was
this
best
with the very
of motive, but
may have done
not the method provided by law, and should not have been
done." In Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Smith,
25 Ky. Law Kep. 2292, 88 S. W. 440, in discussing this jury
law, the court said: "The statutes quoted provide an elaborate system for the selection monthly in courts of continuous session of impartial jurymen fresh from the body
of the people. If these provisions are enforced, each litigant is guaranteed that the best effort possible has been
made to secure for the trial of his case an impartial jury.
It is not believed that the requirements in the statute in
regard to the selection of juries would have been set forth
with such minute particularity and detail, if it had been
intended that the court might nullify the manifest intention of the Legislature by ignoring them." In Risner v.
Com., 95 Ky. 539, 26 S. W. 388, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 84, the jury
commissioners did not put in the wheel the number of names
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required, and the court said: "Wliile it is not made to directly or certainly appear that appellant was thereby substantially prejudiced, still he had the right to insist upon being tried by only a jury obtained according to the statute,
which was passed for the purpose of securing fair and im13artial jurors; and, to more effectually accomplish that end,
the names of at least 200 persons should have been placed
in the drum or wheel case. This provision cannot be disregarded in any substantial particular without defeating one
of the principal purposes of the statute." Central Kentucky Asylum for the Insane v. Hauns, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 22,
50 S. W. 978, to which our attention is called by counsel
for api)ellee, is not in point; nor is it in conflict with the
authorities cited. There the objection to the manner in
which the jury was selected was not made until after the
trial was completed, and hence came too late to be available.

If

the methods avowed to have been adopted in this case
by the commissioners are upheld, all the safeguards thrown
around the selection of juries will be virtually abolished,
and the effort of the legislative department to improve and
elevate the jury system a failure. The juries are almost
entirely composed of men selected by the commissioners,
and this power confided to them cannot be delegated in
whole or in part to others. No minor officers connected with
the administration of justice have more important duties
to perform than do the jury commissioners.
Upon their
judgment and discretion in the selection of intelligent,
sober, discreet, and impartial citizens and housekeepers of
the county depends in a large measure the pure and impartial administration of justice in the conduct of jury
trials, and this valuable privilege ought not and will not
be frittered away merely because delay or inconvenience
to the court or litigants may result from sustaining a challenge to the array because of substantial irregularity in
the selection of the juries. It is iafinitely better that there
should be some delay in the trial of cases or inconvenience
suffered by individuals than that a statute intended to safeguard the rights of all litigants should be totally disregarded. If the mistake or irregularity was a minor one,
we would not regard it as material; but, if the avowals
made are true, the statute was violated in several substan-
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tial particulars. The provisions disregarded are not directory, but mandatory.
They constitute the very substance
and life of the law, and may not lightly be ignored or disobeyed.
No fraud or improper purpose can be imputed to
these commissioners, nor is it necessary that it should be.
Doubtless they acted in good faith, but nevertheless in open
disobedience of the law under which they were selected,
and their conduct can neither be overlooked nor approved.

For
versed}

the

*

error mentioned,
*

*

the

judgment must

be

re-

ULLMAN V. STATE.
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
124

1905.

Wisconsin, 602.

Plaintiff in error was duly informed against

as

having

on the 3rd day of August, 1902, at Dodge County, Wisconsin, made an assault on Ida Ullman with a loaded revolver
with intent her, the said Ida Ullman, to kill and murder. In
due time and form he entered a plea of not guilty, and was
tried in October, 1903, in the circuit court for Dodge county.

Makshall, J. Before the impaneling the jury for the
trial was commenced, counsel for the accused said he desired to "file a challenge to the array of jurors," accompanying such statement by presenting a paper in that regard, which was placed on file. Such paper was not incorporated into the bill of exceptions, neither does the bill
show in any formal way the grounds of the challenge. The
proceedings had in respect to the matter show i3retty clearly
what such grounds were. The point is made by the attorney
general tliat such a challenge must be made in writing, stating specifically the grounds thereof, and that the writing
must bo embodied in the bill of exceptions in order to enaI)lo this court to review the decision of the trial court in respect thereto. If that be correct, whether the decision over-
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ruling the challenge to the array was proper or not, is not
before us.
At common law a challenge to the array was required to
be made in writing, stating specifically the grounds relied
on. An issue of law or fact was then formed in respect
thereto, which was tried by the court, if one of law, and by
triers appointed by the court, if of fact. Under our statutory system for selecting and returning jurors there is no
challenge to the array in the strict common-law sense. The
Code was designed to be as complete for the trial of criminal as for the trial of civil cases. It makes no provision
for a challenge to the array, or for any equivalent proceeding. One is liable to fall into confusion in respect to
the matter by failing to note the fact that most of the decisions in this country in Code states, where it is said that
a challenge to the array must be in writing, are based on
In Iowa, where there is an exstatutory requirements.
press provision for a challenge to the entire panel, it is
said that the common-law challenge to the array does not
exist. State v. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311. It is said in cases decided in New York, California, Texas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, and other states that might be mentioned,
that a challenge to the array must be in writing, but it will
be found on investigation that such decisions merely follow
The ancient method of trying isstatutory requirements.
sues of fact raised on such challenge is obsolete. All issues, whether of law or fact, on an abjection to the entire
panel of jurors are now triable summarily by the court,
whether the making of the challenge is regulated by statute
or is a mere matter of practice regulated by the court.
Trial courts have inherent authority, and it is their duty,
to permit and give consideration to objections seasonably
and properly made to the entire panel of jurors, based upon
grounds specifically stated, which, if true, indicate that the
statutory method of selecting jurors was prejudicially departed from. The motion or objection may properly be, as
it commonly has been in this state under the Code, called a
State v. Cameron, 2 Pin. 490;
challenge to the array.
ConJi-ey v. Norfhern Bank, 6 Wis. 447; Perry v. State, 9
Wis. 19. But that does not imply that it must be regarded
as having all the common law characteristics.
It has only
such of them as are appropriate to our judicial system. It
T. p.— 13
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is said in 12 Ency. PI. & Pr. 426: ''At common law a challenge to the array was required to be in writing, and where
this requirement has not been abrogated by statute the rule
of the common law is still in force," citing authorities from
seven states, in each of which, however, the matter is regulated by statute.
There is neither any statute nor rule of court nor decisions in this state regulating definitely the practice as to
objecting to the entire panel of jurors. The right to make
such an objection, however, has always been recognized,
and exists by well established practice.
It makes no very
great difference how the question of the validity of the
panel is raised so long as the grounds thereof are brought
definitely to the attention of the court. It may be in the
form of an objection to the entire panel, or a motion to
quash the return thereof, or be made in the set phrase of a
challenge to the array. Mere form is of little consequence
when not necessary by statute. The spirit of the Code, generally speaking, is that the substance of things only is
material. If it were the practice to make the objection
only in writing and to denominate it by any particular name,
and the trial court were to permit a violation thereof and
entertain the matter nevertheless, unless it appeared that
the adverse party was prejudiced thereby the error would
be regarded as harmless under sec. 2829, Stats. 1898.
While it is good practice to make a challenge to the array, so called, in writing, since there is no statute requiring it to be so made, and a stenographer is now a part of
the regular machinery of a trial court, who is expected to
take down accurately everything that occurs in the course
of a trial, the reason, in the main, for the common-law rule
as to the manner of presenting the challenge, no longer exists. It should therefore be deemed entirely sufficient if the
challenge is stated definitely at the bar of the court and
taken down by the stenographer.
It was early held here in harmony with the common-law
rule that the grounds of a challenge to the array should be
specifically stated. Conhey v. Northern Bank, 6 Wis. 447.
That should be regarded as the settled practice.
Though
the trial court has some discretion as to how specifically
the grounds of challenge must be stated, the statement
should be sufficiently full and definite to inform the trial
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court and the adverse party reasonably of the precise departures from the legal requirements relied upon. The
right of challenge should be exercised before commencing
to impanel the jury, otherwise it should be deemed waived.
12 Ency. PI. & Pr. 424. No departure from that rule is permissible except for extraordinary reasons.
In this case the practice as to the time of making the
objection, motion, or challenge and the manner thereof, except in that the specific grounds relied on do not appear in
the bill of exceptions, the writing in respect thereto being
absent therefrom, was proper. The practice of the court
also in treating the grounds assigned for the challenge,
not admitted by the adverse party, as at issue and summarily trying the issues, was proper. Since such grounds
were not formerly stated, taken down by the stenographer,
and preserved in the bill, and the writing filed was not
so preserved we might properly omit consideration thereof.
However, since it appears that the questions raised by the
challenge were fully tried and the grounds with reasonable clearness appear from the evidence, we have concluded
to treat the matter.
The evidence taken upon the trial of .the issues involved in
the challenge indicates that the grounds relied on were
as follows: First, whereas the statute provides that the
jury commissioners shall furnish the clerk of the circuit
court one list of names of persons qualified to serve as
jurors, to be drawn from the body of the county, each commissioner proposed and furnished a partial list, and such
lists were treated as satisfying the statute. Second, the
commissioners did not furnish the clerk of the circuit court
a complete list of names verified or certified in proper
form. Third, the clerk did not make a copy of the lists
filed and deliver the same to the commissioners or any one
Fourth, the names furnished to the clerk as
of them.
aforesaid were not written upon separate slips of paper,
and the slips folded and put into a box by the clerk or his
deputy, as the law requires. The facts appear to be these .•
Each commissioner made a list and submitted it to the three
for consideration. They approved of such three lists, which
in the aggregate included the requisite names, as the one
list which the statute required, and delivered the same to
the clerk of the circuit court.
Such clerk did not make
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a copy of the lists so furnished and deliver the same to at
least one of the commissioners, as the law requires, but
each of the commissioners, to the knowledge of the clerk,
preserved a copy of the list proposed by him. The law does

verification or
formal certification of the list furnished to the clerk. While
neither the clerk nor his deputy wrote the names of the
persons appearing upon the lists furnished, as aforesaid,
on separate slips of paper, and it is not certain that either
one of them folded the slips after the names were written
thereon, and placed the same in a box in the presence of
the commissioners, as the law requires, the names were
so written by a person acting under the direction of* the
clerk in his presence and in the presence of the deputy
not require the commissioners

and

the

commissioners,

and

to make any

the slif)s were then by the

direction of the clerk, in his presence and in the presence
of the commissioners, either by the deputy clerk or
the person who wrote the names, placed in the box. The
names so written upon slips of paper and put in the
box were the identical names on the list furnished by the
There is an entire absence in the record of
commissioners.
any showing of prejudicial departure from the letter of the
statute. The mere fact that each commissioner proposed
a list of names for a part of the entire list -to be agreed
upon, and the several partial lists were approved and in
tliat form handed to the clerk, instead of the three lists
being transferred to one and in that form delivered, is of no
The fact that the physicial acts
consequence whatever.
of writing the names on slips of paper and folding such
slips ready for the box and putting them therein, if such
be the fact, in the whole, is likewise of no consequence, since
it appears that such person acted under the immediate
direction of the clerk, in his presence and in the presence
of the commissioners, and there is not only no indication
<liat there was any prejudicial departure from the statute
in the matter, but tliei-e is conclusive affirmative evidence to
the contrary. Tiie general rule as to irregularties in executing tlie statutory method for selecting jurors is that they
are to ])e deemed immaterial, unless it appears probable that
tlic person seeking to take advantage thereof may be prejudiced thereby. Proffatt, Jury Trial, Sec. 154 ; Thompson
&

Merriam, Juries, Sec. 134;

12

Ency. PI & Pr. 277.
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The point is made by the attorney general that in any
case the challenge to the array was waived by the failure to
object to the jury as a whole, reliance being placed on
Jackson v. State, 91 Wis. 253, 267, 64 N. W. 838. The rule
invoked has never been, and it seems cannot reasonably be,
applied to objection to the entire panel of jurors. It
only goes to objections to individual jurors. When an exception is once properly saved to a ruling on an objection
to the entire panel of jurors it will be available upon a
subsequent review of the final result without further calling
the matter to the attention of the trial court.

**********

By

the

Court. — Judgment is affirmed.

Section

4.

Qualifications of Jurors.

KUMLI V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Oregon.
21

1892,

Oregon, 505.

Bean, J. — This is an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been received by plaintiff while a passenger on one of defendant's passenger trains which was
wrecked by the falling of the bridge or trestlework across
the marsh known as Lake Labish, in Marion county, in November, 1890. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment
in favor of plaintiff for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars,
from which defendant appeals, assigning as error the action
of the court in overruling its challenge for actual bias, to the
jurors Kennedy, Harriott, Cooley, and Her, and in refusing
to set aside the verdict of the jury, because it is so excessive,
and so disproportionate to the amount of plaintiff's injury
as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.
These assignments of error will be noticed in the order
indicated.
1.

As

to the

overruling of the challenge to the jurors

:

It

is unnecessary to state the facts, as disclosed by the examination of any of the jurors, or their voir dire, except the
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juror Her, whose examination presents as strong a case
for the defendant as any in the record. The juror Her, in

1

a

a

is

it

a

;

a

it,

his examination in chief by defendant's counsel, said that
he did not know the plaintiff; had heard nothing about this
case; had heard considerable talk about the wreck; read
of it in the newspapers, and heard persons talk about it
who claimed to have looked at and examined the wreck;
from what he had heard the persons say who had examined
the wreck, and what he saw in the newspapers, he had
formed and expressed an opinion as to whether or not the
railroad company was to blame for the wreck ; he had that
opinion then; did not know that it was a particularly fixed
opinion; it is one that would require some evidence to reHe could not say how many persons he had heard
move.
talk about the wreck, who had examined and looked at
but
half dozen they said what they supsupposed, perhaps,
the
caused
wreck;
they were persons whom he had reposed
spect for. From what they said, and what he had read in
the newspapers, he had formed an opinion as to the cause
of the wreck; he had heard the various theories put forth
through the newspapers, as to whether the wreck was
caused by a defective structure, or by
rail being removed
from the track by some evil-disposed person. At the conclusion of his examination by counsel, the juror, in response
to questions by the court, said that what he had heard about
the transaction was not from any of the witnesses in the
case, but just from persons who had gone to view the
wreck; that no opinion he had formed would influence his
judgment in the trial of the case, but he should try the case
impartially, according to the law and the evidence; that he
could disregard what he had heard about the wreck, and
would be governed by the evidence altogether; would not
regard what he had heard, as
was only hearsay; would
pay no attention to what he had been told, but would simply
be guided by the testimony given in court.
The challenge
was thereupon overruled by the court, defendant excepting.
There
much conflict in the adjudged cases as to when
an opinion touching the merits of the particular case will
disqualify person called as juror. The standard of Lord
Mansfield, in Mylock v. Saladine,
W. Bl. 480, that ''a
juror should be as white as paper, and know neither plaintiff or defendant, but judge of the issue merely as an ab-
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stract propositon upon the evidence produced before him,"
has long since been discarded as impracticable.
The courts
are agreed, that with the present popular intelligence and

it

a

a

a

a

a

is

is

is

is

if

it

a

1

1,

a

a

a

is,

wide dissemination of current events, through the medium
of the press, a juror's mind cannot reasonably be expected
to be ''as white as paper," and it is no longer regarded as
an objection, per se, to a person called as a juror, that he
has heard of the particular case, or even formed or expressed an opinion touching the merits thereof.
''Were it possible," said Mr. Chief Justice Makshall, ''to
obtain a jurv without any prepossessions whatever, respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be extremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps,
impossible, and therefore not required.
The opinion which
has been avowed by the court
that light impressions,
which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that
may be offered, which may leave, the mind open to
fair
juror; but that those strong and deep impresjection to
sions which will close the mind against the testimony that
may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat
that testimony and resist its force, do constitute
sufficient objection to him." (Trial of Aaron Burr, Vol.
416;
Thomps. Trials, sec. 79.)
The rule laid down by this distinguished jurist in
trial which at the time attracted universal attention, has
become substantially the settled law of this country, and
the juror's opinion will
now generally considered that
not
in the case, he
the
evidence
presented
readily yield to
incompetent to sit upon the trial of the issue.
will
of such character, that
As to when the opinion
evidence
this
produced, the law in
not readily yield to the
state of confusion, that no success can
in such
country
be hoped for in reconciling conflicting opinions, or arraying
Expressed in the varying
the decisions in logical order.
or impression conthe
opinion
of
utterances,
judicial
terms
cerning the merits of the cause on trial, which disqualifies
juror, must be "fixed," "absolute,"
person called as
is

"positive," "definite," "decided," "substantial," "delibalmost unierate," "unconditional" opinion. The rule
versally laid down by these words, or words of similar import. A "conditional," "hypothetical," "contingent," "in-
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determinate," '' floating," ''indefinite," "uncertain" opinion will not do. {Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. *823 ; People v.
Bodine, 1 Denio 281 ; Staup v. Com., 74 Penn. St. 458 ; Willis
V. State, 12 Ga. 444; Osiander v. Com., 3 Leigh 780, 24
Am. Dec. 693; People v. Stout, 4 Parker Crim. Rep. 71; 1

Thomps. Trials, sec. 78.) These terms convey one and the
same meaning, and, in substance, require that in order to
disqualify a juror, his opinion touching the merits of the
case on trial must be of a fi.xed and determinate character,
deliberately formed and still entertained; one that in an
undue measure shuts out a different belief. An opinion or
impression formed from rumor, newspaper reports, or
casual conversation with others, which the juror feels conscious he can dismiss, and so unsubstantial that contradiction from the same source would be as readily accepted as
true, as the original statements upon which the impression
or opinion was formed,' constitute, ordinarily, no sufficient
objection to him.
"The opinion or judgment," says Chief Justice Shaw,
"must be something more than a vague impression, formed
from casual conversation with others, or from reading imperfect, abbreviated newspaper reports. It must be such
an opinion, upon the merits of the question, as would be
likely to bias or prevent a candid judgment upon a full
hearing of the evidence. If one had formed, what in some
sense might be called an opinion, but which yet fell far
short of exciting any bias or prejudice, he might conscientiouslv discharge his duty as a juror." {Comw. v. Webster,
5 Cush. 297; 52 Am. Dec. 711.)
While the rule is genrally recognized, that the disqualifying opinion of a juror must be of a fixed and determined
character, its application is frequently a matter of great
nicety, and the courts have struggled, apparently in vain,
to establish some judicial test, by which the question can
})e determined.
In order to avoid the uncertainty in the
d(!cisions, as well as the supposed inflexible rules of law, by
which the courts were driven, in many instances, to the illiterate and hopelessly ignorant portions of the community for
jurors, the legislature of this, as well as many other states,
lijis enacted a statute by which the competency of a person,
called as a juror, shall be determined, on the trial of a chai-
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lenge, for having an opinion touching the merits of the par-

ticular case.

By section 187, Hill's Code, it is provided, that on the
trial of a challenge for actual bias, *' although it should appear that the juror challenged has formed or expressed
an opinion upon the merits of the cause from what he may
have heard or read, such opinion shall not of itself be sufticient to sustain the challenge, but the court must be satisfied
from all the circumstances that the juror cannot disregard
such opinion, and try the issue impartially." This statute
is but a recognition of the fact that, at the present day,
when newspapers, railroads, and telegraphs have made
intercommunication easy, and when the important transactions of today in all their details are published to the world
tomorrow, the advance of popular intelligence and wide
dissemination of knowledge of current events, have under
the former rules of law, rendered it inapossible to secure
a jury of intelligent men for the trial of causes which have
excited much public attention and have resulted in the necessity of trying such cases before juries composed of the
illiterate and ignorant. Statutes of this character have been
held not unconstitutional as invading the right of trial by
jury. {Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164; 13 Am. Rep. 492;
Jones V. People, 2 Colo. 351; Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St.
328.)

This statute does not deny the principle, which has its
foundation in natural justice as well as law, that jurors
should be impaHial and free from any existing bias which
may influence their judgment. But it assumes, and we think
correctly, that a man may be a fair and impartial juror, although he have an opinion touching the merits of the cause
on trial, and that he may, notwithstanding, be able to set
aside and disregard such opinion and decide the case from
the evidence independently thereof and uninfluenced thereby. We think human experience teaches that it may not
unfreqently happen that persons who have formed an opinion touching the merits of a cause from reports verbal or
written, may, as jurors, lay aside their prepossessions, and
not only honestly and conscientiously endeavor, but in fact
be able to hear and decide the case upon the evidence,
Whether a person
uninflunced by such prepossessions.
called as a juror can do so or not depends largely; upon his

202

general

Trial Practice

[Chap.

5

intelligence, manner, tone, appearance, personal
peculiarities, and sources of information from which his
opinion is formed, its strength, the fact whether he exhibits
any pride of opinion which may lead him to give too little
or too much weight to the testimony for or against either
party, and many other circumstances, difficult if not impossible to suggest.
The determination of his competency,
therefore, necessarily becomes primarily a question for the
trial court, keeping ever in view, as it should, that the ultimate object to be attained is a trial before a fair and impartial jury. The question is wisely left largely to the
sound discretion of that court, and its findings upon a challenge to a juror for actual bias, where there is any reasonable question as to his competency, ought not to be reviewed
by an appellate court unless it clearly appear that such discretion has been arbitrarily exercised. {State v. Tom, 8 Or.
177; State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300.)
It is ordinarily more safe and just to the juror and the
cause of truth, to trust to the impression made upon the
trial court, which heard his testimony, and noticed his
manner and appearance while under examination, subject
to the scrutiny of counsel, than to any written or reported
His tone, temperament, and
statement of his testimony.
personal peculiarities, as exhibited on his examination, and
which do not appear in the written report of his testimony,
are important factors in determining his competency as a
juror. If a person called as a juror on his examination,
opinion in the case, on the merits, and nothing further is
shown, the court ought, as a matter of law, to reject him
Such a juror necessarily does not stand
as incompetent.
indifferent between the parties, and it matters little from
what source he received the information upon which his
If, however, he has no fixed belief or
opinion is based.
prejudice, and is able to say he can fairly try the case
on the evidence, freed from the influence of such opinion or
impression, his competency becomes a question for the trial
f'ourt, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and its findings
ought not to be set aside by an appellate court unless tiie
f'li-or is manifest. "No less stringent rules," says Mr. Justice Waite, "should be applied by the reviewing court in
siK'h a case than those whicli govern in the consideration
of motions for new trial because the verdict is against the
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evidence. It must be made clearly to appear that upon
the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had
formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed
impartial. The case must be one in which it is manifest
the law left nothing to the conscience or discretion of the
court." {Reynolds v. U .8., 98 U. S. 156.)
In the case before us, we think the challenges to the jurors
were each properly overruled.
Such opinions as they had
were formed from newspaper reports and casual conversations with persons who had visited the wreck. They evidently had no prejudice against the defendant, and had taken no
particular interest in the case. It is apparent that they
had nothing but loose, floating, hesitating opinions ; and as
far as we can see, there was no such prejudgment of the
case as would prevent them from sitting as fair and impartial jurors. The language of their examniation is qualified and considerate, and is not that of positive men, hasty
to judge and prompt to condemn, but rather that of honest,
careful conscientious men, fair, open, and candid, with an
obvious purpose to conceal nothing and suppress nothing.
They each was conscious that they could disregard all they
had heard about the case, and try it on the evidence as produced, uninfluenced by any opinion or impression they then
had. We cannot think this is such a manifestation of partiality or prejudice as left nothing to the conscience or discretion of the trial court.

**********

The judgment is affirmed.

THEOBALD V. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of Missouri.
191

Marshall, J. — This

1905,

Missouri, 395.

is an action for $5,000 damages arising from the death of the plaintiff's nineteen year old son,
about six o'clock in the afternoon on the 20th of January,
1903, caused by one of the defendant's cars colliding with
the rear of a wagon driven by the deceased, at a point sev-
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enty to one hundred fifty feet west of Union avcmue on De
Giverville avenue, in the city of St. Louis. There was a
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and the
defendant appealed.

I.
The first error assigned is the ruling of the trial court
in overruling the challenge for cause of the jurors Hartman and Bensberg.
Briefly stated the facts developed upon the voir dire
were, that eight or nine years before the trial the juror
Hartman had been thrown off of a car. He stated that that
fact would influence him in the trial of this cause. He also
stated that he would, be governed by the testimony and instructions of the court, and believed that he could render an
impartial verdict; that he had nothing against this defendant, but that he had during all those years entertained
a prejudice against street car companies, and that that prejudice existed when he was first examined as to his qualifications for a juror, but that during the examination, that
prejudice had been removed, and that he had reached the
conclusion within the last five minutes that he could try this

impartially.
The juror Bensberg testified that he had a sort of a
prejudice against the company, and that he did not think
it would influence his verdict as a juror, yet added, ''But
still a person having a prejudice, that would probably unAnd further added:
consciously bias his opinion."
would give more preference to the testimony of a non-employee of the company than I would an employee." Upon
the court's suggestion that he meant thereby that he would
consider the interest of the employee in determining the
credibility of his evidence, the juror acceded to that view.

case

"I

After examination by the court and counsel, the juror was
asked: "Q. Well, really, Mr. Juror, I do not understand
your position now. Tliat is the reason I am asking these
questions. A. Well, as I said before, I have a prejudice
against the company to start with. Q. You still have that
prejudice? A. Still have it. Q. And you also have a
prejudice against the testimony of employees. A. I would
not give it the same preference

that

I

would the evidence
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person who was not an interested party on either side
so an employee of the company."
Under our system of jurisprudence there is no feature
of a trial more important and more necessary to the pure
and just administration of the law than that every litigant
shall be accorded a fair trial before a jury of his countrymen, who enter upon the trial totally disinterested and
Where a juror admits, as Hartman
wholly unprejudiced.
did, that he had a prejudice against street car companies of
eight or ten years standing, and that that prejudice existed
up to the time he gave his first answer upon his voir dire,
yet after being examined and cross-examined by counsel and
the court, and being put in the position of having to say
he would allow that prejudice to overcome the obligation of
his oath as a juror, or on the other hand to say that he
could divest his mind of such a prejudice and fairly try a
case, and that the prejudice had become dissipated within
the last five minutes, it can scarcely be reasonably said that
such a juror fills the requirements of our system of jurisprudence.
The juror Bensberg more candidly and accurately stated
the conditions existing in such cases when he said: ''Well,
a person having a prejudice, that would probably unconsciously bias his opinion." The truth of this statemenr is
self-evident.
The question of the qualification of a juror is
be
a question to
decided by the court, and not one to be decided by a juror himself. It is the prerogative and duty of
the trial court to exercise a wise, judicial discretion in this
regard, and the conclusion of the court should rest upon the
facts stated by the juror with reference to his state of
mind, and should not be allowed to depend upon the conclusions of the juror as to whether or not he could or
would divest himself of a prejudice he admitted existed in
his mind. And this is true whether the prejudice exists
against either of the parties or against the character of the
subject-matter in litigation, or against either of the parties
as a class, and not against the party as an individual. It is
proper to examine a juror as to the nature, character and
cause of his prejudice or bias, but it is not proper to permit the juror, who admits the existence in his mind of such
prejudice or bias, to determine whether or not he can or
Such
cannot, under his oath, render an impartial verdict.
a

— more
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permits the juror to be the judge of his qualifications instead of requiring the court to pass upon them as
questions of fact.
It is altogether a mistaken idea that the ruling of the
a course

trial court
review.

on such questions is conclusive and not subject to
In some cases it has been loosely said that the

ruling of the court on such questions is like the ruling of
the trial court in law cases, and that where there is any
evidence to support the ruling, an appellate court will not
review the same. Such questions generally arise only in
cases at law. It is the discretion exercised by the trial judge
which is the subject of review. In approaching the decision
of that question an appellate court is always guided by the
same rule that obtains with reference to the review of discretionary judicial acts of inferior tribunals. Great deference is paid to the finding of a trial judge, but that finding
is not conclusive, and where the facts are, as here, practically undisi3uted, such ruling is subject to review on appeal.
Otherwise the whole power and authority as to the selection
of jurors would be vested in the trial court, and it is against
the policy of our law to permit any ruling in nisi prius court
to be beyond review and correction by an appellate court.
Accorded such a power, all else would be a foregone conclusion, and a litigant would be entirely at the mercy of
the trial judge, and the usefulness and propriety of appellate courts, would, to a large extent, be diminished.
This matter has been the subject of much consideration
and adjudication, not only in this State but in sister states,
and text writers have undertaken to formulate rules which
should be observed in the determination of the question. An
examination of cases cited in the briefs of counsel, shows a
vast contrariety of opinion and ruling in cases of this character.
Counsel for plaintiff refer to Thompson in his work on
Trials, section 100, where it is said: "Under modern practice the court acts as trier of all challenges. And the determination of questions of fact is final and not subject to
review." Of this it is sufficient to say that such is not the
lule in tliis State.
Counsel for plaintiff further refer to Thompson on Trials,
section 115, where the doctrine is laid down as follows:
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party cannot, on
trial court in over-

a

error or appeal, complain of a ruling of a
ruling his challenge for cause, if it appear that, when the

jury is completed, his peremptory challenges were not exhausted ; since he might have excluded the obnoxious juror

challenge, and therefore the error is to
For the same reason, if
be deemed error without injury.
a court erroneously
overrules a challenge for cause, and
thereafter the challenging party excludes the obnoxious
juror by a peremptory challenge, he cannot assign the ruling
of the court for error, unless it appear that, before the jury
was sworn, his quiver of peremptory challenges was exhausted ; in which case there is room for the inference that
the erroneous ruling of the court may have resulted in leaving upon the panel other obnoxious jurors whom the party
might, but for the ruling, have excluded by peremptory challenge. Some courts, therefore, hold that it is enough, in such
a juncture, to show that his peremptory challenges were exhausted before the jury was sworn. But others take what
seems the better view, that it must also appear, not only
that his peremptory challenges were exhausted, but that
some objectionable person took his place on the jury, who
otherwise would have been excluded by a peremptory chalby a peremptory

lenge."
Counsel for plaintiff cite cases which hold that even where
the trial court erred in overruling a challenge for cause it
must affirmatively appear by the record that the party had
exhausted his peremptory challenges in order to successfully challenge the ruling of the court.
This doctrine is manifestly pregnant with difficulty, and
would necessitate an extensive collateral inquiry precedent
to the regular proceedings in a case, in order that it might
appear that the aggrieved party had or had not exhausted
his peremptory challenges, or had not been driven to the
necessity of using some of his peremptory challenges to get
rid of the alleged prejudiced juror, whom he had challenged
for cause, and thereby been deprived of the opportunity
of getting rid of other objectionable jurors, though less obSuch a
jectionable than the juror challenged for cause.
burden
which
upon
a
the
party
aggrieved,
ruling imposes
he ought not to be compelled to bear, and reverses the theory
of our system of jurisprudence that error is prejudicial,
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unless the party in whose favor the error is committed,
The rule stated by
shows that it was harmless error.
Thompson on Trials reverses this practice and imposes
upon the party who points out and assigns the error, the
further burden of showing affirmatively that he was prejudiced by the error. Under our statute each party is absolutely entitled to three peremptory challenges. The statute
also gives parties litigant the right to challenge a juror for
error appears in the ruling of the court on a chalcause.
lenge for cause that question should be decided wholly independent of any consideration of whether the party litigant had or had not exhausted his peremptory challenges.
In other words, the statute provides for two classes of challenges, one for cause and the other peremptorily without
assigning any cause. And in the determination of the question of the propriety of the ruling upon a challenge for
cause, it is improper to mix with it a consideration of the
question as to whether or not the complaining party had
exhausted his peremptory challenges.

If

The conclusion is irresistible that the trial court should

**********

have sustained the challenge for cause.

For

the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit
court is reversed.
Bkace^ p. J., concurs ; Valliant and Lamm, J. J., concur
in paragraphs 1 and 2, and in the result.

WILSON V. WAPELLO COUNTY.
Supreme Court of loiva.
129

1905.

Iowa, 77.

Action at law to recover damages growing out of the
death of W. M. Wilson, plaintiff's intestate, and which
deatli was occasioned, as alleged, by the negligence of the
defendant county in permitting a county bridge to remain in
Upon trial there was
a defective and dangerous condition.
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verdict and judgment in favor of defendant, and tlie plaintiff appeals. — Affirmed.
a

**********

J. — I.

This action was commenced in January,
1903, and was reached for trial upon the issues joined in December, 1904. As the jury was being impaneled, the plaintiff challenged for cause each of the individual jurors called
into the box who made answer that he was a property owner
and tax payer in the county. The ground of challenge was
Bishop,

that the juror was ''incomiDetent because of showing such
a state of mind as would preclude him from rendering a just
verdict in said cause." The several challenges were overruled, and, after exhausting her right of peremptory challenge, the plaintiff was compelled to go to trial before a
jury made up of taxpayers of the county. Out of this situation arises the error first complained of. The statute enumerates the several grounds upon which a challenge for
cause to an individual juror may be laid.
Among these,
and it is the only one having any pertinency to the present
inquiry, is the following: "When it appears the juror * * *
shows such a state of mind as will preclude him from
rendering a just verdict." Code, section 3688, subd. 9.
It must be apparent that a challenge based upon such
ground calls only for a conclusion upon a fact question,
and of necessity such question is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. And, as in other cases, where an
exercise of discretion is under review, we may not interfere,
except an abuse be made to appear. Anson v. Dwight, 18
Iowa, 241 ; Sprague v. Atlee, 81 Iowa, 1 ; Goldthorp v. Goldthorp, 115 Iowa, 430.
Now it may very well be considered that a personal pecuniary interest in the result of an action is of itself sufficient to justify a finding that a state of mind exists such as
And without doubt every taxto preclude a just verdict.
payer within the limits of a municipal corporation is interested in a pecuniary sense in the result of an action brought
against such corporation to recover damages as for a perHe must contribute in the way of payment
sonal injury.
of taxes to liquidate any judgment that may be obtained.
It is in line with this thought that we have uniformly held
that in actions against a city or town for the recovery of
money there was no abuse of discretion in sustaining a
T. p.— 14
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juror; the challenge being predifact that the juror was a taxpayer

a

Of such cases are these:
Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Dively v.
Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa 567; Cramer v. Burlington, 42 Iowa
315; Cason v. Ottumwa, 102 Iowa 99.
Some language is used in the opinion in the Cramer Case,
and likewise in the Cason Case, upon which an argument
might be based, to the effect that it would be reversible error to overrule a challenge made to a taxpayer called as a
juror in such a case, but respecting such matter we need not
make any pronouncement at this time. It is sufficient to
remark in this connection that jurors are drawn from the
county at large, and where a city, town, or other minor
municipality is proceeded against no substantial injustice
could result from a trial to a jury made up of non-taxpaying
members of the panel. Moreover, no difficulty need be apprehended in such cases, as challenges on the ground of interest, if sustained, could not have the effect of blocking the
machinery of the court, and thus make it impossible that a
When, however, a county is procase be put upon trial.
ceeded against, the court is confronted with quite a different situation. While there is no requirement in the statute
that one must be a taxpayer to be eligible as a juror, yet
it is fair to presume that each person drawn for jury service is the owner of some property, greater or less in
Indeed,
amount or value, which is the subject of taxation.
we think it within common experience in this State that
the appearance of a non-taxpaying juror furnishes a rare
exception to the rule. And it is hardly conceivable that a
panel should be drawn in any county presenting a sufficient
number of non-taxpaying members to make it possible to
make up a jury out of such for the trial of a case. It may
be true enough that, after exhausting the regular panel,
the drawing of talesmen might be resorted to and continued
indefinitely until a sufficient number of jurors who could
pass challenge should be found. Conceding the possibility
of such a course, and to say nothing of the expense incident
thereto, we should be very slow to condemn the discretionary action of a trial court in refusing to compel parties
to sul)mit tlioir important matters of difference to a jury
or town.

which might be eventually thus made up.

And this conclus-
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ion is the more readily reached in view of the statute which
gives a phiintiff who has brought an action triable to a jury
against a county, in the court of that county, as he must,
the unqualified right to have the place of trial changed to
an adjoining county. Code, section 3505, subd. 1.
In some of the sister States it has been provided by statute that, in an action against a county, it shall be no ground
of challenge that a juror called to the box is a taxpayer of
the county. And such enactments are undoubtedly based
upon the thought that the extent of the personal interest
of an individual taxpayer is too slight to be permitted to
outweigh, not only the necessity for a speedy disposition
of cases thus brought, but the desirability of having every
jury made up from the substantial citizenship of the county.
In other States it has been held that, in the absence of a
mandatory statute, the slight financial interest which flows
from the obligation to pay taxes is not sufficient to disqualify
a juror, where otherwise there would be a failure of justice.
Com. V. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; Com. v. Brown, 147 Mass. 585
(18 N. E. Rep. 587, 1 L. R. A. 620, 9 Am. St. Rep. 736) ; State
v. Intoxicating Liquors, 54 Me. 564; Middletown v. Ames,
7 Vt. 166',Bassett v. Governor, 11 Ga. 207.

We conclude that there was no error, and the judgment is
affirmed.

SEARLE

V. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

SPRINGFIELD.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SPRINGFIELD
V. SEARLE.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
203 Massachusetts,

1909,

493.

Two Actions of Tort; the first action by George Everett
Searle against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield,
who as a corporation sole under St. 1898, c. 368, held the
title to certain real estate in the town of Easthampton, which
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was bought as a site for a church edifice, alleging the conversion by the defendant of a one story and a half wooden
building alleged to be personal property and to be the
property of the plaintiff, having been built for the plaintiff
by one Charles W. Smith, with the consent of Delia A.
Strong, who then was the owner of the land; and the
second action by the defendant in the first case against the
plaintiff in the first case and certain other persons, for
damages alleged to have been caused by an attempt to remove the building from the real estate, of which it was alleged to be a part, seeking also equitable relief by way of

injunction.

*****

C. J. The question at the trial was whether
a building erected on land of the defendant in the first action, who will hereinafter be called the defendant, was personal property belonging to Searle, who will hereinafter be
called the plaintiff, or was real estate owned by the defendant.

Knowlton,

**********

Exception was taken by the defendant to the ruling of
the judge at the request of the plaintiff, that no person of
the Roman Catholic faith should sit as a juror in these cases.
Under this ruling two jurors were excluded from the panel,
one a resident of Northampton and the other a resident of
South Hadley. The ruling was made on the ground that the
defendant is the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield,
a corporation sole under the St. 1898, c. 368, who holds
the title to the real estate in trust for the Roman Catholic church, and that these excluded jurors have an interest in the suit analogous to that which taxpayers have
in a suit against the city or town in which they re-

side.
It is not contended and it could not successfully
be contended that holding the same religious belief as one
of tlie parties, or affiliation with him in the same church,
woukl disqualify a person from sitting as a juror in his
The application of such a doctrine would be uncase.
Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 16 Pick.
just and impracticable.
153; Purple v. Horton, 13 Wend. 1; Barton v. Erickson,
14 Neb. 164; Smith v. Sisters of Good Shepherd, 27 Ky.
Law Rep. 1170.
The real estate held by the defendant is in the town of
Easthampton, and it was bought as a site for a church edi-
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The excluded jurors were not taxpayers in that town,
and it may be assumed that they were not members of the
parish that was expected to use the church. The ruling applied to all jurors of the Roman Catholic faith, without
reference to their residence or to any close affiliation with
the local church. Has every person of the Roman Catholic
faith in the diocese of the bishop of Springfield a pecuniary
interest, of which the court can take notice, in every church
owned by the defendant in every part of the diocese? We
are of opinion that he has not. It does not appear, and
we have no reason to suppose, that every Roman Catholic
living in a remote part of the diocese can be affected pecuniarily by a small loss or gain of the bishop as owner, in connection with the erection of a Roman Catholic church in
Easthampton.
Under the St. 1898, c. 368, the defendant's holding of
property is "for the religious and charitable purposes of
the Roman Catholic Church." In the R. L. c. 36, sec. 44-46,
it is strongly implied that there is a difference in the trusts,
and in the beneficiaries, among churches in different places^
and that the members of a particular parish and those
directly connected with the church therein have different
pecuniary relations to the church there from those of the
same faith who live in a different part of the same diocese.
Upon the record before us this ruling of the judge appears
to be wrong. See Bxirdine v. Grand Lodge of Alabama, 37
Ala. 478; Delaivare Lodge v. AUmon, 1 Penn. (Del.) 160.
The remaining question is whether the error was prejudicial to the legal rights of the defendant. The manner
of impaneling jurors is prescribed by the R. L. c. 176, sec.
25.
The names of those summoned as jurors are written
on ballots and placed in a box, and, after the ballots are
shaken up, the clerk draws them one by one in succession
until twelve are drawn. Apart from challenges, 'Hhe twelve
* * *
shall be the jury to try the issue," etc.
men so drawn
was a violation of the statutory prothe
judge
order
of
The
vision, and of the defendant's right to have the excluded
men sit as jurors unless challenged by the plaintiff.
The case was tried by other qualified jurors, and it is
argued that the defendant was not injured by the order.
Under the R. L. c. 176, sec. 32, no irregularity in the drawing, summoning, returning or impaneling of jurors is suffic-
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lent to set aside the verdict, unless the objecting party was
injured thereby. In general it may be assumed that all
duly qualified jurors, against whom there cannot be a successful challenge for cause, will consider and try a case properly. But a man may have affiliations and friendships or
prejudices and habits of thought which would be likely to
lead him to look more favorably for the plaintiff, or less
favorably for him, upon a case of a particular class, or
upon one brought by a particular person or a member of a
particular class of persons, than would the average juror,
even though his peculiarities are not sufficiently pronounced
to disqualify him for service. It is in reference to these
peculiarities that the parties are given a limited number of
peremptory challenges. While they have no direct right of
selection, this right of peremptory challenge gives to each
party a restricted opportunity for choice among qualified
persons.
Anything wliich renders this statutory right of
peremj:)tory challenge materially less valuable is an injury
to a party, within the meaning of the statute. We do not
intimate that any juror would consciously allow feelings of
friendship or prejudice, or unusual and peculiar habits
of thought, to affect his conduct in the jury room; much
less that a party has a right to have the benefit of the peculiar views or special feelings of a particular juror in the
trial of his case. But the right of peremptory challenge
in the impaneling of jurors cannot be disregarded as of no
value to the parties. In the case at bar, a class of persons qualified as jurors, whom the plaintiff thought in such
relations of religious affiliation with the defendant that
they would be likely to hear his defense in an attitude of
special friendship, was withdrawn from the list of jurors.
The order of the judge rejecting these men, at the request
of the plaintiff, gave him at the outset an additional power
of choice, and made his right of peremptory challenge relatively more valuable, while the defendant's similar right
\ias made relatively less valuable. We are of opinion that
this was an injury to the defendant which entitles him to
a new trial.
The number of persons summoned as jurors
that b(!l()nged to this class does not appear.
It only apto
be drawn
])eMrs that the names of two of them happened
from tlio box.
Our decision sooms to be in accordance with the weight
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of authority, although some of the cases depend upon local
statutes. Hildreth v. Troy, 101 N. Y. 23i;Welch v. Tribune
Publishing Co., 83 Mich. 661 ; Scranton v. Gore, 124 Penn. St.
595; Montague v. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. 767; Kunneen
V. State, 96 Ga. 406; Bell v. State, 115 Ala. 25; Danzey v.
State, 126 Ala. 15.
We are aware that courts have often required prett>
clear proof of injury before setting aside a verdict for a
cause of this kind. West v. Forrest, 22 Mo. 344; Southern
Pacific Co. V. Rauh, 49 Fed. Kep. 696; Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago S St. Louis Railroad v. Montgomery, 152 Ind.
1, 23 ; People v. Searcey, 121 Cal. 1 ; Tatum v. Young, 1 Porter, (Ala.) 298; Abilene v. Hendricks, 36 Kans. 196, 200. It
is also generally held that an appellate court will not review
an exercise of discretion, or a mere finding of fact of a

trial judge, determining

whether a person shall sit upon
Commonwealth
v.
Hayden, 4 Gray 18; Grace v.
a jury.
Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313; People v. Searcey, 121 Cal. 1, 3;
Commonivealth v. Moore, 143 Mass. 136, and cases cited.
Whether an error of law like that in the present ease, if
it arose only in determining the qualifications of a single
juror, should be held so far to injure an objecting party as
to require the verdict to be set aside, we do not find it
necessary to determine; but when, as in the present case,
the ruling applies to a class of persons, we feel constrained
to say that there was an injury of which the law should
take notice.
Exceptions sustained.

Section
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GOFF V. KOKOMO BRASS WORKS.
Appellate Court of Indiana.
43

1909,

Indiana Appellate, 642.

J. — Action

by appellant to recover damages for
[)ersonal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him
while in the. service of appellee. The issues were formed

Myers,
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by the complaint and answer of general denial. The cause
was tried by a jury and a verdict returned for appellee.
From a judgment in favor of appellee appellant has appealed to this court, assigning as error the overruling of
his motion for a new trial.
The reasons assigned in support of the motion relate
solely to the action of the court in sustaining the objections
of appellee to certain questions, propounded by appellant to
the persons called to act as jurors, touching their competency and qualifications so to act. These questions called
for information as to whether they were acquainted with
any of the officers or agents of the Travelers Insurance
Company, whether any of them ever had any business relations with that company, whether they were then or ever
had been the agents or in the employ of that company, or
whether they were then acquainted with any agent of that
company? Preliminary to these questions appellant offered
to introduce evidence to the court tending to show that
the Travelers Insurance Company was interested in the
result of the suit, and this offer was refused. A complete
examination of each of the jurors upon his voir dire is
made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. Appellee
contends that, the jury being accepted by appellant, without
making any peremptory challenge or objection to the competency of any juror, he thereby waived any error that
may have been committed in impaneling the jury.
From the objections made to the various questions propounded by appellant to each of the jurors, and from the
rulings of the court as disclosed by the record, it appears
that the court proceeded upon the theory that, as appellee
was the only defendant of record, the latitude of appellant's
inquiry did not extend to elicit the suggested information.
The matter of impaneling a jury must, to a great extent, be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
only in cases where an abuse of that discretition is clearly
shown will appellate tribunals disturb the judgment of that
court. Courts of last resort having to do with questions,
in principle, not unlike the one here presented, with almost 0'i.ie accord, have held that where parties are acting ui
good faith considerable latitude should be allowed along
lines touching the competency of persons called as jurors

The Juey

Sec. 5]

217

if

a

is

a

a

is

&

it

7

a

a

a

is,

to act in the matter under investigation, as also for the
purpose of furnishing a basis upon which the court and
parties may proceed intelligently, to the end that a fair and
impartial jury may be obtained. 2 Elliott, Gen Prac, Sees.
507; Epps V. State (1885), 102 Ind. 539, 545; Evansville
Metal Bed Co. v. Loge (1908), 42 Ind. App. 4:61; Donovan v.
People (1891), 139 111. 412, 28 N. E. 964; SJioots v. State
(1886), 108 Ind. 415; Connors v. United States (1895), 158
U. S. 40'8, 15 Sup. Ct. 951, 39 L. Ed. 1033; 24 Cyc. 341;
StepJienson v. State (1887), 110 Ind. 358, 362, 59 Am. Rep.
216. The juror
witness, obliged to disno less than
close, upon his oath, true answers to such questions as may
be asked touching his competency to serve as
juror in the
case about to be tried (Thornton Juries and Instructions,
Sees. 128; Burt v. Panjaiid (1878), 99 U. S. 180, 25 L. Ed.
451), and the court should exclude questions which are irrelevant, and would not, however answered, affect the
juror's competency in the particular case, or which would
tend to mislead or confuse
juror, or would, as said in the
case of ChyhoivsU v. Bncyrus Co. (1906), 127 Wis. 332, 106
N. W. 833, L. R. A. (N. S.) 357, clearly give ''undue importance to the insurance company's connection with the
case, since no such basis was necessary." Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co. (1906), 129 Wis. 98,* 108 N. W. ^8;Faber
V. C. Reiss Coal Co. (1905) 124 Wis. 554, 102 N. W. 1049;
Connors v. United States, supra; 24 Cyc. 341.
In M. O'Connor
Co. v. Gillaspy (1908), 170 Ind. 428,
said: "Parties litigant in cases of this class are entitled
to
trial by thoroughly impartial jury, and have right
to make such preliminary inquiries of the jurors as may
seem reasonably necessary to show their impartiality and
disinterestedness.
In the exercise of this right counsel
must be allowed some latitude, to be regulated in the
sound discretition of the trial court, according to the nature and attendant circumstances of each particular case.
not only
The examination of jurors on their voir dire
for the purpose of exposing grounds of challenge for cause,
any exist, but also to elicit such facts as will enable
counsel to exercise their right of peremptory challenge intelligently. Questions addressed to this end are not barred
though directed to matters not in issue, provided they are
pertinent, and made in god faith. It does not appear from
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the record that an accident or indemnity insurance company was in any manner interested in this action, but the
laws of this state authorize the incorporation of companies
for indemnifying employers against liability for accidental
injuries to employes, and it is a matter of common knowledge that numerous companies are engaged in such insurance

In

in this State."

a

a

a

it,

the case at bar the Travelers Insurance Company was
not a party to the record, and for aught that appears from
the complaint was not interested in the result of the suit,
but the record shows that appellant offered to introduce
evidence to the court tending to show that it was present
in court by hired counsel actively engaged in defending the
action ; and that it had issued a policy of insurance to appellee. This evidence was admissible only in the discretion
of the court, and for its sole use in determining counsel's
good faith in pursuing the inquiry. Therefore, meeting the
question, does the record before us show an abuse of that
discretion lodged with the trial court as will authorize this
court to set aside the judgment? Limiting our inquiry to
the particular information desired by appellant, as indicated by the questions propounded to each juror, and to
which objections were sustained, it seems to us quite clear
that the questions should have been answered. For, in case
the insurance company was pecuniarily interested in the
litigation, a person in its employ or otherwise interested
in
naturally would be more liable to be unduly influenced
to grant an advantage on the side of his employer or in
private interest than one having
the protection of
verdict according to the law
single purpose — returning
and the evidence. In Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Co. (1903),

it
is

said: ''That either
Minn. 354, 358, 94 N. W. 1079,
to
the
litigent has
challenge for implied bias must,
right
of course, be admitted, and we think
would be impossible
to say, or for the court to hold in the exercise of its proper
discretion, that any person connected with the indemnifying
stockholder or otherwise could be
proper
company as
juror in case the result of which might
person to sit as
l)e of pecuniary interest to such company.
If the proposed
juror was
stockliolder.or otlierwise interested in such
company his disqualification would seem to follow as
matter of law. If this be so,
difficult to see upon what.

a a

a
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it

a

a

a

a
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ground the court could refuse to permit counsel to ascertain
the facts while impaneling the jury. It is no answer to this
to say that the insurance company is not named as a party
to the action, for the bias of the juror is not to be determined by this fact. Xor is it an answer to say that counsel
may protect his client by using a peremjDtory challenge. It
is his right first to learn the facts, and he must do so to
exercise intelligently his right to challenge peremptorily.
The authorities all go to show that a very insignificant interest in the result of an action, and frequently a ver\^ trifling relationship to one of the parties, is sufficient to disqualify a person from sitting as a juror. In order to secure
to litigants unbiased and unprejudced jurors, we are compelled to hold that plaintiff's counsel had a right to ascertain whether there was such a relationship between the persons called as jurors and the insurance company, a corporation vitally interested in the result, which would disqualify these persons, because, by implication, they would
And see Block v. State (1885),
be biased and prejudced."
100 Ind. 357; Burnett v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (1884), 16
Neb. 332, 20 N. W. 280; Ensign v. Harney (1883), 15 Neb.
330, 18 N. W. 73, 48 Am. Rep. 344; Martin v. Farmers, etc.
Ins. Co. (1905), 139 Mich. 148, 102 N. W. 6D6;Hearn v. City
of Greenshurgh (1875), 51 Ind. 119; Terre Haute Electric
Co. v. Watson (1904), 33 Ind. App, 124; Johnson v. Tyler
(1891), Ind. App. 387; 2 Elliott, Gen. Prac. Sees. 507, 514,
515; Beall v. Clark (1883), 71 Ga. 818.
The weight of authority affirms the right of parties to
examine persons called as jurors on their voir dire, as counsel sought to do in this case. He was denied that right. The
information indicated by the questions does not appear in
the record as having been furnished in any other manner.
Whether any or all of the jurors who tried the case had
any interest in the insurance company, which counsel for
appellant offered to show to the court was financially interested in the result of the litigation, nowhere appears.
The action of the court in refusing to permit counsel for
appellant to examine the persons called as jurors along the
line suggested in this opinion was error, and, in the absence of a showing that it was harmless, entitles appellant
to reversal of the judgment without first showing that

I
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disqualified juror sat in the case. * * *
Judgment reversed.'^

iStatutory restrictions.
In some states the character and scope of the
See Commonwealth v.
questions to be asked a juror are prescribed by statute.
Warner, (1899) 173 Mass 541, 54 N. E. 353; Commonwealth v. Poisson, (1893)
157 Mass. 510, 32 N. E. 906; State v. Bethum, (1910) 86 S. C. 143, 67 S. E.
466; State v. Eoberts, (1910) (Del.) 78 Atl. 305; Woolfolk v. State, (1890)
85 Ga. 69, 11 S. E. 814.

Section

Method of Empanelling.

6.

POINTER V. UNITED STATES.
Supreme Court of United States.
151

1894.

United States, 396.

Justice Harlan

delivered the opinion of the court.
At the February term, 1892, of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Western District of Arkansas, the
grand jury returned an indictment against John Pointer
for the crime of murder.
Me.

The entire panel of the petit jury was called and the
as to their qualifications, and, the
journal entry states, thirty-seven in number were found
to be generally qualified under the law, that is, in the
words of the bill of exceptions, ''qualified to sit on this
case." The defendant and the government were then furnished, each, with a list of the thirty-seven jurors thus
selected, that they might make their respective challenges,

jurors were examined

twentv by the defendant and five by the government, the
remaining first twelve names, not challenged, to constitute
the trial jury. Tlie defendant at the time objected to this
mode of selecting a jury: ''1st, because it was not according to the rule prescribed by the laws of the State of Arkansas; 2d, because it was not the rule practiced by common law courts; 3d, because the defendant could not know
the particular jurors before whom he would be tried until
after his cliallcngos. as guaranteed by the statutes of the
Unitod Sfntos. bnd been exhausted; 4th, because the government did not tender to the defendant the jury before
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whom he was to be tried, but tendered seventeen men instead of twelve, and made it impossible for defendant to
know who the twelve men before whom he was to be tried
were until after his right to challenge was ended."
At the time this objection was made the defendant's
counsel saved an exception to the mode pursued in formthat the
ing the jury, and said: ''The point we make
government must offer us the twelve men they want to
try the case." The court observed: ''They offered you
thirty-seven."
"We understand," counsel said, "but we
want to save that point."
a

given number of jurors withone of the most important of the

The right to challenge

if

2. a

A

is

a

a

4

b;

3

is

is

is

out showing cause
"The end of challenge,"
rights secured to the accused.
says Coke, "is to have an indifferent trial, and which
required by law; and to bar the party indicted of his lawful challenge
principal matter concernto bar him of
ing his trial."
Inst. 27, c.
He may,
he chooses,
peremptorily challenge "on his own dislike, without showing any cause;" he may exercise that right without reason
or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously, Co. Lit. 156
Bl. Com. 353; Leivis v. United States, 146 U. S. 376.
Any system for the empanelling of
jury that presents
or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned.
And, therefore,
he cannot be compelled to make
peremptory challenge
until he has been brought face to face, in the presence of
the court, with each proposed juror, and an opportunity
given for such inspection and examination of him as
required for the due administration of justice.
Were his rights in these respects impaired or their exercise embarrassed by what took place at the trial?
We
think not. The jurors legally summoned for service on
the petit jury were, as we have seen, examined in his presence as to their qualifications, and thirty-seven were ascertained, upon such examination, to be qualified to sit in the
case.
Both the accused and the government had ample
opportunity, as this examination progressed to have any
juror who was disqualified rejected altogether for cause.
list of all those found to be qualified under the law, and
not subject to challenge for cause, was furnished to the
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accused and to the government, each sMe being required
to make their challenges at the same time, and having notice from the court that the first twelve unchallenged
would constitute the jury for the trial of the case. It is
apparent, from the record, that the persons named in the
list so furnished were all brought face to face with the
prisoner before he was directed to make, and while he
was making his peremptory challenges.
Was the prisoner entitled, of right, to have the government make its peremptory challenges first, that he might
be informed, before making his challenges, what names
In
had been stricken from the list by the prosecutor?
some jurisdictions it is required by statute that the challenge to the juror shall be made by the State before he is
passed to the defendant for rejection or acceptance.
Such is the law of Arkansas, and the court below was at
liberty to pursue that method. Mansfield's Digest, sec.
2242. And such is regarded by some courts as the better
practice, even where no particular mode of challenge is
prescribed by statute. State v. Cummings, 5 La. Ann.
330, 332. But as no such provision is embodied in any
act of Congress, it was not bound by any settled rule of
criminal law to pursue the particular method required by
The uniform practice in England, as apthe local law.
pears from the observations of Mr. Justice Abbott, afterwards Lord Tenterden, in Brandeth's Case, 32 Howell's
St. Tr. 755, was to require the accused to exercise his
right of challenge before calling upon the government. He
said: ''Having attended,
believe, more trials of this
kind than any other of the judges,
would state that the
uniform practice has been that the juryman was presented to the prisoner or his counsel, that they might have a
view of his person; then the officer of the court looked
first to the counsel for the prisoner to know whether they
wished to challenge him ; he then turned to the counsel for
the crown to know whether they challenged him." p. 771.
In the same case. Lord Chief Baron Richards said that he
conceived it to be clear that ''it is according to the practice of the courts that the prisoner should first declare
his resolution as to challenging."
p. 774. Mr. Justice
Dallas expressed his concurrence in those views, pp. 774,
But the general rule is, that where the subject is not
775.

I

I
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controlled by statute, the order in which peremptory challenges shall be exercised is in the discretion of the court.
Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185; Turpin v. State,
55 Maryland, 464; Jones v. State, 2 Blackford, 475; State
V. Hays, 23 Missouri, 287; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 406;
State V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477, 480, 504; State v. Boativright, 10 Rich. (Law), 407; Shuflin v. State, 20 Ohio St.
233.

In

some

jurisdictions the mode pursued in the challeng-

ing of jurors is for the accused and the government to
make their peremptory challenges as each juror, previously ascertained to be qualified and not subject to be chal-

lenged for cause, is presented for challenge or acceptance.
But it is not essential that this mode should be adopted.
In Regina v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129, 137, (1839), the names
of jurors were taken from the ballot-box, and each was
sworn on the voir dire as to his qualifications before being sworn to try. When the government peremptorily
challenged one who had been sworn on the voir dire as to
his qualifications, it was objected that the challenge came
too late, because the juror had taken the book into his
hand to be sworn to try. In disposing of this objection
Chief Justice Tindal said: ''The rule is that challenges
must be made as the jurors come to the book and before
The moment the oath be begun it is too
they are sworn.
the
oath is begun by the juror taking the book,
late, and
having been directed by the officer of the court to do so.
If the juror takes the book without authority, neither party wishing to challenge is to be prejudiced thereby."
These observations, it is apparent, had reference only to
the question whether a peremptory challenge could be
permitted after the juror had, in fact, taken the book into
his hand for the purpose of being sworn to try. At most,
in connection with the report of the case, they tend to
show that the practice in England, as in some of the
States, was to have the question of peremptory challenge
as to each juror, sworn on his voir dire and found to be
free from legal objection, determined as to him before
But
another juror is examined as- to his qualifications.
of
in
is
no
suggestion
by
any
the judges
Frost's case
there
that that mode was the only one that could be pursued
without embarrassing the accused in the exercise of his
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right of challenge. The authority of the Circuit Courts
of the United States to deal with the subject of empanelling juries in criminal cases, by rules of their own, was
recognized in Lewis v. United States, subject to the condition that such rules must be adapted to secure all the
rights of the accused. 146 U. S. 379.
We cannot say that the mode pursued in the court below, although different from that prescribed by the laws
of Arkansas, was in derogation of the right of peremptory
challenge belonging to the accused. He was given, by the
statute, the right of peremptorily challenging twenty
jurors. That right was accorded to him. Being required
to make all of his peremptory challenges at one time, he
was entitled to have a full list of jurors upon which appeared the names of such as had been examined under the
direction of the court and in his presence, and found to be
qualified to sit on the case. Such a list was furnished to
him, and he was at liberty to strike from it the whole number allowed by the statute, with knowledge that the first
twelve on the list, not challenged by either side, would constitute the jury. And after it was ascertained, in this
mode, who would constitute the trial jury, it was within
the discretion of the court to permit them to be again examined before being sworn to try. But no such course
was suggested, and the record discloses no reason why a
further examination was necessary in order to secure an
impartial jury. The right of j^eremptory challenge, this
court said, in United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480,
482, and in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 71, is not of
itself a right to select, but a right to reject, jurors.
It is true that, under the method pursued in tliis case, it
might occur that the defendant would strike from the list
the same persons stricken off by the government.
But
that circumstances does not change the fact that the accused was at liberty to exclude from the jury all, to the
number of twenty, who, for any reason, or without reason,
were objectionable to him. No injury was done if the
government united with him in excluding particular persons from the jury.
He was not entitled, of right, to know,
in advance, what jurors would be excluded by the government in the exercise of its right of peremptory challenge.
He was only entitled, of right, to strike the names of twen-
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ty from the list of impartial JTir}Tnen furnished him by the
court. If upon that list appeared the name of one who
was subject to legal objection, the facts in respect to that
juror should have been presented in such form that they
But it does not apcould be passed upon by this court.
character
was made, or
of
that
pear that any objection
could have been made, to any of the thirty-seven jurors
found, upon examination, to be qualified.
Thus, in our opinion, the essential right of challenge to
which the defendant was entitled was fully recognized.
And there is no reason to suppose that he was not tried
The objection that the government
by an impartial jury.
should have tendered to him the twelve jurors whom it
wished to try the case, or that he was entitled to know
before making his challenges the names of the jurors by
whom it was proposed to try him, must mean that the government should have been required to exhaust all of its
peremptory challenges before he peremptorily challenged
any juror. This objection is unsupported by the authorities, and cannot be sustained upon any sound principle.

We perceive no error in the record to the prejudice of
the substantial rights of the plaintiff in error.
Judgment affirmed.

Section
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Challenges.

COUGHLIN V. PEOPLE.
Supreme
144

Court of Illinois.

Illinois,

140, 164.

Mr. Chief Justice Bailey delivered
court

:

1893.

the

**********

opinion of the

Challenges to jurors, based upon an allegation of bias,
favor or partiality, were, at the common law, di\dded into
two classes, viz., principal challenges and challenges to the
favor. A principal challenge was grounded on such maniT. p.— 15
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fest presumption of partiality, that if the fact alleged was
proved to be true, the disqualification of the juror followin
ed as a legal conclusion, incapable of being rebutted,
case of a challenge to the favor, on the other hand, the disqualification arose as a conclusion of fact to be determined
by the triers, the evidence adduced in support of the challenge leading to no presumption which might not be overcome by other evidence.
Among the various matters which, at common law, were
held to be principal cause of challenge, that is, cause from
which bias or partiality would be inferred as a legal conclusion, were these: consanguinity or affinity of the juror
with either of the parties within the ninth degree ; that the
juror was god-father to the child of either party, or e converso; that the juror was of the same society or corporation with either party; or was tenant or ''within the distress" of either party; or had an action implying malice
depending between him and either party; or was master,
servant, counsellor, steward or attorney for either party;
or after he was returned, he ate and drank at the expense
of either party; or had been chosen as arbitrator by either
party. By most of the authorities it was held to be ground
of principal challenge, that the juror had formed and de5
clared his opinion touching the mater in controversy.
Bac. Abridg. 353; 3 Black Com. 363; 2 Tidd's Prac. 853;
Coke Litt. 155; 3 Burns' Justice of the Peace (28th Ed.)
519; 21 Viner's Abridg. 252; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 541; 3
Chit. Gen. Prac. 794; Pringle v. Hulse, 1 Cow. 436, note
1 ; People V. Bodine, 1 Denio,
304. According to these
authorities and others like them, where the matter alleged
was held to be ground for principal challenge, all the challenging party was called upon to do was, to prove the existence of the fact alleged by him as a ground of challenge,
and that being shown, the incompetency of the juror followed as a necessary legal consequence, and in such case,
no inquiry was permitted as to whether, notwithstanding
the fact shown, he could sit as a juror and render a fair
and impartial verdict.
The law, from the fact proved, conclusively presumed bias, and permitted no further inquiry.
In til is State, triers are not appointed, according to the
mode of procedure at common law, all challenges, by our
Nor has the compractice, being determined by the court.
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mon law distinction between principal challenges and challenges to the favor been kept up in this State, still many of
the principles growing out of that distinction have been
habitually recognized and enforced. Indeed, most of the
objections to jurors which at common law were held to be
ground of principal challenge, are held with us to be absolute disqualifications,
that is, ujDon mere proof of the
fact alleged, the disqualification follows as a legal conclusion, and evidence is not admitted to show that, notwithstanding the fact proved, the juror is really impartial.

STATE V. MYERS.
Supreme Court of Missouri.

Gantt,

It

j

198
#

1906,

Missouri, 225.

* « * *

is next insisted that the court erred in overruling
the defendant's challenge to the Jurors Lancaster, Golden,
Cossett, Borgnier, Wharton, Miller, Soper and Capps for
the reason that the said jurors on their voir dire examination testified that they had formed opinions as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant from having read a copy of
the confession of Frank Hottman published in the Kansas
City newspapers. To this assignment of error the State
makes two answers: First, no specific ground of challenge
was stated by the defendant to either or all of said jurors ;
and, second, that the jurors were not incompetent because
they had formed an opinion from the reading of the newspaper report of the Hottman trial, and what purported to
be Hottman 's confession published in the newspapers. The
record discloses that upon the close of the exauiination of
each of the said jurors, the defendant made the general
challenge, "Defendant challenged this juror;" no specific
ground of challenge was given in either case. "Were the
challenges sufficient to preserve the error now complained
of for review by this court? In Kansas City v. Smart, 128
Mo. 1. c. 290, it was said: "The grounds of challenge to a
2.

228

juror must
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it is offered and tested on his

The trial court is entitled to know the reason
for the challenge. {State v. Broivnfield, 83 Mo. 453, 454;
Thompson & Merriam on Juries, sec. 253, and cases cited ;
1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 98.)"
In State v. Taylor, 134
Mo. 142, Judge Sherwood, speaking for this court, reviewed the authorities on this point and said:
"The defendants of course, were entitled to a full and
competent panel of forty men before announcing their final
challenges, but in reaching this stage of the proceedings it
became necessary to make what might be termed intermediary challenges. In making such preliminary challenges
that is, challenges for cause, this formula was observed at
the close of the examination of each venireman: 'Counsel
for defendants objected to this juror as disqualified and
not qualified to sit as a competent juror in this cause, and
challenged said juror for cause.
Objection and challenge
to
which
Nothing
defendant
excepted.'
ruling
overruled,
voir dire.

is better settled than that challenges for cause must be
specifically stated. The particular cause must be set forth,
{People V. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 128; Mann v. Glover, 14 N. J.
L. 195; Powers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227; Southern Pacific Co. V. Rauh, 49 Fed. 696; Drake v. State, 20 Atl. 747;
2 Elliott's Gen. Prac, sec. 530, and other cases there cited.)
The facts constituting the cause of complaint were not given
in this instance ; the challenge simply amounted to the statement of a legal conclusion.
The rule should be the same
here as it is where general objections are taken to the evidence, that it is incompetent, immaterial, etc., and where it
is held that general objections amount to nothing more than
Indeed, there seem to be more cogent
saying, 'I object.'
reasons why specific objections should be urged in a case
of this sort, where the question is as to the admission of a
juryman, than where it is as to the admission of a piece of
evidence. At any rate, in either case, fairness to the court
and to adverse counsel alike demand the grounds of the
challenge for cause to be particularly set forth."
The doctrine announced in that case on this point was
roafTirincd in State v. Bced, 137 Mo. 1. c. 132; State v. McGinvis, 158 Mo. 1. c. 118; and in State v. Evans, 161 Mo.
1.

c. 108.

Counsel for the defendant, however, insists that in this
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case the ground of the challenge was so apparent to the
court and the opposite counsel that they could not have
been misled as to the ground of the challenge. AVe are un-

able to concur in this view.
These jurors had been fully
examined as to their competency, and among other
things as to their opinions formed from reading newspaper
reports. If the objection was intended to be based specifically upon the ground of opinions formed or expressed, it
should have been so stated and the matter properly preserved for our review.
Moreover, we are of the opinion that the jurors were not
disqualified because they had formed an opinion from reading the newspaper reports of the Hottman trial and what
purported to be Hottman 's confession, because each one of
said jurors testified that he could sit as a juror in this case
and be governed solely by the evidence and render an impartial verdict, notwithstanding his opinion formed from
the reading of such newspaper reports and such opinion as
he had was based entirely upon the newspaper reports. Section 2616, Revised Statutes 1899, provides: *'It shall be a
good cause of challenge to a juror that he has formed or
delivered an opinion on the issue, or any material fact to
be tried, but if it appear that such an opinion is founded
only on rumor and newspaper reports, and not such as to
prejudice or bias the mind of the juror, he may be sworn."
It is a well-settled law in this state that a person otherwise qualified to sit as a juror in a criminal case is not disqualified by reason of having formed an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused, from reading partial newspaper accounts of the homicide, or from rumor when he
states on his voir dire that he can give the defendant a fair
and impartial trial. [State v. Reed, 137 Mo. 132, and State
In the last cited case,
V. Forsha, 190 Mo. 1. c. 323, 324.)
certain of the jurors upon the voir dire examination answered that they had read a report of the Bailey trial, in
which Bailey had been tried for the same murder, and that
they had read what purported to be the evidence on that
trial, including the testimony of the Biggs woman, who was
present with Bailey and Forsha when the murder was committed, and from such reading had formed an opinion as to
the guilt of the defendant, but that they could give the
defendant a fair and impai-tial trial notwithstanding such
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it was ruled that they were not disqualified.
The grounds of disqualification in that case were almost
identical with those urged in this, and we do not think renan opinion, and

dered the jurors incompetent.

of the Circuit Court must be and is affirmed, and the sentence which the law pronounces is directed to be carried into execution.
BuKGEss, P. J., and Fox, J., concur.
The judgment

M 'DONALD V. STATE.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
172

J,

1909,

Indiana, 393.

on an indictment
charging him and another with conspiring for the purpose
and with the intent unlawfully, feloniously and designedly
to defraud the Adams Express Company, by preparing a
which package contained,
package, securely wrapped,
among other things, two damp sponges, excelsior and damp
phosphorus, so arranged that when sufficiently dried the
phosphorus would ignite and cause such package and its
contents to be burned and consumed ; that, in pursuance of
the conspiracy, they delivered the package to said express
company to be transported from Indianapolis, Indiana, to
Louisville, Kentucky, and falsely represented that the package contained papers of the value of $10,000; that the conspirators intended, by the preparation of such package, and
its delivery to the express company, that the contents of
the package, while in possession of the company, should
l)e('ome sufliciently dry to ignite, burn and destroy the package, and to claim to have been damaged in the sum of $10,000, and fraudulently and unlawfully to make demand upon
the company tlu^-efor, and cheat and defraud the latter by
obtaining money from such company by virtue of such false
pretenses.
The only error assigned is upon the overruling of the
motion for a new trial.
Myeks,

Appellant

was convicted
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The questions sought to be presented arise upon alleged
error in refusing the peremptory challenge of a juror on
his voir dire, and in giving instructions. The evidence is
not in the record.
A bill of exceptions discloses that in
impaneling the jury, when the jury had been passed back
to the defendant's counsel for re-examination for the third
time, and defendant had used but three peremptory challenges, being entitled to ten, the defendant peremptorily
challenged a juror who had been in the jury box from the
time the impaneling of the jury began, and the challenge
was disallowed, ''for the reason that, under a rule of said
court, which had been in existence for many years, the defendant's peremptory challenge was made too late," said
rule was stated by the court at the time as follows: "That
each side, the defendant and the State, is entitled to examine
each juror twice, and challenge, if desired, but cannot challenge a juror after the jury has been passed twice with
each juror in the box.
Said rule is an oral rule, and is not
entered in the records of the court, but has been regularly
It is further recited that the
enforced for many years."
defendant and his attorney, at the time of the challenge,
did not know of the rule, but they did not inform the court
on being advised of such rule that either or both of them
and did not ask that
were ignorant of
be suspended,
nor that an exception be made to its enforcement, on account of such ignorance. We think
quite clear that there
can properly be no such thing as an oral rule of
court.
Rules of court, when legally adopted and promulgated, have
the effect of positive laws. Sec. 1443, Burns 1908, sec. 1323
R. S. 1S81 iMagnuson v. Billings (1899), 152 Ind. 177 State
V. Van Cleave (1902), 157 Ind. 608; Smith v. State, ex ret.
(1894), 137 Ind. 198; 11 Cyc. 742.
They ought not only to be formally promulgated, but
they should be definiteiy stated, which could not be true of
They
judge.
practice reposing solely in the breast of
should be published and made known in some permanent
form, so that they might be known to all. The so-called rule
rule at all, and binding upon no one —
was clearly not
clearly not upon one who has no notice of it. The statutory
provision (sec. 2099 Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 634,
''In prosecutions for capital ofas follows:
sec. 228),
fenses, the defendant may challenge, peremptorily, twenty
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jurors; in prosecutions for offenses punishable by imj^risonment in the state prison, ten jurors; in other prosecu-
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J

is

it

is

is

is

is

a

it
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a

a
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it
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a
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tions, three jurors. When several defendants are tried together, they must join in their challenges.
Irrespective of the so-called rule, was appellant denied
a statutory right?
No provision is made by statute nor
by rule as to how or when the right shall be exercised, and
it is claimed by appellant that it may be done at any time
until the jury is sworn. In some jurisdictions the passing
of a juror after he has been examined, tendered to and accepted by the other party, is a waiver of the right to
challenge. In others, the right to challenge is in the sound
discretion of the court. In others, a party who accepts a
juror with knowledge of an objection waives the objection,
but if a cause of objection is afterward discovered it is not
waived, unless he is guilty of negligence in not discovering
the objection. 24 Cyc. 322, 323. There is no showing made
that appellant did not know from the beginning the grounds
for the peremptory challenge, and he stands here upon the
bare proposition that he was entitled to the challenge in
any event, without offering any excuse to the court, or
making any request for exemption or relief from the local
practice. Had any request for exemption upon the ground
that the so-called rule was void, or that the appellant or his
counsel had no knowledge of
been made, or
any reason
were shown why the juror twice passed by appellant as
difsatisfactory had been discovered to be unacceptable,
ferent question would be presented, for, independently of
the so-called rule, appellant shows no ground for relief
from his own act and acquiescence.
We think
cannot be said that the right of challenge
denied where
restricted to
defined number of opportunities for challenge, nor that there must be definite rule
fixing the time wlien, or the manner in which,
must be
exercised, for we think
may be controlled either by fixed
rule, or by any reasonable limitation imposed in any specific
case, so long as the right of peremptory challenge
not
taken away; in other words, that, when reasonable opportunity
given to challenge, the spirit of the statute
coman
does not mean that the right
l)li(Hl with, and that
open on(! at all times until the jury
sworn, irrespective of
all else that there
no good reason why there may be spec-
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ulation as to what the opposite party may do, and the jury
passed backward and forward to await the action of the
adversary; that the statute means that when the jury is
passed to a partj^ he must challenge peremptorily if he
would challenge, in the absence of an after-arising condition, and that, when the opportunity was twice given, as
here, and not exercised, a party cannot complain, unless
new conditions arise, calling for an exception to, or relaxation of, the practice or the order in the particular case, and
that if a given practice, not rising to the dignity of a rule,
is invoked, as here, one to be exempt from its operation, on
must seasonably apply to be
account of his ignorance of
At common law no challenge
relieved from its operation.
to the array or panel could be made until the full jury was
Chitty, Crim. Law (4th Am. ed.),*544. Our
present.
statute (sec. 210l' Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 634, sec.
230), was evidently adopted with this practice in mind, and
the right to challenge contemplated the right to challenge
might stand, and not
as the panel thus full stood, or as
that the right should be one arising out of indefinitely passing the jury as acceptable.
In Ward v. Cliarlestoivn City R. Co. (1883), 19 S. C. 521,
45 Am. Rep. 794," after
plaintiff had announced that she
had no objection to the jury, the defendant challenged two
jurors, and plaintiff then claimed the right of peremptory
challenge. The court said: "There was no denial on the
part of the court; on the contrary the right was tendered to
her at the proper time, and having waived the exercise of
then, for the reasons given by the circuit judge, we think
was too late to demand
after the defendant had exersaid in Mayers v. Smith (1887), 121
cised his right." It
442, 448, 13 N. E. 216: "Under the practice at common
here presented, of
law, no such case would arise as

a

is

111.

party reserving his power of peremptorj^ challenge until
after he had examined and passed upon the whole twelve
jurors, or eight of them, for causes of challenge, and then
to claim the exercise of such right of peremptory challenge
as to jurors who had previously been passed upon and accepted, for the reason that the practice there was to require
each

juror to

be sworn

when his examination

was com-

In

State v. Potter (1846), 18 Conn. 166,

a

pleted."
talesman was
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called and examined by the counsel for defendant as to his
bias, or for cause of challenge, and no objection appearing
the court informed defendant's counsel that they could
challenge him peremptorily. They declined to exercise the
right at that time, as the panel was not full, and after it was
full they challenged the juror peremptorily, and the court
inquired whether any cause then existed which did not exist
when they first declined the right. They answered in the
negative, and the court held that the challenge came too late,
and this ruling was upheld. The reasoning, which is pertinent here, is as follows: ''Again, it is said, the prisoner
has been deprived of a right to a peremptory challenge,
which he was entitled to. It is not denied that time and
opportunity were given to the prisoner to challenge a juror ;
but it is claimed, that he had not all the time the law allows
him. Dickerman, a talesman, had been examined, and there
was no cause of challenge known against them. The court
then told the counsel, if they intended a peremptory challenge, they must make it at that time. They then had a
reasonable opportunity to make their challenge; but they
claim they may make it at their own time^ provided it is
done before the jurors are sworn. The statute, it is said,
gives them power to challenge peremptorily twenty jurors
summoned and impaneled, — and much criticism has been
had upon the word 'impaneled.' It is claimed, that it means
the jury sworn to try the cause ; and that until sworn, they
* * *
But it is said, that by the Engare not impaneled.
lish practice, the party has a right to challenge until the
jury is sworn. There, each juror is sworn, as soon as he
has been examined and opportunity given for challenge.
By our practice, jurors are none of them sworn until all
have been examined, and an opportunity offered for chal-

lenge."
Under the statute of Arkansas, the state in criminal cases
is required to exhaust its challenges before passing a jury
to the defendant, and it was held that when the state had
passed a jury to the defendant it was error to permit a
Williams v. State
jtcremptory challenge by the state.
39
(1897), 63 Ark. 527,
S. W. 709.
Where, upon impaneling a jury, the judge announced that
he would require the defendant to make his challenges as he
desired, to each juror as called, it was held not error to re-
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fuse a peremptory challenge after the juror was sworn and
accepted, and it was held that, when there was a fair opportunity to interpose a peremptory challenge, the defendant
cannot complain of a refusal to be allowed the further exercise of the right. People v. Carpenter (1886), 102 N. Y. 238,

N. E. 584.
We are not unaware that in the earlier cases in this State
and in other states it is held that the right of challenge continues up to the swearing of the jury, but we are unable to
perceive that any substantial right of a defendant is invaded when an opportunity for challenge of the full numbers is afforded and it is not availed of up to the time the
jury is sworn. The object to be attained is an impartial
jury, and while the right of peremptory challenge is an
absolute one, it is not, we think, so far so that it may be
If, by the introduction of
exercised under all conditions.
6

new men upon the panel, a cause for challenge should arise
— such as the coming on of a person at such enmity to one
already passed that they could not work in harmony, or the
introduction of anything which might prejudice the right of
a defendant — he would have a clear right to exercise his
preference, and challenge the man already acceptable,
rather than the new man, and the right would thus be preserved until the full panel is complete and the jury sworn.
He has a right to a full panel to begin with, the right of
canvass and comparison among jurors, and if his full right
of challenge is preserved, within the line here indicated, it
is practically a right of peremiDtory challenge until the jury
is sworn, but it does not follow that the opportunity must
be open under all circumstances or conditions, for it is a
right which may be waived. Neither do we understand that
the rule here declared is in conflict with the earlier holdings
of the court, which upon examination are found to be general declarations as to the right of peremptory challenge extending until the jury is sworn, and did not involve any
question of practice as to the mode of conducting the impaneling of juries, and of exercising the right of challenge,
or of the right and power of courts to direct the manner of
* * *
No reversible error is shown, and the
its exercise.
judgment is affirmed.^
Wrder
secured

"The right to challenge jurors is one given and
of challengef!.
Until the challenges
by law, and cannot be taken away by the court.

Trial

236

Peactice

[Chap.

5

to which a party is entitled under the statutes are exhausted, the right extends
The juror is first challenged for cause, either actual or
to every juror called.
In civil actions, each party is entitled to
implied bias; then peremptorily.
The usual practice in the
G. S. 1894, $ 5370.
three peremptory challenges.
selection of a jury in such actions is to require the peremptory challenges to
be made by the parties alternately, one at a time, beginning with defendant."
Swanson v. Mendenhall, (1900) 80 Minn. 56, 82 N. W. 1093.

STATE V. CADY.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
80

1888,

Maine, 413,

Peters, C. J. Two respondents were arraigned together
under a joint liquor indictment, having the same counsel to
answer for them. The judge allowed each respondent two
peremptory challenges in impaneling tbe jury, and when
one respondent in person challenged a juror, the other disputed the challenge, claiming that he had a right to have the
One respondent accepted
challenged juror on the panel.
and the other rejected the juror.
The judge accorded to them two challenges each, while
they were entitled to two jointly, and no more. In capital
cases each prisoner, under a joint trial, is entitled to his
The statute in that case prescribes
personal challenges.
that ''each person" shall be so entitled. In all other criminal cases it is ''the party" that is entitled to the two challenges.
they do not agree upon the persons to be obThe presumption is,
jected to, they lose their challenges.
where respondents in criminal cases, not lately capital, consent to be tried togetlier, or where the judge in his discretion orders a joint trial, that their interests are alike, and
differences between them are uncalled for. By R. S., c. 134,
sec. 20, it is provided that issues in fact in criminal cases
not capital, shall be tried by a jury drawn and returned in
the same manner, and cliallenges shall be allowed, as in civil
cases. By E. S., ch. 82, sec. 74, it is provided that in civil
cases, and criminal cases not capital, "each party" is entitled to two peremptory challenges when a jury is impanclU'd by lot. Party does not mean person. Allowing
challenges without cause is a merely statute right, not to

If
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be extended by construction.
Wliere defendants are numerif
each
had
personal challenges, it would require the
ous,
presence of an impracticable number of jurors. This ques-

tion is settled by several authorities. State v. Reed, 47 N.
H. 4G6; Stone v. Segur, 11 Allen, 568; State v. Sutton, 10
R. I. 159. These cases show that several respondents are
but one party, and are entitled to no more challenges than
one defendant.
But if in his discretion, the judge extended
a greater privilege than the statute concedes, neither respondent is in a position to complain of it. We have held in
Snoiv V. Weeks, 75 Maine, 105, that to a ruling of a judge,
in excusing or rejecting a juryman, exceptions will not lie.
It is there said: "He may put off a juror when there is no
real and substantial cause for it. That cannot legally injure an objecting party as long as an unexceptionable jury
is finally obtained. He may put a legal juror off. He cannot allow an illegal juror to go on." This question was exhaustively and learnedly examined in a case of piracy,
United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480, in which Judge
Story maintains the same doctrine, and he there says: "The
right of peremptory challenge is not of itself a right to
He further remarks
select but a right to reject jurors."
the
to
right "enables the prisoner
that
say who shall not
try him, but not to say who shall be the particular persons
who shall try him."
The objection to the county attorney's remarks is without force. He was expressing his judgment upon the testimony and giving illustrations of it in an unobjectionable
manner. He was not relating outside facts. The other objections have no weight.

Exceptions overruled.
Libbey
Walton, Danforth, Virgin,
and Foster, JJ., concurred.
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Discharge of Juror.

STATE V. DAVIS.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
31

1888.

West Virginia, 390.

Johnson, President :

On the 20th day of February, 1888, William Davis was, in
the Circuit Court of Ritchie county, indicted for maliciously,
etc., stabbing one Creed Wilson, with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, and kill him. The prisoner moved to quash
the indictment, which motion was overruled, and the prisoner pleaded not guilty. The jury was sworn on the 24th
day of February to try the issue. It appears from an order
entered on the next day that '*it appearing to the court
that Peter G. Six, a juror, is unable to perform his duty,
George W. Hammer, a qualified juror, was selected, tried,
and sworn in his place," etc. The prisoner objected to the
swearing of a new juror, which objection was overruled.
•

*

* *

The prisoner moved the court to discharge him, because
he had not been tried before a proper jury. He also moved
in arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial ; which several motions were respectively overruled, and the court pronounced judgment on the verdict, and sentenced the prisoner to confinement in the penitentiary for the term of two
years.

**********

Upshur, Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court in
Fell's Case, 9 Leigh 617, said, after reviewing a number of
FiUglish and American cases:
''One general rule is deducible from all the cases, which is that the court may discharge the jury whenever

a necessity

for

so doing

shall

arise; but what facts and circumstances shall be considered
as constituting

such a necessity can not be reduced to any
general rule. The power to discharge is a discretionary
power, which the court, as in all other cases of judicial dis-

cretion, must exercise soundly according to the circum*:tances of the case.
The object of the law is to obtain a
fair and just verdict, and, whenever it shall appear to the
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court that the jury impaneled can not render such a verdict, it ought to be discharged and another jury impaneled.
This is emphatically the case of necessity contemplated in
the authorities we have referred to ; as where the prisoner
became too sick to attend to his defense or one of the jury
was rendered physically unable to discharge his duty. There
are other cases of necessity equally strong, one of which
probably is where a juror, from the peculiar condition of his
mind and feelings, is manifestly disqualified from bestowing upon the case that attention and impartial consideration which is necessary to a just verdict. * * * The actual
sickness of a juror, and his consequent inability to discharge
his duty, is admitted on all hands to present such a necessity. In the case before us, the juror was not actually sick,
but there was every reason to believe that he would become
so through longer confinement.
Was the court bound to
wait till the case actually occurred! We think not. * * *
A necessity not less strong was presented by the situation
of the wife of another juror. If the object of the trial be,
as it undoubtedly is, to obtain a fair, just and impartial verdict, there can be but little prospect of such a result from
the constrained and reluctant action of minds wholly absorbed in the deep and peculiar interest of their domestic
relations." It was held that it would be improper, under
such circumstances, to discharge the prisoner.

if,

Here it appears from the record that the juror, Six, was
informed that his son had just died. It would, indeed, be a
stout-hearted father who could, unmoved, receive news of
the death of a child.
Some men could receive such news
and proceed with their work with steady nerve and mind

it

a

is

if,

is

a

a

indeed, we
clear and strong ; but observation teaches us,
have not learned from sad experience, that the natural refather, of the
sult of information, suddenly imparted to
to unfit him, for the time, to attend to
death of
child,
business. It would have been cruel to have required the
juror to remain on the jury under such circumstances. His
grief would naturally unfit him for the discharge of such an
as the court said in Fell's Case,
important duty. And
fair, just and impartial
to obtain
the object of the trial
verdict, there could be little prospect of
under such cir* * *
cumstances.
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The statute says — and it is in perfect accord with the
principles of the common law — that if a juror, after he is
sworn, be unable from any cause to perform his duty, the
juror
court may, in its discretion, cause another qualified
'^ ^ ^
# #
to be sworn in his place. Code, ch. 159, sec. 1.
Both on principle and authority, the court, in this case,
did not err in discharging the juror Six, for the reason
shown by the record, because a manifest necessity existed
therefor. Neither did the court err in ordering the trial to
proceed with the jury as constituted after the substitution
of the juror Hammer for Six, as he had had his legal challenge to the original jurors and to the substituted juror.
Every right guaranteed to him by the constitution was
granted him.

* *

*

* * *

The prisoner was not prejudiced by the fact that
the juror Hammer had not heard everything that the other
jurors heard. When the substituted juror was sworn, the
trial commenced de novo. Then the prosecuting attorney
introduced the evidence just as if the jury was entirely different from what it was before, and the defence, of course,
had the right to bring forward all the evidence it could. We
can not perceive how the prisoner was prejudiced by this.
Certainly, nothing appears in the record to his prejudice in
this respect. The court did not, therefore, err in refusing
to exclude the evidence of the State.
There is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court
and it is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Oath Administered.

WELLS

V. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
49 West

Virginia,

1901.

78.

Brannon, President. — This is an action of ejectment
It resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs.

*

*.

The defendant complains of the overruling a motion in
The ground for this motion is that
arrest of judgment.
the oath of the jury was not such as the law requires. The
record says that a jury came "who were the duly tried and
sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined in this case ;"
whereas it should have been sworn, ''You shall well and
truly try the issue joined between Charles E. Wells and
others, plaintiffs, against H. L. Smith, defendant, and a
true verdict give according to the evidence." The oath to try
the issue joined is good in civil cases. It is the oath given
as proper in that excellent work of late date, Encylopaedia
of Pleading and Practice, Vol. 12, p. 516. What does the
oath in this case lack? Only the injunction to try the issue
and render a verdict according to the evidence. Of course,
the omission to enjoin the jury to render a verdict is immaterial, and as to the omission of the oath to enjoin the
jury to render a verdict according to the evidence, that is
immaterial, since the law requires a jury to pass on tlie
evidence, to respond to facts shown by the evidence. By

it,

what else could the jury try the case? It is necessarily to
be understood, in a legal point of view, that the trial must
be by evidence. Even in a felony case the entry would be
sufficient. In Lawrence's Case, 30 Grat. 845, the order book
showed that the jury ''were sworn the truth of and upon
the premises to speak," and it was held good. The court
said that while the oath in felony cases, "You shall well and
truly try and true deliverance make between the commonwealth and the prisoner at the bar, whom you shall have
in charge, and a true verdict give according to the evidence.
So help you God," — is the correct oath, still no law precommon or statute, and one of the same import
scribed
T. p.— 16
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would be sufficient, and that it was not necessary that the
be literally inserted in the record, but it would be sufficient that it should therein simply
appear that the jury was duly sworn according to law. The
court said that the statement of the record as to the oath
was obviously not the form of oath actually administered,
but was merely intended to state the fact that the jury was
*
sworn. So we can say in this case. * * I must not be understood as saying that if the record shows the oath actually
administered in full, and it is not substantially good, it is
not error, but I mean to hold that unless it so appears a mere
statement of the record, in any words, attesting the swearing of the jury, both in civil and criminal cases, is sufficient.
But this case being a civil case I think the oath shown by
the record, even if regarded as t'he full literal oath, is good,
though we are not compelled to so regard
but may presume that the injunction to well and truly try the case
according to the evidence was really in the oath administered.
just now discover that State v. Ice, 34 W. Va. 244,
so holds.
Ample authority so settles the point. See 12
Ency. PI. and Prac. 522, where
stated that the better
entry
not to give the oath in full but simply state that
the jury was duly sworn according to law.
think so. Can
we say that the oath in this case
not substantially good?
**If the oath
substantially in the prescribed or recognized
will be sufficient, and
form,
literal adherence to form
will not be required." 12 Ency. PI. and Prac. 518. Mere
technicality should not be allowed such sway as
proposed
is

is

a

it

is

is

I

is,

it

I

it,

full form of the oath should

I

1

a

a

a

if

is

in this case.
There
another reason why this point should not reverse
the trial.
The defendant had right to object to the oath
when administered and to demand
not satproper one,
isfied with the one used, and he could not sit silent, take his
chances of
verdict in his favor, and then take advantage
of such
defect. He could have shown the oath actually
administered by bill of exceptions, and must do so, as held
in Lawrence's Case, 30 Grat. 650, and in Dysen v. State, 26
Miss. 32, and many other cases cited in
Thompson on
Trials, s. 108.
will add that an oath such as that in this
case, to try tlio issue joined, was held good on principle and
authority in civil cases.
Pierce v. Tate, 27 Miss. 283;
Windham v. Williams, Id. 313. We affirm the judgment.

Afirmed,

CHAPTER VI.
THE RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE.
JOHNSON V. JOSEPHS.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
75

1884.

Maine, 544.

Trespass in which the plaintiff claimed damages in the
sum of two thousand dollars for an alleged assault and battery by the defendant upon the person of the plaintiff.
The pleadings and the question presented to the law court
are stated in the opinion.
Petees, C.

J.

**********
Plaintiff

sued

for an assault and battery.

demesne," and plaintiff
replied
Under these pleadings the defendant,
against the plaintiff's protest, was allowed by the court "to
open and close." This was contrary to what we regard as
the well settled practice in this state. The rule of practice
and of law in this state, is that, when a plaintiff has to prove
anything to make out a full and perfect case, he is entitled
to open and close.
whether he need put in any
The test
proof of any part of his claim. In this case, the burden fell
upon him to prove the extent of the damages sustained. It
case of nomcase of unliquidated damages, and not
inal damages, or of damages to be assessed by computation
merely.
The
The plaintiff certainly had something to prove.
counsel for the defendant contends that the defendant's
plea confessed everything alleged against him. "We think
not. It did not admit more than a general demurrer or
default would admit, and that would be nominal damages
only. Hanley v. Sutherland, 74 Maine, 212, and cases cited.
but
qualified adThe plea of "son assault demesne"
The
point
may be tested in
mission of the injury alleged.
this way: Suppose that, after the pleadings were comDefendant

pleaded ''son assault
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pleted the defendant had rested without any proof whatever. Judgment wonld go for the plaintiff, no doubt. But
for how much? Would the court order judgment for the
sum of one thousand dollars, the amount of damages which
the plaintiff alleges, or would the plaintiff be required to
prove the damages? Can it be, that a plea of son assault
demesne admits any amount of damages which a plaintiff
inserts in the ad damnum of his writ? If so, a plaintiff may
prevent the plea in many cases by alleging exaggerated
damages.
In fact, the defendant cautiously worded his plea to avoid
admitting the whole injury charged. He says he did ''unavoidably a little beat, bruise and ill-treat the said plaintiff." One of the issues of the case, therefore, was whether
the beating was little or much. The declaration for an assault and battery is usually formal and general. Under the
common form, in our practice, the plaintiff may prove
malice as the foundation for punitive damages. The damages are necessarily a matter of uncertainty. The judicial
discretion of a jury can be invoked by a plaintiff to settle
them, and whatever the pleadings, if in the common form,
there must be proof of the nature and extent of the injury
sustained.
We think there might be great abuse of the
practice, if the ruling in this case be sustained. Defendants
would adopt the plea of self defence, in order to have th'3
last word, in cases where no real question exists but to have
It is not the natural
the amount of damages ascertained.
order of things to hear the accused before the accuser is
lieard.
In the trial of this cause there was testimony upon both
sides. No one would doubt that the plaintiff proceeded with
testimony after the defendant's side was closed. The defendant had the privilege of closing the argument upon the
<luestion of the extent of the plaintiff's injury and amount
of damages thereby sustained. To take the lead, a defendant "must admit all the facts necessary to be proved by
the plaintiff," and not merely a prima facie case, Spauldiuff V, Hood, 8 Cush, 602. "When anything is left for the
])laintiff to show, he has the right to begin and close,"
Thurston v, Kennett, 2 Foster, N, H, 151; Belknap v, Wendell, 1 Foster, N, li, 175. The latest authorities sustain the
])hiintiff's view upon this question. See 1 Green, Ev. sec.
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English and American cases cited in notes
of the latest editions.
Lunt v. Wormell, 19 Maine, 100;
Saivyer v. Hopkins, 22 Maine, 276; Washington Ice Co, v.
Webster, 68 Maine, 449 ; Page v. Osgood, 2 Gray, 260 ; Dorr
V. Tremont National Bank, 128 Mass. 359; Carter v. Jones,
6 C. & P. 64; Mercer v. WJiall, 5 Ad. & El. N. S. 447.
The favor extended to the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a valuable legal right — one highly prized by advocates. It did not rest in the discretion of the trial judge to
grant it. The rule should be fixed and certain, and not be
subject to the varying judgments of different judges. The
and that
bar should know what the rule
may be deit

is,

sec. 75, 76, and

pended upon.

Exceptions sustained^

J. J.,

Walton, Virgin, Libbey and Symonds,

concurred.

&

a

"The general rule is that
lEule the same as to Evidence and Argument.
the order of argument follows the burden of proof; and whoever opens the
right to so open, has the same right in the
case with the evidence, if he has
argument:"
Abel v. Jarrett, (1897) 100 Ga. 732, 28 S. E. 453.
To the
same effect:— D. M. Osborne
Co. v. Kline, (1885) 18 Nebr. 344, 25 N.
W. 360; O'Connor v. Henderson Bridge Co., (1894) 95 Kv. 633, 27 S. W.
251; Lowe v. Lowe, (1875) 40 la. 220; Palmer v. Adams, (1*893) 137 Ind. 72,
36

N. E.

695.

BUZZELL V. SNELL.
New Hampshire.

Judicature

25

New Hampshire, 474.

of

of

Superior Court

1852.

a

it

a

a

Assumpsit. The declaration contained three counts, for
the j)rice of sleigh. One upon an account annexed for $26,
sale of the sleigh
the others special. One of these alleged
contract to pay for
for $26, and
275 bushels of char-

a

a

coal, of
certain quality, to be delivered at a specified place
and time, or to pay $26 in money.
The defendant pleaded the general issue to the whole
declaration, except the sum of seven dollars and ten cents,
and as to that sum pleaded
tender, and issues were joined.
The coiirt ruled that upon these pleadings the defendant
was not entitled to the opening and close in the trial of the
c£ise, and the defendant excepted.
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The plaintiff offered evidence tending to sustain his special count, and the proof on both sides was that the sleigh
was called $26 in the trade, and that the payment was to
be 275 bushels of coal, or $26 in money. The defendant did
not contend that he had performed the original contract,
whatever it was, but endeavored to show that 200 bushels
of coal had been delivered and accepted in part payment,
the

plaintiff at

the same time agreeing to receive money

for

the residue; but upon this point the testimony was conflicting. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was
not bound to accept the coal, unless it was according to the
contract in respect to time, quantity and quality, but he
might waive his rights in any of these particulars ; and that
after the plaintiff had proved a contract for 275 bushels of
coal, or the money, if the defendant would maintain that 200
bushels had been received in jDayment pro tanto, the burden
of proof was upon him to show the fact. To this instruction, in relation to the burden of proof, the defendant excepted.

Bell, J.

The principal question presented by this case
the
is upon
right, claimed by the defendant, to open the case
to the jury, and, consequently, to make the closing arguThe question whether the plaintiff or the defendant
ment.
has the right, almost necessarily arises at the commencement of the hearing, and before the court can have any
opportunity to know anything of the nature or character of
the questions which are to arise upon the trial, except as
The right is, therethey are disclosed by the pleadings.
held
to de])end upon the state of the pleadings.
fore, usually
''The party who asserts the affirmative of the issue is entitled to begin and to reply." 1 Green. Ev., sec. 74.
the record contains several issues, and the plaintiff holds
the affirmative in any one of them, he is entitled to

"If

begin." lb.
This question was considered, and the cases collected and
examined, in the case of Belknap v. Wendell, 1 Foster's
rjep. 175. Gilchrist, C. J., there lays down the rule thus;
"The plaintiff begins and has the right of reply, in all cases
where the defendant's pleadings, or any part of them, deny
llie wliole or any part of the plaintiff's pleadings, so as to
leave any arfinnnlive allegation on his side to be estab-
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''And this (he says) is uniformly the

case, unless the defendant, by the

form of pleading, admits

the plaintiff's right of action, but for the cause which he
sets up in his plea, no proof in such case being required on
the part of the plaintiff." This rule is in accordance with
the practice in this State. We are not aware that there has
ever been any difference of ruling in the common pleas, or
of decisions in this court, or that any exception has ever
been admitted in this respect.
This case comes clearly within the rule in Belknap v.
Wendell, since the affirmative of one of the issues is upon
the plaintiff. Two pleas are filed. Tlie first is the general
issue as to all the plaintiff's claim, except the sum of seven
dollars and ten cents. Upon this issue, it is the duty of the
plaintiff to go forward, and introduce proof of the facts
alleged in his declaration; and if he does not, the case of
course must end in a non-suit. Before this is done, he cannot call upon the defendant to take any step in the cause.
The second plea alleges a tender as to seven dollars and
ten cents. Upon this the burden of proof is upon the defendant. But it is suggested that as a plea of tender is an
admission of the plaintiff's cause of action, as set forth in
his declaration, this has the effect, substantially, to change
the issue upon the first plea. We do not so regard it. The
right, by the rule in Belknap v. Wendell, depends upon the
form of the pleading, and is determined by the fact that the
affirmative of one of the issues is upon the plaintiff, and this
is in no way affected by the circumstance that the plaintiff
has greater or less facilities for making the required proof.
Any material fact may be proved by the admissions of the
adverse party; and it does not change the burden of proof
upon the pleadings, that the defendant has admitted the
claim, which he formally denies by his plea. Nor is it in any
way material in what form the admission is made, so long
as he chooses to deny it upon the record, and join issue
upon it.
The admission is evidence of a matter of fact, to be decided by the jury, and the plaintiff, to sustain his case, must
lay that evidence before them. In this respect, the admission of the contract declared upon, implied from the payment of money into court, stands upon the same ground as
the admission of the signature of a written instrument de-
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clared upon, resulting from a neglect to gi\e notice upon the
docket of the denial of such signature, according to the general rule of the court. In actions upon promissory notes,
the proof of the signature of the instrument is all that the
plaintiff is required to make, upon the general issue: and
this is admitted under the rule by the want of notice of a
denial, upon the docket. It has never occurred to any one
to imagine that this admission changed the burden of proof
upon the general issue, or gave to the defendant a right to
begin and to reply.
This question, substantially, arose in the case of Gump
V. Smith, 11 N. H. Rep, 48. The general issue was pleaded,
with a brief statement. A fact, necessary to be proved by
the plaintiff, was admitted by the statement. But the court
held that the general issue imposes upon the plaintiff the
burden of making out his whole case, before the matter of
the brief statement comes in issue at all; and the same, the
court say, is the result where special pleas are pleaded with
the general issue. This decision is but a recognition of the
common principle, that where several pleadings are filed,
they are to be tried precisely as if each was pleaded alone;
and the admissions, expressed or implied, in one plea, cannot be used as evidence "against the party upon otlier issues.
alley V. Jenness, 2 N. H. Rep. 89; Chapman v. Sloan, 2 N.
H. Rep. 467.
The plea of tender is of course not evidence upon the
general issue for any purpose, but the independent fact of
the payment of money into court with the plea of tender, is
an admission of the contract declared on; but this fact is to
Upon
be proved by the plaintiff, like any other admission.
the pleadings in such case, nothing appears which changes
tlie ordinary effect of the general issue.
The question presents itself under an entirely different
aspect from that it would have had, if the defendant, instead of pleading the general issue, had pleaded what seems
to have been his true defence, either payment or a delivery
and accptance pro tanto of coal, of a different quality, and
l)erha])H at a different place. In that case, the burden of
proof upon both pleas would have been upon the defendant,
and the right to begin and close, would have belonged to
liirii. This would have been apparent at once upon the record, but upon the general issue, it cannot appear that the
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to be rendered upon the verdict,
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defence is payment or its equivalent.
Nor does it seem to
us that it can ever be desirable to substitute for the simple
inquiry by which the courts now determine the right to
begin, — the form of the issues, — any inquiries as to what
are the real points in controversy.
The second point raised by the exception, as to the duty
of the defendant to prove the defence of payment, if he
admitted by the defendant to have beea
relies upon
insisted upon to show
correctly decided in itself; but
the incorrectness of tlie ruling as to the right to open and
close. It surely could not be expected that the court would
hold that the plaintiff was bound to prove the defendant's
was to be taken for granted without proof,
plea, nor that
or the plaintiff required to disprove it. In our judgment,
there was no inconsistency in holding that upon the pleadings, as they were drawn, the burden of proof was upon the
plaintiff, and that he was, therefore, entitled to begin and
close; and in holding afterwards, when the defendant had
the defendant relied
taken upon himself his defence, that
disdenial of the plaintiff's claim, but upon
not upon
charge of that claim by new and independent facts, that the
burden was upon him to prove his defence. This point was
before the court in BelJcnap v. Wendell, where the court say,
''The burden of proof may shift during the trial. In suit
written contract, the plaintiff produces his evidence,
upon
proves the signature of the defendant, and stops; the defendant then alleges payment, or other matter of defence;
upon him, and yet the plaintiff opens
the burden of proof
and closes the argument."
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LAKE ONTARIO NATIONAL BANK V. JUDSON.
Court of Appeals of Neiv York.
122

1890.

New York, 278.

This action was brought to recover the amount of four
promissory notes, which, by the complaint, the plaintiff alleged were made by the defendant payable to the order of
E. M. Fort, delivered to the payee, and by him endorsed,
and transferred to the plaintiff. The complaint also alleged
that the defendant was indebted to respondent in a sum
stated, for money advanced on his checks drawn upon the
plaintiff for an amount in excess of his deposits there.
The defendant, by his answer, alleged that he and Fort
purchased of the plaintiff some canal boats ; that they were
induced to make the purchase by the warranty of the plaintiff, particularly specified, and gave for them their joint
notes ; that afterward the plaintiff took up those notes, and
the makers gave their individual notes for their respective
interests in the purchase to the plaintiff, which notes were
received by the plaintiff "in place of and in payment of said
first-mentioned notes, and which notes last given are the
notes, and the renewal thereof set forth in the complaint."
The answer then alleged a breach of this warranty and
damages as the consequence; it also alleged, by way of
counter-claim, that the plaintiff was indebted to defendant
in a further sum for services performed by him for and at
the request of the plaintiff, for which, with the amount of
damages for the alleged breach of warranty, he demanded
judgment. And for further answer he denied the complaint,
and each and every allegation therein contained except as
thereinbefore admitted.
The plaintiff, by reply, put in
issue the new matter of the answer constituting the alleged
counter-claims.
The trial court directed judgment for the
amount of the notes and of the overdraft mentioned in the
complaint.

**********

Further facts appear in the opinion.
Bradley,

J.

The contest on the trial mainly had relation

to the defendant's alleged counter-claim for services, upon
which claim he gave evidence to the effect that they were
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performed by him pursuant to an agreement with the plaintiff, by which the latter undertook to pay him $2,500, of
which $160 had been paid. This claim, and the evidence on
the part of the defendant tending to support
were disputed by the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, and the
trial court found the facts against the defendant. For the
purpose of this review, the findings and determination of
the court below must be deemed conclusive. Upon the trial
the question as to which party was entitled to the closing
argument was raised; the court held that the plaintiff had
tlie right to
and the defendant excepted. The rule that
the party having the affirmative of the issue in an action
shall have the opportunity to make the opening and closing
presentation of his case
deemed founded upon a substantial right, the denial of which
error. {Conselyea v. Sivift,
103 N. Y. 604.)
In its application to trials by jury
has
ordinarily more practical importance than in those before
the court without
jury and before referees. If appears
that
party could not have been prejudiced by the failure
of the court to observe this rule, the error would not be
available, and in trials by the court without jury or before
referees that question would be dependent upon the circumstances of each case. In the present case the view of the
court evidently was that the affirmative of the entire issue
was not with the defendant, and that
the question presented for consideration.
The denial by the defendant in
his answer, except as therein admitted, of each and every
allegation of the complaint, put in issue any material allegation of the complaint not distinctly admitted by the answer.
(Allis v. Leonard, 46 N. Y. 688; 22 Alb. L. J. 28; Calhoun
The charge in the complaint, in
V. Hallen, 25 Hun. 155.)
due form, of the indebtedness of the defendant to the plaintiff" for the amount advanced to him upon his check in excess
of the balance of his account with the plaintiff, was not admitted by the answer, but was controverted by such denial.
It appears that after the trial had been moved and the plaintiff, by its counsel had, by statement of
made the opening
of the case to the court, the defendant orally admitted the
*
*
count of the complaint alleging the overdraft.
The
question arises whether the oral admission at the trial of
the plaintiff's claim for the amount of the defendant's overdraft, entitled him to the right of closing the argument on
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of the case to the court for determination. And that depends upon the question whether the affirmative of the issue, with a view to such a right, must be
ascertained from the pleadings, or may arise from admissions orally made at the trial. The issues to be tried can be
ascertained only by reference to the pleadings, and they
must govern so far as relates to the right of the parties to
the final submission

is

is,

open the case at the beginning and conclude the argument
at the close of the trial. When the parties go to trial they
respectively assume the burden of establishing that which
they have affirmatively alleged as a cause of action or counter-claim, if it is controverted by allegation sufficient to put
it in issue. The admission of a fact upon the trial is evidence merely. It may obviate the necessity of further trial
of the issue to which it relates, but does not change it as
That can be done by amendrepresented by the pleadings.
ment only. It is true that the admission made at the trial
may reduce the controversy to matter as to which the
affirmative is with the defendant. Such would be the effect
of evidence of any character, undisputed and indisputable
of the facts constituting the alleged cause of action. The
right under consideration does not depend simply upon the
admission of those facts, unless they are admitted or uncontroverted by the answer; otherwise it is evidence only.
There is no occasion to extend the rule so as to give effect
for such purpose, to concessions at the trial. This might
lead to the adoption of such a course when further dispute
of the facts upon which a plaintiff relies may appear hopeloss to a defendant, for the purpose of obtaining the right
of closing the trial. There is no apparent reason for applying such rule to any one more than to any other stage of the
trial. Tlie defendant who may wish to take the right of
opening and concluding the trial, must frame his pleading
with that view, and so as to present no issue upon any allegation of the complaint essential to the plaintiff's alleged
cause of action. If the defendant fail to do that, no matter
how little proof the remaining issue may require, or how
easily, or in what manner it may be established by evidence,
the right of the plaintiff to open and close the case is not
denied to him. (Mercer v. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 447.)
The test
whether without any proof, the plaintiff, upon
the pleadings,
entitled to recover upon all the pauses
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If he is, and the defendant alleges any counter-claim, controverted by the plaintiff's pleading or any affirmative matter of defense in avoidance of the plaintiff's alleged cause of action, and which is
the subject of trial, the defendant has the right to open and
* * *
If the defendant, by permission
close, otherwise not.
of the court, had stricken out the denial in his answer, or
amended it by inserting the admission orally made, a different question would have been presented at the trial upon the
claim of the defendant to the right to conclude it.
No other question requires the expression of consideration.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur except Follett, Ch. J., not sitting.
of action alleged in his comiDlaint.

Judgment Affirmed.

iThere is some authority for the rule that admissions made at the trial will
determine the right to open and close.
See Abel v. Jarrett,
(1897) 100 Ga.
732, 28 S.

E.

453.

GARDNER V. MEEKER.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
169

Illinois,

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered

1897,

40.

opinion of the court :
This was a suit in assumpsit upon a promissory note for
the

J.

$1,000, given by John
Girtin and William C. Girtin to
Nash, Wright & Co., dated September 6, 1889, due in ninety
days, and duly assigned to one Henry A. Gardner. The

defendant John J. Girtin was not served. The defense made
by William C. Girtin was, that the consideration of the note
was a balance due upon certain transactions on the Board
of Trade of Chicago, which were in violation of the statute
against option dealing in grain, and the note was therefore
void. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant. * * *

After

the

trial had begun the defendant withdrew his plea

of the general issue, and the court, over the objection of the
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plaintiff, permitted him to have the opening and closing of
the argument.
This, also, is assigned for error. The rule
on the subject of the opening and closing of the argument is
this: ''That where the plaintiff has anything to prove in
order to get a verdict, whether in an action ex contractu or
ex delicto, and whether to establish his right of action or to
fix the amount of his damages, the right to begin and reply
belongs to him."
(1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 228; McReynolds v. Burlington and Ohio River Raihvay Co., 106 111.
The withdrawal of the plea of the general issue
152.)
amounted to an admission of the right of the plaintiff to recover the amount of the note sued on, unless the defense
alleged in the special pleas was proven by a preponderance
of the evidence. There is no doubt that the defendant had
a right, before the commencement of the trial, to withdraw
the general issue and rely upon the special pleas, and if he
did so, he would have the right to open and close. {Harvey
V. Ellithorpe, 26 111. 418 ; Carpenter v. First Nat. Bank, 119
id. 352.) The trial court had the right, in the exercise of a
sound, reasonable discretion, to permit the issues to be
changed, and to allow the defendant, in consequence thereof,
to assume the affirmative and to open and close the argument, as well after the case was on trial as before, and we
think that discretion was not abused in this case. Nor was
it error to permit the defense to file additional special pleas
in the midst of the trial, no affidavit of surprise or application for continuance having been made.

**********

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.^
1 statutory

The practice is sometimes governed by
Modification of Bule.
Thus, in Schoonover v. Osborne, (1902) 117 Iowa, 427, 90 N. W.
844, it was held that under fode ^ 3701, the right to open and close the argument is to be determined by the evidence, and not by the pleadings.
Discretionary or of right, in some jurisdictions the opening and closing
is hold to be a matter resting in the discretion of the court.
Woodward v.
Insurance Co., (1899) 104 Tenu. 49, 56 S. W. 1T)20; Smith v. Frazier, (1866)
r,:? T'a. St. 220; Young v. Newark
Fire Tns. Co., (1890) .59 Conn. 41, 22 Atl.
32.
Rut in the great majority of jurisdictions it is deemed a matter of right.
In Michifinn, where the defendant is obliged in all cases to file a general
issue, he may obtain the opening and closing under Circuit Court Rule 24 (c)
by expressly waiving the benefit of the general issue and admitting the facts
alleged in the plaintifT's declaration, this being done by a special notice accompanying the general issue.
statute.

CHAPTER VII.
OPENING STATEMENT OF COUNSEL.

SCEIPPS V. EEILLY.
Supreme

Court of Michigan.
35

1877.

Michigan, 371.

Graves, J.
Defendant in error recovered judgment in the superior
court of Detroit in an action for libel, and plaintiff in error
complains of various proceedings at the trial.
Defendant in error was a lawyer in practice in Detroit.
He was a single man. In the spring of 1875 he was elected
circuit judge of Wayne county, and in the fall thereafter
was appointed to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation

of Judge Patchin.
In 1873 plaintiff in error began publishing the newspaper
called the "Evening News," and has continued the publication since that time. In 1875 the paper had a large daily
circulation and the news items of each issue averaged some
two hundred. The parties were not personally acquainted,
but the paper opposed the election of defendant in error
and supported another gentleman, and during the canvass
some intemperate articles were published.
Some time in
the fall after the election one Bobbins filed a bill in the
superior court to obtain a divorce from his wife, and among
other charges in the bill against her, alleged that she had
been guilty of adultery with defendant in error.
Almost immediately after this bill was placed on file, a
reporter and gatherer of local news for the paper got access to the bill, and with the help of the city editor prepared
an article covering this charge in Eobbins' bill, and caused
it to be published in the paper. This occurred on the 7th
of December. This article is the libel complained of. The

*****

action was commenced the next day.
The first in the order of proceeding
naturally to call for attention first.
255

at the

trial

seems
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relates to the course the counsel for defendant in error
was permitted to pursue, against repeated objections, in
opening the case to the court and jury.
He declared it to be his purpose, as part of his opening, to read at length before the jury a series of articles
published in the newspaper during the course of several
months and commencing in the spring of 1875 and running
until some time after the appearance of the publication in
suit.

And the first group suggested consisted of articles from
the 19th of March to the 6th of December, and none of which
referred to defendant in error. The reading of them was
objected to on the ground that neither of them would be
relevant or competent if regularly offered as evidence under
the issue. Counsel for defendant in error then stated that
he proposed to read such articles as in good faith he should
offer in evidence, and he would read them because he could
not remember their contents. The court thereupon ruled
that he might read in his opening such articles as he claimed
to be libelous, and which had been afterwards retracted.
About twenty articles, not relating to defendant in error,
and running through the period before indicated, were then
read to the jury as part of the opening. An exception was
taken to each. They were calculated from their character
to influence the minds of the jurors against plaintiff in error. The counsel for defendant in error then offered to
road at length, as part of his opening, a series of articles
published the spring before the publication charged as
libelous, concerning the defendant in error when running
for the office of circuit judge.
This was objected to on the ground that the articles did
not tend to show actual malice, and would not be competent
if offered as evidence. Counsel for defendant in error then
ex))]ainod that he did not propose to then read them as
evidence to show malice, but to read such as he expected to
offer and prove afterwards, and such as when put in evidence would tend to show malice towards defendant in error. The court overruled the objection and allowed counsel to read as he proposed.
He then read, as part of his
oy)oning to the jury, five articles he claimed tended to show
aclufil malice by plaintiff in error against defendant in er-
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ror. They bore date March 12th, March 22nd, March 29th,
March 31st, and April 3rd, 1875.
The counsel for defendant in error then proposed to read
at length, as part of his opening and not as evidence, another series of articles published after the libel.
This was objected to on the ground that the articles would
not be competent or admissible if offered as evidence. They
all referred to the alleged libelous article and the legal proceedings growing out of it.
The objection was overruled. ***** The opening statement having been allowed to embrace the reading in full
of all these publications, and having been brought to a
close, the counsel for defendant in error proceeded to offer
None had yet been received, and although the
been able to prevent the reading
of the publications to the jury he was still not able to meet
them as evidence, for any purpose or in any way.
They were lodged in the jurors' minds as matters in the
cause they were entitled to receive, but not through the
channel the law has made for the conveyance of evidence,
or at the stage of proceeding proper for submitting eviThey were matters which could not fail, when so
dence.
presented, to prepossess the jury unfavorably against the
plaintiff in error. Confining attention now to this branch
of the case, it appears from the record, that of the series
of publications not relating to defendant in error, and permitted to be read at length in the opening statement, on
the pledge that they would be afterwards offered in good
faith as evidence, five were not even offered as evidence at all at any stage of the trial, and as to one other the
record is contradictory; some ten or a dozen or more, the
record being ambiguous as to a few, were not offered except
upon the rebutting case, and were then rejected by the
court ; and the residue of this list, being five or six, were reserved until the plaintiff in error had rested his defense,
and were then offered and admitted as rebutting evidence.
Of the series published in the spring of 1875, concerning the candidacy of defendant in error as circuit judge,
and which were read at length in the opening, on the avowal
of counsel's belief that they intended to show actual notice
by plaintiff in error against defendant in error, and would
be offered in evidence for that purpose, not one was offered
evidence.

plaintiff in error had not

T. p.— 17
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during the making out the case in chief. They were held
back until the plaintiff in error had rested, and were then
tendered as rebutting evidence. All were excluded. There
were five in this group.
Of the set published after the appearance of the alleged
libel, five were given in evidence b}^ the defendant in error
to show actual malice, and they were so given, but against
objection, as part of his case in chief.
When the judge came to charge the jury, he referred to
the course which he had permitted in respect to the open-

*****

ing statement, and observed, "Mr. Griffin in his opening
read several articles which at the trial were finally excluded.
These should also be withdrawn from your consideration
and laid out for view in your deliberations upon the case."
No further reference was made to the subject of the opening statement, and no caution whatever was given concerning the articles which had been read at length by permission
of the court against objection, but which had not even been
offered in evidence at all.
The question is, whether the practice which was here allowed in the opening address was correct, and if not,
whether the advice quoted from the charge cured the error,
and in case it did not, then whether it is competent for this
court to revise the proceedings.
The trial judge must always have a very large discretion in controlling and managing the routine proceedings
at the trial, and it is not necessary to specify the matter to
which such discretion extends. It applies beyond doubt to
the addresses of counsel as well as to other incidents.
But
it must be a reasonable, a legal discretion, and whether it be
so or not must depend upon tiie nature of the proceeding on
which it is exercised, the way it is exercised and the special
circumstances under which it is exercised. It can never be
intended that a trial judge has purposely gone astray in
dealing with matters within the category of discretionary
proceedings, and unless it turns out that he has not merely
misstepped, l)ut has departed widely and injuriously, an
appellate court will not re-examine. It will not do it when
there is no better reason than its own opinion that the
course actually taken was not as wise or sensible or orderly
as another would have been.
For example, if all the articles allowed to be read m the opening statement had been
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afterwards given in evidence, their reading in the opening,
however contrary to settled practice, might not have offered anything proper for consideration here. Questions
concerning their admissibility wonld fall under another
head.
But where it is manifest the trial judge has fallen
into a serious mistake, — one likely to have hurt a party, —
an error mentioned in the books as an abuse of discretion, —
this court is bound to take cognizance, or disregard its constitutional duty of supervision.
It is a chief duty of the trial judge to secure fair play
to litigants, and so far as practicable to shape the order and
course of proceedings in such a way that neither party will
be put to a disadvantage not due to his case or its mode of
management by his counsel. The rules of the court, and
what is called the course of the court, have their origin in
the purpose to secure fairness in legal controversies, and
the order of business and the regulated succession of steps
at trials have the same object.
The rule (62) ordained by this court for the circuit courts
in regard to an opening statement, is especially meant to
guard against surprise and deception and to promote fairAnd when it declares that ' ' it shall be the duty of the
ness.
plaintiff's counsel, before offering evidence to support the
issue on his part, to make a full and fair statement of his
case and of the facts which he expects to prove," it indicates
very distinctly the extent of both right and duty. It draws
a line between "evidence" and "facts," and contemplates a
"fair" statement of the "facts" expected to be "proved"
before putting in the testimony or "evidence" by which
these "facts" are expected to be "proved."
Neither the
nature of the proceeding, nor that fairness it is intended to
promote, nor the plain meaning of the rule, gives any sanction to the claim that in this opening statement the plain-

tiff's counsel may read

at length to the

jury any documen-

tary matter he may assert his intention of subsequently offering as evidence. But the position taken in this cause involves the assertion of the right to fill up the opening statement with any depositions on file and the whole of oral
statements of expected witnesses, without regard to objections to admissibility as evidence. Surely it cannot require
much tliought to decide against the reasonableness and fairness of such a practice.
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The text books in this country which deal with the subject
are distinctly agreed concerning the end and scope of this
They all represent it as a proceeding
opening address.
prefatory to putting in evidence, and as one practically
necessary to make an advance exhibit of the legal nature of
the controversy and its salient peculiarities, and enable the
judge, jury and opposing counsel to apprehend the necessities of the plaintiff's case and correctly understand the drift
and bearing of each step and each offer of proof as it shall
And considering that its office is to
occur subsequently.
afford preliminary explanation, that it is to precede proofs
and precede controversy before the jury, and is not to embody or convey proof or prepossess the jury, they unite in
substantially denying the right to make use of it to get
before the jury a detail of the testimony expected to be offered, and especially any not positively entitled to be introduced, and deny the right to use it as a cover for any topics
A brief summary or outline of the
not fairly pertinent.
substance of the evidence intended to be offered, with requisite clear and concise explanations, are considered proper. But a relation of expected oral testimony at length, or
a reading of expected docuirtentary proofs at large, or any
otbor course fitted to mislead the triers, should not be tol-

erated. Of course there mav be cases and instances where
a statement of the evidence itself, or a reading of a paper,
Such, however, must be
may be convenient and harmless.
exceptional, and not within the spirit of the general require* * * *
ment.
The courts have usually been very firm in confining counsel within proper bounds and in guarding jurors against
unfair and irregular acts and endeavors, and parties have
been deprived of their verdicts upon evidence merely indicating the operation of influences about the outskirts of the
trial. Tt has been many times ruled that counsel in arguing
may not seek to influence the jurors by reference to matters
in the nature of evidence not in proof before them, and that
tlie trinl judge should promptly repress the attempt as
sometliing reprehensible. * * * *

In tlie case of The State v. Hascall, 6 N. H. 352, the defcTidant was convicted of prejury, whereupon it was shown
tliat i)apcrs calculated to make an unfavorable impression
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jury were exhibited by the prosecutor at several
public places where jurors boarded, and were read in the
hearing of jurors during term and before the trial, and
the court decided that for this cause the verdict should be
on the

set aside.

In Spenceley v. De Willot, 7 East R. 108, which was an
action for usury, a new trial was granted because the plaintiff had published a statement of the case which was distributed about the court and hall before and at the time of
trial; and in Coster v. Merest, 3 Brod. & Bing. 272, a new
trial was allowed on an affidavit stating that handbills reflecting on the plaintiff's character had been distributed in
court at the time of the trial and had been seen by the jury,
and the court refused to hear affidavits, made by all the
jurors, stating that no such placard had been shown to them.
There is no occasiem for dwelling on this part of the case
after what has been said. The practice pursued was wrong,
und the error was not cured or materially alleviated by the
charge. The jury were not even told to disregard such of
the articles as were read in the statement of the case and not
afterwards offered in evidence, and the special direction to
refuse attention to those which had been offered and rejected was calculated to imply in the jurors' minds that they
were entitled to regard all others. Tlie omission to tell the
jury to disregard the articles not offered was no doubt an
inadvertence of the court.
The effect, however, was the
same as if it had been designed.
But if the charge had been
to disregard all unadmitted articles it would not have cured
the error. Because it is quite impossible to conclude that
the jurors had not been influenced too far by the erroneous
rulings and proceedings, to be brought into the same impartial attitude by the court's admonition, which they would
have held if tlie counsel for defendant in error had been
properly confined in his opening statement. The course of
fair and settled piactice was violated to the prejudice of
plaintiff in error, and it is not a satisfactory answer to say
that the court went as far as practicable afterwards to cure
the mischief, so long as an inference remains that the remedy applied by the court was not adequate. And there is no
doubt of the right of this court to revise in such a case as
this. If the trial court may pursue any course it pleases
in relation to the opening statement, if it raav act inde-
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pendently of all control, then the idea of a rule to be prescribed by this court under the constitution and legislative
enactment for its guidance and government, is preposterous
But the point is too plain for argument. As
and absurd.
already suggested, this court will not revise such matters
unless there is plain evidence of action amounting to what
is called an abuse of discretion and calculated to injuriously affect the legal rights of a party, and where such is the
case, whether the result of accident, or inadvertence, or misThe error in this case
conception, it will take cognizance.
was not cured, and is one subject to review, and is sufficient to require a reversal.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new

trial ordered.

FOSDICK V. VAN ARSDALE.
Supreme Court of Michigan.
74

1889.

Michigan, 302.

Morse, j. * * * *
The record shows that, after the primary case of the
plaintiff was closed, —
"V. H. Lockwood proceeded to state the defendants' case
to the jury, and during the opening proceeded to state the
law governing the defendants' case, and upon which the de-

fense was based ; whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff interposed an objection, and the said court sustained the objection, stating that the law would come from the court in

time."
This is made the first assignment of error in defendants'
brief.
We are not able, from this meager statement in the record, to know whether error was committed or not by this
action of the circuit judge.
But counsel have the right in
stating their case to the jury at the opening to briefly set
forth what points of the law they rely upon, and the nature of the testimony they propose to introduce to support

due
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such points. It is true the law is to be given by the court ;
but, as it is not given in most cases until the testimony
is ended, and the counsel have summed the same up in support of their case before the jury, the counsel have the
right, both in opening the case to the jury, before the testimony to support their case is offered, and when closing the
argument, after the testimony is in, to state to the jury that
they claim the law to be thus and so, and that they shall
request the court to so instruct them, and that they will adduce such and such testimony to support their claim under
the law in the first instance, or at the close to state that the
evidence in the case, under the law as they shall claim it to
be, establishes their right to a verdict at the hands of the
jury. The counsel have no right to read law to the jury,
or to usurp the province of the court in any way in this respect, but they have the undoubted right to state so much of
the law, as they claim it to be, as may enable them to lay
before the jury an intelligent idea of the force, effect, and
bearing of the testimony upon their case, either before or
after said testimony is in the case.

SAN MIGUEL CONSOLIDATED GOLD MINING COMPANY V. BONNER.
Supreme Court of Colorado.
33

1905.

Colorado, 207.

Mk. Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the court.
The dispute is over a strip of mining ground claimed by
plaintiffs and appellants as a parcel of the Happy Home
placer, and by defendant (appellee) as a part of the Loopton lode mining location. The owner of the lode claim first
applied for a patent, and appellants, as owners of the placer, filed in the United States land office their protest or adverse claim against the same, and seasonably brought this
action in its support. Trial was to the court and jury, and a
verdict was returned for defendant on which judgment was
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rendered, and plaintiffs are here with this appeal, urging as
grounds for reversal alleged erroneous rulings below, to
the consideration of which we now proceed.
In his opening statement to the jury counsel for
1.
plaintiffs, after stating to the jury that they were to take
the law from the court in instructions that would be given
at the close of the trial and before argument, proceeded to
state the law applicable to the case, as he understood it,
for the alleged purpose of giving to the jury his theory of
the case, so that they might be the better enabled to appre
ciate and apply the facts as they were elicited during the
trial. To this course defendant objected, in which he was
In support of plaintiffs' exception
sustained by the court.
to the ruling they insist that a plaintiffs' counsel has the
absolute right to state to a jury in his opening address not
only the case as made by the pleadings, and the evidence
but that he may also
by which he proposes to sustain
necessary
state so much of the law as, in his judgment,
to enable him to convey to the jury an intelligent idea of
the force, effect and bearing of the testimony in the case.
To this are cited: — Fostick v. Van Arsdale, 74 Mich. 302;
2

&

Prenfis v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234; McDonald v. People, 126
Ills. 150;
Enc. PI.
Pr. 706.
To the contrary appellee cites: — Giffen v. Lewiston

is

5

2

2

{Idaho), 55 Pac. 545, 549; Hill v. Colorado National Bank,
Colo. App. 324-9; Felt v. Cleghorn, Colo. App. 4:-%; Pick'
ett V. Handy,
Colo. App. 295.
The respective contentions are substantially sustained by
some of these authorities.
Whatever the practice may be
in other jurisdictions, our code, section 187, in prescribing
the order of trials by jury, provides that after the jury
:

sworn, unless for good cause shown the court otherwise
directs, the proceeding shall be
''First. — The party on whom rests the burden of the issues may briefly state his case, and the evidence by which
he expects to sustain it.
''Second. — The adverse party may then briefly state his
defense, and the evidence he expects to offer in support of

it."

7

G

These clauses confer upon respective counsel no authority in opening to state the law of the case to the jury.
Subdivisions
and
of the same section require the court to
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give instructions upon the law after the evidence is closed
and before argument is begun, which may, in all cases, be
read to the jury and commented on by the attorneys in
argument, and, if requested by either party or the jury,
Ample promay be taken by the latter in their retirement.
vision is thus made for counsel, at a certain stage in the
progress of the trial, to read to the jury, and comment upon, the law of the case which the jury must take from the
court.
The mere fact that the court does not allow counsel in his opening to exercise the statutory right here given,
and before he could know what the court would declare
the law to be, instead of in his argument at the close of the
case, where the code says it shall be enjoyed, is not something of which a party may complain. In other words,
since the code has declared what a party may state to the
jury in his opening, he may not, as of right, make any
statements other than those specially permitted.
Furthermore, the right of counsel here asserted, if it ex
ist at all, does not, as already said, spring from statute.
Practice and procedure, outside of statutory provisions,
are so largely within the sound discretion of trial courts,
and the conduct of trials and the latitude to be allowed
counsel are so largely within their control, that, except for
illegal or gross abuse of discretion, their action with respect thereto should be upheld. — McClure v. Sanford, 3
Colorado, 514, 518. From the brief reference found in the
abstract, we do not believe that any prejudice could have
resulted to plaintiffs by reason of the refusal of the court
to permit their attorney to state to the jury the law of the
case in the opening remarks.

Perceiving no material prejudicial error in the record,
the judgment is affirmed.^
iTo
53.

the same effect see Maynard v. State,

(1908)

81 Nebr.

301,, 116

N . W.
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PIETSCH V. PIETSCH.
Supreme

Court of Illinois.
245

Illinois,

1910.

454.

Mr. Justice Cartwright delivered the opinion of
eonrt

the

:

This is a suit in forcible detainer for the possession of
a lot in Chicago, begun by Charles F. Pietsch, the appellee,
by filing his complaint in the municipal court of Chicago
Afagainst Otto E. Pietsch and Helen Pietsch, appellants.
attorney
sworn
for
the
ter a jury had been empaneled and
plaintiff made an opening statement of the case to the jury,
to the effect that the defendants, who are husband and wife,
had made a mortgage or trust deed on the lot. which was
foreclosed; that a sale was made under the decree, from
which there was no redemption; that a deed was made, in
pursuance of the sale, to Charlotte L. Clark; that the prop$4,000 and a deed was made to him; that the defendants
were in possession of the premises and refused to surrender
possession after demand in writing; that the testimony
might show there was some talk concerning an agreement
that if the defendants would pav to the plaintiff the amount
of monev that was represented bv his purchase of the property, with interest and costs, within a reasonable time, they
miirht have the property and he would deed it to them ; that
if it should appear there was an agreement the plaintiff
was still willing to perform it. but that he was claiming tho
possession of the property in the suit. An attorney for the
defendants then stated to the jury, in substance, that the
defendant PTelen Pietsch, beincr the owner of the premises
occupied by the defendants as their home, made a mortgage
on the same, which was foreclosed ; that about the time when
the redemption Avould expire she went to the plaintiff, her
brother-in-law, and wanted him to loan her the amount of
the mortgage and permit her to remain there; that he let
her have the money as a loan but said he' would take the
deed in his own name as security; that he put up something
over Jf;4,000; that the matter ran along and she paid him
back $1,000 at one time, $150 at another and afterward $200
more; that it ran along for three or four years afterward,
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and she had another piece of property upon which there
was a mortgage of $8,800 and he said he would loan her
enough money to take that in. The attorney for the plaintiff objected to the statement relating to other property,
and the attorney for the defendants said that he wanted
to state to the jury that the plaintiff got his money back by
means of a mortgage upon the other piece of property and
this one, but the court sustained the objection and an exception was taken to the ruling. Continuing, the attorney
stated that the amount was $4,283.98 upon which pa\Tnents
had been made, and that it was agreed that Mrs. Pietsch
should remain in possession of the premises and was entitled to remain there. The court then said, ''I assume you
have stated all of your defense," and the attorney replied,
"Yes, sir," whereupon the court instructed the jury to return a verdict finding the defendants guilty of unlawfully
withholding possession of the premises and that the right
of possession was in the plaintiff. The jury returned a
verdict accordingly, and the court, after overruling a motion for a new trial, entered judgment on the verdict.
The
Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgment and granted a certificate of importance and an appeal
to this court.
When the jury had been sworn to try the issues and render a verdict according to the evidence it was the privilege
of the attorney for each party, if he saw fit to do so, to
make an opening statement of what he expected to prove.
Such a statement is not intended to take the place of a declaration, complaint or other pleading, either as a statement
of a legal cause of action or a legal defense, but is intended
to advise the jury concerning the questions of fact involved,
so as to prepare their minds for the evidence to be heard.
How full it shall be made, within reasonable limits, is left
to the discretion of the attorney, but the only purpose is to
give the jury an idea of the nature of the action and defense. To relate the testimony at length will not be tolerated.
A party is entitled
(1 Thompson on Trials, 267.)
to introduce evidence and prove a cause of action or to defend against evidence tending to sustain a cause of action
if no statement at all is made, and is not confined in the introduction of evidence to the statement made in the opening,
if one is made, The opening statement may be wrong as to
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that it shall give
all the facts of the case, which may turn out to be different
from the statement. The argument that a court may direct
a verdict, not upon the evidence or the want of evidence
but upon the statement of an attorney, rests mainly upon
the power of an attorney to make admissions binding upon
his client and to waive his rights. There is no dispute
about the authority of an attorney to admit facts on the
trial and waive the necessity of introducing evidence as to
such facts, but the authorities cited relate to such admissions in the trial of the case. That the opening statement
to the jury cannot be treated as an admission of facts binding upon the client was decided in Lush v. Throop, 189 111.
127, where the refusal of an instruction that any statement
made by the attorney for the plaintiffs in his opening statement, about what the evidence would show, was as binding
upon the plaintiffs as if the plaintiffs themselves had made
such statement, and as such should be considered by tht
jury in making their verdict, was endorsed by this court.
the jury could not treat statements of an attorney, in his
opening statement, as to what the evidence would show as
admissions of fact binding on the client and consider the
same in making up their verdict, the same rule must necessarily be applied to the court, and it follows that there was
no admission here of the cause of action or that there was
no defense to it. Even if it could be said that the attorney
admitted that the legal title to the lot was in the plaintiff
and the title could not be tried in forcible detainer, there
was no attempt to try the question of title.
The title was
not involved and could not be tried or determined, but it did
not necessarily follow that the plaintiff was entitled to the
possession of the property. The law in England is, that a
court cannot take such action as was taken in this case upon an opening statement.
In Fletcher v. London and
Northivestern Bmlivay Co., G5 Ij. T. Eep. 605, the judge nonsuit od flic plaintiff on the ground that the opening state
ment did not show any cause of action, and it was held that
the ludgo at the trial had no right to non-suit a plaintiff upon his counsel's opening statement without the consent of
his counsel. It was pointed out that a suitor might lose
his case because his counsel had omitted or mis-stated something in the opening, and the course adopted in that case
some facts, and there is no requirement
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was condemned as most dangerous to the rights of litigants.
The law is the same in Wisconsin. {Fisher v. Fisher, 5
Wis. 472; Hadley v. Western Transit Co., 76 id. 344.) The
same argument was made to the Wisconsin court that is
made here, — that it would be convenient and conduce to the
speedy administration of the law and justice to permit the
court to decide the case upon an opening statement; but
while that was conceded by the court, the practice was con- ;
sidered too dangerous to the rights of clients to be sanctioned. It is undoubtedly true that the method adopted in
this case would be expeditious, and if there were no omissions or defects in the statement, and it was certain that the
evidence would turn out in accordance with
the court
would be
might be enabled to do justice but
still more
expeditious method and equally conduce to the ends of justice for the court to call up the attorneys and examine them
and decide the case on what they say before calling
jury,
whereby much time, labor and expense would be saved.
But
parties have
right to
trial by jury of the issues
by
pleadings,
the
the
made
verdict must rest upon evidence
or want of evidence and not upon opening statements.
The decision chiefly relied upon in support of the ruling
of the court was made in Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeatcase where the
ing Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, but that was
statement disclosed
contract that was void, as being corrupt in itself and prohibited by morality and public policy.
The Statement was that the plaintiff sued for commissions
on
sale of arms to the Turkish government, of which he
was then consul general at the port of New York, and no
court would entertain any action upon such
contract.
Counsel for appellee
unable to perceive any difference
between stating
corrupt cause of action contrary to public policy and good morals and failing to state
good cause
of action or defense, but the difference
quite apparent.
If cause of action such as no court would entertain,
bound to raise the question in the interest of due
court
administration of justice and not for the benefit or in the
interest of either party. Whether
claim of illegality
made by the pleadings or not, parties cannot compel
court
to adjudicate upon alleged rights growing out of
contract
void as against public policy or in violation of public law.

270

Trial

[Chap.

Peactice

7

Wright v. Cudahy, 168 111. 86; CricJifield v. Bermudez Asphalt Paving Co., 174 id. 466.
In this case the defendants had moved for a continuance
for a limited time and nrged as a ground that their remedy
against the action was in equity and that they desired to
proceed in a court of equity, but the continuance was denied and the grounds stated in support of the motion formed no basis for directing the verdict.
The judgments of the Appellate Court and the municipal
court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the municipal court.
Reversed and remanded.

LINDLEY V. ATCHISON, TOPEKA

EAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
47

&

SANTA FE

1891,

Kansas, 432.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Johnston, J. : D. C. Lindley brought this action against
the railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while traveling on a
stock train. The first trial of the case resulted in a verdict
in his favor, but proceedings in error were prosecuted, and
the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
(Railroad Company v.
Lindley, 42 Kas. 714.) Wlien the case was called for trial
the second time, a jury was impaneled, after which the plaintiff by his counsel stated his case to the jury, and the evidence by which he expected to sustain it.
He then offered
in evidence a deposition which had been taken, when the
defendant objected to the reading of the same, for the reason that the amended petition did not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and
agninst tlie defendant, and for the further reason that the

statement made to the jury shows that the plaintiff was
guilty of such contributory negligence as would preclude a
recovery against the defendant.
The objection was sus-
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The plaintained by the court, and the jury discharged.
tiff brings the case here upon a transcript of the record,
asking a review and a reversal of the ruling of the district
court.
The first question presented is, whether the court may
dispose of the case upon the statement made by the plaintiff in opening his case. Such a statement is a part of the
The code provides that, when the
procedure of the trial.
jury is sworn, the plaintiff or party who has the burden
of proof may proceed to state his case to the jury, and the
evidence by which he expects to sustain it.
(Civil Code,
made are
admissions
then
or
statements
If the
§ 275.)
such as to absolutely preclude a recovery, it would be useless to consume further time or to prolong the trial. The
court is warranted in acting upon the admission of the
parties the same as upon the testimony offered; and, as it
may sustain a demurer to the evidence of the plaintiff and
give judgment against him, it would seem that when he
stated or admitted facts which were fatal to a recovery the
The same question
court might close the case at once.
arose in like manner in Oscanyan v. Arms Company, 103
U. S. 251. Justice Field, who pronounced the judgment of
the court, stated that —
''The power of the court to act in the disposition of a
trial upon facts conceded by counsel is as plain as its power
The question in either
to act upon the evidence produced.
case must be whether the facts upon which it is called to inIf a doubt exists
struct the jury be clearly established.
as to the statement of counsel, the court will withhold its
directions, as where the evidence is conflicting, and leave
the matter to the determination of the jury.
In the trial
of a cause the admissions of counsel, as to matters to be
proved, are constantly received and acted upon. They may
dispense mth proof of facts for which witnesses would
otherwise be called. They may limit the demand made or
the set-off claimed. Indeed, any fact bearing upon the issues involved, admitted by counsel, may be a ground of the
court's procedure, equally as if established by the clearest
proof. And
in the progress of trial, either by such admission or proof,
fact
developed which must necessariput an end to the action, the court may, upon its own
motion, or that of counsel, act upon
and close the case."
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the statement made to the court and jury by the plaintiff showed beyond dispute that the injuries which he received were the result of his own negligence, he could not
recover anything from the defendant, and it would have
been idle to have proceeded further with the trial of the
cause. It is contended, it is true, that the statement made
contained no fatal admission or any statements which justified the action of the court; but, unfortunately for the
It
plaintiff, the statement is not found in the record.
might have been preserved by a bill of exceptions or in a
case-made, but neither has been done. There appears to
have been an attempt to make the statement a part of the
record, as there is attached to what purports to be the statement a certificate made by the official stenographer of the
district court. This certificate is unavailing. Such a
statement can only be made a part of the record through a
bill of exceptions settled and signed by the court, and it is
not contended that this has been done. A certificate has
been made by the judge that the statement appended to the
record is a true and correct transcript of the same; but it
is not the province of the judge to authenticate a transcript
of record. If the court had allowed a bill of exceptions
containing the statement, and made the same a part of the
record, it would have been the province of the clerk, and
not of the judge, to have authenticated a transcript of the
same.
It follows that the statement is not before us for
consideration, and therefore the ruling and judgment of the
district court must be affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.

REDDING V. PUGET SOUND IRON

&

Supreme Court of Washington.
36

STEEL WORKS.
1905.

Washington, 642.

RuDKiN, J. — This was an action brought by the widow
and minor children to recover damages for the death of the
husband and father, caused by the wrongful act of the defendant.
After the jury was impaneled to try the cause in
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the court below, the attorney representina^ the plaintiff
made the opening statement of his case to the jury. Upon
this statement the defendant moved the court to withdraw
the case from the consideration of the jury, and to direct
At the suggestion of the
a judgment for the defendant.
court, the motion was so amended as to include the pleadings, and, as thus amended, the motion was granted, the
jury discharged, and a final judgment entered in favor of
The plaintiff appealed.
the defendant.
No reason is assigned in support of a judgment on the
pleadings except that the complaint is defective and does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
judgment rendered was a final judgment on the merits, and,
if warranted at all, must find its support in the opening
statement of counsel, and not in some defect in the complaint. The complaint alone, however deficient, would not
justify or sustain a judgment on the merits such as was
rendered by the court below. For this reason we will not
consider or pass upon the sufficiency of the complaint, as
It
the same may be amended after the case is remanded.
is unnecessary to set forth the opening statement of counsel
in full. We deem it sufficient to say that the statement
was most general in its character, and fell far short of
stating facts sufficient to warrant a recovery against the
respondent.
Nothing was stated affirmatively, however,
would
that
constitute a defense to the action or bar a recovery. When, then, is a court justified in taking a case
from the jury and directing a judgment on the opening
statement of counsel?
That a party to an action is bound
by admissions made by his attorney in the opening statement of his case, or at any stage of the trial, and that the
court may act upon such admissions and direct a judgment
in accordance therewith in a proper case is not disputed or
denied. This is all that was decided in Lindleij v. Atchison etc. B. Co., 47 Kan. 432, 28 Pac. 201, and Johnson v.
Spohane, 29 Wash. 730, 70 Pac. 122. In neither case was
the opening statement upon which the trial court acted
brought before the appellate court.
Oscanyan v. Arms Co.,
103 U. S. 261, was an action on contract.
It appeared from
the opening statement of counsel that the contract in suit
was against public policy and void, and the supreme court
of the United States held that upon such a statement the
T. p.— 18
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circuit court properly directed a verdict for the defendant.
So, in any case, if it affirmatively appears from the opening statement of counsel that the contract in suit is void, or

facts are admitted which constitute a full and complete
defense to the action, it would be idle for the court to proceed further with the trial.
But such is not the case here. Counsel stated too little,
not too much. The court directed a judgment, not because
the appellant was admitted oui of court, but because the
opening statement did not state facts sufficient to constiCounsel may state their case as
tute a cause of action.
briefly or as generally as they see fit, and it is only when
such statement shows affirmatively that there is no cause
of action, or that there is a full and complete defense thereto, or when it is expressly admitted that the facts stated
are the only facts which the party expects or intends to
prove, that the court is warranted in acting upon it. The
opening statement now before the court contained no admissions which would constitute a defense or defeat the action,
and the omission of counsel to state the case more fully
is no justification for the action of the court below in withdrawing the case from the jury.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for new trial.^
Mount, C. J., and Fullerton, Hadley, and Dunbar,
concur.

if

JJ.,

iln Jordan v. Reed, (1908) 77 N. J. L. 584, 71 Atl. 280, it was held that
' '
the statement of counsel, by its omissions or adto authorize a non-suit
missions, must render it clearly evident either that no case can be made out
' '
or that a recovery is precluded.
In Kelly v. Bergen County Gas Co., (1906) 74 N. J. L. 604, 67 Atl. 21, the
court stated that ' ' if objection be made to a statement too meagre to sustain
the plaintiff's case, counsel will, doubtless, be i^ermitted to enlarge his statement."
In Hoffman House v. Foote, (1902)
"The practice of disposing
court said:

N. Y.

348, 6.5 N. E. 169, the
upon the mere opening of
counsel is generally a very unsafe method of deciding controversies, where
It cannot be resorted to in many
there is or ever was anything to decide.
cases with justice to the parties, unless counsel stating the case to the jury
states or admits some fact that, in any view
deliberately and intentionally
of the case, is fatal to the action."
172

of

cases

CHAPTER VIII.
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
COBB V. WM.

KENEFICK COMPANY.

Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.
23 Oklahoma,

Dunn,

1909,

440.

J. — This

action was begun in the United States
court for the Western District of the Indian Territory, at
Muskogee, by the Wm. Kenefick Company, defendant in
error, against S. S. Cobb, City National Bank of Wagoner.

Ind. T., First National Bank of Wagoner, Ind. T., W. B.
Kane, and J. W. Wallace, to enforce payment of two notes
given by S. S. Cobb to the said company to cover a subscription made by him to secure the construction of a railroad to the city of Wagoner under the terms and conditions
as shown by the pleadings.
A demurrer to the liability
charged against the other parties named who signed the
notes was sustained by the court, from which no appea]
Hence they are eliminated from the case,
was prosecuted.
and we have but to deal with the controversy existing between the appellant Cobb and the appellee. On the filing
of the amended answer, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was sustained by the court,
from which appeal was prosecuted to the United States
Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory, and the case now
comes to us for review by virtue of our succession to that
court.

As

**********

a

preliminary question, counsel for appellant in their

brief contend that such

motion as was filed by appellee,
to our Code.
While this
strictly speaking, true, yet the practice
well
established by the procedure adopted in the courts and
meets nearly,
not quiffe, uniform approval. Black on
sec. 15 Ency. Pleading
Judgments, vol.
Practice, vol.
a

&

;

1,

if
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for judgment on the pleadings, is unknown
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pp. 1044, 104:5; Hutchis
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v.

Myers,
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52

Kan.

290, 34

8

Pac.

742.

In

the case of Hutchinson v. Myers, supra, Justice Johnston in the consideration thereof, speaking of the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, has this to say :
"Complaint is next made of the action of the court in
entertaining a motion for judgment upon the pleadings, and
in allowing judgment against Hutchison without testimony.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings was equivalent
to a demurrer to Hutchison's answer, and is a common and
permissible practice. If the averments of the petition were
sufficient, and the answer did not allege a defense, and no
amendment was asked for or allowed, plaintiff was certainly entitled to a judgment."
The general rule is stated in 23 Cyc. 769, as follows :
"This is a form of judgment not infrequently used in
practice under the reformed Codes of Procedure. It is
rendered on motion of plaintiff, when -the answer admits or
leaves undenied all the material facts stated in the complaint; but such a judgment cannot be given where the
pleadings of defendant set up a substantial and issuable
defense or where the suit is for unliquidated damages and
the answer states matters in mitigation."
And, say the authorities, in the consideration thereof,
"the pleadings objected to as insufficient Avill be liberally
construed, and the motion will be denied, where there is any
reasonable doubt as to their insufficiency." 11 Ency. of

Pleading & Practice, 1047; McAllister v. Welker, 39 Minn.
535, 41 N. W. 107 ; Kelley v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146 ; Giles
Lithographic S Liberty Printing Company v. Recaniier
Manufacturing Company, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 475. In the
case of Malone et al. v. Minnesota Stone Company, 36
Minn. 325, 31 N. W. 170, the court in the syllabus says:
"Upon such motion every reasonable intendment is in
favor of the sufficiency of the pleading objected to."
Now with this rule, requiring, as we have seen, the liberal
construction of the answer filed in the case, the question
arises: Does the complaint and the answer, taken together,
considering those portions of the former admitted or undenied, in conjunction with the averments of the answer,
leave the case in such a situation and present such a statement of facts as will justify an affirmance of this judg-
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This question will necessitate an analysis of the
ment!
pleadings filed, to the end that we may ascertain the precise
facts shown thereby. If the complaint states a cause of action which is undenied by the answer, and there is no new
matter pleaded in the answer under the rule above noticed,
sufficient to deny plaintiff the right to the relief demanded,
then the judgment should be sustained ; otherwise it should
be reversed.

HOOVER V. HORN.
Supreme Court of Colorado.
45

1909.

Colorado, 288.

Chief Justice Steele delivered the opinion of

the court

:

The district court of Boulder County rendered judgment
in favor of S. T. Horn and against Hoover and Keables, the
defendants, upon a certain promissory note executed by
Hoover and Keables and one Gearhart, dated August 4,
1904, and payable two months after date, to the order of
Horn. The judgment was rendered on the pleadings.
The defendants' answer, aside from denials which were
bad, one as being a negative pregnant, and the other as
stating a legal conclusion, shows an attempt to plead two
inconsistent defenses :
First, that the plaintiff, Horn, had, at the time the note
sued on became due, a valid chattel mortgage upon property of the said Gearhart, of the value of five or six hundred
dollars, and that he made no attempt to realize on such
property; and,
Second, that, for the purpose of inducing the defendants
to sign the said note with Gearhart, the said Horn falsely
and fraudulently pretended to them that he had a good
and valid chattel mortgage upon property of the said Gearhart, of the value of five or six hundred dollars ; whereas,
in truth and in fact, as the said Horn well knew, all the
property originally covered by the chattel mortgage had,
at that time, been removed from the county of Boulder by
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Gearhart, and sold and disposed of; that the de-

fendants believed said representations to be true, and were
induced thereby to sign the said note as sureties for the
said Gearhart, in consideration of an extension of two
months, by Horn to Gearhart, of the term of said chattel
mortgage.
The rule adopted by this court with reference to judgment ujDon the pleadings is thus stated in the case of Mills
et al. V. Hart, 24 Colo. 505, wherein Mr. Justice Gabbert
states: ''As a general proposition, a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, based on the facts thereby established,
cannot be sustained, except where, under such facts, a judgment different from that pronounced could not be rendered ;
notwithstanding any evidence which might be produced
{Rice V. Bush, 16 Colo. 484) ; or that such a motion cannot
be sustained, unless, under the admitted facts, the moving
party is entitled to judgment, without regard to what the
findings might be on the facts upon w^hich issue is joined;
so that, in determining the rights of the defendants to the
judgment given them, the real question to determine is, the
sufficiency of the admitted facts to warrant the judgment
rendered, and the materiality of those on which issue was
joined." And, quoting from 9 Col. App. 211, Judge Gabbert further states : ''A motion for judgment on the plead
ings cannot prevail, unless, on the facts thereby established,
the court, as a matter of law, can pronounce a judgment on
the merits; that is, determine the rights of the parties \
the subject matter of the controversy, and render a judgment in relation thereto which is final between the parties,
Such a motion cannot, under the guise of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, be substituted for some other

plea."
Upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings inconsistent defenses cannot be regarded as vitiating one anothei ,
but if any good defense is stated in the answer, it must be
considered as true.
The answer states that the owner of
the note represented

to these defendants

that he held a

flialtel mortgage which was a first lien upon certain property of Gearhart, and that the property was of the value of
five or six lumdred dollars. The answer further alleges
that llicy, believing these representations, agreed to becoiiic, and did become, sureties n])on the note of Gearhart.
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The answer further states that, at the time the said mortgage was given, all of the property mentioned therein had
been removed from the county of Boulder, where the property was supposed to have been situated, and had been sold
by said Gearhart, and that the plaintiff knew of such facts.
These matters are perhaps not properly pleaded, and a
motion to strike the answer because it contained but one
defense and that defense contained several contradictory
and inconsistent statements, might properly have been
granted; but it was improper to grant a motion for judgIf the defendants were induced
ment upon the pleadings.
to become the sureties of Gearhart upon the statement of
the holder of the mortgage that he had a valid first lien
upon the property, when in truth and in fact there was no
property of the mortgagor in that county upon which he
had a lien, it deprived these sureties of the right to pay off
the mortgage and become subrogated to the rights of the
mortgagee.
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Mk. Justice Gabbekt and Mr. Justice Hill, concur.

STERNBERG V. LEVY.
Supreme Court of Missouri,

Marshall,

It

j

159

1901.

Missouri, 617,

* * * *

is claimed that the motion for judgment on the pleadings is a demurrer, and hence is part of the record proper,
and therefore no motion for new trial or bill of exceptions
was necessary, but that the court will review the judgment
upon the record, so constituted.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is not a demurrer. It partakes of some of the qualities of a demurrer
but it is not a demurrer, and hence it is not a part of the
record. It is a matter of exception and can only be made
a ])art of the record by a bill of exceptions.
It partakes of the nature of a demurrer, in that, it ad-
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mits all facts that are well pleaded, and if it is overruled
the order overruling it is not a final judgment from which
an appeal will lie, but the party may plead over or proceed
to trial on the issues joined. On the contrary, if it is sustained, judgment goes at once, whereas if a demurrer is
sustained the order is not a final judgment, the party has
a right to plead over, and it is only in case of refusal to
plead over that final judgment can be rendered on demurrer.
There is no motion for judgment on the pleadings contained in this record.
The bill of exceptions filed does not
for
call
any such motion, and therefore there is no such
question ojDen to review in this case.

CHAPTER IX.
DEMURRER TO THE EVIDENCE.
COPELAND V. NEW ENGLAND INSURANCE
PANY.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
22

COM-

1839.

Pickering, 135.

This was assumpsit on a policy of insurance, whereby
the . defendants insured the sum of $2,500 on the brig
Adams, at and from Wilmington to Jamaica and at and
from thence to her port of discharge in the United [States.
It was alleged, that the vessel was totally lost upon a coral
reef near the Isle of Pines, w^hile on her voyage from Jamaica to Wilmington.
Plea, the general issue.
The plaintiffs, in order to maintain the issue on their
part, introduced the policy, the register of the vessel, the
written abandonment of their interest, and the depositions
of three witnesses, which had been taken on behalf of the
defendants, detailing the circumstances attending the loss
of the vessel. They also examined a witness viva voce, and
his testimony was reduced to writing.
The defendants,
''confessing all said evidence to be true, and admitting
every fact and every conclusion which the evidence thus
given by the plaintiffs conduces to prove," say that the
matters thus shown in evidence are not sufficient in law to
maintain the issue on the part of the plaintiffs, and pray
judgment that the jury m.ay be discharged from giving any
verdict upon such issue, and that the plaintiffs may be
barred from having their action against them. The plaintiffs joined in the demurrer.

Morton,

J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. This is
policy of insurance on the brig Adams. It
is alleged, that the brig was totally lost upon a coral reef

assumpsit on a

281

282

Teial Practice

[Chap.

9

The admisnear the Isle of Pines on the coast of Cuba.
sions of the parties reduced the case to the simple question,
whether the loss was caused by any of the perils insured
To prove the affirmative the plaintiffs introduced
against.
the testimony of four witnesses, and here submitted their
case.
The defendants believing this evidence to be insufficient to support the action, demurred to it. The plaintiff
joined in the demurrer; and the case has been argued upon
the evidence thus brought before us.
This mode of trial is very unusual in this State. No
case of the kind has happened since the commencement of
our Eeports ; and it is believed that very few instances occurred before that time. But however unusual the resort
to this mode of trial may be, it cannot be questioned, that
the legal right to demur to evidence exists, under proper
regulations and restrictions. However, as its purpose
seems to be, to withdraw facts from the tribunal specially
provided for their determination, it is no favorite of our
system. And when the hazard and disadvantages which it
imposes upon the party demurring, are duly considered,
and the few cases to which it may properly apply are recollected, there will be no danger of its coming into common
practice.
There are undoubtedly cases, though they are rare, in
which a demurrer to evidence may be safely and properly
taken.
Where all the evidence in a case, consists of written instruments, and these are introduced by the party
having the affirmative, his opponent may safely demur to
the evidence, and be sure thereby to bring the merits of his
case before the court.
As it would be the province of the
court to determine the construction and legal operation of
the instruments, they would have, by the concession of
the parties, all the materials necessary to enable them to determine the legal rights of the parties in the action.
The
facts being thus before them they, in applying the law to
thorn, are in the exercise of their appropriate duty.
P'Ut a demurrer is not confined to written evidence.
Wlioro witnesses positively testify to certain definite facts,

and there is no discrepancy between them, and no other
evidemurrer will properly bring these
facts before the court, and enable them to judge whether
denco to be offered, a

BemuereK to the Evidence.

Chap. 9]

283

it

a

a

a

a

is

is

it

is

a

a

a

is

a

it

a

is

it

a

is

if

a

it

it

it,

they will sustain the action or defence wliich they are introduced to support.
But it not infrequently happens, that the plaintiff or
party having the affirmative, attempts to support the issue
on his part by indirect and circumstantial evidence. And
when the positions are to be established by inferences from
many other facts, it is difficult, if not impracticable, to admit a demurrer.
It may be well here to consider the effect of a demurrer
to evidence. And we shall do it with the more care, because we apprehend, that it was not duly considered or perfectly understood by the counsel on either side. It seems
to have been supposed to be an admission of the truth of
the evidence ; and the Court have been called upon, supposing it all to be true, to determine what inferences may be
would be competent for the
and whether
drawn from
jury upon
to find
verdict for the plaintiffs. And
we would set aside
verdict found
has been argued, that
for the plaintiffs on this evidence, we must render judgment for the defendants, on the demurrer.
mistaken view of the subject and
But we think this
fails .to give to the demurrer its legal effect. It leaves
to the court to draw inferences from the circumstances
proved and to judge of the weight of the evidence; which
would be trenching upon the province of the jury.
The
demurrer to evidence,
not only to admit the
offect of
truth of the evidence, but the existence of all the facts
which are stated in that evidence or which
conduces to
ITence
that most acute and learned pleader, Mr
prove.
Justice Gould, says, that this demurrer, 'though called
demurrer to evidence,
essentiallv demurrer to the facts
slioivn in evidence."
Gould on Pleading. 47, 48, 49. As
demurrer to
declaration asks the opinion of the court
upon the facts properly pleaded, so
demurrer to evidence asks their opinion upon the facts shown in evidence.
In both cases the decision
purely
matter of law, and
cannot involve any questions of fact on the evidence.
The true question alwaA's raised by this kind of demurrer
is, not what
competent for the jury to find, but what
fully sustained
the evidence tendfi to prove. This view
by
most clear and elaborate opinion given by the very
learned Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in pronouncing the judg-
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ment of the House of Lords in the case of Gibson v. Hunter,
This case contains a most lucid and
2 H. Blackstone, 187.
He says, the precise
able discussion of the whole subject.
operation of a demurrer to evidence is, to take from the
jury and refer to the judges the application of the law to
In the nature of things the facts are first to be
the fact.
ascertained.
Wliere the evidence is written or, if in parol,
is positive, definite and certain, the party offering the evidence is bound to join in demurrer. But the reason of the
rule ''does not apply to parol evidence which is loose and
indeterminate, which may be urged with more or less effect to a jury; and least of all will it apply to evidence of
circumstances, which evidence is meant to operate beyond
the proof of the existence of those circumstances, and to
And
conduce to the proof of the existence of other facts.
yet if there be no demurrer in such cases, there will be no
consistency in the doctrine of demurrers to evidence, by
which the application of the law to the fact on an issue is
meant to be withdrawn from a jury and transferred to
If the party who demurs, will admit the evithe judges.
dence of the fact, the evidence of which fact is loose and indeterminate, or in the case of circumstantial evidence, if he
will admit the existence of the fact, which the circumstances
offered in evidence conduce to prove, there will then be no
more variance, in this parol evidence, than in a matter in
writing, and the reasons for compelling the party who offers the evidence to join in demurrer, will then apply, and
the doctrine of demurrers to evidence will be uniform and
consistent." See also Mid diet on v. BaJcer, Cro. Eliz. 753.
This doctrine seems to be foimded upon and well supported by the case of Wright v. Pindar, reported in Style,
34, and also in Aleyn, ig, * * * *
The same principles are recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Young v. Black, 7 Cranch,
5G5.
Mr. Justice Story, in giving the judgment of the
court, says, '* the party demurring is bound to admit as
tine not only all the facts proved by the evidence introdnood by the other party, but also all the facts which that
evidence may legally conduce to prove."

In

this case, Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 11
Whcaton, 320, the learned judge says, ''It is no part of the
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object" of a demurrer to evidence '' to bring before the
court an investigation of the facts in dispute, or to weUjh
the force of testimony, or the presumptions arising from
That is the proper province of the jury.
the evidence.
The true and proper object of such a demurrer is to refer
It supposes,
to the court the law arising from the facts.
therefore, the facts to be already ascertained and admitted,
and that nothing remains but for the court to apply the
law to those facts."
Judge Gould expresses the same doctrine in a little different language. He says, § 47, *'The object of a demurrer
is to bring in question on the record, the relevancy of the
evidence on one side, and to make the question of its relevancy, the sole point on which the issue in fact is to be determined. ' ' He adds, § 51, " that evidence is always relevant to any issue it conduces in any degree to prove. And
as its relevancy is the only point of which the court can
judge, it follows, that it can never be safe for a party to
demur to evidence which is clearly relevant to the whole
issue, viz. which clearly conduces in any degree to prove the
whole affirmative side of the issue."
The result of these authorities is, that a demurrer to evidence admits not only all the facts directly stated in
but
also all the facts which the evidence in any degree tends to
prove.

is

a

it

it,

it

is

it

Where the evidence consists of written documents or of
direct and positive testimony of witnesses, there can be no
and of raising the question of
difficulty in demurring to
law on the facts.
circumBut where the evidence
stantial or uncertain, leaving much to inference and presumption,
not easy or safe to frame a demurrer upon
rejoinder thereto. It will not be sufficient to demur
or
to the evidence generally and leave the court to ascertain
what
tends to prove, or what inferences may be drawn
from it.
But in reciting the evidenc-e, in the demurrer, the
party demurring must state distinctly the facts which the

is

evidence tends to prove, and which he thereby admits, that
the court may readily perceive the facts upon which they
are to decide.
Judge Gould, adopting the language of Lord Chief Justice Eyre, says, "Where the evidence
circumstantial, the
party demurring must distinctly admit upon the record
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every fact and every conclusion, in favor of the opposite
party, which the evidence conduces to prove ; otherwise he
is not bound to join in the demurrer, because without such
admission the iveight as well as the relevancy of the evidence would be referred to the court."
And Mr. Justice Story, in the case before cited, uses this
language: '*No party can insist upon the others joining in
the demurrer, without distinctly admitting, upon the record, every fact and every conclusion, which the evidence
This is exactly' the doctrine of Gibconduces to prove."
son V. Hunter.
Now in the case at bar, the defendants demur generally
to evidence, which is circumstantial, loose and indeterAnd so far from reciting the facts and concluminate.
sions which the evidence tends to prove, and which they intend to admit, they refer generally to all the evidence as it
exists in the form of depositions, consisting of a great variety of interrogatories and cross interrogatories, and the
answers to them, which are neither direct and positive nor
To
This we think to be clearly irregular.
consistent.
' '
The defendants
quote again the language of Judge Story,
have demurred, not to facts but to evidence of facts, not to
admissions, but to mere circumstances of presumption."
The evidence offered in this case tends to show, and undoubtedly does show, that the brig insured, in a squall,
(not a severe one to be sure,) ran upon a coral reef and was
totally lost.
This proof, by itself, clearly would support
But the defendants contend that
the plaintiffs' action.
the testimony of the same witnesses tends to show, that the
vessel was run on shore intentionally or through the gross
incapacity of the master.
Now these are distinct substantive facts, which the defendants wish to establish.
It
is true the evidence tends strongly, very strongly, to prove
them.
But the defendants cannot avail themselves of
these grounds of defence on a demurrer to the evidence.
If llie plaintiff's evidence does not show a prima facie case,
tlie defendants may demur.
But if they wish to set up any
facts in defence, they must resort to the jury to have them
estaljlished.
Tlie depositions introduced by the plaintiffs
were taken by the defendants, and tlius the facts may bo
prescnlrd in an order and a form most favorable to the
Tlie defr'Tidants too, by demurring, admit the facts
hitter.
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which the evidence conduces to prove for the plaintiffs,
and cannot avail themselves of such as it tends to show for
The plaintit¥s, by joining in the dethe defendants.
murrer, did not admit the truth of that part of the testimony which is favorable to the defendants, much less any
inferences which may be drawn from it.
If the defendants wish to set up any facts to exonerate or discharge
The
them, they must look to the jury to establish them.
Court cannot examine, compare and weigh the different
parts of the evidence.
It would be performing a duty
which the law has not imposed upon them, and which they
uniformly refuse to accept from the agreement of the parties themselves.
Without going into a further examination of the evidence, we are fully convinced that the demurrer was not
properly tendered, that the evidence did not present a
proper case for a demurrer, that the plaintiffs ought not
to have joined in
but to have prayed the judgment of
the court whether the defendants should be admitted to it.
The Court have an important discretion in allowing or
disallowing demurrers to evidence.
Although
demurrer
matter of right and the opposite party may be comwhen properly presented, yet he should
pelled to join in
careful
always be
to see that
contains the proper admissions before he joins in it. On the whole, we are satisfied,
that the demurrer was tendered and joined without fully
examining and duly considering the nature and effect of
the measure.
And we think, not as Lord Chief Justice Rolle said,
"that both parties have misbehaved themselves," but in
the language of the Supreme Court of the United States,
''that the demurrer has been so incautiously framed, that
no manner of certainty in the state of facts upon
there
which any judgment can be founded.
Under such
predicament, the settled practice,
to award
new trial, upon
the ground that the issue between the parties has not been
This was done in the analogous cases of W right
tried."
V. Pindar, and Gibson v. Hynfer, by the PTouse of Lords,
Alexandria, bv the
and in Fowle v. Common Council
Supreme Court of the United States.
Venire facias de novo awarded.
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GALVESTON, HARRISBURG & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY V. TEMPLETON.
Supreme Court of Texas.
87 Texas,

1894.

42.

Brown ; Associate Justice. — Defendant in error, plaintiff

below, brought this suit by petition filed August 1, 1891, in
the District Court for the Forty-fifth Judicial District of
Bexar county, to recover $15,000 damages, alleged to have
been sustained by him on or about August 20, 1890, at San
Antonio, by reason of injuries received, while in the service
of appellant and in the discharge of his duties as switchman, in attempting to mount a flat car on which was a defective brake, causing him to be thrown from the car, his
right leg broken, and thereby made much shorter than the
other, and rendering him a cripple for life, unable to perform manual labor. From the injury he charges that he
suffered great physical pain and mental anguish.

There was a trial by jury. The plaintiff having closed his
evidence, the defendant demurred thereto; upon which
plaintiff joined issue, and the court overruled the demurrer
and instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff the actual
damages by him sustained, if any, as the only question left
There was a verdict and judgment
for their determination.
in favor of plaintiff for $4,600. Defendant made its motion
for a new trial, which being overruled, it excepted thereto
and in open court gave notice of appeal ; and thereafter perfected its appeal by filing a supersedeas bond and an assignment of errors,
Tlie Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
District Court,

Tliis

to this court upon the following
pr()j)ositions and objections to the judgment of the District
Court and tlie ('ourt of Civil Appeals:
case is presented

Tliat tlie Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding
that upon overruling the defendant's demurrer to evidence
the court below properly refused to submit the case to the
Third.
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jury upon
plaintiff

the evidence, to determine
was entitled to a verdict.
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whether or not the

1

a

2

;

7

1

1

a

3

4

it,

The defendant having demurred to the evidence, and the
the case was as to the facts and
plaintiff having joined in
the right of plaintiff to recover withdrawn from the jury,
Booth v. Cotton, 13
and must be decided by the court.
Texas, 362; Tierney v. Frazier, 57 Texas, 443; Thornton v.
Tidd's
Ark. 110;
Pet. 40; Ohaugh v. Finn,
Bank,
Prac. 575.
If the damages claimed by plaintiff were liquidated, the
court might decide the entire case, for in that event there
would be no issue to submit to the jury. But when, as in
this case, the damages claimed are unliquidated that quesjury to ascertain the amount.
tion must be submitted to
So. Rep. 863; Boyd v. Gilchrist, 15 Ala.
Ins. Co. V. Lewis,
Tidd's Prac.
Port. (Ala.) 420;
856; Young v. Foster,
575
Id. 866.
demurrer to evidence has been presented and
When
joined in by the opposite party, the court may submit the

if

case to the jury to ascertain the damages before deciding
upon the demurrer, and hold the verdict subject to decision
the demurrer be decided before the
Or
on the demurrer.
jury then empanelled has been discharged, the court may

it

is

3

7

1

4

a

2

it

submit the question of damages to the jurj^ that heard the
evidence. Or the court may, upon presentation of the debe overruled emmurrer, discharge the jury, and in case
Tidd's Prac.
new jury to assess the damages.
panel
So. Rep. 863; Ohaugh v. Finn,
866; Ins. Co. v. Leivis,
Port. (Ala.) 420; Boyd v.
Ark. 110; Young v. Foster,
Rand. 516.
v. West,
Humphreys
Gilchrist, 15 Ala. 856;
It the better practice, we think, to submit the question
of damages to the jury that has heard the evidence, either
before or after decision on the demurrer, by which delay
and cost would be saved for the parties to the action.
be submitted before or after the decision upon
Whether
the demurrer can not be of importance nor work injury to
either party. It was not error to submit the issue as to the
amount of damages to the jury then empanelled, after the
demurrer had been overruled.
Plaintiff in error claims that the court, after overruling
its demurrer to the evidence, should have submitted the case
T. p.— 19
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on the evidence as to the right of
This would be a most extraordinary

jury

By it defendant

plaintiff to reresult of a de-

that
practice (if it were the practice in any court), withdraw the
case from the jury as to the rights of the plaintiff, and in
case the decision was favorable to the defendant, the plaintiff would be deprived of a trial by jury at the election of
the defendant ; but in case the court to which defendant apthen
must be allowed that
pealed should decide against
demurrer.
It would
sought to avoid by the
trial which
have been error to have done what plaintiff in error claims
tlie court should have done. It would have been contrary to
tlie kiw, against reason, and against the right.
under

it

would,

it

it,

murrer to evidence.

**********

The judgments of the District Court and the Court of
Civil Appeals are affirmed.
Affirined.^

is

it

is

it
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a

a
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it
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If

a

between Demurrer to Eviaence and Motion for a Directed
iComparison
In Eberstadt v. State, (1898) 92 Tex. 94, 45 S. W. 1007, the court
Verdict.
said: "The effect of the motion made by the defendants to instruct the jury to
find for them has practically the same effect as a demurrer to the evidence in
calling for the opinion of the court on the legal sufficiency of the proof, but
motion
does not have the effect to withdraw the case from the jury.
had not been made,- and the
be overruled the trial must proceed as if
court can not because the motion has been overruled instruct the jury to find
for the plaintiff upon the ground that the motion admitted the truth of the
Thomp. on Trials, sec. 2270, p. 1624; Harris v. Woody,
evidence adduced.
The difference between the demurrer to the evidence and the
Mo. 113.
verdict for the defendant is technical,
true, but
motion to instruct
practical difference, in this, that the defendant does not choose to withBtill
draw his case from the jury and rely upon the testimony already introduced,
but exercises his option of calling for the judgment of the court upon the
strength of the plaintiff's case, with the privilege in case the decision
action.
against him of proceeding to develop his defense to the plaintiff
Instead of moving the court to instruct the jury, the defendants might have
presented a written instruction to that effect, and
being refused could have
proceeded to introduce their testimony."

V. CLARK.

Supreme Court
80

of

FRITZ

Indiana.

1881.

Indiana, 591.

Bert, (^.--Tliis action was brought

by the appellees
against the appellant to recover sixty-six acres of land in
||()w;ii(] ccHiuty, Indiana. The complaint consisted of three
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An answer of three paragraphs was

reply in denial was filed to the second
the
paragraph of
answer, and the issues thus formed were
submitted to a jury for trial. After the evidence on both
sides had been heard, the appellees demurred to the evithen filed.

The court withdrew the case from the jury, susdence.
tained the demurrer to the evidence, and rendered final
judgment thereon for the appellees, to all of which the appellant duly excepted. A motion for a new trial was also
made and overruled.
Various errors have been assigned in this court. Among
others, it is insisted that the court erred in sustaining the
appellees' demurrer to the evidence; and, as the conclusion
reached by us upon this question is decisive of the case, the
others will not be considered.
The appellant insists that the evidence of a party who
demurs will not be considered upon such demurrer, and in
the absence of the appellees' evidence the demurrer should
have been overruled.
The question thus raised has not been, so far as we are
* * *
informed, decided in this State.

**********

There are many cases in our reports where the defendant
has demurred to the evidence of the plaintiff. The following are among them : Lindley v. Kelley, 42 Ind. 294 ; Pinnell v. Stringer, 59 Ind. 555 ; FoucJi v. Wilson, 60 Ind. 64 ;
Netvhoiise v. Clark, 60 Ind. 172 ; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co.
V. Goar, 62 Ind. 411 ; Miller v. Porter, 71 Ind. 521 ; Ohio, etc.,
R. W. Co. V. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261.
There are some cases where the plaintiff has demurred to
the evidence of the defendant, aside from those mentioned
in the former part of this opinion, but in each of such cases
the burthen of the issue was upon the defendant.
The folStrough
are
them:
Gear,
cases
v.
48 Ind.
among
lowing
100; Lemmon v. Whitman,!^ Ind. 318.
In none of them, however, was the question here discussed
involved, but all of them proceeded upon the familiar doctrine that the evidence of the party who joins in the demurrer must determine its sufficiency. Will the evidence of
the party who tenders the demurrer be considered?
In Hart v. Calloway, 2 Bibb, 460, the defendant, after the
evidence on both sides had been admitted, tendered a de-

292

Teial Practice

[Chap.

9

murrcr embracing the evidence of both parties, and the

question was whether the plaintiff could be compelled to
join in such demurrer. The court, in speaking of the nature
of a demurrer to the evidence, said: "The demurrant, according to the established forjn, alleges that the matter
shewn in evidence by his adversary, is not sufficient in law
to maintain the issue on his part, and that he, the demurrant to the matters aforesaid, in form aforesaid shewn in
evidence, hath not any necessity, nor is he obliged by the law
of the land to answer, and concludes with a verification.
* * *
The party whose evidence is demurred to, in the
joinder alleges that he hath shewn in evidence to the jury,
sufficient matter to maintain the issue joined on his part,
and for as much as the demurrant doth not deny nor in any
Thus
manner answer the said matters, prays judgment.
is the issue joined between the parties, upon the question
whether the matters shewn by the party whose evidence is
demurred to, is sufficient in point of law to maintain the
issue on his part. To this question the judgment of the
court responds, either in the affirmative, that the matter
shewn in evidence by him is sufficient, or in the negative
that it is not sufficient."
In Woodgate's Aclm'r v. Threlkeld, 3 Bibb. 527, the court
upon a similar demurrer, said: "The defendant could not
by demurring cause his own evidence to be taken for true,
and the court can not, without usurping the province of the
jury, decide upon its truth. In principle, it is not less ab
surd for a party to demur to his own evidence, than it would
be to demur to his own plea; and it is believed that there
is no precedent to be found in the English books for the
former, no more than there is for the latter practice."
In Fowle v. The Common Council of Alexandria, 11
\Vlioat. 320, the court, upon a similar demurrer, where the
f'vidence was circumstantial, said: "Even if the demurrer
could be considered as being exclusively taken to the plaintiff's evidence, it ought not to have been allowed without
a distinct admission of the facts which that evidence conduced to prove; })ut where the demurrer was so framed as
to h't in tlif defendants' evidence, and thus to rebut what
the otiier .side aimed to estalilish, and to overthrow the presumptions arising tlierefrom, by counter presumptions, it
was the duty of tlie circuit court to overrule the demurrer,
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incorrect, and untenable in principle.
The question
referred by it to the court, was not a question of law, but
as

of fact."

These cases abundantly show that the evidence of the
demurrant will not be considered upon the demurrer, and,
in the absence of authorities, it would seem impossible to
The demurrant attacks the
reach any other conclusion.
evidence of his adversary, and, in the very nature of things,
this attack can not be aided by his own evidence. The sufficiency of the adversary's evidence to support the issue
upon his part is the only question presented by the demurrer, and this question must be determined without reference
to the evidence of the demurring party; indeed, such party
does not and can not have any evidence. The evidence of
the adversary is alone involved in the issue raised by the
demurrer.
The cases of Thomas v. Ruddell, 66 Ind. 326,
and Baker v. Baker, 69 Ind. 399, so far as they are inconsistent with this opinion, should be overruled.
As the evidence of the demurring party is not to be considered, the case stands precisely as though no evidence
was offered by the appellees; and, as the burthen of the
issue was upon them, the demurrer should have been overruled, and judgment rendered for the appellant.
Fouch v.

Wilson,

For

60

Ind.

64.

these reasons, the judgment

should be reversed.

BENNETT V. PERKINS.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Virginia,

47 West

McWhorter, President
''Fourth.

It

1900.

425.

:

was error for the court to require defendant to join in plaintiff's demurrer to the evidence," as set
out in the bill of exceptions No. 4; and, fifth, "It was error
to render judgment, on the demurrer to the evidence, for
plaintiff." The contract sued upon here was for the pay-
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plaintiff of the sum of three hundred dollars in
case he succeeded in relieving or releasing two certain
tracts of land from the lien of a judgment which endangered
it. If he was wholly successful he was to be paid the
three hundred dollars, with interest, but, in the event he
should fail to release both of said tracts from said lien, and
should relieve from liability the one tract on which said
defendant then lived, then he was to be paid the one-half
of said sum. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff
to show to the satisfaction of the jury that he had performed his part of the contract, and was entitled to recover the three hundred dollars, or the one-half thereof,
ment

to

Counsel for plaintiff contend that
either party may demur to the evidence, and cite Insurance
Co. V. Wilson, 29 W. Va. 528, (2 S. E. 888) ; Shmv v. County
Court, 30 W. Va. 488, (4 S. E. 439), and Arnold v. Bunnell,
42 W. Va. 479, (26 S. E. 359) in support of their con6 Enc,
tention, and this is true, with certain restrictions.
PL & Prac. 440, says:
"Either party has a right to
demur to the evidence, but the demurrer is only applicable
to the evidence of the party holding the affirmative of the
issue." In Pickel v. Isgrigg, (C. C.) 6 Fed. 676, it is held:
"The evidence of a party upon the affirmative side of an
issue of fact before a jury may be demurred to by the
adverse party under certain conditions ; but the party upon
whom the l)urden of proof of the issue rests is not permitted to demur to the evidence of the other party, for he
cannot be allowed to assume that he has made out his
case." So, in Styles v. Inman, 55 Miss. 469, (Syl., point
8): "A demurrer may 'be taken to the evidence of either
party, plaintiff or defendant, liolding the affirmative of
the issue." While it has not been held, in so many words,
by this Court, that the evidence of the party not having
the burden of proof cannot be demurred to, yet it has so
lield by implication. In Bank v. Evans, 9 W. Va. 373, (Syl.,
point 7): "The defendant ought to be compelled to join
in a demurrer to evidence when the burden of proof is upon
liiiM, uiih'ss the case is clearly against the plaintiff, or the
court (l(jul)ts what facts should be reasonably inferred from
the evidence."
What is the plain inference here but that,
if the burden of proof is not upon the defendant, he should
not be recpiired to join in the demurrer.
To a jury of his
as the case might be.
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peers the defendant as well as the plaintiff has a right,
under the Constitution of the United States, and of this
State, to submit all questions of fact in issue in actions
at law. Article VII. of the former instrument provides
that: "In suits at common law, when the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States
than according to the rules of the common law;" and our
State Constitution (Article III., § 13) makes the same provision; and, when a defendant submits his facts in evidence
before a jury impaneled to try the issue made in the case,
and the same tend in any degree, however slight, to contradict plaintiff's evidence, or to prove failure on the part
of plaintiff to comply with his contract, the riglit to have
such evidence weighed and considered by the jury is guaranteed to him, and he cannot be deprived of this right by
the court withdrawing the case from the jury, the constituted triors of the issues of fact, and itself weigh the evidence, and decide which party succeeds on the issue.
If
either party has an absolute right, whether the onus prohandi was upon him or not, to demur to the evidence, and
force his adversary to join therein, then the right of trial
by jury is at an end, and that which has ever been held by
the American people as one of their most sacred rights, is
The rule is that he who affirms a proposition
a myth.
*
*
*
rj'jjg
must maintain it with sufficient evidence.
—
fifth assignment that it was error to render judgment for
the plaintiff on the demurrer to the evidence —
therefore, well taken.

It

follows that the judgment and the verdict of the jury
should have been set aside, and the plaintiff's action dismissed.
Reversed.
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HOPKINS
Supreme

V. RAILROAD.

Court of Tennessee.
96

[Chap. 9

1895.

Tennessee, 409.

J. — The

only question presented for determination upon the record is whether the practice of demurring
to the evidence is sanctioned by the Constitution and laws
of this State. The suit was brought by W. D. Hopkins, Administrator, to recover damages for the unlawful killing
of his son, W. 0. Hopkins.
The plaintiff's intestate, at the time of his death, was
employed by the railroad company in the capacity of fireThe gravamen of the action, as
man upon a locomotive.
outlined in the declaration, is that the death of the plaintiff's intestate was occasioned by the negligence of the en*
*
*
gineer in charge of the train.

McAltstee,

* * *

The record discloses that the deceased, in obedience
to the rules of the company, had voluntarily taken his position at the rear brake of the rear car ; that, with knowledge
of the signals, he gave a danger signal to the engineer, and
the latter, in answer to said signal, immediately shut off
steam, producing a jar in the train which threw the
plaintiff from his position on the car violently to the
This was the proximate cause of the accident.
ground.
* *
*So that, in any view of the case, upon the plaintiff's
own showing, no liability was made out against the company. It a]ipears from the record that at the conclusion
of the plaintiff's testimony before the jury, council for defendant company interposed a written demurrer to the
evidence, as follows, towit : ' ' The defendant comes and demurs to the evidence of plaintiff, and offers to admit of record that the following testimony and proof introduced by
tlie ])laintiff (setting out all the testimony introduced by
plaintiff) is true, and further admits as true all proper and
l«'gal deductions and inferences therefrom in law.
The defendant offers to admit, that the facts so stated are the
facts in the case, and were proven entirely by plaintiff and
his witnesses, and does now aver that the facts so stated
present no ground for a recovery against it under the
pleadings in this cause, and this it is ready to verify.
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Wherefore, defendant prays the Court to
murrer, and direct plaintiff to join therein;
of the Court accordingly ; and that plaintiff
against having or maintaining his action
further prosecuting the same.

allow this deand judgment
may be barred
or
against
it,
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"East
*'C. D. Porter,
"J. D. B. DeBow,

"Attorneys."
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It will be observed that the demurrer in this cause was
in writing, and set out in full the plaintiff's evidence, which
in accordance with the established practice in such
cases.
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Counsel for plaintiff moved to dismiss the demurrer, because unknown to the forms or practice of the law, and because insufficient, which motion was by the Court overruled.
UpThereupon, plaintiff joined issue upon the demurrer.
on argument of counsel and consideration by the Court the
demurrer was sustained, and the suit dismissed. Plaintiff
appealed, and has assigned errors.
that the trial Judge erred in alThe first assignment
demurrer to the evidence, suslowing defendant to file
insisted
taining the same, and dismissing the suit. It
Section
of the
this action of the Court violates Article
Constitution of the State, which provides that the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, etc. and also Article
Section
which ordains: "Judges shall not charge
juries witli respect to matters of fact, but may state the
testimony and declare the law." It may be well to undermeant
stand at the threshold of this investigation what
by the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by the Constitution. The late Mr. Justice Miller, in his lectures on Constitutional Law, quotes, with approval, the following from
the Encyclopedia Britannica, in its article "Jury," to-wit:
"The essential features of trial by jury, as practiced in
England and countries influenced by English ideas, are the
The jury are
body of laymen, selected by lot,
following
Judge, the truth in
ascertain,
the
under
guidance of
to
civil litigation or
questions of fact, arising either in
*
Their province
strictly limited
criminal process.
fact,
that
province, they are
and, within
to questions of
still further restricted to the exclusive consideration of
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matters tliat liavo been proved by evidence in the course of
the trial. They must submit to the direction of the Judge
as to any rule or principal of law that may be applicable
to the case," etc.
Again, Forsyth, in his History of Trial by Jury, pub*'The distinctive characteristic of
lished in 1852, says:
the system is this, that the jury consists of a body of men
taken from the community at large, summoned to find the
truth of disputed facts. They are to decide upon the effect
of the evidence, and thus to assist the Court to pronounce a
right judgment, but they have nothing to do with the judgment or sentence which follows the verdict.
They are not,
like the Judges, members of a class charged with the duty
of judicial inquiry; they are taken from varied pursuits
to make a special inquiry, and return to their ordinary
avocations when this labor is over."
It will be observed that in both of these definitions the
that
tribdistinctive feature of the jury system
unal erected for the settlement of variant, contested, and
disputed facts. If the facts upon which the plaintiff relies are uncontroverted and are expressly admitted by the
defendant, together with all legal and reasonable inferences that may be deduced. therefrom,
difficult to perceive what function
to be performed by the jury in the
settlement of such agreed facts. The province of the jury
to weigh the evidence, but when there
no disputed
facts in the record, there
nothing to be weighed. It was
upon this idea that the demurrer to the evidence became an
established practice at common law.
"It defined by the best text writers to be a proceeding
by which the Court in which the action
depending
called upon to decide what the law
upon the facts shown
in evidence, and
regarded, in general, as analogous to
demurrer upon the facts alleged in the pleading.
When
party wishes to withdraw from the jury the application
of tlie law to the facts, he may, by the consent of the Court,
demur in law upon the evidence, the effect of which
to
tak(! from the jury and refer to the Court the application
of tlie law to the facts; and thus the evidence
made
j)art of the record, and
considered by the Court as in the
rase of
special verdict." Siujdam v. Williamson, 20 How.
4U7
Van^tone v. Siillwell Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 134.
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''The demurrer not only admits

the truth of all the eviagainst
whose evidence the departy
murrer is directed, but it also admits all the inferences that
may be logically and reasonably drawn from the evidence.
The probative force of the evidence is not confined to the
direct effect of the evidence, but extends to the results reasonably deducible from it by logical and legitimate infer*
*
*
ence.
i^ follows, therefore, that the facts which
the evidence, directly or indirectly, tends to prove must
be taken as admitted."
Elliott's General Practice, Vol. 2,
dence adduced by the

**********

Sec. 858.

We have seen from the authorities that the only province
of the jury is to settle disputed questions of fact, while the
office of the demurrer to the evidence is to admit the facts
and invoke the application of the law by the Court. Is this
practice in any sense an invasion of the constitutional guaranty ''that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,"
or is it subversive of the other provision "that judges shall
not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may
state the testimony and declare the law?" We do not so
understand it. It is not so understood in other States of
'he Union with similar constitutional provisions.
Says Mr. Elliott : "In some jurisdictions," citing Maine,
"the Courts refuse to recognize the practice of demurring
to the evidence but, as we think, without reason, for the
practice is an ancient and well established one, having a
firm support in principle. It is recognized in most of the
States, and also by the Federal and English Courts." Vol.
2, Sec. 855.

"It

is

it

a

it,

is illogical," says the same author, "to assert that
that there is any encroachment upon the province of the
jury where the evidence is conceded to be true, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
it are admitted, for in such a case there is no disputed
question for the jury to decide.
Nor is there any injustice
in entertaining a demurrer, for, if the law is against the
party to whose evidence the demurrer is addressed upon
the evidence and the legitimate inferences that may be
drawn from
he can by no possibility be rightfully enthe duty of the Court to so
recovery, and
titled to
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2, Sec.

9

858.

It

from this review that the demurrer
preserved in seventeen of the States.
been repudiated in the other States
Constitutions, but it has been superseded by a less cumbersome and more radical procedure,
to- wit, ordering- n -"^n'^nit and <lirecting a verdict.
will thus be seen
to the evidence is still
The practice has not
as obnoxious to their

*

*

*

It will

preceived, moreover, that in every
State of the Union the Judge is allowed to withdraw a case
from the jury whenever there is a destitution of any competent, relevant, and material evidence to support the issue,
and this authority is exercised, either by directing a verdict, sustaining a demurrer to the evidence or enforcing
a compulsory nonsuit, as the practice may prevail in the
particular State. This fact is incontestable, and is abundantly shown in the overflow of cases already cited.
But it is argued by counsel for plaintiff in error that,
whatever may be the practice in other States of the Union,
the adjudications of this Court are against either form of
practice, and necessarily so, since the Constitution of Tennessee not only secures the right of trial by jury, but further declares that "Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and
declare the law." As already seen, the first clause in respect of the trial by jury, is found in the Constitution of all
the States in one form or another, but the latter clause is
found in the organic law of only five States. We do not
think the latter clause adds anything to the prohibition contained in the first clause.
be

It

will be found that the practice in the five States whose
Constitutions embody this additional clause sanctions either the compulsory nonsuit or the right of the Judge to
direct a verdict, in either case confessedly a more radical procedure than the demurrer to the evidence.
We hold that an ai)iJropriate form for determining
wlieth(!r, as a matter of law, any recovery can be had, or
liability fixed, against the defendant upon facts which are
not disputed la by demurring to the evidence. This form
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of practice is expressly sanctioned by an adjudication of
this Court which has never been overruled, though it may
be conceded that the practice is cumbersome and antiquated.
In the nature of things, it can seldom be successfully inupon any rational or legitivoked, for the reason that
mate view of the evidence,
prima facie case
made out,
the testimony be doubtful, or the trend of facts con"or
tradictory in themselves, or admit of different interpretation by fair-minded men," the case must be submitted to
attended with the danthe jury. Moreover, the practice
unsuccessful, the prevailing party
ger that,
entitled to
final judgment and an immediate assessment of his damElliott's General Practice, Vol.
Sees. 865-870.
ages.
In the present record we are confronted with perfectly
established against the
jDlain case, in which no liability
defendant upon the facts, or upon any reasonable or legitimate inference that may be made upon such facts.
The
law of every case, in whatever form presented, belongs to
not only the prerogative of the Judge, but
the Court. It
a solemn duty to declare it.
entitled to the judgment of
The defendant in this case
undisputed
facts
upon
the
found in the record.
the law,
Our duty
imperative, and, being of opinion that in no
\'iew of the facts shown in evidence
any liability made
defendant
out against the
company, we affirm the judgment
of the Circuit Court.
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Dismissal.

under which Plaintiff may Dismiss.

BERTSCHY V. McLEOD.
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
32

1873,

Wisconsin, 205.

Appeal from the County Court of Milwaukee County.
This action was brought to recover an alleged unpaid
balance due from the defendant to the plaintiff for a steam
engine and fixtures furnished by the plaintiff to defendant,
pursuant to a written agreement between the parties, a copy
of which is inserted in the complaint. The answer contains,
in addition to certain matters pleaded as defenses, two
counter-claims, one of which alleges that the written agreement does not contain the contract made by the parties and
which they intended to include therein, in that an important
portion of such contract is omitted therefrom, and prays
that the written agreement be reformed so as to include
the omitted portion; and the other counter-claim
is for
damages for the alleged failure of the plaintiff to perform
sucli contract on his part, on account of which the defend-

ant demands judgment against the plaintiff for a sum exceeding the demand of the plaintiff.
Tlic ])laintiff replied to such counter-claims, in effect denying tlie material allegations thereof. After issue was thus
joined in the action, the attorney for the plaintiff entered
a sidebar rule, or order of course, with the clerk of the
court, discontinuing the action on payment of the defendant's taxable costs therein.
lie also, on the same day,
served upon the attorneys for the defendant notice of such
proceeding, and an offer to pay the defendant's costs upon
presentation of a taxed bill thereof, and a further offer
302
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to appear without formal notice before any taxing officer
for the purpose of having the costs adjusted.
The attorthe
defendant
the
plaintiff's
neys for
immediately notified
attorney that they should disregard the attempted discontinuance of the action, for the reason that after a counterclaim had been interposed the action could only be discon-

tinued by leave of court; and they accordingly noticed the
cause for trial, and caused it to be placed on the calendar
for trial at the next term of the court.
Thereupon a motion was made on behalf of the plaintiff,
to strike the cause from the calendar, on the ground that the
same had been discontinued.
The court denied the motion,
holding that the cause had not been legally discontinued,
but was still pending. This ajDpeal is from the order denying such motion.

**********

Lyon, J.
The following propositions must, we think, be conceded :
1st. At the common law, a plaintiff had the absolute right
to discontinue his action before or after issue joined, and
without leave of court, 2nd. In suits in equity, under the
former practice, the plaintiff might, in like manner, dismiss his bill, but such dismissal did not carry with it a
2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 128
cross bill interposed by the defendant.
and cases cited. 3d. The right of discontinuance is not
effected by the code, but remains the same, both in legal
and equitable actions, as under the former practice.
By the common law, neither of the counterclaims here
The one which
interposed could be pleaded in the action.
demands a reformation of the written agreement could only
be made available by a suit in equity; and the other, which
demands judgment for damages for the alleged violation
of his contract by the plaintiff, in excess of the plaintiff's
demand, could only be enforced by a separate action. Of
course, the subject matter of the latter counter-claim might
be pleaded as a defense to the action, either in whole or in
part; but the defendant could not in that case recover judgment for any excess of damages eustained by him, over and
above the damages sustained by tiie plaintiff.
In brief, at
the
defendant could only plead such matter
the common law
in defense, and could not obtain in the action equitable relief, or recover a judgment for damages against the plain-
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tiff, as he now may under proper pleadings and proofs.
Waterman on Set-Off, Recoupment, etc., 471; 1 Chitty's
PL, 569; 2 Black. Com. (Cooley's ed.), 305, note 19. Hence,
all there was of the action at the common law was the
cause of action as stated in the declaration, and the defense
pleaded thereto by the defendant; and that was all which
Such
the plaintiff had an absolute right to discontinue.
right of discontinuance still remains under the present
practice, and, to the extent above indicated, has been rightfully exercised in this case by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's
cause of action, and all defenses pleaded thereto which
could have been pleaded as such under the former practice,
have disappeared from the cause by force of the order of
discontinuance.
But we are unable to perceive how it can be held, upon
any logical principle, that such discontinuance necessarily
carried with it those proceedings of the defendant which
the code permits him to institute in the action, or rather to
but which are, in substance and effect, acengraft upon
Had
tions brought by the defendant against the plaintiff.
these proceedings been under the common law practice, as
already observed, the counter-claims interposed in this action would have been asserted in two separate and distinct
actions, one at law and the other in equity, in both of which
the position of the parties would be the reverse of their
position in the present action. In such case, surely the discontinuance by the plaintiff of the action brought by him
discontinuance
would not work
of such other actions
brought against him. Why should the plaintiff's discontinuance of his action lead to that result under the present
The learned counsel for the plaintiff have failed
practice?
to answer this question satisfactorily, and we freely confess our ina))ility to do so.
The cases decided by the various courts of New York
upon the sul),jer't of the right of discontinuance under the
cod(! are conflicting, and quite unsatisfactory; and we can
get but little aid from them in determining the question under consideration.
may be stated, in sui)port of the views above expressed,
that this right or practice of counter-claim
borrowed from
the civil law, where
''demand
in reconvendesignated
tion;" and the Louisiana cases referred to by the learned
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counsel for the defendant clearly show that, by the rules of
the civil law, a discontinuance of the action by the plaintiff
is ineffectual to put a defendant out of court who has interposed a ''demand in reconvention."
If the foregoing views are correct, it necessarily follows
that the discontinuance of his action by the plaintiff left
the issues made by the counter-claims and the reply thereto, pending in court and for trial, and that the court ruled
correctly in refusing to strike the cause from the calendar.
If application be made for that purpose, the county court
should, under the special circumstances of the case, permit
the plaintiff to vacate the order of discontinuance so entered by him, to the end that the whole controversy between
the parties may be adjudicated in this action.

**********

By the Court. — The order appealed from is affirmed.

CARLETON V. DARCY.
Court of Appeals of Neiu York.
75
FOLGEE,

J.

1878.

New York, 375.

The plaintiff has seen fit to ask the court below for an
order permitting him to discontinue his action, on the pay
That court has refused
ment of costs to the defendants.
his request, and on appeal from the order he claims that he
has the right, of his own head, to discontinue his action on
those terms. But there is no valid discontinuance of an
action without an order to that end. That order, whether
ex parte or on motion, must be an order of the court, and
It is true, as a general rule,
as its order, within its control.
that a plaintiff may, upon the payment of the costs of th(^
defendant, enter an order of discontinuance of the action,
and give notice thereof, and that the cause will be thereYet the court has always kept and exerby discontinued.
cised the right to control such an order, as well as any
And where circumother order put upon its records.
stances have existed which have made it inequitable that
T. p.— 20
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the plaintiff should, of his own head and without terms,
discontinue his action, they have refused his motion to do so
altogether, or except on terms; or when he has entered an
order ex parte, have opened
and made
conform to
under
the circumstances.
what was proper
Thus the order has been refused where
counter-claim had been set
up, against which the statute of limitations would be
bar,
the suit was discontinued; {Van Alen v. Schermerhorn,
14 How. 287)
or where the defendants had been examined
as witnesses, unless the plaintiff would stipulate that the
examination might be used in evidence in any action to be
subsequently brought: Cockle v. Underwood,
Duer, 676;
Cooke
Beach,
v.
25
also,
see,
How. 356.
So that the court, to which the motion for leave to discontinue was addressed, had
discretion, under all the
circumstances of the case, whether or not to refuse it.
The
We do not think that
abused that discretion.
plaintiff had pursued his action of ejectment against
tenant, until the landlord had interposed and been made
defendant so that he might protect his own rights in the
premises; the plaintiff had recovered judgment in his action of ejectment, and had been put in possession of the
new
lands; the defendant had paid the costs and taken
trial under the statute; and then the plaintiff, still in possession, asks leave of discontinue his action.
He got the
fruit of his action, the whole fruit of
the possession of
the premises.
By discontinuance of his action, he would
turn the defendants about to an action of ejectment against
him, and lay on them the burden of showing
valid title,
sufficient to support the action against him. Had he preferred not only to give up the action, but the substantial
fruits of
which he had got, and to put the defendants, or
either of them, into the possession that he had taken from
them, he might not be required to prosecute an action which
he wislied to end, and to further continue litigation.
But
quite different when he has got all that his action could
give him, and has put the defendants to the need of that
further litigation which the law allows them, to maintain
what they tliink
tlieir right, for him then to discontinue
his action and throw the burden of the affirmation
of
anotlier issue upon the defendants.
The court might well
require him to pursue the action that he had commenced,
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until a definite and final result was reached in
settling
positively the right of possession of the lands in dispute.
We therefore think that the court below, in making the
orders appealed from, did not abuse or exceed their discretion.
The appeal should be dismissed.
All concur.

Appeal dismissed.^

'

iThe necessity for an order of the court dismissing an action, is sometimes dispensed with by statute.
Luse v. Luse, (1909) 144 la. 396, 122 N W
970.

Time when Plaintiff may Dismiss.

(b)

CARPENTER AND

SONS COMPANY V. NEW YORK,

NEW HAVEN, AND HARTFORD RAILROAD
COMPANY.
Supreme Judicial Court

of

MANUFACTURING

GORHAM

COMPANY V. SAME.
Massachusetts.

184 Massachusetts,

1903.

98.
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LOEING, J.
It has always been a recognized principle of the English
law, on the equity as well as on the common law side of the
not bound to prosecute
suit or
plaintiff
court, that
action to
finish because he has begun it. But on the contrary he
without losing the right
at liberty to abandon
of action on which
he can enforce that
and
founded,
riglit subsequently on paying the costs of the former proceeding. In this respect
more fortunate than
plaintiff
defendant who has
day in court to interpose his defence
he would not have final judgment given against him.
What
how far the plaintiff's proceeding
not so clear
suit in equity or an action on the common
be
(whether
law side of the court) must have gone for
to have readied
the stage where this right of abandonment
lost.
In England the plaintiff originally had right to abandon
an action at law and become nonsuit at any time before
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Derick v. Taylor, 171
verdict, if not before judgment.
Mass. 444, 445. That it was before verdict and not before
judgment is laid down in OiitJiwaite v. Hudson, 7 Exch.
This rule
380, 381; 2 Tidd's Practice, (3d Am. ed.) 867.
was adopted here by an ordinance of the Colony in 1641;
Anc. Chart. 46; and in Locke v. Wood, 16 Mass. 317, it was
contended by Webster and Shaw in 1820 that that was the
rule of practice of the Commonwealth and that the plaintiff had a right to become nonsuit at any time before judgBut the court "were of opinion that there was no
ment.
such right; and that, after a cause is opened to the jury,
and begun to be proceeded in before them, the parties are
entitled to a verdict, unless the court should, in its discretion, allow a nonsuit or discontinuance."
Since then it has
been held or said to be the rule that a plaintiff can become
nonsuit as of right at any time before the trial has begun
but not afterwards. Means v. Welles, 12 Met. 356, 361;
Loivell V. Merrimack Manuf. Co., 11 Gray, 382; Shaiv v.
Boland, 15 Gray, 571; Truro v. Atkins, 122 Mass. 418;
Burhank v. Woodward, 124 Mass. 357; Kempton v. Burgess, 136 Mass. 192; Derick v. Taylor, 111 Mass. 444;
Worcester v. Lakeside Manuf. Co., 174 Mass. 299. See also
the previous case of Haskell v. Whitney, 12 Mass. 47.
The reason for denying in this Commonwealth the rule
of the English common law was the injustice done to the
defendant, who was subjected to being harassed a second
time on one and the same cause of action on receiving costs,
which in this Commonwealth are nominal.
In that respect
the burden of being subject to a second action is much
greater here than in England, where costs are substantial.
But the common law rule has now been abolished in England. By Order XXVI. of the Rules of the Supreme Court,
1883, adopted under the judicature act, it is provided that
"the plaintiff may, at any time before receipt of the defendant's defence, or after the receipt thereof before taking any other proceeding in the action (save any interlocutory application), by notice in writing" discontinue the
action. Wilson's Practice of the Supreme Court of Judicature, (7tli ed.) 234.
The Massachusetts rule as to when a plaintiff could
])Oconi(! nonsuit in a common law action was established
wlien substanlially, if not absolutely, all such cases were
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tried to a jury. No question could arise as to what the
rule was when applied to cases tried by the court, as so
many cases are now tried since Sts, 1874, c. 248, sec. 1;
1875, c. 212, sec. 1 ; 1894, c. 357, now R. L. c. 173, sec. 56,
directing all cases to be tried by the court unless a trial

Until the case is
by jury is claimed by one of the parties.
opened the right to become nonsuit exists.
A question did arise as to the application of the rule in
case of a preliminary trial before commissioners in case
of a petition to recover compensation for property taken
It was held that when
under the right of eminent domain.
the hearing before the commissioners was begun the right
to become nonsuit was lost. Worcester v. Lakeside Mamif.
Co., 174 Mass. 299.
The case as bar presents the question whether the right
is lost when a hearing before an auditor has been finished
but before the auditor's report is filed.
Were the question now before us a question of first impression depending entirely on the advantages and disadvantages to the plaintiff and the defendant respectively, it
is by no means clear that it ought not to be held to be too
late for a plaintiff to become nonsuit when an order had
been made sending the case to an auditor. A hearing before an auditor is not now, as it was, a preliminary investigation of complicated accounts and nothing more. The
rule laid down in W-kitivell v. Willard, 1 Met. 216, was altered by St. 1856, c. 202, now R. L. c. 165, sec. 55. Although
this rule was altered so long ago, it was not until lately that
the practice as to what cases should be sent to an auditor

It

now, however,
(owing to the overcrowding of the dockets), to send to
auditors cases involving a long investigation, no matter
what the kind of investigation may be. The result is that
an auditor's hearing is now a different thing from wliat it
was. Not onlv that, but this change has been recognized
St. 1900, c. 418, (R. L. c. 165, sec. 59;
by the Legislature.
c. 173, sec. 81), provides that the court may set a day for
the "trial" before the auditor, and upon such order being
made the trial shall proceed from day to day until it is
concluded; that the actual engagement of counsel in a
hearing before an auditor shall be an excuse in another
was changed.

has become

the practice
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in court, and each party is required to proceed before the auditor at the time appointed
and "to produce in good faith, the testimony relied upon
cause as

he were engaged

by him."
But in spite of the character which auditor's hearings
have now assumed, it is still true that such hearings result
in evidence merely and cannot result in an adjudication;
and we are of opinion that a hearing which results in evidence and cannot per se result in an adjudication is not a
trial within the rule which has now been laid down for over
eighty years, namely, that a plaintiff can become nonsuit
at any time before the trial begins and not afterward.
Moreover this seems to have been assumed by the Legislature in this very statute, St. 1900, c. 418 (R. L. c. 165, sec.
It is there provided that if the
59, and c. 173, sec. 81.)
plaintiff does not comply with the provisions of the act
and attend before the auditor, or if he refuses in good faith
to put in the testimony relied on by him, the court is authorIn making that proized to direct him to become nonsuit.
vision it is assumed that the court has no power to enter
judgment for the defendant at that stage of the proceeding.
Under these circumstances, we do not feel at liberty to
If, under the pracdispose of the question on its merits.
tice which now oJ^tains, the rule, which we feel we are
bound by, does injustice to defendants, the remedy is with
the Legislature.
Entry of nonsuit to stand.

OPPENIIEIMER V. ELMORE.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
109

1899.

Iowa, 196.

Deemer, J.
The record discloses that after the issues were made up,
tho jury imp;molod and sworn, and the plaintiff's evidence
adduced, tlic (IclViuhuit snhrnitted a motion asking the court
to direct a verdict for liiin ; and tliat after the court had indicated that lie would sustain the motion, but before any
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entry was made on the docket or any direction in fact given
to the jury, the plaintiffs asked the court to dismiss their
case without prejudice, which it refused to do, but, on the
contrary, instructed the jury to return a verdict for defendant, which was accordingly done, and a judgment was thereafter rendered thereon. Section 3764 of the Code is as
follows: *'An action may be dismissed, and such dismissal
shall be without prejudice to a future action, before the final
submission of the case to the jury," What, then, is the
submission of a case to a jury? That question seems to be
answered by Harris v. Beam, 46 Iowa, 118, wherein it is
said: "In every case finally submitted there must be some
moment of time in which the condition of being finally submitted is assumed. Ordinarily, there is no difficulty in determining whether or not a case has been submitted. If
the last word of the court 's charge to the jury had not been
read, it would probably be conceded that no final submission had occured but, as the charge had been fully read, it
is claimed nothing further remained for court or counsel
to do, and that the case was finally in the hands of the
jury. A cause is not finally submitted to a jury when the
last word of the charge is read. In practice, the jury are
directed by the court to retire in charge of a sworn officer
to consider their verdict, or to enter upon the consideration
of the case without retiring. This direction by the court to
the jury, to enter upon the consideration of the case, may be
fairly regarded as the moment when the final submission
of the case occurs. An attorney cannot always tell wheth-

it,

er he can safely submit his case to the jury on the evidence
introduced until he hears the charge of the court. If, in
his judgment, the charge is so adverse to him that he cannot safely trust his case in the hands of a jury, he ought at
the moment to be permitted to dismiss without prejudice
Morrisey v. Railway Co., 80 Iowa, 314,
to future action."
is a case almost directly in point, and it is there said:
**
Plaintiff having produced all his evidence, and rested, the
defendant made a motion to instruct the jury to find for the
defendant ; which being fully submitted, the court said that
he thought the motion ought to be sustained, and indicated
but had not yet made the entry on
that he would sustain
the calendar, nor directed for the defendant." "The plaintiff's attorney then asked leave to dismiss, to which the
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defendant objected, on the ground that the case had been
submitted to the court, which objection was overruled and
This action of the court was assignthe case dismissed."
In passing upon this question, we said: "A
ed as error.
submission is final only when nothing remains to be done
to render it complete. Submission to a jury is not final
until the last words of a charge are read, and the jury diHarris v. Beam, 46 Iowa,
rected to consider their verdict.
There was no final submission of this case to the jury.
118.
They had not received the charge of the court, and as yet
had no authority to consider of or return a verdict. Appellant contends that, as the sustaining of the motion for
verdict was, in effect, a final disposal of the case, there was
a final submission of the case to the court before the plaintiff asked leave to dismiss. Surely, the submission of the
motion was not a submission of the case to the court ; for,
whether the motion was overruled or sustained, it remained
to submit the case to a jury for a verdict. There was no
final submission of the case to the court or jury." See,
also, Partridge v. Wilsey, 8 Iowa, 459 ; Livingston v. Mc

Iowa, 175; Hays v. Turner, 23 Iowa, 214. Nothing at variance with the rule established by these cases is
In that
announced in McArflmr v. Scliidtz, 78 Iowa, 264.
case there was a final submission, with an attempted reservation of a right to dismiss without prejudice. Such practice was condemned, and the action of the trial court in permitting a dismissal was reversed. Defendant's counsel
have cited a number of cases from the supreme court of
Kansas holding that the action of the trial court under
such a statute is discretionary, and will not be interfered
with on appeal. We have adopted a different rule, and, as
it is a rule of pi'actice, our own decisions must govern. The
trial court should have permitted a dismissal of the case
and its order and judgment are Reversed.

Donald,

21
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ASHMEAD V. ASHMEAD.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
23

1880.

Kansas, 262.

Brewer, J.
This was an action for divorce.

After

the testimony had
and the case taken under advisement, the
plaintiff moved the court for leave to dismiss her action
Defendant objected, and insisted that
without prejudice.
judgment be rendered upon the merits, but the court sustained the motion, and permitted the plaintiff to dismiss
without prejudice.
We have not before
Was this error?
us the testimony upon which the court acted in sustaining
this motion. We must therefore presume it sufficient, if the
It will be
court had the power to grant such a motion.
the
case, the
conceded that after the final submission of
plaintiff had no right to a dismissal without prejudice. Up
to that time she had such right, and could exercise it of
her own option, without the consent of the defendant or
the permission of the court.
At that time her rights in
But has not the court the power in
that respect ceased.
its discretion to permit a plaintiff, even after the final submission, to recall that submission and dismiss without prejudice? It would be both strange and harsh, if such power
did not exist. Oftentimes, by some oversight or forgetfulness, the plaintiff omits some essential portion of his testimony. Is the court powerless to afford him relief? It is
constant practice to open a case for additional testimony.
Even after a jury has retired to consider of its verdict, the
court may recall
and open the case for future evidence.
true, rests within the discretion of the court,
All this,
right of the party. Here the court exercised
and
not
its discretion, and we cannot- say that there was any abuse
The case of Schafer v. Weaver, 20 Kas.
of such discretion.
true, after
in point. The question there arose,
295,
been
sustained, but the
demurrer to the evidence had

is

the same.
principle
The judgment will be affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.

is

it

a

is

is

it

a is

it,

been received,
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Effect of Dismissal.

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY V. MILLER.
Supreme

Court of the United States.
217

1909.

United States, 209.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant in error, plaintiff below, brought suit in
the City Court of Hall county, Georgia, against the Southern Railway Company, a corporation of Virginia, and
certain individual citizens of Georgia, to recover damages
for personal injuries received by him while in the employ
of the railroad company as an engineer. A recovery in
the court of original jurisdiction was affirmed in the Court
of Appeals of Georgia (59 S. E. Rep. 1115), and the case
is brought here to review certain Federal questions presented by the record. These are, first, that the state court
erred in refusing to remove the case to the United States
Circuit Court upon the petition of the plaintiff in error;
second, as it appeared that the case had once been removed
to the Federal court and was dismissed by the plaintiff,
the state court should have held that the right to further
prosecute in that court was lost, and the jurisdiction completely and finally transferred to the Federal court.
*

*

*

There was no error in the refusal to remove the

case.

A

further objection is made that inasmuch as the suit
was once removed from the state court to the Federal court
and therein dismissed, there was no right to begin the case
again in the state court. This argument is predicated upon
tlie statement in a number of cases in this court, to the
effect that where the petition for removal and bond has
been filed the state court loses jurisdiction of the case, and
subs('(|nent proceedings therein are void and of no effect.
P>ut this is far from holding that a Federal court obtains
jurisdiction of a suit thus removed in such wise that it can
never again be brought in a state court, although there has
been no judgment upon the merits in the Federal court,
and the case has been dismissed therein without any other
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disposition than is involved in a voluntary dismissal witii
the consent of the court.
While it is true that a compliance with the act of Congress entitling the party to remove the case may operate
to end the jurisdiction of the state court, notwithstanding
it refuses to allow such removal, it by no means follows that
the state court may not acquire jurisdiction in some proper
way of the same cause of action after the case has been dismissed without final judgment in a Federal court. By complying with the removal act the state court lost its jurisdiction, and upon the filing of the record in the Federal court
that court acquired jurisdiction.
It thereby had the authority to hear, determine and render a judgment in that
case to the exclusion of every other court. But where the
court permitted a dismissal of the action by the plaintiff
it thereby lost the jurisdiction which it had thus acquired.
We know of no principle which would permit the Federal
court under such circumstances, and after the dismissal of
the suit, to continue its jurisdiction over the case in such
wise that no other court could ever entertain it. After the
voluntary dismissal in tJie Federal court the case was again
at large, and the plaintiff was at liberty to begin it again in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
We find no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals
of Georgia, and the same is affirmed.

Affirmed,

FKANCISCO V. CHICAGO «& ALTON RAILWAY
COMPANY.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

79

1906.

Circuit Court of Appeals, 292.

Before Sanborn, Hook and Adams, Circuit Judges.
Sanborn, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff below is the plaintiff in error here.

He

brought an action against the defendant to recover $5,000
damages for the negligent killing of George L. Gerew. The
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There was a trial of the
defendant denied its liability.
issues before a jury. At the close of the evidence the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury that under the
pleadings and evidence they must find a verdict for the deThe court granted the motion, and the plaintiff
fendant.
excepted. But before the jury were actually instructed the
})]aintiff prayed leave of the court to take an involuntary
The court granted him permission and a judgnonsuit.
Subsequently the plaintiff
ment was rendered accordingly.
moved the court to set aside this judgment of nonsuit and to
grant a new trial of the action, and this motion was denied.
He has sued out this writ of error to secure a reversal of
this judgment of nonsuit on account of numerous alleged errors in the trial of the action, and especially because the
court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
cause of action and that the defendant was entitled to a verdict thereon.
But invited error is irremediable. If the court erred in
the rendition of the judgment of nonsuit, it erred at the
plaintiff's request and to the prejudice of the defendant,
and that error can form no ground for the reversal of the
judgment at the suit of the plaintiff who procured it. A
judgment of nonsuit upon the motion or request of the defendant and against the objection or protest of the plaintiff is reviewable by writ of error. Central Transp. Co. v.
Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 29, 39, 40, 11 Sup. Ct. 478.
35 L. Ed. 55; Median v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611, 614, 618,
12 Sup. Ct. 972, 36 L. Ed. 835.
But a judgment of nonsuit on the motion, at the request
or with the consent of the plaintiff, is not reviewable by
writ of error at his suit, because he is estopped from convicting the trial court of an error which he requested it to
commit. * * *
Southern Ry. Co., 143 Fed, 276, a case which
North Carolina, where, in the state courts, a plaintake a nonsuit at any time before verdict, the deat the close of the evidence had moved the court to
the jury to return a verdict in his favor, and the

In Parks
arose in

tiff

may
f(3ndant

instruct

v.

court liad sustained the motion. Plaintiff then moved for
leave to tak(! a nonsuit.
The court denied his motion and
instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
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The Circuit Court of Appeals held that, when the motion
to instruct the jury for the defendant was made, the plain-

tiff was put

to his election to then take his nonsuit or to
submit the whole case upon the motion to instruct, that the

motion for leave to take a nonsuit after the decision upon
the motion to instruct came too late, and that there was no
error in the subsequent refusal of the court to grant the nonsuit. While a different rule has been established in this circuit in cases coming from Missouri, in deference to a statute
of that state and in conformity to the practice in its trial
courts {Chicago, M. S St. P. Rij. Co. v. Metalstaff, 41 C. C.
k. 669, 101 Fed. 769), the opinion in the Parks case contains a statement of the duty of courts to respect the rights
of defendants, as well as plaintiffs, to a lawsuit, to make an
end of litigation and to prevent the abuse of the means of
administering justice by the trial of experiments upon the
courts with defective causes of action, which strongly appeals to our judgment and presents a persuasive argument
in support of the rule under consideration.
Judge Pritchard said:
"It is highly important that the court in the exercise of
its discretion should not only see that equal and exact justice is done between litigants, but it is equallj' important
that needless litigation should be speedily determined, and
in the trial of cases the court should consider the rights of
the defendant as well as those of the plaintiff, and, where
it appears that all the evidence which it is possible to
obtain has been offefed and the case has been submitted to
the jury or to the court, it is the duty of the court, if In
its opinion the evidence is not sufficient to justify a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff, to direct the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The courts are not organized for the purpose of permitting the jDlaintitf in an action
to experiment with a certain state of facts for the purpose
of ascertaining the opinion of the court as to the law applicable to the same and then permit him to withdraw from
the scene of conflict and state a new cause of action and
mend his licks in another direction. Such policy, if adopted,
would be productive of much mischief, and should not be

tolerated."
The difference between a judgment upon an instructed
verdict and a judgment of nonsuit is that the former pre
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vents, while the latter permits, the maintenance of another
action for the same cause. When the evidence was closed
in the suit before us, each party had established rights in
the trial of this action. The plaintiff had the right to elect
whether he would take a nonsuit (section 639, Rev. St. Mo.
1899; Chicago, M. S St. P. Ry. Co. v. Metalstaff, 41 C. C.
A. 669, 101 Fed. 769), or would submit the whole cause
upon the motion to instruct and endeavor to secure a verdict in his favor. The defendant had a right to elect
whether it would endeavor to obtain a nonsuit or a verdict
on the merits in its favor. It chose the latter alternative
and moved the court for a directed verdict. This motion
the plaintiff opposed and submitted the cause to the court
for decision. The court granted the motion, and the plaintiff excepted, lie then had the right to elect whether he
would take a nonsuit and bring another action on the same
cause, or would take a verdict against himself and secure a
review of the rulings of the court by a writ of error. He
chose the former remedy. He moved the court for leave to
The parties then stood in
take an involuntary nonsuit.
The defendant asked and pressed for an
this situation:
instructed verdict and thereby necessarily objected to the
nonsuit which gave the plaintiff an opportunity to bring anThe plaintiff prayed for the nonsuit and
other action.
thereby necessarily objected to the instruced verdict and to
a judgment whi(?h would prevent his maintenance of another
action. The court granted the request of the plaintiff and
denied that of tlie defendant. Plaintiff thereby secured his
right to maintain his action for the same cause, and the defendant lost the judgment in its favor and the entire beneThe nonsuit was
fit of a trial in which it had succeeded.
obtained by the act and request of the plaintiff against the
motion and objection of the defendant, and it may not be
successfully challenged by a writ of error procured by the

former.

It

is said that this was an involuntary nonsuit because
the plaintiff was forced to take it by the decision of the
trial court that he had proved no cause of action, and that
the Supremo Court of Missouri has often so decided and
has reviewed cases from the inferior courts of that state
Williams v. Finks,
uf)ori writs of error to such judgments.
156 Mo. 597, 57 S. W. 732; Ready v. Smith, 141 Mo. 305, 42
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S. W. 727; English v. Mullanphy, 1 Mo. 780; Coll'ms v.
Bowmer, 2 Mo. 195; Bates County v. Smith, 65 Mo. 464;
Schulter's Adm'r v. Bockivinkle's Adm'r, 19 Mo. 647;
Dumey v. Schoeffler, 20 Mo. 323; Greene Co. v. Gray, 146
Mo. 568, 48 S. W. 447. The answer is (1) that whether the
nonsuit was voluntary or involuntary in the conception of
the Supreme Court of Missouri, and whether or not it
would have been reviewable by that court, if it had been
granted by an inferior court of that state, an indispensable
condition of its review at the instance of a plaintiff in error
in a national court is that it was granted "without his consent and against his objection," and this judgment lacks
this condition, for the nonsuit was granted at his request
and by his active procurement; (2) that the plaintiff was
not forced by the decision of the court below that he had
failed to prove his case to take a nonsuit, but he had the
option to take the verdict and judgment against him and
and
was erroneous to reverse
to review
by writ of
error, or to take the dismissal of the action and try again;
and (3) that his choice of the latter alternative cannot be
made involuntary by placing that deceptive adjective before
in the face of the record that he was free to proceed
to verdict, judgment, and review, or to
judgment of nonsuit, and that of his own free will and against the motion
and objection of his opponent he asked and secured the dismissal.
The real character of this nonsuit cannot be refalse epithet.
versed or concealed by applying to

It

it

it

a

a

a

a

fixed rule of practice of the appellate courts
of the United States for almost 100 years that no writ of
judgplaintiff to review
error will lie at the suit of
ment of nonsuit which has been rendered at his request or
with his consent, and that no judgment will be reversed for
an error which the plaintiff in the writ has invited the court
to commit, and the fact that the Supreme Court of Missouri
presents
nonsuit "involuntary" and reviews
calls such
no persuasive reason why one of the national appellate
courts should depart from this salutary rule while there are
should abide by and enforce it. Courts are
many why
established and maintained to settle and terminate controversies between citizens and to enforce their rights, not to
furnish debating societies for the trial of legal experiments.
has been
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The chief reason of their being is to end, not to perpetuate,
"Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium/' A
disputes.
practice which permits a plaintiff to experiment with the
courts and to harass the defendant interminably at will
runs counter to the basic purpose of legal tribunals and of
all civilized governments, and, instead of assisting to wisely
administer justice, it inflicts and perpetuates wrong. Yet
this is the practice which a grave review of such nonsuits
as that in hand would establish.
Under it a plaintiff could
introduce his evidence and try the Circuit Court to see
whether or not it would sustain his action. If it granted
a motion to instruct a verdict against him, he could procure
from the court an involuntary nonsuit, then sue out a writ
of error and try the appellate court, and, if it would not sustain his action, he could pay the costs, bring another action

for

and continue his actions and experiments interminably. The federal courts ought not to permit themselves to be made the subjects of such experiments.
The only material interests involved in the review of such
judgments are the costs of the actions, for the plaintiffs
may try their causes again whatever the decisions of the
appellate courts, and the demands upon these courts for
the decision of real and important issues are too grave and
pressing to permit them to devote their time to litigation so
the same cause,

frivolous.
There is

more compelling reason why proceedings of
this nature should not be sustained. The plaintiff is not the
only party to a lawsuit who has rights. The defendant has
some, and one of them is the right, not only to a fair and
impartial trial of the action against him, but to a final
adjudication of the alleged cause which the plaintiff pre
sents and to a termination of the litigation upon it. This
right he can never enforce, this termination he can never
secure under the practice here proposed, for there is no
limit to the number of actions on the same cause, or on the
want of
which the plaintiff may bring, review, and dismiss under it.
The conclusion
that
writ of error will not lie in
national appellate court at the suit of the plaintiff to review
judgment of nonsuit or dismissal which has been
rendered at his request or with his consent after the court
a

a

a

is

it,

a

Sec.

]J

Dismissal, Non-Suit, Directed Verdict

321

has held at the close of the trial that the defendant is entitled to a verdict.
This case has been considered and determined upon the
theory that the evident intention of the plaintiff and of the
court to render a judgment of nonsuit has been effected.
But the form of the judgment is such that a claim may be
made that it was a judgment on the merits. For this reason alone the judgment will be reversed, the defendant in
error will recover its costs in this court, and the case will
be remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to render
a judgment that the action be dismissed without prejudice
to the right of the plaintiff to maintain another for the
same cause, and that the defendant recover its costs of the
plaintiff, and it is so ordered.

(d)

Form of Motion.

FERGUSON V. INGLE.
Supreme Court of Oregon.

1900.

38 Oregon, 43.

Mr. Justice Moore, after stating

the facts, delivered the

opinion of the court.

It

is contended by plaintiff's

counsel that the court
erred in refusing to grant a voluntary nonsuit requested
by their clients; while defendant's counsel insist that, the
motion therefor not having specified the ground upon which
it was predicated, no error was committed in this respect.
Considering those questions in inverse order, the rule is
well settled that the motion of an adverse party for a nonsuit must specify the grounds therefor, and, unless it does
so, an appellate court will not review the action of the trial
court in denying the motion : 14 Enc. PI. & Prac. 117, 136 ;
Silva V. Holland, 74 Cal. 530 (16 Pac. 385) ; Flijnn v. Douglif.rtij, 91 Cal. 669 (27 Pac. 1080, 14 L. R. A. 230) ; Wright v.
Fire Ins. Co., 12 Mont. 474 (31 Pac. 87, 19 L. R. A. 211.)
The reason for this rule is found in the fact that an appellate court will consider only such questions as have been
T. p.— 2r
1.
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l)resented to the trial court at the projier time, and in an
appropriate manner; and when it appears that the question sought to be reviewed was not thus submitted to such
court the presumption that its decision thereon is correct
ought to prevail. But, whatever reason may be adduced for
the existence of this rule, the point insisted upon is without
merit, for the motion in this case was not made by the adverse party. The statute provides, in effect, that the plaintiff, upon his own motion, may secure a judgment of nonsuit at any time before trial, unless a counter-claim has been
pleaded as a defense. Hill's Ann. Laws, sec. 246. A voluntary nonsuit is, therefore, peremptory, and, whatever motive may have prompted a plaintiff to dismiss his suit or
action, he is not required to state it; for if the motion be
made before trial, and in the absence of a counter-claim
])leaded as a defense, the trial court is without discretion in
the matter, and must give the judgment requested.

The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to grant the nonsuit.
Reversed.

Section

CARROLL

2.

Nonsuit.

RONDE ELECTRIC
PANY.

V. GRANDE

Supreme Court of Oregon.

COM-

1907.

49 Oregon, 477.

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Bean.
This is an action by Eliza Carroll, administratrix, against
tlie Grande Ronde Electric Co. On August 28, 1905, Leonard Carroll was killed by an electric wire belonging to deof his estate
The administratrix
company.
fendant
account of his
on
})rouglit an action to recover damages
dcatli, alleging that it was caused by the negligence of deThe defendant answered, denying the allegations
fendant.
of tJK; complaint, and, for a further and separate defense,
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setting up contributory negligence on the part of deThe trial was begun before a jury on issues joinceased.
ed, and, after the plaintiff had introduced her testimony
and rested, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the
ground, among others, that the evidence showed that the
death of her intestate was caused bv liis own negligence.
This motion was allowed ; the record of such allowance reciting 'Hhat the plaintiff's intestate Leonard Carroll, at
the time of the accident complained of, resulting in his
death, was guilty of contributory negligence, which was
the proximate and direct cause of the injury resulting in
The judgment was subsequently affirmed:
his death."
Carroll v. Grande Ronde Elec. Co., 47 Or. 424, (84 Pac.
389; 6 L, R. A., N. S. 290). Thereafter the plaintiff commenced this action on the same cause as is alleged in the
action heretofore referred to. The defendant pleads the
judgment in the former action as a bar, and, such plea being sustained, judgment was rendered in its favor, and
plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.

Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Bean.
The statute, after providing that a judgment of nonsuit
may be given against the plaintiff on motion of the defendant, when upon the trial the plaintiff fails to prove a
cause sufficient to be submitted to the jury (Section 182, B.
& C. Comp.), declares that, when such judgment is given,
the action is dimissed, but it shall not have the effect to
bar another action for the same cause: Section 184, B. &
The statute would seem to leave no room for
C. Comp.
argument as to the effect of an involuntary judgment of
nonsuit.
But the defendant contends that because, in the
case at bar, the entry of the order sustaining the motion
contains a statement or finding that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate was the proximate cause
of his death, it is a judgment on the merits, and therefore
The vice of this position lies in
a bar to another action.
the fact that, on a motion for a nonsuit, the court has no

jurisdiction or authority to pass upon the merits or adjudicate the rights of the parties, and an attempt to do so is a
nullity. A motion by defendant for a nonsuit does not
challenge the facts as shown by plaintiff, nor call upon the
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court to determine the rights of the parties, but only to
decide as a matter of law whether upon the evidence of
plaintiff, as it now stands, he is entitled to take the opinion
of the jur}" on his case. It is a motion based on some defect or neglect of the plaintiff, and does not involve the
The plaintiff, therefore, is, under all the authorimerits.
ties, authorized, if the motion is sustained to bring his
action again: Black, Judgments (2 ed.), sec. 699; Freeman,
Judgments, sec. 261; Reynolds v. Garner, 66 Barb. 319;
Lindvall v. Woods, (C. C), 47 Fed. 195; Manhattan Life
Ins. Co. V. Broughten, 109 U. S. 121 (3 Sup. Ct. 99, 27 L.
Ed. 878) ; United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89 (7 Sup. Ct.
454, 30 L. Ed. 601) ; Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.,
And it
150 U. S. 349 (14 Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L. Ed. 1107).
can make no difference upon what point the motion is allowed, or how the judgment may be framed, or what recitals it may contain, or that the motion was ordered upon
the failure of plaintiff's evidence: 23 Cyc. 1137; 24 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.), 801; Black, Judgments (2 ed.), sec.
699; Glimmer v. Trustees of Village, 50 Wis. 247 (6 N. W.
885) ; United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89 (7 Sup. Ct.
454, 30 Law. Ed. 601). It is still nothing but a judgment of
nonsuit, which has been likened to the blowing out of a
candle, which a man, at his own pleasure, may light again,
and wliich the statute declares shall not be a bar to another
action for the same cause.
At the time the motion was
made by the defendant, the plaintiff, on her own motion,
could have taken a voluntary nonsuit, which certainly
would not have been a bar, and she is in no worse position
because the court on motion of defendant did what she
herself voluntarily could have done. The defendant could
have had a judgment which would have been a bar to
another action if it had rested, and submitted the case
io the jury on plaintiff's evidence, instead of moving for
a nonsuit, but it has no right to experiment with a motion
for a nonsuit, thus reserving to itself the right, if the ruling
is against
to go into
full trial on the merits, and deny
the ])laiiitirr,
she
the losing party, the right to bring
her Mclioii anew. If the defendant would not be bound by
tlic nilidg on the motion, the plaintiff ought not to be. If
judgment of nonsuit, on the motion of defendant,
an
adjudication upon the merits, conclusive on the plaintiff.
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and a bar to another action, then the correlative rule must
of such motion is conclusive upon
the defendant, and operates as a judgment for the plaintiff,
No judgment can be an estopa position nowhere asserted.
pel unless it is on the merits : Freeman, Judgments, sec.
And a motion for a nonsuit is a waiver of the right
260.
to have a judgment on the merits, and submits to the court
the single question whether the plaintiff has proven a case
sufficient to be submitted to a jury, and the sustaining or
overruling of the motion is an adjudication of no other
The case of Bartelt v. Seehorn, 25 Wash. 261 (65
matter.
Pac. 185), seems to be contra to this conclusion, but no
authorities are cited in its support, and we have been unable to find any, and the rule there announced is against the
plain provisions of our statute.
Judgmicnt reversed, and cause remanded for such other
proceedings as may be proper, not inconsistent with this
decision.
Reversed.
be adopted, that a denial

SMALLEY V. RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILWAY
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Utah.
34

1908.

Utah, 423.

Straup, J.
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him by reason of the
defendant's negligence. The accident happened in the defendant's railroad yard at Ogden. It was alleged in the
complaint that the yard was located between two streets in
a well-settled portion of the city ; that in the vicinity of the
accident it had been the custom of the public to cross the
yard and walk along the tracks, and of children to play
about the yard and ride on cars, with the knowledge and
consent of the defendant ; that the yard and cars operated
therein were alluring and attractive to young children, who
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were attracted to tlie yard aud tempted to ride on cars;
that it was the duty of the defendant to fence the yard, and
in switching cars to have a sufficient number of men engaged
at such work to perform it with reasonable safety to those
who might be in and about the yard, and to have persons
stationed on the cars to control their movements and to observe proper lookout for the presence of children about the
tracks; that the defendant negligently failed to perform
such duties, by reason of which the plaintiff, a boy five
years of age, who had been attracted to the yard and at
play on or about the tracks, was run against and injured by
The defendant
a car moved and switched about the yard.
in
charged
the complaint, and alleged
denied the negligence
that the plaintiff unlawfully, and without the knowledge and
consent of the defendant, entered the yard and while trespassing therein attempted, without the defendant's knowledge and consent, to board a moving car, which was being
switched about the yard, and in so doing fell and was injured without fault on the part of the defendant, and that
the custodian of the plaintiff, in whose charge the child
had been placed by its father, was guilty of negligence in
permitting it to wander about and to enter the yard. The
case was tried to the court and jury.
*

*

*

At the conclusion of the evidence the court, on the
defendant's motion, directed the jury to render a verdict,
*'in favor of the defendant, no cause of action." The jury
rendered a verdict, finding ''the issues joined in favor of
the defendant, and against the plaintiff, no cause of action." A judgment was entered on the merits in favor of
the defendant, from which this appeal is prosecuted by
plaintiff.

It is contended by appellant that, though the evidence
was not sufficient to let the case to the jury, the court nevertlieless was not authorized to direct a verdict and enter a
judgment on merits, as was done.
This claim is made upon tlio following statutory provisions (section 3181, Comp.
Tiuws 1907) : "An action may be dismissed or a judgment
of nonsuit entered in the following cases: (1) By the plaintiff himself at any time before trial, upon the payment of
costs, if a counter-claim has not been made, or affirmative
relief sought by the answer of the defendant, etc. (2) By
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cither party upon the written consent of the other. (3) By
the court when the plaintiff fails to appear on the trial, and
the defendant appears and asks for the dismissal.
(4) By
the court when upon the trial and before the final submission of the case the plaintiff abandons it. (5) By the court
upon motion of the defendant, when upon the trial the
plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient case for the jury; provided, that the offering of evidence after the overruling of
a motion for a nonsuit shall not be deemed or considered a
waiver of the exception taken by the defendant to the order
overruling such motion. (6) By the court when after verdict or final submission the party entitled to judgment neg-

lects to demand and have the same entered for more than
six months." Section 3182: ''In every case, other than
those mentioned in the next preceding section, judgment
must be rendered on the merits." By reason of these provisions, especially subdivision 5 of section 3181, it is argued that the direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant, when the plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient case for the
jury, can have no greater effect than the granting of a motion of nonsuit. * * * *

In

**********

some respects the principles applying to a motion of
nonsuit also apply to a motion for a direction of a verdict.
In a general sense it may be said that both take the place

of a demurrer to the evidence and are governed by the same
principles. But a demurrer to the evidence was a submission of the case for final determination, which determination called for a judgment on the merits. Our Code has
provided under what circumstances a motion of nonsuit
may be granted, and that the granting of such a motion
shall not be an adjudication on merits, nor shall the overruling of such a motion preclude the moving party from
thereafter offering evidence, as was the case on a demurrer
to evidence. The court may, at the close of plaintiff's evidence, on plaintiff's motion, grant a voluntary, and on the
The court
defendant's motion an involuntary, nonsuit.
may do the same thing at the close of all the evidence, and
before the case has been submitted for firial determination.
In each of such cases the judgment is not on the merits
The plaintiff, however, at the close of liis evidence may rest
The defendand submit the case for final determination.
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ant may do likewise witliout offering any evidence. So, too,
at the close of all the evidence offered by both parties, the
plaintiff may still submit the case for final determination,
Wlienever a party ''rests" his
as also may the defendant.
case, he indicates that he has produced all the evidence he
intends to offer, and submits the case, either finally, or subject to his right to afterwards offer rebutting evidence.
When both parties have "rested," they indicate a submisThe determination
sion of the case for final determination.
If
merits.
the
the facts are in
on such a submission is on
dispute, the case must be sent to the jury for their finding,
upon which a judgment on merits is entered accordingly.
the facts are not in dispute, the determination presents
a mere question of law, to be decided by the court, upon
whose decision, or upon the rendition of a verdict directed
Upon
by him, a judgment is also entered on the merits.
a final submission of the case, when there is no evidence to
sustain the case of the party having the affirmative, it is
proper for the court to direct a verdict against him. It is
as proper for the court to direct a verdict against the plaintiff, in the absence of proof to establish a fact essential to
his case, as to direct a verdict against him when the proof,
either upon his own evidence or that of the defendant, conclusively establishes some affirmative defense. We do not
understand the statute to mean that the court is authorized
to direct a verdict in the one instance, but not in the other,
or that the court is unauthorized to direct a verdict in any
In the case in hand, upon the evidence adduced by
case.
both parties, the case was submitted for final determination without the making of a motion of nonsuit or dismissal
by either party. Upon such a submission the defendant
urged that the facts were not in dispute, and that, on the
esta])lished facts,
as matter of law, was entitled Lo
judgment in its favor.
On the other hand, the plaintiff
ui-ged that the facts were in dispute, and that the question
of the defendant's negligence was one of fact, and not of
law, and hence the determination of the case required
finding by the jury. In such case the determination, whether made by the court as matter of law, or by tlie jury as
matter of fact, called for
judgment on the merits.
We
are tliorefore of the opinion that the court was fully authorized to direct such
verdict and to enter such judga

a

a

a

a

it,
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Whether the ruling was erroneous remains to be
considered.
It is urged that the court erred in directing a verdict
because no grounds were stated for such action.
This
court has repeatedly held that the particular grounds upon
which a motion for nonsuit is based must be stated in order
that the attention of the court and counsel may be called
thereto, and that the defects in the proof may be obviated
and corrected, if such defects admit of correction.
Frank
V. Bullion-Beck, etc., M. Co., 19 Utah, 35, 56 Pac. 419 ; Skeen
V. 0. S. L. R. R. Co., 22 Utah, 413, 62 Pac. 1020 ; Leivis v.
Mining Co., 22 Utah, 51, 61 Pac. 860; Wild v. Union Pac.
Ry. Co., 23 Utah, 266, 63 Pac. 886, and other cases there
cited. From the above cases it will be seen that a judgment
of nonsuit in a number of them was reversed because the
grounds upon which the motion was based were not sufficiently specified, regardless of the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence to send the case to the jury. The general
rule, when a motion is denied or an objection overruled,
the moving party is permitted, on appeal, to urge only
such grounds for a reversal as were specifically pointed
out or made by him before the trial court, but when the
motion or objection is sustained, because of the presumption against error coming to his aid, a party is permitted,
on appeal, to defend the ruling on any ground inhering
in the record, was, either in effect or expressly, held, in a
number of cases in this jurisdiction, not applicable to a
In the case of White v. Rio Grande
motion of nonsuit.
Western Ry. Co., 22 Utah, 138, 61 Pac. 568, it was expressly
decided that there is no difference with respect to the rule
requiring a specification of grounds when the motion is
denied and when the motion is sustained. In Mclntyre v.
Ajax Min. Co., 20 Utah, 332, 60 Pac. 552, this court held
that ''an appellate court will not sustain a motion for
nonsuit, except on the grounds alleged in the motion, ' ' and
approvinglv quoted the syllabus, in the case of Palmer v.
Marysville Dem. Puh. Co., 90 Cal. 168, 27 Pac. 21 that
''It is error for the trial court to grant a nonsuit, unless
the grounds therefor are called to the attention of the
trial judge and the plaintiff at the time the motion is made;
and, where none of the grounds upon which the nonsuit is
asked are sufficient to warrant the court in granting the
ment.

Trial Practice

330

[Chap.

10

motion, the order granting it will be reversed, although
another gronnd, not specified in the motion, might have
warranted the order."
We think the reasons given by courts, requiring the
grounds upon which a motion for nonsuit is based to be
specified, in order that the court ma_y know upon what
question of law the case is asked to be taken from the jury,
and the party against whom the motion is directed may
be afforded opportunity to correct the defects, if they admit of correction, and can be obviated by additional evidence, apply with equal force to a motion for a direction
of a verdict. If such opportunity should be afforded him
on a motion of nonsuit, which, if granted, would not be an
adjudication on the merits, and not a bar to another action,
for much stronger reasons should such opportunity be given
him on a motion for a direction of a verdict, which, if
*
*
*
granted, would be a bar to another action.
*

*

*

In the case of Tandercup v. Hansen, 8 S. D. 375,
N. W. 1073, it was said:
"Where such a motion is made, the specific ground upon
which the motion is made must be stated. It is due to the
court and the opposing counsel, that their attention should
be called to the precise defect in the evidence, or the omission of evidence, that the party claims entitles him to the
direction of the verdict. It is due to the court to enable
it to pass understandingly upon the motion, and it is due
to counsel that he may, if possible, supply the defective
or omitted evidence if permitted to do so by the court."
The same doctrine is stated in 6 PI. & Pr. 699, in the following language:
"The motion to direct a verdict, and the judge in making such direction, should specify the particular ground or
grounds which justify it."
We have not been referred to, nor have we seen, any
case holding to the contrary. This, however, does not mean
that the movant of the motion or the court is required to
If the grounds are
state reasons supporting the grounds.
sulliciently specified to call attention to the particular defects and the (luostion of law on which the case is taken
from the jury, that is all that is required. A mere general
statement that, under the evidence, the plaintiff is not
66
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entitled to recover, or that the defendant is entitled to a
verdict, or that the plainiff has not made a sufficient case
If, however,
to go to the jury, does not point to an\i;hing.
in a case of negligence a specification is made that the evidence is insufficient to show negligence on the part of
the defendant, or that under the evidence the plaintiff is
conclusively shown to be guilty of contributory negligence,
or that he assumed the risk, etc., such a specification is
ordinarily sufficient. If a verdict is directed on the ground
that the evidence is insufficient to show negligence on the
part of the defendant, it sufficiently is made to appear on
what question of law the case was taken from the jury.
The making of such a specification ordinarily points out
the defect within the meaning of the adjudicated cases.
The court in such instance may give reasons why in his
opinion the e\ddence is insufficient to show such negligence.
Though the reasons given may be groundless, yet, if upon
an examination of the record the evidence is found insufficient to show such negligence, the ruling must be upheld. The
rule is also qualified to the extent that, if it is otherwise
made manifest upon what question of law the case was
taken from the jury, and the defects upon which it was
based do not admit of correction, or could n<ot have been
cured had direct attention been called thereto, a failure to
specify grounds will not reverse the ruling. Daley v. Russ,
86 Cal. 114, 24 Pac. 867; Fontana v. Pac. Can. Co., 129 Cal.
It may, however, be urged that a request
51, 61 Pac. 580.
to direct a verdict is a request to charge, and that a party
submitting requests is not required to state reasons or
grounds in sujDport of them. But a request to direct a verdict is not a request to charge the jury. It is, in effect, a
motion to take the case from their consideration.
When
a verdict is directed by the court, the jury is bound to
render the verdict as directed. In such instance the court
alone determines the case, and there is no occasion to instruct or charge the jury in respect of the law applicable to
the case.

"With these observations we now proceed to the question
in hand. At the conclusion of all the evidence, and after
both parties had rested, counsel for the defendant stated:
**I now move the court to instruct the jury to return a
verdict in favor of the defendant, no cause of action ; and.
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in view of the elaborate discussion that has been had, I
unless the court desires to hear
am not inclined to argue
further upon some particular question from us. If counsel

a

it

it

a

if

it

a

it

I

it,

will replj^ to any suggestions that he
cares to argue
It must be conceded that the motion itself
may have."
specifies no grounds, and were that all that was made to
would be very doubtful whether the question of
appear,
law upon which the verdict was asked to be directed was
Counsel for plaintiff in reply to the
sufficiently indicated.
suggestion stated that he did not care to argue questions
which had already been argued. As disclosed by the record, the questions referred to involved the doctrine of the
''turntable" cases, and its application to the facts in the
case.
Counsel for plaintiff further stated that, under all
the circumstances of the case, whether the employees of
the defendant exercised due care in the premises was
question of fact for the jury, and urged that the evidence
was conflicting as to whether the child caught hold of the
The
was injured in some other way.
car, or whether
counsel desired to take the
court then observed that,
position that there was such
conflict, he would exclude
the jury and permit counsel to argue it. The jury was
thereupon excluded, and the matter then discussed by counsel for plaintiff.
In that connection he also discussed the
question, and took the position that the employees were
guilty of negligence in not anticipating the return of the
after
had returned to
child, and in failing to discover
the yard. At the conclusion of plaintiff's discussion, the
court indicated that he did not care to hear from counsel
for the defendant, and stated that, in his opinion, the evidence without dispute, showed that the plaintiff attempted
to get on the car, or was riding on the car, at the time the
injury was icflicted, and that, under the circumstances, he
was not entitled to recover.
The jury was thereupon recalled, and directed to return
verdict for the defendant.
The particulars upon which the verdict was directed were
theretofore called to the attention of counsel, and the question of law upon which the verdict was directed sufficiently
indicated. If the defects were curable, plaintiff was in the
same position to cure them as though the motion itself had
specified the grounds.
This, then, brings us to the further point, made by the
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appellant, that the evidence was sufficient to send the case
to the jury on the question of the defendant's negligence.

a

it

a

a

a

it,

In this case the presence of the plaintiff and his companion, on their first visit to the yard, was discovered by
the defendant's employees. Instead of remaining passive
and inactive, the employees took sufficient affirmative action in the premises to cause the removal of the children, i
In obedience to the direction given them they left the yard
and entered upon adjoining premises, and disappeared
from the sight of the employees. The employees gave the
matter sufficient attention to satisfy themselves that the
children had left the premises, and that they were no longer
in danger. Up to this point it is not contended that the
defendant's employees did not do all that due care reThereafter they directed their attention to their
quired.
work, and continued switching and moving cars about the
yard. In a few minutes the children, without the observation of the employees, again entered the yard and stood
between the fence and the track several lots to the east
of the place where they had left the premises, and there
watched the car slowly approaching them. When it reached
them, they, without the knowledge of the defendant's employees, took hold of it and attempted to get on it. To
now hold with appellant's contention that the employees
ought to have anticipated that the children might return,
and that they were required to observe a lookout for them
before moving and switching the car from one track to
another, or to accompany it so as to warn the children
requires not only
away or prevent them from getting on
holding that the employees were in duty bound to use
care to discover the presence of trespassing children, and.
of wholly unauthorized intrusions of others, to the same
extent as to discover the presence of persons and children
who may, with knowledge on the part of the employees, be
holding
rightfully about the premises, but also requires
that the employees were required to use care to prevent
trespassing children from injuring themselves in the defendant's yard. Upon the undisputed facts in the case the
law does not warrant such
holding.
should
Though
be held that the employees, in the switching and moving
of cars about the yard, owed duty in the premises to use
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care in such operations, the evidence is insufficient to justify a finding that such operations were conducted in a negligent manner, or that the act of moving the car along the
track was the proximate cause of the injury. So far as
made to appear, the car was switched in the usual and ordinary way from one track, and moved along another, at a
The children
speed of from three to four miles an hour.
were not struck by the car. It was not the manner in which
the car was oj^erated that caused it to collide with plaintiff,
or that caused the plaintiff coming in contact with it. The
direct cause of his coming in contact with the car was his
taking hold of the car and attempting to ride on it without the knowledge or consent of the defendant's employees.
While the child, because of its age, cannot be regarded a
conscious trespasser, nor held chargeable of contributory
negligence, nevertheless the consequences of its acts cannot be charged to the defendant.
The conduct of the child
was in no sense influenced or induced by any act or conduct
on the part of the defendant or its employees, nor was the
injury occasioned because of any negligence on their part.
We are of the opinion that the court was justified in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed,
with costs.
McCaety, C. J., and Feick, J., concur.

BOPP V. NEW YORK ELECTRIC VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.
Court of Appeals of New York.
177

Vann,

At

J.

1903.

New York, 33.

of the plaintiff's evidence in chief, each defendant made a separate motion for a nonsuit and each
exc(*))1('(l to the action of the court in denying the motion.
Each defendant had the right to then withdraw from the
case and rest upon its exception. Neither did so. The Ve\\'\v\it Company ]>i('k(Ml ii]) the burden first, put in its evithe close
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dence and again moved for a nonsuit.
Assuming that an
exception was taken to tlie denial of its motion, for the
second time it was in a situation to rely on its exception
and refuse to take any further part in the trial. It did
not do so. On the contrary, it continued to take an active

and aggressive part in the trial by cross-examining the witnesses of its codefendant, thoroughly and at length.
It
aided in developing the facts and attempted to defend itself against the allegations of the plaintiff and the effort
of the other defendant to fasten the responsibility upon
it alone. It did not succeed, and it now claims that all its
action, after its motions to nonsuit were denied, should go
for naught and be ignored upon the ground that the question is the same as if it had withdrawn from the case at
that time. We do not think so. It did not remain in the
case for amusement, but for self-defense, and it could not
make further efforts to defend itself without running the
usual risks. The plaintiff had the right to rely upon any
evidence in her favor, whether it was put in by herself or
by either defendant, and the Vehicle Company by failing
to withdraw when it had the right to and continuing to take
part in the trial, ran the risk that evidence tending to make
it liable would be received. The situation does not differ
in principle from the ordinary case where a sole defendant,
instead of withdrawing when he fails to secure a nonsuit,
continues to take part in the investigation to the end. In
so doing, even if his motion should have been granted when
made, the exception is undermined and becomes of no avail,
provided at the close of the whole case the evidence presents a question for the jury.
Thus in Jones v. Union Railway Company (18 App, Div.
267, 268) Judge Cullen said: "When the defendant enters
into its proof, the question never is, whether the plaintiff's
evidence is sufficient to justify the submission of the case
to the jury, but whether, on the whole case, there is a question of fact as to the defendant's liability. If, at the close
of a plaintiff's case, the defendant is confident that no
eause of action has been made out, the only method of securing a review of an erroneous ruling on the point is to
let the case stand without further evidence. If the defendant enters upon its evidence, it takes the chances of supplying the deficiencies of the plaintiff's case."
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N. Y. 299, 304) we said
through Judge Bartlett: ''The rule laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States seems the proper one,
to the effect that when a defendant, after the close of the
plaintiff's evidence, moves to dismiss, and, the motion being denied, excepts thereto, and then proceeds with his
case, and puts in evidence on his part, he thereby waives
the exception, and the overruling of the motion to dismiss
So in Hopkins v. Clark

(158

cannot be assigned as error."
Judge Martin relied upon the case last cited, when, speaking for us all, he said: "Where after a motion to dismiss
at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, a defendant proceeds with his case and puts in evidence on his part, he
thereby waives the exception to the refusal to nonsuit when
the plaintiff rested." {Sigua Iron Co. v. Broivn, 171 N. Y.
488, 506).

The rule of the Federal courts was expressed by Chief
Justice Waite as follows: "It is undoubtedly true that a
case may be presented in which the refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's testimony will be good ground for the reversal of a judgment
on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, if the defendant rests
his case on such testimony and introduces none in his own
behalf ; but if he goes on with his defense and puts in testimony of his own, and the jury, under proper instructions,
finds against him on the whole evidence, the judgment cannot be reversed, in the absence of the defendant's testimony, on account of the original refusal, even though it
would not have been wrong to give the instruction at the
time it was asked."
{Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Cummings, 106 U. S. 700, 701. See, also, Littlejohn v. Shaiv,
159 N. Y. 188, 191; Wangner v. Grimm, 169 N. Y. 421, 427;
Accident Insurance Co. v. Grandal, 120 U. S. 527; Northern
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mares, 123 U. S. 710; Robertson v. Perkins, 129 U. S. 233 ; Columbia S P. S. R. R. Co. v. Haivthorne, 144 U. S. 202, 206; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Daniels,
152

U. S. 684.)

In

the cases cited the defendant ran the risk that his
own evidence might supply any defect in the plaintiff's
evidence. So, in this case, the Vehicle Company, by contimrmg to try its case, for that is what it did, ran the risk

tbut tiie evidence of its codefendant would supply the de-
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fects in the plaintiff's case against itself. It could not
keep on trying its case without abiding by the condition
of the evidence when all the testimony was in. At that
time there was a question for the jury as to its liability,
and hence its j^revious exceptions, taken when the evidence
did not present that question, became of no avail.
It did not let go of the case when it could have done so
in safety, but hung on until there was evidence enough to
warrant a vt^rdi-^t against it.
Courts sit to do justice according to the rules of law
after giving all parties an opportunity to be heard. The
Vehicle Company had its day in court and was fully heard.
No legal evidence was excluded and no incompetent evidence was received to its injury.
It took no exception to
the charge of the court. Under these circumstances public
business and private rights should not be delayed by granting a new trial on account of an error which was waived
by the subsequent course of the party now complaining.
The Vehicle Company was not compelled to remain in
the case in order to get an exception when its second motion was not granted, because an effort to except, made at
the proper time and in the proj^er form, is an exception,
whether allowed by the court or not.
After considering all the exceptions taken by both defendants we find none upon which a new trial should be
granted in behalf of either.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Gray,

J.

**********

(dissenting).

Haight, Maetin and "Wernee, JJ., concur with Vann,
Parker, Ch. J., and O'Brien, J., concur with Gray, J.
Judgment affirmed.

T. p.— 22

J.

;
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The defendants are husband and wife. On the twentyseventh day of November, 1889, the defendant C. F. Houck
executed and delivered to Calla Houck his promissory note
for about twelve hundred dollars, and a chattel mortgage
upon a stock of goods and merchandise, to secure the payment of the note. The mortgage was filed for record on the
fourth day of December, 1889, and duly recorded. On the
seventh day of December, 1889, the plaintiffs commenced
an action against C. F. Houck upon an account for goods
sold and delivered to him, and sued out an attachment, and
caused the same to be levied upon the mortgaged goods.
Calla Houck intervened in the action, and claimed the goods
as mortgagee.
The plaintiffs answered her petition of
intervention by claiming that the mortgage was invalid
and void as to creditors of C. F. Houck, because it was
made with intent to defraud said creditors. There was a
trial by jury, and when the plaintiffs completed the introduction of their evidence the intervenor moved the court
to direct the jury to return a verdict against the plaintiffs.
The motion was sustained, and the jury returned the verdict as directed, upon which judgment was entered. The
plaintiffs appeal. — Affirmed.

Rothrock,

J.

But it is further claimed that there was some evidence
tending to show that the transaction in question was fraudulent, and that it was the duty of the court to submit the
case to tlie jury if there was any evidence, however slight.
It may ])e conceded that there was some evidence. There
are one or two facts which might be regarded as badges of
fraud; but, wlien weighed in tlie balance with the other
evidence, tliey do not constitute such a conflict as would
authorize a verdict for the plaintiffs. The rule of practice
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in relation to directing verdicts which has prevailed in
this state is well understood. A motion to direct a verdict
for the defendant has been regarded as a demurrer to the
evidence, and it has always been held that such a motion
not only admits the truth of the fact found, but every fact
and conclusion which the evidence conduces to prove, or
which the jurj^ might have inferred therefrom in his favor.
The rule was stated in very nearly the foregoing language
in Jones v. Ireland, 4 Iowa, 63. And that practice has obtained in this state up to the present time. There are a
multitude of cases adhering to the rule. It is unnecessary
to cite them.
They will be found collected in McClain's
The practice has been
Digest (volume 2, pp. 335-338).
that where there is what is called a "scintilla of evidence"
to be considered by the jury, it is error to direct a verdict.
The rule has been stated in various forms of expression, as
will be seen by an examination of the cases. In Way v.
Illinois Central R'y Co., 35 Iowa, 585, the following language is employed: "Hence, under the statute, and our previous rulings, it follows that it is the duty of a nisi priiis
court in this state to submit the case to the jury upon the
evidence where it only tends even to prove
although the
court should feel in duty bound to set aside
verdict for
plaintiff
the
the jury should so find." It
further said
in that case that "in other states
different, and perhaps
better and more consistent rule obtains whereby the court
may direct the jury how to find, where
would set aside
verdict otherwise." Citing Broivn v. R'y Co., 58 Me. 389;
Wilds V. Hudson River R'y Co., 24 N. Y. 430. In other
cases the statement of the rule has been modified, as in
Starry v. Dubuque
S. W. R'y Co., 51 Iowa, 419, in which
the district court directed
verdict for the defendant, this
would have been the
court said: "Such being the case,
set
verdict
aside
in favor of the
duty of the court to
plaintiff. Why, then, occupy the valuable time of the court
at the public expense for the purpose of going through
useless form and ceremony?" Language to the same effect will be found in the case of Botliwell v. C. M.
St. P.
R'y Co., 59 Iowa, 192. After thorough examination of adjudged cases, we have reached the conclusion that the practice should be changed so as to harmonize with that "better
and more consistent rule" referred to in Way v. R'y Co.,
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supra, which now obtains in England and in the United
States courts, and in nearly all the states of the Union.
The doctrine in England on this question is well stated in
the following language: "But there is in every case a preliminary question, which is one of law, namely, whether
there is any e\^dence on which the jury could properly find
the verdict for the party on whom the onus of proof lies. If
there is not, the judge ought to withdraw the question from
tlie jury, and direct a nonsuit if the onus is on the plaintiff, or direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the onus is on the
defendant.
It was formerly considered necessary in all
cases to leave the question to the jury if there was any
evidence, even a scintilla, in support of the case, but it is
now settled that the question for the judge (subject, of
as
stated by Maule. J., in Jewell v.
course, to review)
Parr, 13 C. B. 916, 'not whether there
literally no evithere
none
whether
that
but
dence,
ought reasonably to
essatisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved
"
tablished.'
Ryder v. Womhivell, L. R. Exch. 32; The Dithe Metropolitan R'y Co. v. Jackson, L. R.
rectors, etc.,
the Dublin, W.
App. Cas. 193; The Directors, etc.,
W.
R'y Co. v. Slatterly Id. 1155.
The rule, as stated by the supreme court of the United
States,
as follows: "The judges are no longer required
to submit
case to
jury merely because some evidence
has been introduced by the party having the burden of
proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that
would tear rant the jury to proceed in finding
verdict in
favor of the party introducing such evidence. Decided
cases may be found where
held that,
there
scintilla of evidence in support of
case, the judge
bound to leave
the
the
jury; but
to
modern decisions have
more reasonable rule, to-wit: that before the
established
evidence
left to the jury there
or may be in every case
preliminary question for the judge, not whether there
literally no evidence, but whether there
any upon which
a jury can properly proceed to find
verdict for the party
producing
upon whom the burden of proof
imposed."
Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278. See also. Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 448; Pleasants v. Fant, 12
Wall. 120; Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 373; Merchants Bank v.

Wal).
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In Pleasants v. Fant, supra, the following language is
used: '*It is the duty of the court, in its relation to the
jury, to protect parties from unjust verdicts arising from
ignorance of the rules of law and of evidence, from impulse of i^assion or prejudice, or from any other violation
of his lawful rights in the conduct of a trial. This is done
by making plain to them the issues they are to try; by
admitting only such evidence as is proper in these issues,
and rejecting all else; by instructing them in the rules of
law by which that eivdence is to be examined and applied;
and finally, when necessary, by setting aside a verdict which
is unsupported by evidence, or contrary to law. In the
discharge of this duty it is the province of the court, either
before or after verdict, to decide whether the plaintiff has
given evidence sufficient to support or justify a verdict in
his favor ; not whether on all the evidence the joreponderating weight is in his favor; that is the business of the jury.
But conceding to all the evidence offered the greatest probative force which, according to the law of evidence, it is
fairly entitled to, is it sufficient to justify a verdict? If it
does not, then it is the duty of the court, after a verdict,
to set it aside, and grant a new trial. Must the court go
through the idle ceremony, in such a case, of submitting to
the jury the testimony on which the plaintiff relies when it
is clear to the judicial mind that, if the jury should find a
verdict in favor of jDlaintiff, that verdict would be set aside,
and a new trial had? Such a proposition is absurd, and
accordingly we hold the true principle to be that, if the
court is satisfied that, conceding all the inferences which
the jury could justifyably draw from the testimony, the
evidence is insufficient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, the court should say so to the jury." The same doctrine may be found in the following cases: Rahy v. Cell, 85
Pa. St. 80, in which it is said that "at one time, indeed, it
was the admitted doctrine that, if there was any, the least
evidence, — a mere scintilla, — the question must be submitted to the jury. But that doctrine has been very justly exploded both in England and in this state." Wittkowsky v.
Wasson, 71 N. C. 451; Zettler v. City of Atlanta, QQ Ga.
195; Weis v. City of Madison, 75 Ind. 241; Dryden v. Britton, 19 Wis. 31; Baldiuin v. Shannon, 43 N. J. Law, 596.
Brown v. R'y Co., 58 Me. 384, in which it is said: "It would
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absurd to send a cause to a jury when the verdict, if rendered in favor of the plaintiff, would not be permitted to
stand. Wilds v. Hudson River R\j Co., 24 N. Y. 430, in
which it is said: "No legal principle compels him (the
judge) to allow a jury to render a merely idle verdict."
Brown v. Massachusetts M. S L. Insurance Co., 59 N. H.
298; Brooks v. Somerville, 106 Mass. 271; Ensminger v.
Mclntire, 23 Cal. 593; Morgan v, Durfee, 69 Mo. 469; Simmons V. Chicago S T.R'y Co., 110 111. 340. We might cite
other adjudged cases to the same effect, but it is unnecesIt will be seen from what we have cited that the
sary.
whole turn of legal thought in this country and in England
is contrary to the rule of practice which requires a court
to go on for several days with the trial of a case to a jury
when the verdict must in the end be either for the defendIt is true there
ant, or be set aside if for the plaintiff.
are decisions to be found in a few states in which a scintilla of evidence is allowed to go to the jury. But an examination of the later cases in some of these states will
show that the rule has not been adhered to. We have cited
enough cases to show that the great weight of modern authority is contrary to the rule which this court has adhered
to, though it has more than once intimated that the other
rule adopted by the large majority of courts of last resort
is better and more consistent.
Our conclusion is that when a motion is made to direct
a verdict, the trial judge should sustain the motion when,
considering all of the evidence, it clearly appears to him
that it would be his duty to set aside a verdict if found
in favor of the party upon whom the burden of proof
rests. The adoi)tion of this rule is no abridgment of the
right of trial by jury. A party against whom a verdict has
been directed by the court can have the ruling of the court
reviewed by exception and appeal just as well as he can if
the rule were otherwise, and he takes an appeal to this
court from an order granting a new trial after verdict. He
has no right to insist that the trial of his cause be continued
as a mere idle form, or a mere experiment, that he may
have the gratification of securing a verdict which must be
As wo have soon, courts very generally now
sot aside.
designate sudi a |)i-ocooding as absurd. Probably this court
has too huig folhnvod the rule to be in a position to debe
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nounce it in that way; but we think that, as the question
involves no more than the change of a mere rule of practice,
which will be of material advantage in the trial of cases in
the saving of the time of the trial courts, — time which
ought to be devoted to the transaction of legitimate business, — and the saving of court expenses to the counties,
with no detriment to the rights of any one, it is high time
that this state should adopt the more consistent and logical
practice which now generally prevails elsewhere.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

McDonald v. metropolitan street railway
COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of New York.
167

New York,

1901,

66.

Maetin", J.
This action was for personal injuries resulting in death
of the plaintiff's intestate, and was based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant. An appeal was allowed
to this court upon the ground of an existing conflict in
the
decisions of different departments of the Appellate
Division as to when a verdict may be directed where there
is an issue of fact, and because in this case an erroneous
principle was asserted which, if allowed to pass uncorrected, would be likely ''to introduce confusion into the
body of the law." {Sciolina v. Erie Preserving Co., 151 N.
Y. 50.) The court having directed a verdict, the appellant is entitled to the most favorable inferences deducible
from the evidence, and all disputed facts are to be treated
as established in her favor.
{Laid v. Aetna Ins. Co., 147
N. Y. 478, 482 ; Higgins v. Eagleton, 155 N. Y. 466 ; Ten
Eyck V. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341, 349; Bank of MonongaJiela Valley v. Weston, 159 N. Y. 201, 208.)
If believed, the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses was
sufficient to justify the jury in finding the defendant negligent and the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory
negligence. -The evidence of the defendant was in many
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respects in direct conflict, and if credited would have sustained a verdict in its favor. Whether the defendant was
negligent, the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory
negligence, and the amount of damages, were submitted to
the jury. It, however, having agreed upon a general verdict and failed to answer the questions submitted, the trial
judge withdrew them and directed a verdict for the defendant. Upon the verdict so directed a judgment was entered.
Subsequently an appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, where it was affirmed, and the plaintiff has now appealed to this court.
Although there was a direct and somewhat severe conflict in the evidence, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were clearly of fact, and were for the
jury and not for the court unless the right of trial by
jury is to be partially if not wholly abolished. It was
assumed below that the plaintiff's evidence established a
case which, undisputed, was sufficient to warrant a verdict
in her favor. But the court said that at the close of the
defendant's evidence the plaintiff's case had been so far
overcome that a verdict in her favor would have been set
aside as against the weight of evidence. Upon that alleged
condition of the proof, it held that the trial court might
have properly submitted the case to the jury if it saw fit,
but that it was not required to as the verdict might have
been thus set aside. The practical result of that decision,
if sustained, is in every close case to vest in the trial court
authority to determine questions of fact, although the
parties have a right to a jury trial, if it thinks that the
weight of evidence is in favor of one and it directs a verdict in his favor.
There have been statements by courts which seem to
lend some justification to that theory, but we think no
such broad principle has been intended and that no such
rule can 1)0 maintained either upon principle or authority.
The rule that a verdict may be directed whenever the
proof is such that a decision to the contrary might be set
aside as against the weight of evidence would be both uncertain and delusive.
There is no standard by which to
determine whori a verdict may be thus set aside. It depends upon the disci'etion of the court. The result of setting aside a verdict and the result of directing one are
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widely different and should not be controlled by the same

or circumstances.
In one case there is a retrial. In the other the judgment is final. One rests in
discretion; the other upon legal right. One involves a
mere matter of remedy or procedure.
The other determines substantive and substantial rights. Such a rule
would have no just principle upon which to rest.
While in many cases, even where the evidence is sufficverdict may be properly set aside and
ient to sustain
new trial ordered, yet, that in every such case the trial
verdict and thus
court may, whenever
sees fit, direct
forever conclude the parties, has no basis in the law, which
confides to juries and not to courts the determination of
the facts in this class of cases.
We think cannot be correctly said in any case where the
right of trial by jury exists and the evidence presents an
actual issue of fact, that the court may properly direct
for the
verdict.
So long as
question of fact exists,
insufficient,
jury and not for the court. If the evidence
or
conclusively anthat which has been introduced
matter of law, no question of crediswered, so that, as
bility or issue of fact remains, then the question being one
of law,
the duty of the court to determine it. But
whenever
plaintiff has established facts or circumstances
which would justify
finding in his favor, the right to
jury continues, and
have the issue of fact determined by
the case must ultimately be submitted to it.
The credibility of witnesses, the effect and weight of
conflicting and contradictory testimony, are all questions
court of review
of fact and not questions of law. If
with
dissatisfied
having power to examine the facts
verdict because against the weight or preponderance of
new trial must be
may be set aside, but
e\ddence,
granted before another jury so that the issue of fact may
be ultimately determined by the tribunal to which those
no evidence to sustain
questions are confided. If there
justified in directing
trial court
an opposite verdict,
to set aside an
have
not
because
would
authority
one,
opposite one, but because there was an actual defect of
matter of law, the party was not
proof, and, hence, as
entitled to recover. {Colt v. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y.
671; BaglejfY. Bowe, 105 N. Y. 171, 179.)
is
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We are of the oiDinion that a plain issue of fact was presented for the jury; that the court erred in directing a
verdict; that the judgment and order should be reversed
and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Parker, Ch. J., Bartlett, Vann^ Cullen and Webner,
J., concur ; Gray, J., dissents.
Judgment reversed, etc.

J

GILES
Supreme

V. GILES.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
204 Massachusetts,

1910.

383.

C. J. — This was a trial in the Superior Court
upon three issues, framed upon an appeal from a decree
of the Probate Court allowing the will of Charles E. Giles.
The first issue presented the question whether the will was
duly executed. The second raised the question whether it
was procured by the undue influence of the petitioner. The
third issue was as follows: ''Was said instrument revoked
by the said Charles E. Giles subsequently to the date, execution and publication thereof by the making, execution
and publication of another will which has been lost or destroyed, and its contents cannot be proved so that it can
be propounded for probate?"
Upon the first issue, after testimony by the subscribing
witnesses tending to show that the will was properly executed, it was admitted in evidence, subject to the appellant's
exception, and at the close of the testimony the jury were
directed to return a verdict in favor of the petitioner. To
this direction the appellants excepted.
Tlie will was rightly admitted in evidence, and the testimony well warranted a finding that it was duly executed,
ir. indeed, full credence was given to the testimony of these
witnesses, this conclusion followed almost necessarily.
It
is true that two of the witnesses had little definite recollection of the transaction, apart from their knowledge that
llieir signatures to the clause of attestation were genqine,

Knowlton,
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and that they knew from their signing that tliey saw the execution of the will by the testator in the presence of the
three witnesses. While the jury, upon the facts, could not
have been expected to reach any other conclusion than that
which was recorded under the direction of the court, the
issue was one to be passed upon by a jury, which is the ordinary tribunal for the determination of questions of fact.
Where a proposition is only to be established by testimony
of witnesses, the judge cannot properly direct a jury to decide that the fact is proved affirmatively by testimony.
It
is for the jury to say whether the witnesses are entitled to
credit.
Merchants' National Bank v. Haverhill Iron
Works, 159 Mass. 158; Commonwealth v. McNeese, 156
Mass. 231; Way v. Butterwortli, 106 Mass. 75; Whitteu
We know of no case in this ComV. Haverhill, ante, 95.
monwealth in which it has been determined that a jury can
be directed to return a verdict, upon the oral testimony of
witnesses, in favor of a party who has the burden of provThis direction
ing the facts to which they have testified.
was erroneous and the exception must be sustained.

Verdict on the first issue set aside; verdict on the third
issue to stand. ^
lAccord:
Haughton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., (1905) 165 Ind. 32, 73 N. E.
592; Wolff V. Cam] bell, (1892) 110 Mo. 114, 19 S. W. 622; Anniston National Bank v. School Committee, (1897) 121 N. C. 107, 28 S. E. 134; Perkiomen E. E. Co. v. Kremer, (1907) 218 Pa. St. 641, 67 Atl. 913.
On the other hand, there are many cases to be found where a directed verdict
for the party having the burden of proof, based on parol evidence, has been
See Inhabitants of Woodstock v. Inhabitants of Canton,
approved.
(1897)
91 Me. 62, 39 Atl. 281; Harding v. Eoman Catholic Church, (1906) 113 N. Y.
App. Div. 685; Israel v. Dav, (1907) 41 Colo. 52, 92 Pac. 698; Shumate v.
Evan, (1906) 127 Ga. 118, 56 S. E. 103; Hillis v. First National Bank, (1894)
54 Kan. 421, 38 Pac. 565; Murray v. Bush, (1902) 29 Wash. 662, 70 Pac.
This vrould seem to be the only logical rule in those jurisdictions where
133.
the doctrine of Meyer v. Houck, {supra) is in force.
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hy Both Parties.

EMPIRE STATE CATTLE COMPANY V. ATCHISON,
TOPEKA & SANTA FB RAILWAY COMPANY.
MINNESOTA AND DAKOTA CATTLE COMPANY V.
SAME.
Supreme Court of the United States.
210

1907,

United States, 1.

Me. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
With the object of saving them from destruction by the
flood which engulfed portions of Kansas City on May 31
and the first week of June, 1903, more than three thousand
head of cattle belonging to the petitioners, which were in
the Kansas City stock yards, were driven and crowded
upon certain overhead viaducts in those yards. For about
seven days, until the subsidence of the flood, they were there
detained and could not be properly fed and watered. Many
of them died and the remainder were greatly lessened in
value. These actions were brought by the petitioners to
recover for the loss so sustained upon the ground that the
cattle were in the control of the defendant railway company
as a common carrier, and that the loss sustained was occasioned by its negligence.
The railway company defended in each case upon the

is,

ground that before the loss happened it had delivered the
cattle to a connecting carrier, but that if the cattle were
in its custody it was without fault, and the damage was
the flood above resolely the result of an act of God, that

ferred to.

As

substantially similar facts
and involved identical questions of law, they were tried
together, and at the close of the evidence the trial court denied
peremptory instruction asked on behalf of the plaintiffs, and gave one asked on behalf of the railway company.
135 Fed. Rep. 135.
While there was some contention in the argument as to
wliut took place concerning the requests for peremptory instructions, we think the bill of exceptions establishes that at
the close of the evidence the plaintiffs requested
pera

a

the cases depended upon
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emptory instruction in their favor, and on its being refused
duly excepted and asked a number of special instructions,
which were each in turn refused, and exceptions were separately reserved, and the court then granted a request for a
peremptory instruction in favor of the railway company,
to which the plaintiffs excepted.
On the writs of error which were prosecuted from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that court
affirmed the judgment on the ground that as both parties
had asked a peremptory instruction the facts were thereby
submitted to the trial judge, and hence the only inquiry
open was whether any evidence had been introduced which
tended to support the inferences of fact drawn by the
trial judge from the evidence. One of the members of the
Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Sanborn) did
not concur in the opinion of the court, because he deemed
that as the request for peremptory instruction made on
behalf of plaintiffs was followed by special requests seeking to have the jury determine the facts, the asking for a
peremptory instruction did not amount to a submission of
the facts to the court so as to exclude the right to have the
case go to the jury in accordance with the subsequent
special requests. He, nevertheless, concurred in the judgment of affirmance, because, after examining the entire case,
he was of opinion that prejudicial error had not been committed, as the evidence was insufficient to have justified the
submission of the issues to the jury.
147 Fed. Eep. 457.
The cases are here because of the allowance of writs of
certiorari. They present similar questions of fact and law,
were argued together and are, therefore, embraced in one
The scope of the inquiry before us needs, at the
opinion.
outset, to be accurately fixed. To do so requires us to
consider the question which gave rise to a division of opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals. If it be that the request by both parties for a peremptory instruction is to be
treated as a submission of the cause to the court, despite the
fact that the plaintiffs asked special instructions upon the
effect of the evidence then, as said in Beuttell v. Magone,
157 U. S. 154, **the facts having been thus submitted to the
court, we are limited in reviewing its action, to a consideration of the correctness of the finding on the law and must
affirm if there be any evidence in support thereof."
If, on
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the other hand, it be that, although the plaintiffs had requested a peremptory instruction, the right to go to the
jury was not waived in view of the other requested instructions, then our inquiry has a wider scope, that is, extends to
determining whether the special instructions asked were
rightly refused, either because of their inherent unsoundness or because, in any event, the evidence was not such as
would have justified the court in submitting the case to
It was settled in BeuUell v. Magone, supra, that
the jury.
where both parties request a peremptory instruction and
do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be undisputed and in etfect submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences proper to be drawn from them.
But nothing in that ruling sustains the view that a party
may not request a peremptory instruction, and yet, upon the
refusal of the court to give
insist, by appropriate reof
submission
quests, upon the
the case to the jury, where
the evidence
conflicting or the inferences to be drawn
from the testimony are divergent.
To hold the contrary
would unduly extend the doctrine of BeuUell v. Magone, by
to embrace
case not within the ruling in that
causing
case like the one becase made. The distinction between
fore us and that which was under consideration in BeuUell
V. Magone has been pointed out in several recent decisions
of Circuit Courts of Appeals. It was accurately noted in an
opinion delivered by Circuit Judge Severns, speaking for
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Minahan V. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 138 Fed. Rep. 37, 41, and was
also lucidly stated in the concurring opinion of Shelby,
Circuit Judge, in McCormack v. National City Bank
Waco, 142 Fed. Rep. 132, where, referring to BeuUell v.
Magone, he said (p. 133)
proved
''A party may believe that certain fact which
But
to
verdict.
him
a
without conflict or dispute entitles
facts,
there may be evidence of other, but controverted
proved to the satisfaction of the jury, entitles him
which,
to a verdict, regardless of the evidence on which he relies in
the first place. It cannot be that the practice would not
the
permit him to ask for peremptory instructions, and,
court refuses, to then ask for instruction submitting the
otlicr rjuestion to the jury. And
he has the right to do
tliis, no request for instructions that his opponent may ask
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of the right.

There is nothing in Beuttell
V. Magone, supra., that conflicts with this view when the
announcement of the court is applied to the facts of the
case as stated in the opinion.
"In New York there are many cases showing conformity
to the practice announced in Beuttell v. Magone, but they
clearly recognize the right of a party who has asked for peremptory instructions to go to the jury on controverted questions of fact if he asks the court to submit such questions to
the jury.
Kirtz v. Peck, 113 N. Y. 226; S. C, 21 N. E. 130;
Sutter v. Vanderveer, 122 N. Y. 652; S. C, 25 N. E. 907.
"The fact that each party asks for a peremptory instruction to find in his favor does not submit the issues of fact
to the court so as to deprive the party of the right to ask
other instructions, and to except to the refusal to give them,
nor does it deprive him of the right to have questions of
fact submitted to the jury if issues are joined on which conflicting evidence has been offered. Minahan v. G. T. W. Ry.
Co., (C. C. A.), 138 Fed. Rep. 37."
From this it follows that the action of the trial court in
giving the peremptory instruction to return a verdict for
the railway company cannot be sustained merely because of
the request made by both parties for a peremptory instruction in view of the special requests asked on behalf of the
plaintiffs. The correctness, therefore, of the action of the
court in giving the peremptorj^ instruction depends, not
can deprive him

upon the mere requests which were made on that subject,
but upon whether the state of the proof was such as to have
authorized the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
That is to
to decline to submit the cause to the jury.
say, the validity of the peremptory instruction must depend upon whether the evidence was so undisputed or was
of such a conclusive character as would have made it the
duty of the court to set aside the verdicts if the cases had
been given to the jury and verdicts returned in favor of the
plaintiff. McGuire v. Blount, 199 U. S. 142, 148, and cases
cited; Marande v. Texas d P. R. Co., 184 U. S. 191, and
cases cited ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Pool, 160 U. S. 440, and
cases cited.
To dispose of this question requires us to consider somewhat in detail the origin of the controversy, the contracts of
shipment from which the controversy arose and the proof
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which is embodied in the bill of exceptions relied on to
on the part of the railway
company.

justify the inference of liability
* * *

As

we

think the undisputed

proof to which we
the existence of the

have referred not only established
necessity for the change of route, but also, beyond dispute,
demonstrated that there was an entire absence of all negligence in selecting that route, we are clearly of opinion that
no liability was entailed simply by reason of the change,
even if that change could in law be treated as a concurring
and proximate cause of the damages which subsequently
resulted.

Affirmed.

WOLF V. CHICAGO SIGN PRINTING COUP ANY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
233

Me. Justice

Illinois,

Caetweight

1908.

501.

delivered

the

opinion of the

court:

Fred W. Wolf, appellee, brought this suit in assumpsit in
circuit court of Cook county against the Chicago Sign
Printing Company, appellant, and his declaration consisted
of the common counts, to which a plea of the general issue
was filed.
There was a jury trial, and at the close of all
the

the evidence the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor. The court denied the motion and the defondant excepted. The plaintiff then moved the court to

direct a verdict in his favor, and the court granted the motion and instructed the jury to find the issues for the plaintiff and assess his damages at $4,000, with interest thereon
at five per cent from August 19, 1902.
The defendant exto
the
of
motion
the
and
granting
giving the instruccef)ted
tion. A verdict was returned, in accordance with the direction of the court, for $4,716.66, and the court, after
()V(!rruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, entered judgment on the verdict.
The Branch Ap-
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pellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgment.
The defendant is a corporation with a capital stock of
$5,000. In 1902 Ernest Salmstein was president and Albert
H. Ernecke was secretary and treasurer of the corporation. The stockholders had considered the question of increasing the capital stock from $5,000 to $25,000, and Salmstein and Ernecke had tried to induce the plaintiff to subscribe for part of the increase, but no proceedings had been
taken for such increase. On August 18, 1902, Ernecke obtained from plaintiff a check, payable to the defendant, for
$4,000, and the proceeds were received by the defendant
the next day. The suit was for the money represented by
the check, with interest, and the disputed question of fact
was whether the money was loaned by plaintiff to defendant or was a partial payment upon an agreement to subscribe for $9,500 of capital stock when an increase should be
effected. At the time the check was delivered the following receipt was left with the plaintiff :

"Chicago, 8-18, 1902.
"Eeceived of Mr. Fred W. Wolf the sum of four thousand dollars ($4,000) account Chicago Sign Printing Co.
A. H. Ernecke,
Secy, and Treas. Chicago Sign Printing Co.
8-18, 1902.
"$4,000.00.
"The above amount is part payment on stock in above concern to be issued shortly.

A. H. Ernecke."

The evidence for the defendant was that this entire paper
expressed the agreement between the parties and that it
was all written when the check was given. The evidence for
the plaintiff was that he had refused to take any stock, but
agreed to and did loan the money to the corporation ; that
the receipt was written, and that the recital that the money
was part payment on stock was added without his knowledge by Ernecke and the paper was left lying on the plain-

tiff's table.

*

*

*

The assignment of error to which the argument is devoted is that the court erred in instructing the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, and especially in directing
In
an assessment of interest from the date of the check.
answer to the argument on that question it is contended
that each party having moved the court to direct a verdict
"J, P.

99-
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in favor of such party, they waived the right to submit any

question to the jury and elected to submit the case to the
court for its decision, both upon the law and the facts.
Section 60 of the Practice act provides for the waiver of
a jury trial and a trial by the court of both matters of law
and fact in case both parties shall so agree, and in the
event of such agreement section 61 provides for submitting
written propositions to be held as the law in the decision of
the case, and section 82 provides for taking exceptions to
decisions of the court either relating to receiving improper
or rejecting proper testimony or to the final judgment upon
the law and evidence. There was no such waiver of a jury
trial in this case, and if the right to a verdict of the jury
upon the facts was waived it was only by implication, and
this court has not recognized any waiver of the kind insisted
upon here.
When the practice of demurring to the evidence fell into
disuse and that of making a motion that the court direct a
verdict was substituted, some difference arose in the decisions of the different courts as to the nature and effect of
such a motion, but the ground of the motion and the practice have been thoroughly settled in this State. The motion
to direct a verdict raises only a question of law as to the
legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict against
the party making the motion.
{Angus v. Chicago Trust
and Savings Bank, 170 111. 298 ; RacJi' v. Chicago City Railivay Co., 173 id. 289; Marshall v. Grosse Clothing Co., 184
id. 421; Martin v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.,
194 id. 138.) In the event of an adverse ruling on the motion
to direct a verdict, an exception preserves the question of
law for the consideration of an appellate tribunal. The
submission of a question of fact to the jury does not waive
the question of law already passed upon by the court whore
the rights of the party have been properly preserved.
{Chicago Union Traction Co. v. O'Donnell, 211 111. 349;
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Swift, 213 id. 307 ; Chicago
Teryyiinal Transfer Railroad Co. v. Schiavone, 216 id. 275.)
Some courts have held that where both parties ask the trial
court to direct the verdict it amounts to a request that the
court shall find the facts and a waiver of any right to the
judgment of the jury upon controverted questions of factTho Supreme Court of the United States held to that doc-
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trine in Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154, and saia that by
making the motion both parties affirmed that there was no
disputed question of fact which could operate to deflect or
control the question of law, and that this was necessarily a
request that the court find the facts. That decision has, of
course, been followed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and
there is a formidable list of cases in which it has been applied by those courts. In New York, if any party asks the
court to direct a verdict and his motion is denied, he must
then ask the court for leave to go to the jury upon questions
of fact, and it is held that there is no question for the jury
unless such a request is made. Accordingly, it is there held,
that if both parties ask the court to direct a verdict, and the
court grants the motion of one party and the other makes no
request to be allowed to go to the jury on questions of fact
but acquiesces in the determination of such questions by
the court, he has waived all objection to the mode of trial.
In Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, it is said that the
effect of a request by each party for a direction of a verdict
in his favor clothes the court with the functions of a jury,
and the courts declare that the request by both parties for
the direction of a verdict amounts to the submission of the
whole case to the trial judge, and his decision upon the facts
has the same effect as if the jury had found a verdict after
the case was submitted to them. [Adams v. Roscoe Lumber
Co., 159 N. Y. 176; Smith v. Weston, id. 194; Clason v.
Baldivin, 46 N. E. Rep. 322; Sigua Iron Co. v. Brown, 64
id. 194.) It will readily be seen that such a rule would not
be in harmony with our decisions, and to say that a request
to the court to decide a pure question of law clothes the
court with power to decide controverted questions of fact
would be both illogical and inconsistent with the nature of
Under our practice a request to withdraw a
the motion.
case from the jury could scarcely be converted into an application to the court to take the place of the jury and decide disputed questions of fact. After the court refuses to
withdraw the case from the jury it is not requisite, in our
practice, for the party to ask the court to allow the jury to
decide
which the court has already done by denying the
motion. When one party asks the court to direct
verdict
in his favor, the fact that the other party makes
similar
in
rights
of the first party.
motion cannot
any way affect the
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If that

were true, no party could make a motion for a directverdict without waiving his right to trial by jury if his
The decisions
opjoonent chose to make the same motion.
relied upon to establish the doctrine that if both parties ask
the court to decide a question of law they each waive the
right to trial by jury of controverted questions of fact are
inapplicable to the practice in this State, and the fact that
each party in this case asked the court to direct a verdict
did not amount to a submission of controverted questions of
ed

fact to the court.
* *

*

If

the plaintiff and conwas
clude that the transaction
a loan of the money, then,
under the statute, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
five per cent from the time the money was loaned; but if
the jury credited the evidence for the defendant and concluded that the transaction was an agreement to take stock,
there could be no recovery of interest until the arrangement was repudiated by the plaintiff and a demand made
for tlie return of the money. The plaintiff would only be
entitled to interest from the time that he refused to carry
out the agreement and take the stock. The court was not
authorized to decide that disputed question of fact and to
direct a verdict including interest from the date of the
check. The defendant was entitled to the verdict of the jury
on that question.
The judgments of the Appellate Court and Circuit Court
are reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit
the

jury should believe

Court.
Reversed and remanded.

(c)

When Motion to he Made.

RAINGER V. BOSTON MUTUAL
Supreme

LIFE ASSOCIATION.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
167 Massachusetts,

1897.

109.

Contract, upon a policy of insurance for $1,000, issued by
tlie defendant on the life of Fred S. Eainger, and payable
tu the plaintiff, who was his wife. The answer set up,
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among other defences, false and fraudulent representations
by Eainger in bis application for insurance.
Trial in the
Superior Court, before Dewey, J., who directed the jury to
return a verdict for the defendant ; and the plaintiff alleged
The facts material to the jDoints decided apexceptions.
pear in the opinion.

Morton,

J.

The plaintiff further contends that it was not within the
power of the judge to order the jury to return a verdict for
the defendant at the time when and under the circumstances
which he did. All that the exceptions state on this point
is: ''At the close of the evidence arguments were made by
counsel, and the presiding justice charged the jury. After
the jury had deliberated upon the case for nearly six hours,
they were called back into court. The foreman stated that
they were unable to agree, and the presiding justice directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, to which
the plaintiff duly excepted." So far as appears from the
exceptions this took place in open court, and, if so, it is
clear that the presiding justice had a right to call back the
jury and direct them to return a verdict as he did. He did
not lose his control over the jury because they had retired
to a side room, under his direction, to deliberate on their
verdict, and in the further conduct of the trial he could recall them and give them such additional directions or instructions as the case seemed to him to require. Kidlherg
V. O'Donnell, 158 Mass. 405; Merrift v. Neiv York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad, 164 Mass. 440.
Exceptions overruled.
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Poiver of Court to Compel Verdict.

(d)

CAHILL V. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE,
RAILWAY COMPANY.

&

ST. PAUL

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit. 1896.
20

Circuit Court of Appeals, 184.

Before Woods and Jenkins, Circuit Judges, and Gross
CUP, District Judge.
Woods, Circuit Judge.
This is an action on the case for
personal injury suffered by Maria Cahill, the plaintiff in
error, who, when attempting, afoot, to cross a switching
track of the defendant in error at the Union Stock Yards,
in Chicago, was struck and run over by a backing engine,
whereby she lost both feet, and suffered other serious bodily
injuries. * * *
*
*
*
The Court below directed a verdict for the defendant.

*

*

*

While we have treated the judgment in this case as if it
had been rendered upon a verdict of the jury delivered in
accordance with the court's peremptory direction, the fact
is not literally so. The record shows that the jurors, at
the conclusion of the charge, refused to render a verdict
for the defendant, severally stating that they could not
conscientiously do so, whereupon the court said: "Very
well. You may retire to your room, and return with such a
verdict as you may find." The jury accordingly retired,
but were recalled into court at a later hour, and directed
again to return a verdict for the defendant; but, one juror
still holding out, counsel for the plaintiff was permitted to
stipulate of record that a judgment of dismissal might be
entered, to have the same force and effect, and none other,
than a verdict for the defendant under the direction of the
court, but that plaintiff should be considered as excepting
to such direction, and also to such order of dismissal, and
tliereupon tlie court ordered such dismissal, and the plaintiff thereupon excepted to such ruling. The stipulation
should not have been accepted. The authority and duty of
a judge to direct a verdict foi- one party or the other, when,
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in his opinion,
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the state of the evidence requires
beyond dispute and
not for jurors to disobey, nor for
to
attorneys
object, except in the orderly way necessary to
save the right to prosecute
writ of error. The conduct of
the juror in this instance was in the highest degree reprehensible, and might well have subjected him, and any who
encouraged him to persist in his course, to punishment for
contempt. His conduct was in violation of law, subversive
of authority, and obstructive of the orderly administration
of justice. In fact, by his course he put in jeopardy the interests which he assumed to protect, because
only by
the verdict directed had been retreating the case as
turned that we have been able to review the judgment and
new trial. We deem
to order
proper to observe here
not essential that there be
that
written verdict signed
foreman, and we have no doubt that, in
by jurors or by
cases where the court thinks
right to do so,
may announce its conclusion in the presence of the jury and of the
parties or their representatives, and direct the entry of
verdict without asking the formal assent of the jury. Until
case has been submitted to the jury for its decision upon
disputed facts, the authority of the court, for all the purat every step, necessarily absolute;
poses of the trial,
and its ruling upon every proposition, including the question whether, upon the evidence, the case
one for the
jury, must be conclusive until, upon writ of error,
shall
aside.
provided
That
be set
remedy
by law, and prethere be just
sumably will be eifective and adequate,
ground for invoking it. Certainly the obstinacy of
conceited juror
not likely to prove
wholesome substitute.
The judgment
reversed and the case remanded, with innew trial.
structions to grant
J.,
dissented on other grounds.]
[Jenkins,

CHAPTER XI.
INSTRUCTING THE JURY.
Section
(a)

1,

Questions of Law and Fact.

General Theory of Division of Functions Between
Court and Jury.

STATE V. WRIGHT.
Supreme

Judicial Court of Maine.
53

1863.

Maine, 328.

The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of murder in the first degree, at the October term, 1863, Walton,
J., presiding.
The case came before this Court on exceptions which
appear in the opinion.
Wai^ton, J. — The most important question raised by the
bill of exceptions in this case is whether, in the trial of
criminal cases, the jury may rightfully disregard the instructions of the Court, in matters of law, ana, if they think
the instructions wrong, convict or acquit contrary to such
instructions. In other words, whether they are the ultimate, rightful and paramount judges of the law as well as
the facts.
Our conclusion is that such a doctrine cannot be maintained; that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of
the common law; contrary'' to the uniform practice of the
highest courts of judicature in Great Britain, where our
jury system originated and matured; contrary to a vast
preponderance of judicial authority in this country; contrary to the spirit and meaning of the constitution of the
United States and of this State; contrary to a fair interpretation of our legislative enactment, authorizing the reservation of qnostions of law for the decision of the law
court, and the alk)wance of exceptions; contrary to reason
and fitness, in withdrawing the interpretation of the laws
360
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from those who make it the business and the study of their
lives to understand them, and committing it to a class of
men who, being drawn from non-professional life for occasional and temporary service only, possess no such qualifications, and whose decisions would be certain to be conflicting in all doubtful cases, and would therefore lead to
endless confusion and perpetual uncertainty.
1.
It is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the common law. It was very early provided that the jury should
not entangle themselves with questions of law, but confine
This rule is
themselves simply and exclusively to facts.
expressed in the well known maxim, ad questionem facti

non respondent judices, ad questionem legis non respondent
juratores. It is the office of the judge to instruct the jury
in points of law — of the jury to decide on matter of fact.
Broom's Legal Maxims, 77. ''An invaluable principle of
jurisprudence," says Mr. Forsyth, in his History of Trial
by Jury, "which, more than anything else, has upheld the
character and maintained the efficiency of English juries,

tribunals for judicial investigation of truth." The
author says it is impossible to uphold the doctrine that the
jury are in any case to give a verdict according to their
own view of the law ; that it is founded on a confusion between the ideas of power and right. ''The law," continues
he, "cannot depend on the verdict of a jury, whose office is
simply to find the truth of disputed facts; and yet such
must be the result if they may decide contrary to what the
judge, the authorized expounder of the law, lays down for
their guidance. This would introduce the most miserable
uncertainty as to our rights and liberties, the misera servitus of vagum, jus, and be the most fatal blow that could
be struck at the existence of trial by jury."
Fors}i;h's
History of Trial by Jury, 259, 265.
2.
It is contrary to the uniform practice of the highest
Courts of judicature in England. Mr. Forsyth, after assigning as a reason for the unpopularity and final disuse of
juries in Scandinavia and Germany, that they carried in
their very constitution the element of their own destruction,
in this, that the whole judicial power, — the right to determine the law as well as the fact, — was in their hands, says:
"Far otherwise has been the case in England. Here the jury
never usurped the functions of the judge. They were origas
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inally called in to aid the court with information upon questions of fact, in order that the law might be properly applied; and this has continued to be their province to the
* * *
Hence it is that the English jury flourpresent day.
ishes still in all its pristine vigor, while what are improperly called the old juries of the continent have either sunk
into decay or been totally abolished." Trial by July, 11, 12.
Parties have often endeavored to appeal from the court
to the jury in matters of law, especially in state prosecutions for treason and libel ; but it is believed that no English case can be found in which such an appeal has been
sanctioned by the court.

In

of St. Asaph was indicted for a libel.
Lord Erskine defended him and insisted that the jury had
a right to pass upon the whole issue, including the law as
well as the fact. Being overruled by Mr. Justice Buller,
he moved for a new trial for misdirection ; and in support
of his motion is said to have made one of the most captivating arguments ever listened to in Westminister Hall.
The judges were unanimously
But he did not succeed.
1784 the Dean

against him.

Lord Mansfield, in delivering judgment, declared that
in matters of law the judge ought to direct the jury, and
the jury ought to follow the direction; that this practice
ought not to be shaken by general theoretical arguments or
popular declamation; that the jury do not know and are
not presumed to know the law; that they do not understand the language in which it is conceived, or the meaning
of the terms in which it is expressed; and have no rule to
go by but their passions and feelings ; that if they should
happen to be right it would be by chance only; that to bo
free is to live under a government of law; that if the law
is to be in every case what twelve men who shall happen to
l)e the jury shall be inclined to think, liable to no review,
subject to no control, under all the pojoular prejudices of
the day, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, what
the result would be; that such a doctrine was contrary to
judicial practice, contrary to the fundamental principles
constituting trials by jury, contrary to reason and fitness,
and lie was glad that he was not bound to subscribe to such
an absurdity. 3 T. K., 428, note.
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is contrary to a vast preponderance of judicial
authority in this country. Before the revolution the doctrine seems to have met with some favor. It was undoubtedly believed that in the then condition of things it would
be safer for the colonies that the power of determining the
law should be vested in the jury than to leave it in the
And even after the revolution the
hands of the judges.
doctrine seems to have obtained some currency that in all
cases, civil as well as criminal, the jury had a right to
determine the law as well as the facts. In a case tried in
the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1794, the full
Court instructed the jury that they had a right *'to deterThis
mine the law as well as the fact in controversy."
was in a civil suit. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall., 4.
But this mode of administering justice could not continue. The federal courts soon discovered that however
useful such a doctrine might have been to us as colonies,
it was wholly incompatible with our new and improved
system of government under the federal constitution.
It
was seen that to concede such a power to the jury would
deprive the Judges of the Supreme Court of that supremacy
in matters of law which the constitution had wisely conferred upon them.
In a case before Mr. Justice Baldwin, of the Supreme
Court of the United States, a man by the name of Shive was
tried for counterfeiting notes of the United States Bank.
His counsel gravely argued to the jury that they ought to
acquit his client on the ground that the act chartering the
bank was unconstitutional and void, and that to counterfeit the bills of such an institution was no crime. True, he
said, the Supreme Court of the United States had decided
otherwise, and, as it was composed of very respectable
gentlemen, he would not deny that their opinion was en.
titled to some consideration ; but he contended that, nevertheless, it was the right and the duty of the jury to revise
the decision, and if in their judgment it was wrong to disregard it.
Judge Baldwin at once saw the absurdity of such a doctrine. ''Should you assume and exercise this power," said
he, in his charge to the jury, ''your opinion does not become a supreme law; no one is bound by it; other juries
will decide for themselves, and you could not expect that
3.
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courts would look to your verdict for the construction of
the constitution as to the acts of the legislative or judicial
departments of the government; nor that you have the
power of declaring what the law is, what acts are criminal,
what are innocent, as a rule of action for your fellow citiIf juries once exercise this power we
zens or the court.
are without a constitution or laws. One jury has the same
You cannot bind those who may take
power as another.
your places. What you declare constitutional to-day another may declare unconstitutional to-morrow. We shall
cease to have a government of law when what is the law
depends on the arbitrary and fluctuating opinions of judges
and jurors, instead of the standard of the constitution, expounded by the tribunal to which has been referred all
eases arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of
United States v. Shive, 1 Bald., 512.
the United States."
In United States v. Battiste, 2 Sum., 243, Judge Story
charged the jury that it was their duty to follow the law as
it was laid down by the Court. '^I deny," said he, "that
in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to
decide the law according to their own notions or pleasure.
hold it a most sacred constitutional
On the contrary,
right of every party accused of a crime tliat the jury
should respond as to the facts, and the Court as to the
law. It is the duty of the Court to instruct the jury as to
the law, and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law as
it is laid down by the Court."

I

It

is unconstitutional. The constitution of the United
States confers upon tlie Judges of the Supreme Court the
power to adjudicate and finally determine all questions of
law properly brouglit before them. To allow juries to revise, and, if they think proper, overrule these adjudications, would deprive them of their final and authoritative
character, and tliiis destroy the constitutional functions of
4.

Court.
The Supreme Court of the United States and of this
State have decided that prohibitory liquor laws, like the
one now in force in this State, are constitutional.
Is it
witiiiii the legitimate power of eacli successive jury impannelled to try a liquor case, to reconsider that question,
and, if they think proper, overrule those decisions?
Is
the
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person charged
with counterfeiting our national currency, to be told that
they may rightfully disregard the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States and the rulings of the presiding
Judge, if they, in the exercise of their own judgment, think
them wrong, and acquit the defendant upon the ground that
the Act of Congress authorizing our national banks is unconstitutional? Every intelligent mind must perceive that
it is impossible to maintain such a doctrine.
Law should be certain. It is the rule by which we are
to govern our conduct.
To enable us to do so we must
know what the law is. Doubtful points ought therefore to
be settled, not for the purpose of a single trial only, but
finally and definitely. If each successive jury may decide
the law for itself, how will doubtful points ever become
settled? They will be bound by no precedents. They may not
only disregard the instructions of the presiding Judge, and
the verdicts of all former juries, but they may also disregard the decisions of the law court. They will be authorized
to construe statutes, declare the meaning of teclmieal terms,
and pass upon the constitutionality of legislative and congressional enactments, and acquit or convict according to
their own view of the law. In doubtful cases — cases where
authoritative expositions of the law are most needed — we
should undoubtedly have conflicting verdicts, and the law
would remain in perpetual uncertainty.
Difficult and important questions of law arise in criminal
as well as civil suits. There is scarcely an Act of Congress,
or of our State Legislature, the construction, interpretation or validity of which may not be brought in question in
a criminal prosecution.
Technical terms are to be explained, conflicting provisions reconciled, their prospective
or retrospective operations ascertained, their effect to repeal or restore former statutes considered, and their .constitutionality determined. To do this often requires much
time, careful thought, the examination of numerous authorities, and a familiarity with the law as a science whicii
a lifetime ot preparatory study is scarcely sufficient to
supply.
Juries are generally composed of upright men, willing
anxious to discharge their duty to the best of their
and_
ability. But they are drawn froyn. non-professional
life.
each successive

a
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and lack the advantage of a legal education. When a cause
is finally committed to them they are put under duress of
an officer, and are not allowed to separate till their consideration of the case is closed. They are not allowed the
use of books, not even the statutes which they may be required to construe. Twelve men thus situated may be admirably qualified to weigh evidence and determine facts,
and may be justly entitled to all the encomiums passed
upon them in that respect; but it is impossible to believe
they constitute a suitable tribunal for the determination of
important and intricate questions of law.
^'The founders of our constitution," said Chief Justice
Shaw, (5 Gray, 235,) "understood, what every reflecting
man must understand, from the nature of the law, in its
fundamental principles, and in its comprehensive details,
that it is a science, requiring a long course of preparatory
training, of profound study and active practice, to be expected of no one who has not dedicated his life to its pursuit; they well understood that no safe system of jurisprudence could be established, that no judiciary department of government could be constituted without bringing
into its service jurists thus trained and qualified.
The
judiciary department was intended to be permanent and
co-extensive with the other departments of government,
and, as far as practicable, independent of them ; and therefore, it is not competent for the Legislature to take the
power of deciding the law from this judiciary department,
and vest it in other bodies of men, juries, occasionally and
temporarily called to attend courts, for the performance
of very important duties indeed, but duties very different
from those of judges, and requiring different qualifica-

tions."

Origin of the doctrine.
The doctrine that the jury are
judges of the law in criminal cases originated in a controversy in relation to the law of libel. The doctrine of im-

it

is,

plied malice, which, when applied to homicides, lias been
resisted by some of the best judicial minds in this country
and in England, was exceedingly distasteful to the defendants, when applied to libels.
The Judges, (in England,)
formerly lield tliat the cliaracter of the publication,— that
whether
was or was not libellous, was to be deter-
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mined by the Court; and, if the Court declared it to be
libellous, then malice was implied and need not be proved;
and, what was still more objectionable, the Judges were in
the habit of directing the jury to return a verdict of guilty
upon proof of publication and the truth of the innuendos,
without telling the jury whether the paper was or was not
a libel, and without permitting the jury to determine that
question for themselves ; and then putting the defendant to
the trouble and expense of moving in arrest of judgment, or
suing out a writ of error, if he thought the publication
innocent. Thus, in the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph, for
publishing a very harmless pamphlet, entitled a dialogue
between a gentleman and a farmer, written by Sir William
Jones, Mr. Justice Buller told the jury that it was no part
of their duty to form any opinion as to the character of
the i)amplilet, or the motives of the defendant in publishing
and did not himself express any opinion upon these
points; and, after long and vexatious litigation, judgment
was finally arrested, because not
single sentence in the
whole pamphlet could be pointed out that was libellous. If
the Judge had told the jury that the pamphlet was not
libellous, or had allowed them to determine that question
for themselves, or had allowed them to pass upon the question of malice, the defendant would have been acquitted at
the trial. This manner of trying libel suits led to a controversy in relation to the law of libel, which lasted for more
than half
century in England and finally resulted in an
Act of Parliament, known in history as "Fox's Libel Act,"
declaring the right of the jury to pass upon the whole
issue, and the duty of the Court to give their opinion and
direction to the jury, as in other criminal cases. But this
Act has never been construed in England as giving the jury
the right to determine the law, even in libel suits. "The
judge
the judge of the law in libel as in all other cases,"
said the Court in Rex v. Burdett,
Barn.
Aid., 131. It was
passed to correct the practice of requiring the jury to return
general verdict of guilty without the sanction of
the judge's opinion that
was one warranted by law.
In the course of this controversy the argument was invented and urged with great plausibility by Lord Erskine,
that, in all cases tried under the general issue, the jury had
right to determine the law as well as the facts. But tnis
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doctrine never met with favor in England. The principal
ground relied upon was, not that the jury were judges of
the law, but that the malicious intent with which a libel is
always charged to have been made, is a question of fact
and not a question of law; and the judges were charged
with invading the province of the jury, not in withholding
from them the decision of questions of law, but in withholding from them the decision of a question of fact; and
it was upon this ground that the advocates of the right of
the jury to pass upon the whole issue in libel suits, and to
have the opinion of the Court whether the facts, if proved,
would or would not warrant a verdict of guilty, finally
triumphed.
In this country the right of the jury to pass upon the
whole issue in prosecutions for libel is universally admitted. In this and many other States it is secured by constitutional provisions. In many of the constitutions it is
provided that the jury may do this ''under the direction
of the Court," or "after having received the direction of
the Court." The latter is the form of expression in tliis
State. Upon these and similar provisions the question has
been frequently raised, whether the jury are bound to follow the directions of the Court in matters of law, or are at
liberty to disregard them, and determine the law for themselves. "Upon this point," asys Mr. Greenleaf, "the
decisions are not entirely uniform ; and some of them are
not perfectly clear from the want of discriminating between
the power possessed by the jury to find a general verdict,
contrary to the direction of the Court in a matter of law,
without being accountable for so doing, and their right
so to do, without a violation of their oath and duty.
But
the weight of opinion is vastly against the right of the jury
in any case, to disregard the law as stated to them by the
Court; and. on the contrary, is in favor of their duty to be
governed by such rules as the Court may declare to be the
law of the land; the meaning of the constitutional provisions being merely this, that the jury are the sole judges
of all the facts involved in the issue, and of the application
of the law to the particular case." 3 Green]., Ev., sec. 179.
We thus see that the doctrine that the jury are judges
of the law as well as the facts in criminal cases, is contrary to the fundamental principles of the common law,
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contrary to a vast preponderance of judicial authority, contrary to reason and fitness ; and, if allowed to prevail, will
destroy the constitutional functions of the judicial department of the government. Whether under the provisions of
our State constitution they may do so in prosecutions for
libel, we express no opinion ; but in all other criminal prosecutions we have no hesitation in saying it is the duty of
the jury to be governed by the law as it is laid down by the
court. We fully concur in the opinion expressed by Chief
Justice Shaw, (5 Gray, 198,) that, ''the true glory and excellence of trial by jury is this : that the power of deciding
fact and law is wisely divided; that the authority to decide
questions of law is placed in a body well qualified, by a
suitable course of training, to decide all questions of law;
and another body, well qualified for the duty, is charged
with deciding all questions of fact, definitively; and whilst
each, within its own sphere, performs the duty entrusted
such
trial affords the best possible security for
to
safe administration of justice and the security of public
and private rights."

**********

and Danfoeth,

(b)

Questions

J. J.,

of

Appleton,

Exceptions overruled.
Judgment on the verdict.
C. J., Cutting, Kext, Dickeesox, Baekows
concurred.
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of

AARON V. MISSOURI AND KANSAS TELEPHONE
COMPANY.
Kansas.

Kansas,

1911.

117.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.:
The appellees, Michael Aaron and
Jeanette Aaron, recovered
judgment for $10,000 against
the appellant, the ^Missouri and Kansas Telephone Company, for the violation of its duty to their son, Walter,
a

Johnston,

T. p.— 24
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through which he lost his life. The action was brought
against the appellant and the Delaware Mutual Telephone
Company, of Lansing, but before the case was submitted
to the jury the Delaware Mutual Telephone Company was
dismissed from the case. In the petition it was alleged
that Walter Aaron was an employee of the Delaware company, which, under contract with appellant, had two wires
upon the poles of appellant, and that it was the duty of
appellant to have proper poles and maintain them in a safe
condition for its own operatives as well as those of the
Delaware company who found it necessary to climb and
work upon them; that appellant had planted new poles
along the line and had removed its own wires from the old
and attached them to the new poles; that Walter Aaron
came along afterward and was transferring the two wires
of the Delaware company from the old to the new poles,
and that when he had climbed an old pole for that purpose
and had stripped the wires from that pole, to which he was
* * *
strapped, it broke and fell, crushing and killing him.

The testimony included two written contracts between
appellant and the Delaware company relating to an interchange of business, the connections to be made, the use of
telephones and switchboards, the maintenance of lines, the
placing of the wires of one on the poles of the other and fixing the compensation for such use, a provision releasing one
from loss or damage caused by wires or fixtures, and containing other stipulations as to the duties of each company
and its obligations to the other.
In submitting the case to the jury the court instructed
"that if you believe from the evidence in this case that it
was the duty of the Missouri and Kansas Telephone Company, under a contract with the Delaware Mutual Telephone Company, to maintain the line of poles in question,
including the particular pole in question, in a reasonably
safe condition for the linemen of the Delaware Mutual
Telephone Company to climb and operate upon; that it
failed so to do, and because thereof the death of Walter
Aaron was caused, without fault on his part, then I instruct
you sliall find for the plaintiffs," etc. * * *
The duty of appellant to the Delaware company in respoct to the maintenance of the poles, including the one
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which fell, depended mainly npon the terms of the conThe contracts were in
tracts between these companies.
writing, and their meaning and effect w^ere questions of
law, exclusively within the province of the court. To send
the jury to a written contract to find the respective duties
and obligations of the contracting parties was to leave the
jury to decide the law as well as the facts. It was the
province of the jury to determine all questions of fact involved in the case, after the court had advised them as to
the governing rules of law and instructed them how to
apply those rules to the facts brought out in the testimony.
To impose on the jury the task of interpreting a contract
and of determining the duty and responsibility of appellant
under the contract is to require them to perform a function
which belongs to the court alone — a duty which it can not
surrender or evade. In Belil v. Keepers, 37 Kan. 64, it was
ruled that "when a written instrument is admitted in evidence, it then becomes the duty of the court to construe
and determine its legal effect, the relation of the parties
thereto, and to include such determination in the instructions to the jurv." (Syl. Par. 2; see, also, Broivn v. Trust
Co., 71 Kan. 134.)
The duty of appellant to one employed by and working
for another company is not only a matter of law, but it is
one of vital consequence in the action. The instruction was
little less objectionable than would have been one that if
the jury believed the appellant was responsible for the injury and death the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The
instructions required the jury to cover the entire field, including the province of the court, and left them to determine both the law and the facts. It has been held that the
failure of the court to define the issues in a case and state
them to the jury is error, and likewise it has been decided
that to send the jury to the pleadings to learn the issues
or contentions of the parties is reversible error. (Railroad
Co. V. Eagan, 64 Kan. 421; Stevens v. Maxwell, 65 Kan.
835; Railroad Co. v. Dalton, 66 Kan. 799.)
The duty of
the court to define to the jury the issues made by the pleadings is no more imperative than to determine the questions
of law arising in the case and to state them to the jury. It is
in fact a greater departure from good practice to leave the
jury to interpret written contracts and determine their
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effect on the relations and obligations of the parties than
to leave them to ascertain the effect of the pleadings or the
issues which they present.

For

the error of the court in submitting the case to the
case is reversed and the cause remanded for a new

jury the
trial.

BAKER V. SUMMERS.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
201

Illinois,

Mr. Justice Cartwright

1903.

52.

delivered

the opinion of the

court.

The second instruction told the jury that they should find

the issues for the plaintiff if she had establish-ed, by a preponderance of the evidence, the material allegations of any
of the counts in the amended declaration. There was no
instruction telling the jury what the material allegations of
the several counts were, and what were the material allegations was a matter of law for the court. Although it is a
practice not to be commended for the 'Court to refer the
jury to the declaration for the issues, it has not been considered error to make such reference where the instruction
The
requires proof of the averments of the declaration.
proper method is for the court to inform the jury, by tiie
instructions, in a clear and concise manner, as to what material facts must be found to authorize a recovery.
The
averments in the declaration which would be clear to a
lawyer would often be obscure and unintelligible to the
average juryman. (Moshier v. Kitchell, 87 111. 18.) Where
the jury are not only referred to the declaration to determine the issues, but are instructed to find a verdict for the
plaintiff if the material allegations of the declaration are
proved, they are left to decide, as a matter of law, what
are the material allegations, and might conclude that some
allegation essential and material in the law was not ma-
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terial or necessai^y to be proved to justify a recovery; and
such an instruction as this was liehl to be undoubtedly
erroneous in Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad
V. Bailey, 145 111. 159.

**********

The judgments of the Appellate and Circuit Courts are
reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court.
Reversed

and remanded.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY V. WOODSON.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
79

1909.

Kansas, 567.

June

while a passenger
on one of defendant's trains, got into an altercation with
a Pullman porter, in the course of which Woodson stabbed
the porter, under circumstances not clearly disclosed. Soon
afterwards the conductor of the train arrested Woodson,
put him. off the train at Ottawa and had him locked up in
the county jail. Subsequently Woodson was tried for the
assault and acquitted.
This action was brought for false

[Arthur Woodson,

on

27, 1905,

imprisonment.]^

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Graves, J.: The arrest and detention of the plaintiff,
prior to July 1, 1905, was without a complaint or warrant.
Wlien the arrest >eomplained of was made the plaintiff was
not engaged in the commission of any offense whatever.
He was quietly seated in a chair, like other passengers.
The defendant interposed the defense that the conductor,
when the arrest was made by him, had probable cause to
believe that a felony had been committed, and this belief,
if honestly and in good faith entertained, justified the arrest, whether the felony had been committed or not. As
indicated by this issue, the pivotal question in the case was
whether this alleged probable cause existed or not. This
question could not be intelligently determined by the jury
unless they understood what in law constitutes probable
iStatement

of facts condensed by the editor.

Trial Practice

374

[Chap.

11

It

was the duty of the court to define this phrase
clearly, so that the evidence could be easily applied to such
definition by the jury. The only instruction given by the
court upon this question, reads :
'*If the plaintiff was a passenger on one of the passenger
trains of the defendant company, and the conductor of said
train arrested the plaintiff and removed him from said
train at Ottawa, a station on said road, or removed plaintiff from the train and then caused his arrest and imprisonment, the defendant company would be liable for said arrest and imprisonment if said arrest and imprisonment was
false ; that is, wrongfully made under the circumstances of
cause.

the case."
When may
Wlien is an arrest legally false or wrongfun
a conductor on a passenger-train, without a warrant, rightfully imprison a passenger while such passenger is 'Conducting himself in a quiet and orderly manner and there
are no reasonable grounds to apprehend misconduct on his
part? The answer given by the law to the last question is :
\Vhen the conductor has probable cause for believing that
the passenger has committed a felony, and acts in good
faith upon such belief. What in a legal sense constitutes
What is a felony? These questions inprobable cause.
volve both law and fact, and are vital to the issue presented
in this case. The jury are not supposed to know the law,
and they should be clearly advised by the court as to the
law which governs the case on trial. This was not done,
but the law and the fact were both submitted to the jury for
their determination.
Because of the erroneous and misleading character of the
instructions given, * * * * the judgment of the district
court is reversed, with directions to grant a new trial and
proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.

*****
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V. TOWN OF FOND DU LAC.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
61

Illinois,

Mr. Justice McAllister

1871.

174.

delivered

the

opinion of the

court.

This was assumpsit, brought by appellant as administrator of the estate of William Mitchell, deceased, against
appellee, to recover for the support and maintenance by the
intestate in his lifetime of one Eliza McFerren, from the
23d of March, 1857, to the 23d of January, 1858, said Eliza
being an alleged pauper and resident of the said township.
The first instruction on behalf of appellee is as follows :
"If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the person,
Eliza McFerren, was boarded and lodged and furnished
with clothing by William Mitchell (whose administrator
brings suit) from the 1st day of March, A. D. 1857, until
his death in 1858, yet, unless they further believe, from the
evidence, that during that time the said Eliza McFerren
was a pauper for whose support the defendant was legally
liable, or for whose support the defendant had, by its proper
officer, contracted to pay the said William Mitchell for during said time, they will find for the defendant."
This instruction submits to the determination of the jury
two questions of law, without an}' aid from the court, viz. :
First — What shall constitute the legal liability of a town
to support a pauper?
Second — Wlio is the proper officer to make a binding contract on the part of the town for such support by another ?
The impropriety of leaving questions of law to the deter-

mination of the jury has been so often decided by the courts
that the citation of authorities seems unnecessary.
The court should have instructed the jury as to what
facts were indispensable to create the legal liability of the
town for the support of the person in question, and then
told them that if such facts were not established by the evidence, to find for the defendant; and should likewise have
informed the jury who the proper officer to bind the town
for such support was, and what would be necessarv to con-
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stitute a contract express or implied, and then left it for
them to say whether such officer acted in the premises, and
if he did nothing to create a contract within the definition
A
given, that then they should find for the defendant.
majority of the court think the instruction erroneous.
For this error, the judgment of the court below must be
reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

WTNCHELL V. TOWN OF CAMTLLUS.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New

York.

109

Williams,

1905.

New York Appellate Division, 341.

J.

:

The judgment and order should be reversed upon questions of law only and a new trial granted, with costs to the
appellant to abide event.
The action is to recover damages for negligence in permitting a sluiceway across a highway under the traveled
part thereof to become filled up so as to set back surface
water accustomed to flow through the same upon the plain-

tiff's premises.

is

it

is

is

it,

In 1890 the Highway Law (Chap. 568) was passed, and
by section 180 of that law the statute of 1881 was repealed
to take effect on March 1, 1891.
(Id. Sec. 183). Substantially the same provision was substituted for
however,
by section 16 of that law, Vviiich
as follows:
''Every
town shall be liable for all damages to x>erson or property
sustained by reason of any defect in its highways or
bridges, existing because of the neglect of any commissioner of highways of such town." The basis of the ngat
to recover
here plainly stated to be the neglect of the
commissioner and not the town.
The trial court read this section to the jury, and then
made the following statement to them:
"Now,
the
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contention of the defendant in this case, that the defects
therein referred to only relate to the defects in the traveled
portions of the highway, or defects affecting the traveler.
leave with you with
Now, that contention is one which
other matters; as a matter of fact to determine."
This statement in the charge was excepted to by the defendant's counsel, and the court was requested to charge
that the defect complained of in the case was not one contemplated by section 16 of the Highway Law, but the court
declined so to charge.
The court did charge that no recovery could be had except under the provision of this section. The jury evidently found as matter of fact that the defect complained of was
within the provisions of this section. Otherwise they could
not have rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.
"We are unable to perceive how the legal meaning or
effect of a statute can be a question of fact for a jury. We
had supposed it was always a question of law for the
court. There was no dispute in this case as to what the
defect was claimed to be, the stopping up of a sluiceway
under the traveled part of the highway, and the damage resulting was not to a traveler on the highway, but to an
adjacent property owner, the setting of surface water back
upon his land, and damaging the same.
The highway was in no way obstructed or interfered with
so far as travel along the same was concerned.
The defendant's contention was that the defects referred to in the
statute related only to the traveled portion of the highway
and affecting the traveler, and the court was asked to construe the statute and to instruct the jury as to its meaning
so they could follow those instructions in considering the
evidence and deciding the case. The court declined to do
this and left the jury to construe the statute as a matter
of fact and not of law.
We think it was the duty of the court to pass upon questions of law, and that it could not properly refuse to do so.
Very likely if tlie jury decided the law properly, as a question of fact, the defendant was not prejudiced, but we think
they went wrong, and held the defendant liable under this
section, when it was not liable at all.

I
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There was clearly no legal right to recover in this action,
and it was erroneously submitted to the jury.
The motions for nonsuit should have been granted.
All concurred, except McLennan, P. J., who dissented in
an opinion in which Spring, J., concurred.

DIDDLE V. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
65

1909.

West Virginia, 170.

JudgC :
Thomas D. Diddle, insured for the benefit of his wife,
Lydia Diddle, in the Continental Casualty Company, for
$2,000.00, was struck by a railway water column, while
riding on a railway engine, and killed. His wife brought
this action on the policy and recovered a judgment for the
sum of $2,049.30. The defense was predicated on a limited
liability clause in the policy, reading as follows: ''Where
the accident or injury results from voluntary exposure to
unnecessary danger or obvious risk or injury, or from the
intentional act of the Insured or of any other per* * * *
or (2) where the accidental injury reson;
sults from or is received while quarreling, fighting or
violating the law; * * * * then and in all cases referred to in this Part III, the amount payable shall
would be
be one-tenth of the amount which otherwise
payable under this policy, anything in this policy to the
contrary notwithstanding, and subject otherwise to all the
conditions in this policy contained." Deeming this clause
applicable and controlling, under the circumstances attending the death of the assured, the insurance company tendered the beneficiary $200.00, one-tenth of the amount of the
policy, less $20.00, due it on account of unpaid premium,
POFFENBARGER,

which she refused.

The following facts are disclosed by the evidence: The
insured was a car-repairer in the shops of the Chesapeake
and Ohio Railway Company at Pluntington. In the even-
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ing of the day he was killed, after the completion of his
work, he came out of the shop, walked down tlie railway
track in a westerly direction a short distan-ce, passing the
water column, standing midway between two railway tracks,
about nine feet apart, and stepped on one of two engines,
drawing a train of cars over a switch from the west bound
track to the east bound track, as he had often done beInstead of getting into the cab of the engine, he
fore.
stood on the step on the outside, holding to a hand-grip,
and
while his body projected or swung from the side of
in
act
into
climbing
he
of
the
was
was riding in that way, or
the engine came
the cab and before he had accomplished
to the water column and his body came into violent contact
with it. * * * *

a

a

it

it,

a

if

a

it

a

Over the objection of the defendant, the court gave one
instruction for the plaintiff in which the jury were told,
first, that the boarding of the engine was not
violation
making
criminal
to
or
statute,
jump
on
off of
of the
trains; and, second, that they might find
verdict for the
they believed from the facts, circumstances and
jilaintiff
evidence that the water tank was
dangerous obstruction,
unless they should further believe that the danger was
known to tlie insured and could have been reasonably expected by him. The court erred in giving the instruction,
since the second proposition, involved in
submitted to
the jury matter which
was the duty of the court to pass
matter of law. Upon the admitted
upon and declare as

Loan Ass'n, 55 W. Va. 134.
errors aforesaid, the judgment will be reversed,
the verdict set aside and the case remanded for
new trial.
the

a

For

&

Bmlding

is

it

a

it,

and uncontroverted facts, disclosed by the evidence, the
danger and risk were palpably obvious. The insured was
bound to know it. The law did not permit him to say, nor
the jury to find, that he did not know
or to excuse him
having
because, though
opportunity for deliberation and
voluntary action," he did not make use of the faculty of
sight, which would have revealed to him the danger and
the risk. There was no basis in the evidence for
finding
in favor of the plaintiff. Under such circumstances,
error to give an instruction telling the jury they may so
find. Kuyliendall v. Fisher, 61 W. Va. 87, 102; Parker v.
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Taken From the Jury.

STANDAED COTTON MILLS V. CHEATHAM.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
125

1906,

Georgia, 649.

Beck, J.
The petition of Cheatham contained substantially the following allegations; that he was employed by
the Standard Cotton Mills to work at certain machines

carders," which were operated by a belt from a
pulley, and it was a part of his duty to clean the machines
by opening certain lids thereon, placing his hand inside of
the same, and taking therefrom accumulations of trash and
In order to clean the carders
lint called "strippings."
it was necessary to stop them, and this was done by switching the belt from the tight pulley, upon which it worked, to
Plaintiff alleges that he had stopped the
a loose pulley.
machines in the manner described, and had opened the lid
and placed his hand inside of one of the carders, when
the belt slipped from the loose pulley on to the tight one,
called

'^

the machine started, caught his hand, and mangled it se-

verely

*

*

*

Movant also complains that the court erred in chargfng
the jury as follows: ''If the carder machine was stopped
by slipping the belt from the tight to the loose pulley, and
that was the proper way to stop the machine and keep it
stopped until the operator himself slipped the belt from
the loose to the tight pulley, if the plaintiff did not know
or ought to have known to the contrary, he would have the
right to presume tliat Ihe belt, once shifted from the tight
to the loose pulley, and the machine thereby stopped, would
remain stopped until again started.
That I charge you
as correct law, gentlemen, provided the defect was one that
the plaintiff could not have discovered by the exercise of
ordinary diligence."
It is alleged that this portion of the
charge was error, "because it was a question for the jury
to determine whether the plaintiff would have the right
to presume that the belt would stay shifted when once
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And this
shifted, considering all the facts before them."
In charging as here alleged,
point seem? to be well taken.
in
the teeth of the statute
directly
went
the trial court
which declares that it is error for a trial judge to express
or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been
We cannot imagine a
proved (Civil Code, Sec. 4334).
more direct invasion of the province of the jury than for
the court to instruct them that as to one of the facts material to be considered by the jury in passing upon the
question as to whether or not the plaintiff himself was
guilty of negligence, "he would have the right to presume
that the belt, once shifted from the tight to the loose pulley,
and the machine thereby stopped, would remain stopped
This did not fall far short of inuntil again started."
structing them that if the plaintiff took certain precautions
while inserting his hand into a dangerous machine, he havl
the right to presume that the precautionary measure so
taken would be equivalent to the exercise of due care and
caution in guarding against an injury that might be brought
about by the machine being set in motion.
In brief, the
court attempted to and did in one breath deal with and
dispose of a vital question of fact.
If any presumption
at all arose as to what would be the effect of shifting the
belt in question from the tight to the loose pulley, it was
a presumption of fact, and should have been left for the
jury's consideration alone, unaided by the court.

**********

Judgment

reversed.

Fish, C. J., absent.

All

the

Justices

concur,

except

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY
V. JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
221

Illinois,

1906.

42.

Mr. Chief Justice Cartwright delivered tiie opinion of

the court :
This is an action on the case brought by appellee, as ad-

382

,

Teial Practice

ministratrix of the estate of her

son,

[Chap.

11

Carl Eobert George

Johnson, in the circuit court of Cook coiintv, to recover
damages from appellant for causing his death.
The declaration alleged that the deceased, who was a
minor, became a passenger on November 3, 1900, on one of
defendant's trains, in the front car next tc the engine, at
West Pullman station, to be carried to Pullman station;
that the train arrived at Pullman station about 7 :45 in the
evening; that at Pullman station was an elevated platform between the tracks for north-boujad and south-bound
trains for the use of passengers; feat when the train
stopped at Pullman the deceased leit the car at the forward
end, as was cutsomary and as directed by defendant; that
the train and car had passed by and beyond said elevated
platform, and on leaving the car deceased found himself
on the ground a few feet north of the elevated platform
between said tracks, with the engine and cars on the east
side and a vacant space on the west and a high picket fence
across the platform on the south; that the depot and exit
were on the west west, and as the deceased went from the
place where he alighted, in a westerly and southerly direction, toward the gates, using due care, one of the locomotive engines of the defendant going in a southerly direction
on the south-bound track struck and killed him.
The plea
was the general issue, and upon a tiial the jury returned
a verdict finding the defendant guilty and assessing plainJudgment was entered on the
tiff's damages at $5000.
verdict, and the judgment was affirmed by the Appellat<
Court for the First District.
The instruction given at the request of the plaintiff which
purported to state the relative duties of the parties, the
theory of the plaintiff and ground for recovery alleged in
the declaration, and the amount of damages which might be
awarded, was as follows:
"The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that if you
find, from the evidence, that the defendant corporation was
engaged in the business of transporting passengers and
freight, for hire, upon a railroad o])erated by said company,
then the law denominated the defendant a common carrier.
The court instructs the jury that common carriers of persons are required to do all that human care, vigilance and
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foresight can reasonably do, in view of the character and
mode of conveyance adopted, to prevent accidents to passengers.
So, too, persons who become passengers must
at all times exercise ordinary care and caution for their
And if the jury believe, from the evidence in
own safety.
this case, that the defendant was at the time of the accident a common carrier, and if you further believe, from the
evidence, that the deceased was a pasesnger on the defendant's train and in the exercise of due care on his part, if
the jury so believe from preponderance of the evidence,
and that the defendant carelessly or negligently operated
its said train or car by running the same past the station
platform, so as to cause the deceased to alight upon the
ground and tracks of the defendant instead of upon the
platform where the passengers are usually unloaded, and
that by reason of such negligent acts, if any are proven
by the preponderance of the evidence in the case, of the
defendant, their agents, and employees, the deceased, Carl
Robert George Johnson, while exercising due care for his
safety, if you so find from the preponderance of the evidence, was struck by an engine controlled and operated by
the defendant and was then and there killed, then you may
find the defendant guilty, and assess the plaintiff damages at such reasonable sum as she may be entitled to recover under all the facts and circumstances proved in the
case, not exceeding $5000."
The instruction was erroneous in three respects.
It was
proved, and not disputed, that the train ran three or four
feet past the north end of the platform, and that deceased
alighted upon the ground instead of on the platform where
passengers were usually unloaded.
The questions in dispute were whether the act of defendant in running past the
platform constituted negligence on its part, and whether
such act caused the deceased to alight upon the ground at
an improper place, or whether he was negligent in going
down the steps where he did.
They were questions of
fact for the jury to determine from the evidence, and it
was the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether
the act of the defendant was negligent and whether tlie decased was J^ilty of negligence.
No other act of the defendant was alleged and no other fact stated in the declaration which could have been construed to be a negligent
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one, and the court could not say that either of the
was negligent as a matter of law.
The Appellate

11

parties
Court,

in considering whether the evidence warranted the jury
in finding the defendant guilty of negligence which caused
the injury, expressed no opinion as to whether the running
of the train past the station platform constituted negligence or not, but held that the defendant was negligent
in the management of the south-bound train, saying that it
was the duty of the engineer to have been on the lookout
for the north-bound train; that he must have known his
train was late; that he ran the train at the rate of from
twelve to fifteen miles an hour, and that the evidence tended
to show he did not exercise the required degree of care in
the operation of his train so as to be able to stop for the
safet}^ of passengers getting on or off the north-bound
train.
There was no averment in the declaration as to
the speed of the south-bound train or failure to keep a lookThe crossing
out, or mismanagement of it in any respect.
place for passengers was south of the platform, more than
three hundred feet distant, and where the train would have
come to a full stop ; and if the question as to the management of the south-bound train had been submitted to the
jury, they would doubtless have considered the question
whether the engineer had, or ought to have had, any reason to expect that a person would be on the track at the
north end of the platform.
It appears, however, that
such questions were not submitted, and that the verdict was
based on the negligent character of the act in running past
the platform.
On that question the instruction assumed
both that the act was a careless and negligent one, and that
it caused the deceased to alight upon the ground on the
tracks of the defendant instead of upon the platform, and
it afterwards refers to the acts as ''such negligent acts."
The plaintiff was entitled to recover if the jury should decide that the act of the defendant was negligent, that it
caused the injury, and that the deceased was in the exercise of ordinary .care; but it was the exclusive province of
the jury to determine those facts, and they should have
been submitted to the jury for determination without any
intimation or assumption as to the proper conclusion.
In
the case of Chicago and NortJiwestern Raihvay Co. v. Moranda, 108 111. 576, the CQurt said : "Where there is evidence
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before a jury upon which it is legally admissible there may
be difference of opinion, it is error to allow any opinion of
judge or court to be obtruded upon the jurors to influence
Where the evidentiary facts will
their determination."
justify different conclusions the question of negligence is
one of fact, and instructions should alwaj^s be dra\\Ti so as
to state th^ law upon a supposed or hn^othetical state of
Instructions asfacts, leaving the jury to find the fact.
suming the existence of any material fact have always been
condemned.
{Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283; Michigan
Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Co. v. Shelton,
66 id. 424; Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v.
O'Connor, 119 id. 586; Swigart v. Hawley, 140 id. 186; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Griffin, 184 id. 9; Allmendinger v. McHie, 189 id. 308; Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago
and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Banfil, 206 id. 553.) Under this
instruction, when the jury found that the train was run
past the platform, they would understand that the court
regarded such act to be a careless and negligent operation
of the train, and that it caused the deceased to get off the
train at the place where he did.
It did not call upon the
jury, as it should have done, to decide whether the act constituted negligence on the part of the defendant.
Because
have been
Court and
manded to

of the material and prejudicial errors which
pointed out, the judgments of the Appellate
circuit court are reversed and the cause is rethe circuit court.
Reversed and remanded.

BUTTRAM V. JACKSON.
Supreme

Court of Georgia.
32 Georgia,

1860,

409.

The questions in this case arise out of the following state
of facts:
Some time in December in 1857, Ira G. Jackson sold to
Andrew J. Buttram a mule, and received in payment thereT. p.— 25
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for two promissory notes, given by
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H. Harris, one

of the notes dated 10th November, 1857, and due twelve
months after date, payable to said Buttram, or bearer, for
the Slim of $30.00 ; the other dated 22d October, 1857, and
due 25th December, 1858, payable to Martha McElreath, or
bearer, for $40.00.
On the 22d January, 1859, Jackson

instituted suit in
Carroll Superior Court, against Buttram, to recover the
value of the mule, alleging, in one count of his declaration,
that Buttram, at the time of the trade, warranted the notes
to be good, and that Harris was perfectly solvent, and that
if the notes were not paid by Harris at their maturity, he,
Buttram, would pay the amount due on the same, whereas,
in truth and in fact, Harris was insolvent at the time, and
afterwards absconded, and went to parts unknown.
The defendant pleaded the general issue.
When the testimony and argument had closed, the presiding judge charged the jury, "that if the defendant told
the plaintiff, at the time of trading him the notes on Harris,
that he considered Harris good, but that he would not be

bound, yet he was bound, if Harris was not good at that
time, if Jackson took the notes on such representation, although there was no guaranty by defendant to stand good
for the notes, the notes being taken by Jackson, who was
ignorant of the condition of Harris at the time, whose condition was known to Buttram."

By

the

Error

Court. — Jenkins, J., delivering the opinion.

was further assigned, in the grounds of the motion
for a new trial against the charge of the Court as set forth
in the statement.
In that charge the presiding judge deemed it necessary,
in order to facilitate the application of the law by the jury
to the case, to advert to certain facts claimed bj^ one party
to have been proven, but the proof of which was denied by
the other.
This practice is not objectionable; indeed, it is
sometimes necessary, to enable the jury to understand
clearly the relation existing between the law and the facts
of the case; but the utmost caution should be observed to
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guard the jury against the inference, that the judge considers any disputed fact to have been proven.
Juries are usually very open to influence from the Bench,
and it is right that they should be so; but that influence
should never be extended to their conclusions, in matters of
A careful analysis of the charge under review makes
fact.
it apparent that the judge put his reference to some of the
facts hypothetically, as ''*/ the defendant told the plaintiff," etc., 'S/ Harris was not good at that time," etc.,
whilst his reference to other facts was in terms which assume that they were incontestably proven, as ''Jackson,
who was ignorant of the condition of Harris, at the time,
The
and whose condition ivas Jinoivn to Buttram," etc.
hypothetical is the proper form of putting facts in such
cases, because it distinctly puts the jury on the inquiry as to
those facts ; but in relation to other facts, put positively before them, put as facts ascertained in the same connection,
in the same sentence, they are much less apt to feel the necessity of inquiry. Indeed, these different modes of treating different facts, would seem to give a double assurance,
that they are relieved from the necessity of scrutinizing the
evidence for the proof of some of them : 1st.
Because the
2nd. Because he has
judge has treated them as proven.
We think there was
cautiously treated others as doubtful.
*
error in this * *
The judgment of the Court, therefore, must be reversed

and a new trial ordered.

Let the judgment

(d)

he

reversed.

Comments by the Court on the Weight of the
Evidence.

NEW YORK FIREMEN INSURANCE COMPANY
V. WALDEN.
Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of
Errors in the State of New York.
1815.
12

Johnson, 513.

This cause came up from the Supreme Court on a writ of
error.

388
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That
1.
the plaintiffs in error, it was contended.
there was a concealment of certain letters and matters, relative to the conduct and character of the master, which were
material to the risk, and ought to have been disclosed to
the plaintiffs in error, at the time the policy was underwritten. * * * 2. That under the circumstances of -the
case, the policy did not protect the ship against the barratry
of Cartwright, the master ; and that there was not sufficient
evidence of barratry to entitle the plaintiffs below to re*
*
*. 3. That the materialty of the
cover on that ground
was
a
concealment
question of fact, and ought to have been
*
*
*
left to the jury.
The Chancellor. This case comes up upon a bill of exceptions, and we are accordingly to be confined to the objections taken at the trial, and appearing on the face of the
bill.
The question is, whether there was error in the
charge which the learned judge delivered to the jury. This
charge was, ''that the several matters given in evidence on
the part of the plaintiffs, were, in his opinion, conclusive
evidence of the barratry of the master of the vessel, on the
voyage; and that the plaintiffs were not bound to communicate, or disclose, to the defendants, any of the letters, matters, or circumstances, which were, at the time of the insurance, in their possession, relative to the master; and tli;^
the matters given in evidence, on the part of the defendants, were not sufficient to maintain the issue on their part,
or; to bar the action of the plaintiffs; and that if the jury
agreed with him in opinion, they ought to find a verdict for
the plaintiffs;" and with that charge, he left the matter to
the jury.
The counsel went at large into the discussion of the question, whether the assured were bound to communicate to
the underwriters, at the .time they applied for insurance,
the letters and other knowledge they possessed of the improper conduct of the master.
But it appears to me that
this question is not for the. decision of tliis Court, because,
wlietlier the circumstances relative to the master ought to
have been disclosed, depends upon the question, whether
those circumstances were material to the risk; and the materiality is a question of fact for a jury and not a question
of law for the Court.
It is a well-settled principle in the

Sec. 1]

Instbucting the Jury

389

law of insurance, that what facts, in the knowledge of the

assured, are material, and necessary to be commnnicated
to the underwriter, when insurance is asked for, is for a
jury to determine; and will briefly notice a few cases, in
My whole opinion will rest upon
illustration of this point.
the admission and the solidity of this principle.

I

It

**********

is thus settled, (as far as authority goes,) beyond all
doubt or contradiction, that, whether the matters not disclosed in this case were material, was a question that ought
to have been submitted to the consideration and decision of
apprehend, lies the error committed
the jury; and here,
by the learned judge, that he has given a binding direction
to the jury, upon matter of fact, as if it had been matter of
law.
It appears to me, that the true and necessary construction of the charge, as stated in the bill, is, that it was
a positive direction, in point of law, as to the materiality of
the non-disclosure, and that it must have been so received
If the charge had been intended
and obeyed by the jury.
as a mere opinion to the jury, on a matter of fact, on which
they were to exercise their judgment, the jury would, undoubtedly, have been told, that the defence in the case
rested upon the question of the materiality of the letters
and facts not disclosed, and that it was for them to judge,
from the evidence, whether the disclosure would have varied the premium, or increased the risk, in respect of the
barratry of the master; and that if the jury should be of
opinion that the facts not disclosed were in that sense material, they must find for the defendants; and that, if
they thought otherwise, they must find for the plaintiffs.
This would have been the language of a charge suited to
the submission of such a point; and we have an example
of this species of charge (if, indeed, an example can be
wanting) in the bill of exceptions taken in the case of
If, then, the judge
Smith V. Carrington, (4 Cranch, 64.)
had deemed it proper to add his own opinion on that fact,
for the assistance or satisfaction of the jury, it might have
been done with utility, and with safety.
But the charge,
as stated in the case, is not of this nature, but it is in the
usual style and language of a direction of the Court, on
matter of law.
The precedent of a bill of exceptions,
which was cited from Buller's N. P. 317, and which is given

I
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of the charge in this

the said chief justice did then and there (says
the precedent) declare and deliver his opinion to the jury,
that the said several matters so produced and proved, on
the part of the defendants, were not, upon the whole case,
sufficient to bar the plaintiff of his action; and, with that
There is a preceddirection, left the same to the jury."
3
Burr.
1742., and which
ent of a bill of exceptions given in
was taken to a charge on the subject of search-warrants,
made by Lord Camden, when Ch. J. of the C. B., and the
language of this very authentic precedent is almost in the
very words of the one before us: "And the said chief justice did then and there declare and deliver his opinion to
the jury, that the said several matters so produced and
proved, on the part of the defendants, were not, upon the
whole case, sufficient to bar the action, and, with that opinion, left the same to the jury."
In this case, from Burrow, it was never doubted but that
the opinion of the chief justice, so stated in that bill, was
taken and received as a direction in point of law ; and if the
charge in the case before us is not to be deemed of that
character, it will be impossible, hereafter, to discriminate
between a charge containing a positive direction in point of
law, and mere advice on a matter of fact.
shall not enon
into
minute
criticism
words.
No
one
any
ter
who consults the precedents can well be at a loss for the meaning
of this charge.
The language of the learned judge was,
that the plaintiffs were not hound or required to make the
disclosure; that the matters offered in evidence were not
su-fficient to bar the action, and nothing was said about the
weight of evidence for the consideration of the jury.
If
even it was doubtful, by the bill, whether the charge was intended as direction, or otherwise, the result of my opinion
would be the same ; because, when the judge interposes his
opinion to the jury, on a point of fact, it ought not to be
left in doubt in what light they are to receive his charge.
In order to preserve a just balance between the distinct
powers of the Court and the jury, and that the parties may
enjoy, in unimpaired vigor, their constitutional right of
having tlie law decided by the Court, and of having the fact
der-ided by the jury, every charge should distinguish clearly
between the law and the fact, so that the jury cannot misuncase.
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derstand their rights or their duty, nor mistake the opinion
of the judge upon matter of fact, for his direction in point
The
The distinction is all important to the jury.
of law.
direction of the judge, in the one case, is obligatory upon
their consciences, and so they will, and so they ought to,
regard it; but his opinion, in the other case, is mere advice, and the jury are bound to decide for themselves, notwithstanding the opinion of the judge, and to follow that
opinion no farther than it corresponds with the conclusions
of their own judgment. Unless this distinction be kept steadily in view, and be defined with all possible precision, the
trial by jury may, in time, be broken down, and rendered
nominal and useless.
am far from wishing to restrain the judges of the
Courts of law from expressing freely their opinions to the
jury on matters of fact, and still less from interfering with
their power of controlling the mistaken verdicts of juries,
by a liberal exercise of the discretion of awarding new
trials.
No man can be more deeply sensible of the value
and salutary tendency of this judicial aid and discretion,
and none, certainly, can possess higher confidence in the
character and wisdom of the Court whose judgment is now
All that feel it my duty to contend for is,
under review.
that whenever the judge delivers his opinion to the jury on
a matter of fact, it shall be delivered as mere opinion, and
not as direction, and that the jury shall be left to understand, clearly that fJiei/ are to decide the fact, upon their
own view of the evidence, and that the judge interposes his
opinion only to aid them in cases of difficulty, or to inspire
It is for this printhem with confidence in cases of doubt.
feel solicitous, and not for anything that may
ciple that
have taken place in this particular cause.
The case before
us is, comparatively, of trifling consequence; but the distinction
have suggested goes to the very root and essence of trial by jury, and may, indeed, become of inestimable value, and, perhaps, of perilous struggle, when the
present generation shall have ceased to exist.
am disposed to hand to posterity the institution of
juries as perfect, in all respects, as we now enjoy it; for
believe it may, in times hereafter, be found to be no inconsiderable security against the systematic influence and ty-

I

I

I

I

I

ranny of party spirit, in inferior tribunals.
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accordingly, of opinion, that the judgment of the
Supreme Court be reversed, and that the cause be remanded, with directions that a venire de novo be awarded.
A majority of the Court being of this opinion, it was
thereupon ordered and adjudged, that the judgment of the
Supreme Court be reversed, and that a venire de novo be
awarded, for the trial of the issue joined between the parties in the said Court ; and that the costs in this Court abide
the final decision of the cause.
Judgment of reversal.
am,

ST. LOUIS, lEON MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHERN
RAILWAY V. VICKERS.
Supreme Court of the United States.
122

1887.

United States, 360.

The defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error in a
state court of Arkansas to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by him while a passenger on one of the
trains of the company. * * *
The case was tried before a jury. * * *
The assignments of error were the following:
The court erred in instructing the jury as follows;
1.
*'
Counsel for the plaintiff told you that you might find a
verdict for plaintiff for any sum from one cent to $25,000.
You have the power to render
This is true in one sense.
a verdict for one cent or for $25,000, but a verdict for either
of these sums would obviously be a false verdict, for if the
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict at all, and upon this point
you will probably have no difficulty, as the evidence clearly
shows negligence and consequent liability on the defendant, though this is a question of fact exclusively within
your province to determine — say, if plaintiff is entitled to
a A'crdict at all he is entitled to recover more than one cent,
and it is equally clear that $25,000 would be greatly in excess of what he ought to recover."
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Dh^lon for plaintiff in error.

The constitution of Arkansas, Art. VII, Sec. 23, provides
*
that 'judges shall not charge juries with regard to matters of fact, but shall declare the law, and in jury trials
shall reduce their charge or instructions to writing on the
request of either party."
In this case the matters of fact in issue were the alleged
negligence of the defendant and contributory negligence
of the plaintiff.
We submit that this constitutional provision should be
followed by the Federal courts sitting as courts of common
law in the state of Arkansas; and that this case is to be
distinguished from Nudd v. Burroivs, 91 U. S. 426, and
Indianapolis Railroad v. Horst, 93 IT. S. 291.
Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of this court
in Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, said: ''The practice
in this respect differs in different states.
In some of them
in
court
neither
sums
evidence
a charge to the
up
the
the
jury nor expresses an opinion upon a question of fact.
Its
charge is strictly confined to questions of law, lea\dng the
evidence to be discussed by counsel, and the facts to be decided by the jury without commentary or opinion by the
court.
But in most of the states the practice is otherwise ;
and they have adopted the usage of the English courts of
justice, where the judge always sums uj) the evidence, and
points out the conclusions which in his opinion ought to be
drawn from it ; submitting them, however, to the consideration and judgment of the jury.
It is not necessary to inwhich
of
quire
these modes of proceeding most conduces
to the purposes of justice.
It is sufficient to say that either
of them may be adopted under the laws of Congress.
And
as it is desirable that the practice in the courts of the
United States should conform as nearly as practicable to
that of the state in which they are sitting, that mode of
proceeding is perhaps to be preferred which, from long
established usage and practice, has become the law of the
courts of the state."
It is submitted that the act of Congress of June 1, 1872,
17 Stat. 197, Sec. 5, should be construed in harmony with
this decision.
It has been repeatedly held in Arkansas that it is error

Tbial Pbactice

39i

[Cbap.

11

in the instructions to the jury, the existence of
the facts in issue.
Montgomery v. Erwin, 24 Ark. 540;
Floyd V. Bids, 14 Ark. 286 (S. C. 58 Am. Dec. 374) ; State
Bank v. McGuire, 14 Ark. 537; Atkins v. State, 16 A^k. 568,
593; Armistead v. Brooke, 18 Ark. 521; Burr v. Williams,
20 Ark. 171.
And that an instruction should not be given
which intimates to the jury the opinion of the court as to
BandolpJi v. McCains' Adminthe weight of the evidence.
istrator, 34 Ark. 696.
Mr. F. W. Compton for defendant in error submitted on
his brief.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the
to assume,

court.

This judgment is affirmed on the authority of Vickshurg
and Meridian Bailroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545 ; Nudd
V. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426, 441; Indianapolis etc. Bailroad v.
Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 299. A state constitution cannot, any
more than a state statute, prohibit the judges of the courts
of the United States from charging juries with regard to
matters of fact.
Affirmed.

KLEUTSCH V. SECURITY MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
72

1904,

Nebraska, 75.

Baknes, J.
Augusta 0. Kleutsch, by her guardian and
next friend, and Katherine Kleutsch Mills, commenced an
action in the district court for Lancaster County, against
the Security Mutual Life Insurance Company of Lincoln,
Nebraska, on a policy issued l)y that company on the life
of one George W. Kleutsch, the plaintiffs being the beneficiaries.
The case was first tried before his honor, Judge
TTolmes, and a verdict returned in favor of the plaintiffs for
the amount named in the policy.
This verdict was set
nsirlo nnd a now trial granted, and from that order the
The case was again tried belilaiiitiffs prosecute error.
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fore his honor, Judge Cornish, and a verdict again reFrom an order demdng a new
turned for the plaintiffs.

trial and
cutes

a judgment

error.

*

on the verdict,

the defendant

**********

*

*

prose-

We come now to consider the assignments of error pre-

It appears that on the
sented by the defendant company.
second trial the court instructed the jury as follows :
'*In this case the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs
to establish by a preponderance of evidence the payment of
the second premium on the policy in suit, which premium
was due November 28, 1900, and on which a grace of 30 days
To
in pajTuent was allowed by the terms of the policy.
redefendant's
the
prove payment the plaintiffs produced
A receipt is evidence of a high grade,
ceipt for the same.
to be overcome only by clear and convincing testimony.
On the other hand it constitutes only prima facie evidence
of what it contains, and it is entirely competent and proper
for the defendant company to show that the payment in
fact was not made, and that the receipt was issued by mistake."
Defendant contends that this instruction was erroneous ;
that it was wrong in this, that the court should not have
told the jury that ''a receipt is evidence of high grade, to
be overcome only by clear and convincing testimony."
And it would seem that by this statement the court called
the attention of the jury directly to this part of the testimony; in fact, singled it out, commented on its character
and weight, and stated that it could only be overcome by
This must have left the
clear and convincing evidence.
impression that the testimony of the defendant's witnesses,
by which they attempted to explain the existence of the receipt, how it came to be issued, and in which they stated
positively that the premium which it represented was never
paid, was not e\Tdence of such a high grade as the receipt
itself, and the jury might therefore well conclude that the
prima facie evidence of pa^Tnent, to-wit, the receipt itself,
Wliatever may be the rule in
was not overcome thereby.
other jurisdictions, we have frequently held that it was
error to single out and to direct the attention of the jury
to any particular part of the evidence, and comment on its
In Smith v. Gardner, 36 Neb,
weight or probative force.
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741, the question involved was, whether a certain promisAfter the death of one of the
sory note had been paid.

a
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a
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The
defendants, the note was found among her papers.
plaintiff testified positively that the note had never been
paid, but that the deceased had obtained possession of it on
and thereafter fraudulently
the pretence of examining
The trial court gave iJie following
refused to surrender it.
instruction: ''You are further instructed that the possesstrong circumstance
sion of the note by Margaret Green
to show pa;\Tiient unless explained by the plaintiffs in the
The court, speaking through Post, J., held this
action."
instruction error, and in commenting thereon said
''We think the giving of the above instruction was error.
"We do not question the soundness of the proposition that
note by the maker thereof after maturity
possession of
denominated
prima facie evidence of payment, but what
presumption of payment in such
case
mere logical
inference from the fact of possession, and may be strong or
weak, according to the circumstances of the particular case.
* * *
Possession of the note by the deceased at the time
of her death
not only
circumstance tending to prove
pajTnent, but from which payment would ordinarily be the
logical inference.
It therefore proper in such case to
instruct the jury that possession
presumptive or prima
evidence
of
which
payment,
will,
uncontradicted or
facie
unexplained, warrant
verdict in favor of the party allegBut the force of such presumption must always deing it.
pend upon the circumstances of the case.
It therefore
error to advise the jury that possession of
note by the
maker raises
strong presumption of payment or
strong circumstance to prove payment."
In Smith v. Meyers, 52 Neb. 70, which was an action for
criminal conversation, the trial court refused to instruct the
jury that, "if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff
continued to live with his wife after he has heard of her
alleged illicit connection with the defendant, the jury
justified in concluding that the plaintiff has condoned the offense of the wife, and this circumstance
entitled to great
weight in considering the question of damages the plaintiff
has sustained by the wrongful conduct of the defendant,
provided the jury shall believe that the defendant has, in
fact, committed any wrong against the plaintiff."
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This was assigned as error, and in determining that question the court said:
''This instruction was properly refused, because loss of
comfort and society of the wife were not the only injuries

for

which compensatory
damages could be awarded.
Again, it was not the province of the court to tell the jury
It was
what circumstance was 'entitled to great weight.'
for the jury alone to determine the weight to be given the

testimony."

In

**********

Show V. Locke, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 176, it was said: "Complaint is next made that the trial court should not have
instructed the jury as follows : 'The jury are instructed that
where the testimony of witnesses is irreconcilably conflicting they should give great weight to the surrounding circumstances in determining which witness is entitled to
This is complained of because it did not confine
credit.'
the attention of the jury to the surrounding circumstances
proved at the trial, and also because it sought to instruct
Dethem what weight to attach to these circumstances.
in
fendant
error replies that the instruction complained of
was just as good for one party as the other and did not
prejudice plaintiff in error; and also says that the cases
cited by plaintiff in error are not in point on a general in*
*
*
struction, such as the one complained of.
We are
constrained to think that the learned trial judge erred in
expressing an opinion as to the degree of weight to be attached to the surrounding circumstances in determining the

credibility of witnesses."
In First Nat. Bank v. Loivrey, 36 Neb. 290, where the issue was fraud, the jury was told that certain matters particularly mentioned by the instruction were strong evidence of secret trust, and this was held prejudicial because
of the singling out of particular evidence on one side. The
same rule is announced in Gillet v. Phelps, 12 Wis. 437 ; Wilcox V. Young, QQ Mich. 687.
See also Davis v. Lambert,
Neb. 242.
It thus appears that we are fully committed to the rule
that it is error to single out a particular part of the evidence and express an opinion as to its weight, its strength
or its probative force.
In the case at bar the only quesin
tion
issue was, whether or not the premium on the policy
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The plaintiffs
in suit liad been paid for the year 1900.
of such payproof
their
as
produced the receipt in question
ment.
The defendant produced the officers of the comI^any who had charge of its business, as witnesses, and especially its secretary who, it was claimed, had executed and
delivered the receipt, in order to explain its existence and
This witness testified positively that
overcome its effect.
the receipt was made out by mistake and enclosed in a letter to the assured, which contained the policy as changed;
that it was intended to evidence the payment of the full
In addition to
amount of the premium for the year 1899.
such positive statement, the witness. gave evidence of facts
surrounding the issuance of the policy, which at least
tended to corroborate his further statement that the premium for the year in question was never paid.
With the
evidence in this condition, the jury Were told that the receipt was a "high grade" of evidence "to be overcome only
It is true that this
by clear and convincing testimony."
was followed by a fairly correct statement of the law ; and

yet we are unable to say that the jury were not influenced
The instruction apto the defendant's prejudice thereby.
pears to fall within the rule announced in the cases above
cited, and is not distinguishable from the instructions therein condemned.
It thus clearlj^ appears that the court
erred in giving the instruction quoted.
As the case will be tried again, it is neither necessary nor
proper for us to comment on the weight of the evidence, or
discuss any of the other assignments of error contained in
For the giving of the instruction complained
the record.
of, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.

STATE
Supreme

Court of North Carolina.
60

Manly,

J. In

V. DICK.
1664,

North Carolina, 440.

looking into the record in this case, two
errors appear to have been committed on the trial, for one
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venire de

novo.
On the trial, a question arose as to the withdrawal of
The Court declined
certain confessions of the prisoner.
withdrawing them, but remarked to the solicitor for the
State, that, after the other evidence already given in the
cause, he, the solicitor, might withdraw them, if he chose to
This seems to us, to
do so, which the Solicitor declined.
be an expression of opinion, on the part of the Judge, tliat
the case was sufficiently proved without the aid of the conThis is not directly asserted, but is a matter of
fessions.
inference plainly from the manner in which the expedient
''After the
of withdrawing the testimony is suggested.
other evidence, already given in the cause, the Solicitor
The sense, which we attribute to
might withdraw," etc.
this language, is that, which his Honor himself seems to
have ascribed to it; for he takes pains to explain to ^the
jury, that they were not bound, by any opinion or judgHe endeavored to obviate the
ment of his, as to the facts.
effect of his opinion, by announcing, in distinct terms, the
jury's independency of him in all matters of fact pertaining to the issue; but this it was not practicable for him to
do.
The opinion had been expressed, and was incapable of
being recalled.
The statute declares, that "no Judge, in delivering a
charge to the petit jury, shall give an opinion whether a
fact is fully or sufficiently proved, such matters being the
true office and province of a jury. ' '
The object is not to inform the jury of their province,
but to guard them against any invasion of it.
The division of our Courts of record into two departments — the one, for the judging of the law, the other, for
judging of the facts — is a matter lying on the surface of our
judicature, and is known to everybody.
It was not information on this subject the Legislature intended to furnish ;
but their purpose was to lay down an inflexible rule of
practice — that the Judge of the law should not undertake
If he can not do so directly, he can
to de^cide the facts.
not indirectly; if not explicitly, he can not by inuendo.
What we take to be the inadvertence of the Judge, therefore, was not cured of its illicit character by the information which he immediately conveyed.
Knowledge on the
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a

it
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it,

part of the jury, of their proper province, is not the criterion for determining the propriety or impropriety of an
opinion from the Judge, as to the sufficiency of the proofs.
It is the same, whether the jury know their rights or not.
The provision of the law in question, has been in existence since 1796.
On the various occasions, when the law
has been digested and re-enacted, it has been continued in
the same words ; and the interpretation which we now give
from the beginning. The
that which has been given
fact
Judge can not properly express an opinion, whether
pertinent to the issue,
sufficiently or insufficiently proved.
Many questions of fact, especially inquiries into mental
capacity, and frauds, require as much experience, science,
and acumen, as the abstruser questions of law; and yet
their decision
left by law in the hands of the comparaThis, we suppose,
tively inexperienced and unlearned.
has been to maintain undisturbed and inviolate, that popular arbiter of rights, the trial by jury, which was, without
some such provision, constantly in danger, from the will of
the Judge acting upon men mostly passive in their natures,
and disposed to shift off responsibility; and in danger also,
from the ever-active principle, that power
always stealWe impute no intentional
ing from the many to the few.
The error
wrong to the Judge who tried this case below.
one of those casualties, which may happen to the most
circumspect in the progress of
trial on the circuit. When
was irrevocable, and the prisonce committed, however,
iner was entitled to have his case tried by another jury.

**********

the end, that
law.

it

to be certified to the Superior Court, to
may take further proceedings according to

is

This opinion

Judicial Court
9

Supreme

of

COMMONWEALTH V. BARRY.
Massachusetts.

1864.

Allen, 276.
a

Indictment for keeping and maintaining
tenement in
School Street in Boston, used for the illegal sale and il-
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legal keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors.
At the trial in tlie superior court, before Vose, J., all the
witnesses were policemen, two of them being officers whose
The defendant's coundaily beat included School Street.
sel, in his argument to the jury, commented with some severity upon their testimony, as the testimony of policemen.
The judge in his charge told the jury that the same rules
were applicable to policemen as to all other witnesses, in
determining the credit to be given to their testimony; that
in very many of the cases which had been tried at the present term of the court policemen had been the principal witnesses, and he thought the jury would agree with him in the
opinion that in all these cases they had manifested great intelligence, and testified with apparent candor and impar-

tiality.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant
alleged exceptions.
Upon mature consideration we have
BiGELow, C. J.
come to the conclusion that we cannot give our sanction to
the instructions under which this case was submitted to the
jury.
Viewed in either of the two aspects of which they
are susceptible, it appears to us that they cannot be supported, consistently with the rules of law.
If they are to be regarded only as an expression of opinion by the court concerning the credibility of certain witnesses who had testified in other cases than the one on trial,
they were clearly of a nature to mislead the jury.
The
implication from the language of the court is direct and
positive, that the jury might properly infer that the witnesses in support of this prosecution were entitled to credit
for the reason that other persons engaged in the same occuimtion had testified with candor and impartiality in the
trial of other cases.
The objection to this instruction is
In the first place, it authorized the jury to draw
twofold.
an inference which was not a legitimate deduction from
the premises.
It by no means follows naturally or logically that witnesses employed in the same or similar occupations will testify on all occasions with equal fairness and
In the next place, the instructions gave the
impartiality.
jury to understand that they might travel beyond the case
as proved before them, to seek for corroboration and support of the testimony adduced in behalf of the prosecution
T. p.— 26
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in facts which not only were not proved, but which could
not have been properly offered in evidence by the governThe
Nor is this the whole extent of the objection.
ment.
facts thus introduced into the case were submitted to the
jury with a distinct expression of opinion by the court as
to the effect to be given to them, at a stage of the trial when
the defendant could not controvert them, and without any
opportunity being given to his counsel to address the jury
Such a course of
on the weight which was due to them.
proceeding is certainly unusual, and, as we think, does not
accord with the due and orderly conduct of a criminal trial.
But in another aspect it seems to us that the instrucThe credibility of the witnesses
tions were objectionable.
who had testified in support of the charge in the indictment
was a fact which it was the exclusive province of the jury
As essentially affecting their bias, and the
to determine.
credit to be given to their testimony, their occupation and
connection with the origin of the prosecution against the
defendant might be important elements, and, within proper
limits, proper subjects of comment by counsel, and of conIf the instructions are to be consideration by the jury.
strued, as we think they fairly may be, as the expression of
the opinion of the court on the degree of credit to whicti
these witnesses were entitled, the court exceeded its authority in stating such opinion to the jury.
By Gen. Sts. c.
172, Sec. 15, the duty of charging the jury in criminal cases
is specially enjoined upon the court. By Gen. Sts. c. 115,
Sec. 5, which is applicable alike to civil and criminal trials,
the rule is prescribed by which courts are to be guided in
It must be admitted that
the performance of this duty.
this provision of the statute is not expressed in terms which
are free from ambiguity.
But although there is a seeming
repugnancy in the two branches of the section, we think
that they are susceptible of a reasonable interpretation,
which will give full force and effect to both of them, and
at the same time carry out what seems to have been the
manifest purpose of the legislature.
It is clear beyond
controversy, that the first clause contains a distinct and absolute prohibition, that the "courts shall not charge juries
with respect to matters of fact."
To reconcile this with
the clause that follows, which provides that the courts
"may state the testimony and the law," the prohibition
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must be regarded as a restraint only on tlie expression of
an opinion b}^ the court on the question whether a particular fact or series of facts involved in the issue of a case is
In other words, it
or is not established by the evidence.
is to be construed so as to prevent courts from interfering
with the province of juries by anj^ statement of their own
judgment or conclusion upon matters of fact.
This construction effectually accomplishes the great object of
guarding against any bias or undue influence which might
be created in the minds of jurors if the weight of the opinion of the court should be permitted to be thrown into the
scale in deciding upon issues of fact.
But further than
this the legislature did not intend to go.
The statute was
not designed to deprive the court of all the power to deal
with the facts proved.
On the contrary, the last clause
of the section very clearly contemplates that the duty of the
court may not be fully discharged by a mere statement of
By providing that the court may also state the
the law.
testimony, the manifest purpose of the legislature was to
recognize and affirm the power and authority of the court,
to be exercised according to its discretion, to sum up the
evidence, to state its legal effect and bearing on the issues,
and to indicate its proper application under the rules of
law.
In the case at bar, the court exceeded the limit prescribed
If the language used by the court was inby the statute.
tended to be applicable to the witnesses who had testified
in behalf of the prosecution, it was an expression of opinion
as to their credibility.
As this was a matter of fact,
within the exclusive province of the jury to determine, such
expression of opinion went beyond a ''statement of the
testimony," and trenched on prohibited ground, being a
charge to the jury "with respect to matters of fact."
We have already said that the occupation of a witness, in
connection with other facts, may have a material bearing on
the credibility of his testimony in a particular case.
But
we feel bound to add that we do not intend to express an
opinion on the question whether in the case at bar there
was any valid ground for calling in question the veracity or
candor of the witnesses whom the defendant's counsel
sought to impeach.
No such point seems to have been
raised at the trial, nor are the facts bearing upon it stated

Tkial Pkactice

404

[Chap. 11

in the exceptions.
The inference from the course of the
trial, especially from the line of argument which the counsel for the defendant was permitted to take, and from the
instructions to the jury, is, that the ground on which the
impeachment of the witnesses was placed was deemed to
have been proper matter for the consideration of the jury.
Exceptions sustained.^
1 Summing
up evidence.
The judge may sum up the evidence without infringing the rule against commenting upon the weight jf the evidence, and
in so doing he may properly ' ' state, analyze, compare and explain the evi" Hamlin v. Treat, (1895) 87 Me. 311, 32 Atl. 909. Some state condence.
stitutions couple with the prohibition against charging on the facts an express permission for the judge to state the evidence.
Thus, the constitution
of Tennessee, Art. 6, Sec. 9, provides: "Judges shall not charge juries with
respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law. ' '
has identically the same provision.
The California constitution
Art. VI,

Sec,

19.

Section
(a)

2.

Scope of Insteuctions.

Relation to Pleadings and Evidence.

JACKSONVILLE, TAMPA

&

KEY WEST RAILWAY

COMPANY V. NEFP.

Supreme

Court of Florida.
28

Florida,

1891.

373.

Mabry, J. :
The appellee, Neff, in April, 1887, sued the appellant railway company in the Circuit Court for Clay
County, Florida, for $5,000 damages for the destruction of
certain property of appellee by fire, caused by the alleged
es-cape of sparks from a locomotive engine under the control of appellant * * *
Tlie third point calls in question the correctness of the
This charge is
for plaintiff below.
if the jury believe from the evidence
that without fault or neglect of the plaintiff, defendant's
employes negligently permitted a lot of loose dry hay to
remain for some time prior to the 18th of March, A. D,
second charge given
ns follows:
"That
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exposed in a box car near plaintiff's property whicli
was set on fire on said day, and that tlie employes of said
defendant railroad comiDany negligently permitted said fire
to be communicated from said car so left exposed by said
employes to plaintiff's said property, and to burn and destroy the same, the verdict should be for the plaintiff."
This charge was excepted to by defendant below.
The objection urged by appellant to this charge is, that "it has no
relation whatever to the issues raised by the pleadings, and
the jury were thereby instructed that if a loss resulted to
the plaintiff by reason of a cause of action of which no
mention was made in the pleadings, they should find for
1887,

the

plaintiff."*

*

*

The declaration contains but one count, and the gist of
the action as therein stated is, that the defendant company
so neglected and unskill fully managed its engine and the
fire and the burning matter therein contained, and said engine was so insufficiently and improperly constructed, that
sparks from said fire and portions of said burning matter
escaped and flew from said engine to and upon a building
in which plaintift's property was situated, whereby said
building and property were burned and totally destroyed.
Issue was joined upon all the pleas of defendant.
The object of pleading is to ascertain with certainty and precision,
the matters of fact which are affirmed on the one hand and
denied on the other, and which are mutually proposed and
It is clear that plainaccepted by the parties for decision.
tiff's cause of action is based upon the negligent construction or negligent use of defendant's locomotive engine,
whereby sparks and burning matter escaped from it and
caused the fire.
The question submitted by the pleadings
is whether or not defendant caused the fire by reason of a
defective engine or the unskillful management of the enThe negligence of defendant submitted to the jury
gine.
for investigation by the charge under consideration consists not in causing the fire, but in allowing loose dry hay
to remain in a box near plaintiff's property, and in negligently permitting fire to be communicated from said car to
plaintiff's property.
The origin of the fire is lost sight
of in this charge, and under it the jury were authorized
to find for the plaintiff although the defendant did not in
any way cause the fire, provided they believed that it neg-
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ligently permitted loose dry hay to remain in the car near
plaintiff's property, and negligently permitted the fire to
be communicated from said car to plaintiff's property and
If it be conceded that this charge embodies a
destroy it.
good cause of action against the defendant, it is evident
that it is not contained within the issues made by the pleadAppellee contends, however, that his right to reings.
cover is co-extensive with the case made by the evidence
introduced on the trial, and the trial judge was authorized
to go outside of the issues joined between the parties and
instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff to the extent jusRespectable authorities hold that
tified by the evidence.
the pleadings are merely to notify the opposite party of
the ground of action or defense, and where a party fails to

it

it,

object to evidence because it is not relevant to the issues,
the court is justified in instructing the jury upon the whole
evidence, and is not confined in his instructions to the issues
The correct view, we think, is that
made in the pleadings.
the instructions must be confined to the issues made by the
pleadings; and this rule has been recognized in our state.
In the case of Porter v. Ferguson, 4 Fla., 102, an action of
assumpsit was instituted by Ferguson against Porter, based
upon' a verbal agreement by which the former undertook
to make and send to the latter, who was a merchant at Key
AVest, arrowroot to be shipped thence to New Orleans, and
Porter promised to receive the arrowroot and ship it to
New Orleans for sale in that market, and to account to
Ferguson for the proceeds.
The declaration further
averred that in pursuance of such agreement and understanding, Ferguson shipped to Porter 1725 pounds of arrowroot worth $140, which was received by him, but contrary to said agreement and understanding he shipped it ta
Charleston and it got lost at sea, by reason whereof the
defendant became liable to pay plaintiff the value of said
arrowroot.
The plea was non assumpsit.
The following
instruction was given for the plaintiff on the trial of that
cause, viz.: ''If the jury believe from the testimony that
it was the usage of trade for consignees for shijmient at
Key West to insure on goods of others sent to tliem for
sliipment, without instructions as to insurance, and that
J. Y. Porter sliippod the arrowroot in question without inand
suring
was lost at sea, lie was liable for the loss,
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In spealdng of this
and they ought to find for plaintiff."
charge this conrt says: "Now, what has this instruction
to do with the issue which the jury were sworn to try? The
instruction directs the attention of the jury to a breach of
the contract or agreement, when the breach is not put in
issue by any plea — a breach, too, which is not alleged in the
The breach alleged is for shipping to Chardeclaration.
leston, when he was bound by his undertaking to ship to
New Orleans, whereby the goods were lost — the deviation
is the gist of the breach ; the negligence or omission to effect an insurance on the goods against the perils of the sea,
which, by the usage of trade, he should have done is not
Whether the instruction is or is not correct in
charged.
point of law, is here not necessary to be decided — it was not
in issue, and therefore, irrelevant, and should not have been
given; and if it tended to mislead the jury, and withdraw
their minds from the consideration of the true issue it is
In the case of McKay v. Friehele, 8 Fla., 21,
erroneous.
the court in speaking of the relevancy of instructions to the
issues says: "In order to determine the correctness and
appropriateness of an instruction which may be given to
the jury, resort must always be had to the evidence upon
That evidence, whether
which the instruction is based.
parol or documentary, is to be found only in the 'bill of
exceptions, ' whose peculiar office it is to give the incidents
occurring in the progress of the trial, from the joining of
It may be laid
the issue to the rendition of the verdict.
down as a general rule, subject to but one exception, that
wherever the error complained of is predicated upon the
instructions of the court below, the whole evidence, or, at
least, so much thereof as forms the basis of the instruction,
must appear in the 'bill of exceptions' accompanying the
record of the cause.
The exception alluded to is where
manifestly
is
without the limits of the issue
the instruction
joined between the parties, and is likely to mislead the jury
In such case, no reference to
in making up their verdict.
the evidence can be of any avail in determining the correctness of the instructions, and the court may pronounce
upon it even in the absence of the bill of exceptions, provided it be properly' attested bv the signature of the judge
below." * * *
The judge who presided

at the

trial of this

case pre-
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sented by instructions to the jury defendant's liability under the issues raised by the pleadings, but the second instruction presented a view of the case not embraced in the
issues and was calculated to mislead the jury in their verWe cannot say that the jury did not base their finddict.
The view
ings against defendant under this instruction.
of this charge, that defendant is liable if its employes negligently permitted fire to escape from the car to plaintiff's
property, would call for further consideration, even if the
charge were not obnoxious to the rule above pointed out.
Our decision is based, however, upon the view that the instruction under consideration was without the limit of the
issues joined between the parties and was likely to mislead
the jury in making up their verdict, and was for this reason
erroneous.

For

the error in giving the second charge in behalf of the
a new trial

plaintiff below, the judgment is reversed, and
awarded.^

To the same effect see Knnst v. City of Grafton (1910) 67 W. Va. 20,
E. 74; W. L. Moodey & Co. v. Eowland (1907) 100 Tex. 363, 99 S. W.
1112; Latourette v. Meldrum (1907) 49 Ore. 397, 90 Pac. 503; Goldman v.
New York, N. H. & H. E. K. Co. (1910) 83 Conn. 59, 75 Atl. 148.
1

67 S.

HANSON V. KLINE.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
136

1907,

Iowa, 101.

Action at law to recover damages arising out of false representations in connection with an exchange of properties.
The defendants, additional to Kline, are W. E. Gray and
J. E. Gray, and at the time in question all the parties lived
in Rockwell Oity, Calhoun county.
The petition alleges
that in July, 1904. plaintiff was the owner of a stock of merchandise in Rockwell City, valued by him at $2,000, which
ho was induced by the defendants Gray to trade to the defendant Kline for a farm of one hundred and sixty acres
situated in Hayes county, Nebraska.
The specific aver-
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conspiracy to bring

about such trade by false representations respecting the
Nebraska farm, and that, pursuant thereto, the farm was
falsely represented, and the trade thereby accomplished,
The defendants answered separgreatly to his damage.
ately, and each denied the charge of fraud as contained in
On the trial plaintiff had a verdict as against
the petition.
all the defendants jointly, on which judgment was entered,
and the defendants appeal. — Reversed and remanded.
Bishop, J. The theory of the petition was that the representations claimed to have been made by defendants
were made as from personal knowledge — such is the disIn a request presented, the defendant
tinct allegation.
asked that the jury be instruced that if the false representations were made as alleged, but that it was stated to plaintiff at the time that they were made on information derived
from others, and not on personal knowledge, then plaintiff
could not recover.
The request was refused, and the jury
was instructed strictly on the theory of the petition ; that is,
they were told that if defendants in representing the condition of the farm did so as of their own personal knowledge,
and so stated to plaintiff, and the representation was false,
and plaintiff relied on such representation to his damage,
And, contra, if the repthe defendant would be liable.
so
made
as
resentations were not
alleged, then plaintiff
The jury was not otherwise instructed
could not recover.
on the subject.
Should it be
We think here was error.
conceded that the instruction given correctly stated the law
applicable to the case, the defendants were entitled to a verThis is so because there was no evidence on which
dict.
to base a finding to the contrary, but, as we have seen,
plaintiff himself declares that in making the representations alleged defendants expressly disavowed any and all
personal knowledge.
Hence the proof did not meet the
Accordingly, we must go ba^ck to the query: Did
issue.
correctly state the law applicable to the
instruction
the
If we are to judge alone from the issues made in
case?
pleading, the answer must be in the afhrmative.
If we are
to judge from the issues as developed on the trial, then the
call for a negative answer is imperative.
We say issues
developed on the trial, because it is plain that plaintiff did
not go into the trial relying upon representations made as

410
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At the very
of the personal knowledge of the defendants.
outset, he testified that defendants denied having any perAnd it is evident that from beginning
sonal knowledge.
to end the defendants did not consider that they were called
npon to face the strict issue as made by the pleadings.
Plaintiff did rely on representations professedly made on
information and belief, and defendants trained their forces
This being true, there arises the further
accordingly.
question whether or not it was competent for the court, and
its duty, to disregard the strict issue as made in the pleadings, and instruct according as the parties had made the isThat it was competent for the court to
sue on the trial.
Beach v. Wakefield, 107 Iowa,
do so we have no doubt.
So, also, we think
567; Fenner v. Crips, 109 Iowa, 455.
it was its duty to do so, and, in view, of the case presented
Under our
by the record, that failure amounted to error.
system, it is left for the parties to frame the issues, and,
if they proceed without objection — and such is the case
here — to the trial of an issue not presented by the pleadThe issue
ings, it amounts to a consent to try such issue.
Mitchell v. Joyce, 76 Iowa,
is then rightfully in the case.
449; Bank v. Boesch, 90 Iowa, 47; Beach v. Wakefield,
supra; Erickson v. Fisher, 51 Minn. 300 (53 N. W. 638).
And, the issue being rightfully in the case, the court must
Potter v. Railway, 46 Iowa, 399; Hill v.
instruct upon it.
We must presume that the court
Aultmann, 68 Iowa, 630.
Attention to
was fully advised of the shift in the issue.
the course of the trial as it proceeded was its duty. Moreover, there was before it the request for instruction presented by defendants, and, while not adequately stating the
law it was sufficient to arrest attention and call for a proper
Kinyon v. Railway, 118 Iowa,
instruction on the subject.
the
add
as
349.
that
may
We
issue made by the pleadings
respecting the subject-matter under discussion was, in effect, withdrawn by the parties, such issue should not in any
Lumber Co. v.
event have been presented to the jury.
83 Iowa, 367.
Barber,
Erickson
v.
Iowa,
76
225;
Raymond,
For the reasons pointed out in this opinion, the judgment
api)eal('d from must be, and it is, reversed, and the cause
is ordered remanded for a new trial.^

1 To the Rame cfFort see Mitchell v. Samford
(1910) 149 Mo. App. 72, 130
S. W. 99; Johnson v. Caughren (1909) 55 Wash. 125, 104 Pac. 170; Central
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R. R. & Banking Co. v. Attaway (1892) 90 Ga. 656, 16 S. E. 956; Brusie v.
Peck Bros. & Co. (1892) 135 N. Y. 622, 32 N. E. 76; Flanders v. Cottrell
(1875) 36 Wis. 564.
In Schwaninger v. McNeeley & Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 447, 87 Pac. 514, the
court said: "When evidence is received without objection upon any particular ground not covered by the complaint, the court may assume that the
complaint is as broad as the evidence when charging the jury, and the complaint will be deemed amended to conform with the evidence and charge,
since the amendment could have been made as of course at the trial. ' '
But in Budd v. Hoffheimer (1873) 52 Mo. 297, it was held that if a party
wishes an instruction
upon a matter duly proved but not alleged in his
pleading, he must first ask leave to amend his pleading to conform with
the proof, and unless he does so such an instruction is properly refused.

WAGON COMPANY V. BOLING.

OWENSBORO

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Kentucky Law Reporter, 816.

32

NUNN,

The

J.

*

1908,

*

petition

*

a
cause
and
stated
was
sufficient
of action.
It was alleged that appellee lost his hand by
the negligence of appellant's servants superior in authority to him, and particularlized the acts and omissions which
constituted the negligence — i. e., that he was raised on a
farm, was only 18 years old and had never worked with
machinery before he was employed by appellant, of which
fa'Ct he informed appellant's superintendent at the time he
employed him ; that the rip saw, at which he was placed to
perform labor, was defectively constructed in the fastenings and bolts that held it ; that it was left unguarded, mth
nothing to keep his hand from coming in contact with it;
and that defendant failed to furnish him a reasonably safe
Appellant filed an
place in which to perform his labor.
answer, controverting all the affirmative matter contained
in the petition, and pleaded contributory negligence on the
part of appellee. The testimony showed that appellee was,
at the time of his emplojTnent by appellant, only 18 years of
age, and had had no experience in working with machinery,
and that he informed appellant's superintendent of this
fact ; that he was put to off-bearing lumber from a rip saw,
and after he had worked 8 days, but not consecutively, he
was directed by the foreman, who had authority to do so,
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to remove the belt, by the use of a lever, from the pulley
which operated the saw to a loose pulley called the "idler,"
to raise the table, under and through which the saw revolved, and then to remove two taps, or screws, which were
situated about 4 and 6 inches from the saw, for the purpose
of oiling the machine. In attempting to comply with the
directions of the foreman and at the moment he undertook
to remove the oil caps, for some reason not explained, the
saw cut off his hand.

**********

There was no testimony introduced tending to show that
this rip saw or its attachments were defective or out of repair. The only thing that tended in the least to show this
was a statement by appellee that the tap, or screw, failed to
move, and if it did it is more than probable it was because
of his inexperience, especially when all the evidence shows
There was no
that it was in proper repair and condition.
testimony introduced by appellee showing that the saw
was improperly guarded.
Appellant's testimony showed
that it could not have been guarded or made safer than it
was. There was no proof that the place at which appellee
worked could have been made safe and still have operated
the saws. The building in which the saws were located was
a large one, and contained many saws of different kinds,
and a number of people were working therein. There was
no testimony introduced showing or tending to show any
negligence or dereliction of duty upon the part of appellant,
other than failing to warn and instruct appellee with reference to the dangers incident to his duties and how to avoid
same. Yet the court gave eight instructions in which he submitted to the jury all, or about all, the different acts of
negligence alleged in the petition. This was calculated to
r-onfuse and mislead the jury.
As stated, there was but one
issue made by the testimony, and the court should have submitted to the jury that issue only. * * * * *
* *

#

The case is reversed, and remanded for further

proceedings consistent herewith.
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DOUDA V. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND

RAILWAY COMPANY.

Supreme

Court of Iowa.
141

&

PACIFIC

1909.

Iowa, 82.

Ladd, J. — Plaintiff's employment at the time of his injury
was that of eieaning out clinkers from the fire boxes of defendant's engines in its roundhouse at Cedar Rapids. The
usual method of performing this work was to drop the
"dump" by means of a bar from outside the wheels of the
engine while it was standing over the ash pit, and to replace the dumping mechanism in the same way. But in this
particular instance the plaintiff thought it necessary to
crawl under the engine into the ash pit in order to close the
dump. He advised the "hostler" in charge of the engine,
who was in the engineer's cab, of his intention to go under,
having had the engine moved to what he considered a proper
place for that purpose, and then proceeded to crawl, feet
first, through the narrow opening between the drive wheels
and above the side bar or connecting rod. When his body
was part way through, the engine moved backwards, and
the consequent rising of the side bar pinched or crushed the
plaintiff causing the injuries of which he complains. There
was a question under the evidence as to whether plaintiff
was not guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to
go under the engine at all or in attempting to go under it
in the manner above described, but there is no complaint as
to the instructions with reference to contributory negligence, and that feature of the case may be passed without
further notice.
The defendant is alleged to have been negligent in two
respects:
(1) in that its hostler in charge of the engine,
with knowledge that plaintiff was under it, without warning him started, moved, or permitted the engine to move;
and (2) the engine was unsafe and defective, in that it
would start forward without the lever being moved or
steam being turned on or any action of the person in
charge, and defendant, knowing this and plaintiff's position, took no precaution to prevent this, but allowed the
The evidence
engine to move, and thereby injure him.
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failed to point out any defect in tlie engine, or that it had
ever started before without steam being turned on, or that
defendant had any reason to anticipate such an occurrence. Nevertheless the jury was instructed that if they
found ''that said locomotive was unsafe and defective, in
that it would start after being stopped without moving the
lever therefor or turning on the steam for the purpose of
and that
would with the knowledge of destarting
fendant or its emi3loyes in charge thereof start without any
action on the part of those in charge thereof, and the defendant took no precaution or safeguards to prevent its

is

a

a

it

is

it

if

it

it

it

it

it

it

if

if

said movements, and that said locomotive was by reason
thereof and the careless and negligent acts of the person
in charge thereof, without notice or warning or signal to
the plaintiff, started and permitted to run upon the body of
plaintiff while under said engine and doing said work, and
such
tlmt by reason thereof plaintiff was injured," then,
injuries were without fault of plaintiff contributing thereto, plaintiff was entitled to recover. Even though this instruction be conceded to be correct in the abstract, the evidence was not such as to authorize it. There was nothing
in the record to charge the employees operating the engine
with knowledge of any defect therein or to indicate any
on defendant's part. Even
information concerning
be
to
have
conceded
been defective, this was not
the engine
shown to have been apparent or discoverable on reasonable
appear from the evidence that the
inspection, nor does
defect had existed prior to that night, or that defendant
or in using
was negligent in failing to discover and repair
was in. So that, even though
might
in the condition
be inferred from the moving of this locomotive engine withdid so
out the application of steam or other agency,
there
in
no
then
of
basis
repair,
that
was
out
move,
charge of negligence
the evidence on which to found
against the defendant, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be applied, and this under the peculiar facts of this
previous instruction, "that the
case was precluded by
accident occurred will not of itself show negligence on
the part of defendant, but you should determine the question (defendant's negligence) from all the facts and circumstances before you." Nor does the instruction first
applicquoted proceed on the theory that such doctrine
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from tlie evidence constituting the elements of negligence alleged.

able, but exacts specific findings

For the reasons pointed out, the judgment
court is reversed.

of the trial

BUYKEN V. LEWIS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Washington.
51

RuDKiN, C.

1909.

Washington, 627.

J. — This

was an action in trespass to recover damages for sluicing down and removing earth from
a certain lot in the city of Seattle owned by the plaintiffs.
The defendant admitted the commission of the acts complained of, though not in manner and form as alleged, and
pleaded by way of justification that the sluicing was done
pursuant to a verbal contract between the plaintiffs and the
defendant which was afterward reduced to writing and
signed by the defendant, though not by the plaintiffs. The
reply denied the plea of justification as set forth in the answer. The cause was submitted to a jury under instructions from the court, and a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of $1,500 was returned. From a judgment
on this verdict, the defendant has appealed.
The principal assignment of error arises out of the
following charge of the court, which was duly excepted to :
*'If you find from the evidence that there was no such
contract as alleged by the defendant in its affirmative defense, which is exhibit No. 2 in the case, but do find from
the evidence that the acts performed by the defendant upon
the said premises of the plaintiffs were performed with
the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, then
instruct
you that the plaintiffs cannot recover for such acts even
though in your opinion the plaintiffs have been damaged
thereby, unless you find froyn the evidence that defendant
negligently or carelessly performed the acts and hy reason
of such negligence and careless performance the plaintiffs
had been damaged."

I

416
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The latter part of this instruction is clearly without the
issues presented by the pleadings.
The action was prosecuted by the respondents solely on the theory that the acts
complained of were committed without their knowledge or
consent and against their will, and all their testimony was
directed toward establishing the allegations of the complaint and proving the amount of the resultant damages.
The testimony on the part of the appellant, on the other
hand, was in support of its affirmative defense, and in reduction of the claim for damages. The question of negligence in the prosecution of the work was not an issue in
the case under the pleadings, nor was it made an issue
There was no claim that any
at any stage of the trial.
particular act committed by the appellant was negligently
or carelessly committed, nor was there any attempt to
segregate damages resulting from negligence from damThe
ages resulting from other and independent causes.
instruction was therefore erroneous, and calls for a reversal of the judgment unless we are able to say that the
error was not prejudicial, and this we cannot do. There
was a direct conflict in the testimony, and the right of recovery was questionable at least. The jury may have found
that the acts committed by the appellant were so committed with the knowledge and consent of the respondents,
but that damages resulted from the performance of the
work in a manner the jury deemed negligent. Under such
circumstances, it is incumbent on this court to order a
new trial. Bernliard v. Reeves, 6 Wash. 424, 33 Pac. 873;
Comegys v. American Lumber Co., 8 Wash. 661, 36 Pac.
]087;"irir&?/ v. Rainier-Grand Hotel Co., 28 Wash. 705, 69
Pac. 378. In Comegys v. American Lumber Co., supra,
the court said:
''This instruction, although a correct statement of the
law in a proper case, was not pertinent to the issues to be
determined by the jury. The plaintiff in his complaint had
htatod the facts constituting his cause of action in accordance with the requirements of the code, and the cause
of action stated was based upon an express contract, and
could not be proved by showing that the defendant was
guilty of a tort. The question as to whether the defendant
had converted the property of the plaintiff to its own use,
and was, therefore, liable for its value, was not in issue,
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and should not have been submitted to the jury. It is not
in accordance with either the letter or spirit of the code
to permit a plaintiff to allege one state of facts in his
complaint and to recover by proof of an entirely different
state of facts at the trial."
The appellant further contends that the court erred in
ruling on the competency of one of the witnesses, and in
refusing to grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.
The former of these assignments is without merit and the latter is obviated by the
reversal of the judgment on other grounds.
For error in the instructions of the court, the judgment
is reversed and a new trial ordered.
Chadwick^ Fullerton, Mount, and Crow, J. J., concur.

KAERER V. CITY OF DETROIT.
Supreme

Court of Michigan.
142

1905.

Michigan, 331.

a

8

it,

[The plaintiff was injured by running his automobile
into an excavation in the street at the intersection of Mack
avenue and Grand Boulevard, while he was driving north
up the boulevard at night. He saw a red light, but thinking it was in the west curb of the boulevard he tried to pass
to the east of
putting on power for the purpose and
or 10 miles an hour. In fact
proceeding at the rate of
the light was at the west end of
trench which extended
from the east almost across the boulevard.
When the
plaintiff discovered the trench he was going too fast to
stop his car, which went into the excavation.]^
Hooker, j,

***********

1

I

if

I

is

The court also said to the jury:
"The plaintiff in this case desires me to say that the
used especially for fast riding and for the use
boulevard
think, gentlemen of the jury, you
of automobiles, and
your own experience
may take that in consideration,
don't remember what the ordisatisfies you of that.
Statement

T. P.— 27

of facts by the editor.
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nance is relative to that particular part of the street, but
doubtless some of you do, and you may have your own experience with reference to the using of the boulevard for
think the whole question, gentlemen,
that purpose; but
as to the degree of care, becomes a question for you rather
than for the court."
This was in effect allowing the personal knowledge of the
jurors to have the weight of evidence in the case. It contemplated not only their determination as to the use of
the boulevard from their personal observation, but also
This was
the character of the ordinances relating thereto.
erroneous.

I

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.
MooEE, C. J., and Carpentek and Montgomery, J.
concurred with Hooker, J.

(b)

Emphasis and Disregard

of Portions

J.,

of Evidence.

TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS V. YOCH.
Appellate Court of Illinois.
133

Illinois Appellate,

1908.
32.

Mr. Presiding Justice Creighton delivered the opinion
of the court.

This was an action in case, in the Circuit Court of St.
Clair county, by appellants against appellees, to recover

damages alleged to have resulted to appellants' school
house and premises by reason of the failure of appellees
to leave proper and sufficient support for the "superincumbent soil" upon which tlie school house stood. Trial
by jury. Verdict in favor of appellees. Judgment in favor
of appellees in bar of action and for costs, and ordering
execution to issue therefor.

The court gave to the jury the following erroneous instructions on behalf of appellee:
''The court instructs the jury that if you believe, from
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pillars in said mine and the roof in
said mine are intact and in good condition under the plaintiffs' premises and for a distance of three hundred feet
beyond and adjacent to plaintiffs' premises, then yot! have
a right to take this fact into consideration in determining
the question whether the defendants have caused any subsidence of the surface of plaintiffs' land, as alleged in
plaintiffs' declaration, or one count thereof, if you believe
from the evidence there has been any subsidence in such
surface.
the evidence, that the

**********

)f

The instruction first above quoted contains all the vices
of that class of instructions so often condemned by the
courts of this State. It singles out particular facts from
the other facts in evidence and specially directs the attention of the jury to them.
This instruction bore upon a
close and controverted issue of fact in the case and it was
equally as important in an honest effort to arrive at a just
verdict that the jury should take each and every other
pertinent fact in evidence ''into consideration in determining the question whether the defendants have caused any
subsidence of the surface of plaintiffs' land," as it was
to take the facts particularly singled out in this instruc-

tion. All the evidence admitted bearing upon that issue,
was admitted for the consideration of the jury, and it was
error to make any detached portion of it or to make any
fact which any detached portion of it might tend to prove,
more prominent than any other part of the evidence, or
This instruction gave undue promother pertinent fact.
inence to the facts specified, and magnified their importance, and tended to divert the minds of the jury from the
main issue.
Counsel suggest in support of this instruction that:
''While it is a well-settled and long-established rule that
an instruction should not single out and call attention of
the jury to one alleged fact more than another, yet this
rule is subject to another one, that each party is entitled to
an instruction h}T)othetically outlining the evidence and
state of the case upon which he relies for obtaining a verdict, and directing the jury to find for the party in whose
favor they find the facts constituting the cause of action
or the defense," and cite; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Math,
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App. 353, and West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v.
Dougherty, 170 111. 379. The instruction in the case at bar
is not of the class of instructions discussed in either of
the cases cited. It does not hypothetically outline either
the evidence or the facts of a full defense and direct the
jury to find in favor of the defendants in case they find the
hypothesis proven by the evidence, as in Chicago City Ry.
Co. V. Math, supra. What it does is to unduly emphasize
one feature of a supposed defense.

114

111.

********

For

and on account of the errors in this opinion noted,
the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the
cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.

TAUBERT V. TAUBERT.
Supreme

Court of Minnesota.
103

1908.

Minnesota, 247.

Start, C. J.
This is an action brought by

young man seventeen
years old, by his guardian, against his mother, to recover
damages for personal injuries which he claims to have sustained while in her employ by reason of her negligence.
Verdict for the plaintiff for $5,000. The defendant appeals
from an order of the district court of the county of Hennepin denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or for a new trial. The record discloses the fact
that the action was defended by an indemnity company,
wliich had issued its policy to the defendant.
The assignments of error raise two general questions:
(a) Was the defendant entitled to a directed verdict in
her favor? (b) If not, was she entitled to a new trial for
errors in the instructions of the trial court to the jury?
a

Tliis brings us to the question whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial on account of alleged errors
in the charge of the court to the jury. The defendant urges
2.
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several errors in the instructions; but we find it necessary to consider only one of them.
The court charged the jury that:
you believe the
plaintiff's testimony, believe that it is true, and believe that
it measures up to the law as
have defined it to you, he
would be entitled to recover, although every other witness in the case had lied."
It is claimed that this was
prejudicial error. It was certainly error, for the reason
that it violated the well-settled rule that it is error for a
trial court in its instructions to a jury to single out the
testimony of a designated witness and lay particular stress
in cases where the evidence
upon
contradictory. 11
State
Enc. PI.
99
Pr. 185;
v. Yates,
Minn. 461, 109 N. VV.

"If

&

is

it,

I

Wilkinson v. City
Crookston, 75 Minn. 184, 77
N. W. 797, and Harriott v. Holmes, 77 Minn. 215, 79 N. W.
obvious. Each party to
1003. The reason for the rule
entitled to have all the evidence relevant to
an action
the issues considered fairly by the jury, and this right
See

is

is

is

of

1070.

a

if

if

it

is

if

it

a

if

not defeated, when the court singles
seriously prejudiced,
out and isolates the testimony of
particular party or witness and gives to
undue importance.
It is, however, urged by the plaintiff that the instruction, even
erroneous, was not prejudicial, when read in
true that the jury
connection with the entire charge. It
were instructed that they should give fair consideration to
all of the testimony in the case; but the instruction complained of was given near the close of the charge, and
was terse, clear, specific, and mandatory in case the jury
believed the plaintiff's testimony.
It in effect invited the
jury to first inquire whether the plaintiff's testimony was
they so found, they need
true, and directed them that,
not concern themselves about the other testimony in the
the plaintiff had told the truth
case, for the reason that
Some of the issues of fact in
he was entitled to recover.
this case were close ones under the evidence, and we are
of the opinion that the instruction was not only erroneous,
new trial must be
but i3rejudicial, and for this reason
granted.
So ordered.
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M 'BRIDE V. DES MOINES CITY RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
134

McLain, C.

J. — The

1907,

Iowa, 398.

facts appearing in the record which
are essential to the determination of the questions of law
raised on this appeal are as follows: Plaintiff's intestate
was a member of the paid fire department of the city of
Des Moines, and in response to a fire alarm, about half
past ten in the morning, with eight other members of the
department, he started on a hose wagon from the fire
station on Eighth street going north. One Nagle was the
driver of the wagon. Plaintiff's intestate rode in his proper
place on a running board or step on the west side of the
wagon, facing east and near the rear end. As the wagon
approached the crossing of Grand avenue running east and
west, on which there was a double track of defendant's
railway, the driver saw a car coming from the west, and
without checking the speed of the wagon drove on across
the track on which the car was approaching. The car
struck the rear wheel on the west side of the wagon, and
deceased was violently thrown to the pavement and his
skull was fractured. From this injury he died within a
few hours.
1.
After stating very elaborately and in great detail the
claims of the parties as to the facts bearing upon the question of the negligence of the defendant's motorman, in
charge of the car which collided with the hose wagon on
which plaintiff's intestate was riding, and defining negli'^
whether
gence, the court instructed the ju^y to consider
or not the motorman having charge of the running and
operating of the car in question was negligent or not in
not stopping or checking the speed of the car before the
collision with the fire hose wagon occurred"; and he then
proceeded to detail a variety of circumstances which the
evidence for plaintiff tended to establish, such as the clearness and calmness of the day, the ringing of the bell on
the hose wagon, and the distance at which such bell might
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beard, the rate of speed of the wagon, etc., none of which
were controlling on the question of the motorman's negliAnd he concluded the instruction with this sengence.
be

tence

:

''After carefully considering

these facts,

if

they be facts,

and all other facts and circumstances proved on the trial,
if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
the motorman by the use of the means at his command
could have stopped the car, or checked the speed thereof,
in time to have avoided the accident, and that ho failed to
do so, that would be negligence on his part; and his negligence, if he was so negligent, would be the negligence of
the defendant, and your verdict should be for the plaintiff,
unless you find the deceased, B. McBride, was negligent,
and that his own negligence contributed to his injury in any
degree, in which case you would find for the defendant."
The first objection urged to this instruction as a whole
is that therein the court called to the attention of the jury
the facts which the evidence tended to establish favorable
to plaintiff's recovery, and omitted special reference to
those relating to defendant 's theory of the accident. This
objection we think was well taken. An instruction was
asked on behalf of defendant, calling attention to other circumstances which the evidence tended to establish, which
should have been considered as bearing on the motorman's
negligence, and which were favorable to defendant's contentions in the case. It was clearly improper for the court
to thus emphasize the circumstances from which negligence might be inferred, and omit any reference to circumstances tending to support the opposite inference. Perhaps the court might properly have omitted to catalogue
the circumstances which the testimony tended to establish
bearing on the question of negligence, and simply have referred in a general way to the facts and circumstances
proved on the trial. But in suggesting to the jury that
they should take into consideration some of the circumstances which were favorable to the plaintiff, and omitting
reference to others favorable to defendant, he put the case
unfairly to the jury.
Another serious objection to the instruction is that the
portion thereof above set out withdraws from the jury the
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question whether the motorman was negligent in not stopping the car or checking the speed thereof in time to have
avoided the accident.
There could be no question under
the evidence as to the ability of the motorman by the use
of the means at his command to stop the car or check the
speed thereof in time to have avoided the accident, if he
had endeavored to do so a sufficient length of time before
the accident occurred, nor was there any doubt that he
failed to stop the car or check its speed so as to prevent
the result of a collision ; and the court specifically instructs
the jury that this ability on the part of the motorman and
The real queshis failure to act constituted negligence.
tion in the case was, not whether the motorman could have
stopped the car, but whether he was negligent in not doing
so; and this was a question for the jury, and not for the
court.
Had the evidence shown without controversy that
the motorman, in the exercise of care, could and should
have anticipated the collision long enough beforehand to
enable him to stop the car or check its speed so as to avoid
the accident, then the instruction might have been correct.
But the facts were in dispute. There were circumstances
supporting either conclusion, and the question of negligence should have been left to the jury.
It is no answer to this position to say that in the first
part of the instruction the jury were told that they must
consider whether or not the motorman was negligent in not
stopping or checking the speed of the car. After this general statement, the court proceeded to enumerate a large
number of circumstances indicating that the motorman was
negligent, and then told the jury that if these circumstances were found to be established, and they believed
from these and other circumstances proved on the trial
that the motorman could have stopped the car, he was
It was not the physical ability of the motornegligent.
man to stop or check the speed of the car that was in question, but his failure to use due care. The instructions as
a whole are lengthy and intricate in their statements, and
the one now specially under consideration is particularly
obscure, and the bald statement at its conclusion that the
motorman was negligent if he could have stopped or
checked the speed of the car in time to avoid the accident,
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and failed to do so, may very well have been seized upon
We
by the jury as the solution of the whole difficulty.
reach the conclusion that in the two respects pointed out
the instruction was erroneous and misleading.

For

the

errors pointed out in the first division of this

opinion, the judgment is reversed.

SEABOAED
Supreme

&

ROANOKE EAILROAD COMPANY V.
JOYNER'S ADM'R.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.
92

Virginia,

1895.

354.

Keith, P.,

delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of trespass on the case, brought in the
Circuit Court of the county of Southampton by Joyner's
administrator against the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad Company, to recover damages for the death of the
plaintiff's intestate, caused, as alleged, by the negligence
of the defendant company. * * *

Nor is there any error in the refusal of the court to
grant the instruction asked for by the plaintiff in error, and

in Bill of Exceptions No. 3, which is in the following words:
''The court instructs the jury that if they believe from
the evidence that Sinclair Joyner went upon the track of
the defendant company without its consent, and placed
himself thereon in such a position as to be struck by a
train, then the said Joyner was a trespasser, and guilty of
such contributory negligence as will prevent a recovery by
his administrator in this action, unless the jury further beset out

lieve that the accident was caused by the willful negligence of the company."
It will be observed that the hypothetical case upon which
this instruction is predicated omits any reference to evidence upon the part of both plaintiff and defendant tend-
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ing to prove that before the accident occurred the engineer
became aware of the dangerous position of Joyner.
The
engineer himself admits that, when he had approached to
within sixty yards of Joyner, he recognized that the object
near the track was not an abandoned tie, as he had supposed, but a man, and that as soon as he made the discovery he used all proper efforts to avert the catastrophe.
The evidence upon the part of the defendant in error tends
to prove that when at a much greater distance from the
body of the deceased, warning of danger was given, which
it was the duty of the engineer to heed, but did not. In any
aspect of the case, whether in that presented by the plaintiff or defendant, here was a most material fact for the
consideration of the jury, upon their determination of
which, under proper instructions, depends their reaching
a just conclusion in this case.
There may be a state of
facts under which the instruction as presented would be
good law, but, upon the evidence set out in this record, its
tendency was to mislead the jury, and it was properly rejected by the court.

We think the judgment of the Circuit Court is without
error, and should be affirmed.

BOYCE V. CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD
COMPANY.
Court of Appeals of Missouri.
120

1906.

Missouri Appeals, 168.

Broaddus, p. J. — This is a suit for damages for negliThe facts of the case are as follows. On the evengence.
ing of October 16, 1903, the plaintiff, in company with her
danghter-in-law, Mrs. Dorothy Boyce, started to go to the
opera house in the town of Odessa. They took the usual
route on the south side of Mason street, which crosses the
defendant's track at its station.
When they got to defendant's tracks, they stopped and waited for a passenger
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train to go by.

They also saw a freight train standing on
the passing track, which was cut in two to allow the passing
of traffic on the street, which crossed the track parallel
with the sidewalk, and to enable foot passengers to continue their journey. At this opening of the train they
saw a man dressed in overalls with a railroad lantern in
his hand, who appeared to be connected with the train, who
told them they ''could cross if they wanted to." Where-

upon plaintiff started to cross the tracks, at which time
the train began to move, which alarmed her, and in order
to prevent being crushed between the cars when they came
together she got off the sidewalk onto the streetway, trod
upon a stone, fell to the ground, but got up in time to
get out of the way of the mo\dng cars.
She did not discover that she was injured until she got to the opera house,
when she says she felt a pain in her ankle, which according
to the evidence turned out to be a severe sprain.

The defendant asked an instruction, which was refused,
if the woman, who was with plaintiff, saw
that the train was about to move and warned her not to
proceed, and that thereafter she persisted in attempting to
cross the track ahead of the moving train, the finding should
be for defendant.
The vice of the instruction is that it
singles out particular facts, to the exclusion of other facts,
upon which the jury are authorized to find a verdict. This
left out of consideration the fact that plaintiff had already
to the effect that

started to make the passage and, such being the case, it
was a question for the jury to say whether it was safest for
We all know from experiher to proceed or turn back.
ence that in case of danger it is sometimes a
question
whether it is safer to proceed or to retreat. And the law
will not place a strict construction upon the acts of a person in such a situation because of want of time for deliberation, and because the imminence of peril is calculated to
confuse the judgment.
It was a question for the jury to
say whether she acted in a reasonable and prudent manner
under the circumstances.
[Reversed

on other grounds.]
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OP VIRGINIA V.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
108

Virginia,

11

1908.

832.

Error

to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the city of
Roanoke in an action of assumpsit.
Judgment for the
plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.
Reversed.
(Instructions given on motion of the plaintiffs.)
*'(1). The court instructs the jury, that although you
may believe from the evidence that the deceased was found
the evening of his death, having convulsions, and that he
continued to have them until he died, and that strychnine
was found in his stomach, this alone is not suflficient to
prove suicide. The defendant company must go further
and show that the deceased intentionally and willfully for
the purpose of committing suicide, took strychnine, and
this must be shown by such evidence as will exclude every
reasonable supposition of accidental death, and unless this
is so shown from all the evidence you must find for the
plaintiff on the issue of suicide.

Keith, P.,

delivered the opinion of the court.
S. W. Hairston, as the next friend of certan infants, recovered a judgment against the Life Insurance Company
of Virginia in the Circuit Court of the city of Roanoke;
and upon the petition of the defendant company the record
is now before us to review certain rulings of the trial
court.
On the 6th of February, 1906, the company issued a
policy of insurance upon the life of David Peter Willis,
the father of the infant plaintiffs, in consideration of the
application for said policy, which is made a part thereof,
and upon condition that the quarterly annual premium of
$20.41 should be paid in advance on the delivery of said
policy, which the declaration alleges was duly paid. It is
also averred that Willis died on the 23rd of March, 1906,
while the policy was in force; that due proof of his death
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had been furnished the defendant; that all the conditions
of the policy had been complied with ; and that, nevertheless, the defendant refused to pay it.

We come now to the instructions given and refused at
the trial.
Instruction No. 1 given on behalf of the plaintiff is
erroneous, in this, that it is predicated upon only a portion of the facts shown in evidence, bearing upon the question of suicide. It is proper for the court to tell the jury
what is the law as applied to a hypothetical statement of
facts, but that statement must present the case shown in
evidence fairly to the jury. The instruction under consideration tells the jury, that if the deceased on the evening
of his death was found in convulsions which continued until
he died, and that strychnine was discovered in his stomach,

this alone is not sufficient to prove suicide.
Another instruction then might have been given presenting another
part of the evidence, in which the jury might with propriety be told that it was insufficient to warrant a conviction; while, if all the facts had been grouped in one
instruction, a wholly different conclusion should have been
reached.
The tendency of such a method of presenting the facts
of a case to the jury is to distract and mislead them, and
the court should content itself with giving the jury general
principles of law and leaving them to apply those principles to the facts in evidence before them, or else it should
be careful, if it prefers to present a hypothetical case to
the jury, to put before the jurors all the facts bearing upon
the issue which the evidence proves or tends to prove.

**********

The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, the
verdict of the jury set aside, and the case remanded for a
trial to be had in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Reversed.
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MUEPHY V. CENTRAL OF GEOEGIA EAILWAY
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Georgia.
135

1910,

Georgia, 194.

Beck, J. The dispute between the parties in this case
is over a strip of land 20 feet in width and about 1,381 feet
in length extending from Glenn street on the north to
Shelton street on the south, in the City of Atlanta, the
issue being as to whether the same constitutes the eastern
edge of a 100-foot right of way of the defendant railroad
company or the western third of a 60-foot public road for
said distance. The plaintiff, in 1881, acquired title to the
lands l.^'ing east of and abutting on the strip of land in dispute. He alleged, that at that time this 20-foot strip was
a road traveled by the public, and had been so used for
more than twenty years; that in 1884, upon petition of
citizens, the commissioners of roads and revenues of Fulton county passed an order formally opening and accepting the same as a public road ; that upon the passing of
this order the petitioner and other abutting landowners on
the east, desiring that the road in front of their property
should be 60 feet in width, dedicated an additional 40-foot
strip for that purpose, adjoining said 20-foot road; that
the county authorities took charge of and worked the entire
60-foot road ; and that the same has ever since been a public road. A short time prior to the bringing of this suit
the defendant railroad company began changing the grade
of the 20-foot strip in question and laying its tracks thereon, and the plaintiff filed suit to enjoin any further interference with the alleged 60-foot road in front of his lands
and the use of any portion of same by the defendant as
its right of way.

It

is complained that the court erred in refusing a written request to give in charge to the jury the following:
"Any uninterrupted use by the public generally of lands
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roadway for a period of time extending througli 20
years, accompanied by acceptance by public authorities,
gives a prescriptive right to the public to such road or
highway." We do not think that the failure of the court
to instruct the jury in the language of the request was
error. It is manifest that the charge which the court refused to give is ambiguous.
It is susceptible of two constructions.
First, it might be construed to mean that an
uninterrupted use by the public generally of lands as a
roadway for a period of time extending through twenty
years, accompanied by acceptance by the public authorities
extending through that period of time, from the beginning
to the end thereof, would give a prescriptive right to the
public to such road.
Second, it might be construed to
mean that an uninterrupted use by the public generally of
the strip of land in question as a roadway for a period of
time extending through 20 years and acceptance by the
public authorities at any time within that 20 years, even
at or near the close of that period, would give a prescriptive right to the public to such road. These two constructions embody very different statements of the law upon the
If the first construction which might
question involved.
have been placed upon the written request was the statement of the law desired by counsel offering the request to
charge, then the principle embodied in the request was sufficiently covered by the charge as given; and as the court
might fairly have placed this construction upon the written
request, he should not be held to have committed error in
refusing to give another charge upon a subject which was
already sufficiently covered by his charge as given. If
counsel had desired a charge laying down the doctrine as
stated in the second eonstruction of the written request, he
should have framed it in terms more aptly embodying the
principle which he sought to have incorporated in the
court's instructions.
as a

**********

Judgment affirmed.

All

the

Justices concur.
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PARKER V. NATIONAL MUTUAL BUILDING
LOAN ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
55
PoFFENBARGER,

Bill of

11

&

1904.

West Virginia, 134.

**********
President

:

exceptions No. 4 contains all the instructions in
the record. The argument and references in the bill of exceptions seem to proceed upon the theory of two instructions.
"Whether given as one or as two is unimportant.
The matter is set out in the bill of exceptions as follows:
**The court instructs the jury that where an agent is employed to sell real estate for his principal if the agent was
the procuring cause of the sale of said real estate the agent
is entitled to his commissions, without regard to the extent
of his exertions, and although the contract commenced by
said agent was consummated by the principal himself or
through the intervention of another; and the court further
instructs the jury that where a broker or agent employed
to negotiate a sale procures a customer for the sale of the
said property on the terms proposed by the owner and the
principal takes the further proceedings out of the hands
of the broker, and completes the sale himself, the agent is
nevertheless entitled to his commissions, and the principal
cannot deprive him of his rights to compensation by a discharge before the sale is consummated, and this is true
where the principal completes the contract with the customer presented by the broker on different terms from
those stipulated to the broker."
The legal propositions stated by these instructions are
They make
no doubt correct, but they are purely abstract.
no reference whatever to the evidence, nor do they submit
to the jury the finding from the evidence of the facts giving
One of them says:
rise to the law enunciated in them.
"Where a broker or agent employed to negotiate a sale
procures a customer for the sale of said property on the
terms proposed by the owner, and the principal takes the
further proceedings out of the hands of the broker,"
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etc., the broker is entitled to his commission.
Had the
court given this instruction in the concrete instead of the
abstract form it would have said: **If the jury believe
from the evidence that the defendant employed the plaintiff to sell the property mentioned in the evidence at a certain price, and agreed to pay him, in case he made such
sale, a commission, and, in pursuance thereof, the plaintiff
procured a customer for the sale of the property on the
terms fixed by the defendant, and the defendant prevented
him from making the sale by interfering and consummating
the sale himself with the customer, they should find for the
plaintiff." This would have directed the minds of the jury
to the facts necessary to be ascertained by them in order
to reach a proper conclusion.
An instruction for the defendant embodying the same proposition of law might have
been given, and in it the jury would have been told, in substance, that if the plaintiff, acting under such contract of
employment, failed to procure such a purchaser, they
should find for the defendant.
Instructions should apply
facts
case.
''It is not the proper
law
in
the
to the
the
course for the judge to lay down the general principles of
law applicable to a case, and leave the jury to apply them ;
but it is his duty to inform them what the law is as applicable to the facts of the case. An instruction, however
pertinent and applicable it may be, is abstract unless it
be made to apply, in express terms, either to the attitude
of the parties or to the very facts in issue." Blashfield on
Instr. s. 92. ''It is not the province of the judge to impress
any particular view of the facts upon the jury, but it is
his province to make his charge so directly applicable to
the facts as to enable the jury to render a correct verdict.
To leave as little room as possible for them to make mistakes in applying the law to the facts, which they may be
very liable to do when they have only general abstract
propositions given to them in charge, there ought, if possible, to be no room for misunderstanding the charge or its
application, and to this end it ought to be specific and direct." East Tennessee V. (§ G. R. Co. v. Toppins, 10 Lea.
(Tenn.) 64. "Courts should apply the principles to the
facts in evidence, stating the facts hypothetically." Blashfield on Instr. s. 92.
T. p.— 28
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Whether the legal proposition should have been in both
forms, or only one of them, depends upon whether or not,
looking at the evidence introduced, the court could say
there was room or ground for either of the two conclusions
presented, dependent upon an issue of fact to be deter-

it

a

is

it

it,

mined by the jury. If there is no evidence whatever upon
which one of the conclusions may stand, there is no reason
for giving an instruction embodying the hypothesis upon
which it is based, nor can the court do so except at the risk
of confusing and misleading the jury. The statement of
the principle without any application of it to the facts or
direction to the jury as to what facts they should look for
in the evidence, is even more likely to mislead for the
reason that, in the effort to apply
they are called upon
by the court to wrestle with both the law and the facts and
form for themselves the hypothesis upon which the conclusion depends, and
leaves room for the jury to form
two, where there may be no evidence whatever to support
one of them. That
exactly what has occurred here. No
evidence of the performance of the contract proved was before the jury. The instructions raised and presented to the
jury question which had no root or foundation in the eviHence,
dence.
could perform no function except to mislead the jury.

a

On account of the misleading character of the instructions given and the want of sufficient evidence to support
the verdict, the judgment must be reversed, the verdict set
new trial granted, and the case remanded.
aside,
Reversed.

Appeals
138

of

Court

of

WEST KENTUCKY COAL COMPANY V. DAVIS.
Kentucky.

1910.

Kentucky, 667.

Opinion of the court by Wm. Rogers Clay, Commissioner.
Reversing.
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Appellee, J. B. Davis, instituted this action against appellant, West Kentucky Coal Company, to recov^er dim^'ges
for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by appellant's negligence. The trial in the lower court resulted in
a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for the sum of
$1,600.
To reverse that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The appellant is a corporation operating a coal mine
near the town of Sturgis, Union county, Ky. It also owns
and operates a mine at Wheatcroft, and at one or two
other places. In connection with these mines it owns and
operates a railroad. Under appellant's tipple, there are
three railroad tracks upon which cars are transported and
placed for the purpose of loading. These tracks are known
as tracks Nos. 1, 2, and 3.
The engine which appellant
operates was taken daily down track No. 1 to the scalehouse; thence it was run up track No. 2 to the tipple for
the purpose of coaling before beginning its regular operations for the day. On the occasion in question, those in
charge of the engine backed it down to the scale house on
track No. 1; thence up track No. 2, where appellee was at
work at the tipple. It was appellee's duty to check the
cars, and see that they were properly loaded. When the
engine arrived at the tipple, it pushed the car which appellee was loading out of the way, placed its tender upon
the tipple, and received its coal. It then went back, placed
a partially loaded car in. position, and proceeded to the
scale-house. It was standing there when appellee resumed
his labors of loading the car on track No. 2. According to
its usual custom, the engine then started up track No. 1,
pushing an empty car. While it was proceeding in the
direction of appellee, the car which the latter was loading
When this took
on track No. 2 became unmanageable.
place, appellee's assistant jumped upon the car for the
purpose of stopping it. Appellee stepped back and moved
up the track for the purpose of notif>dng the tipple men to
There was a distance of four or five
stop the machinery.
feet between tracks No. 1 and No. 2. When appellee rose
up and stepped backward to give the tipple man the required notice, he came in contact with the car which was
being pushed by the engine up track No. 1, and was in-

436
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jured.

The evidence shows that there was a flagman on
the front end of the car that was being pushed by the

engine. His testimony is to the effect that appellee backed
into the car so suddenly that it was impossible to stop the
train after his peril was discovered.
There was evidence
to the effect that the whistle was not blown nor the bell
rung as the engine approached the place of accident.

**********

The instructions complained of are as follows:
Gentlemen of the jury, the court instructs you
**(1)
that it was the duty of the defendant's employee in charge
of the engine and cars attached thereto at the time and
place in question to exercise ordinary care, as hereinafter
defined, in running and operating the same so as to prevent injury to its employes; so, if you shall believe from
the evidence that defendant's said employes in charge of
said engine and cars failed to exercise such care as above
required, but negligently ran said cars against the plaintiff, thereby injuring him, while plaintiif was exercising
ordinary care, as hereinafter defined, for his own safety,
if he was then doing so, then in that event you should find
for the plaintiff and award to him such an amount in damages as will fairly and reasonably compensate him on account of any mental and physical suffering endured by
him as a direct result of such injury, if any, and also for
the reasonable value of the time necessarily lost from his
business on account thereof, if any, and also for any permanent reduction in his power to earn money, if any, as
was the direct result of such injury, not exceeding the sum
of $2,000, the amount claimed in the petition. But unless
you shall so find and believe from the evidence as above
required, you must find for the defendant."

The court further instructs you that it was likewise the duty of the plaintiff performing his duties and
doing the work in question to exercise ordinary care for
his own safety, and, although you may believe from the
evidence that the defendant's said employe was at said

''(4)

time negligent and careless, yet if you shall also
from the evidence that plaintiff at said time when
injured was also careless or negligent, and that but
own carelessness or negligence the accident and

believe
he was
for his

injury
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would not have occurred, then in that event you should find

for

the

defendant."

It will

observed that the instructions complained of
do not present to the jury the reciprocal duties of appellant
and apjDellee. They are so general and abstract in form
as to make the jury the judges of both the law and the
facts. Smith v. Cornett, 38 S. W. 689, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 818 ;
C. N. 0. (& T. P. Rij. Co. V. EilVs Adm'r, 89 S. W. 523, 28
Ky. Law Rep. 530. The jury may have concluded that certain acts constitute negligence, when, as a matter of fact,
such was not the case. That this conclusion is sound may
be gathered from the fact that one witness was permitted
to testify that the car which struck appellee was not
equipped with a fender or pilot ; indeed, much stress is laid
upon this fact in appellee's brief. Doubtless it was commented upon by counsel in their argument to the jury. We
can not, then, say that the jury were not influenced by this
fact in returning a verdict in favor of appellee. Certainly
the failure of appellant to e-quip the car in question with a
fender or pilot was not negligence. To so hold would be
to impose upon appellant a greater liability than has ever
been imposed upon ordinary railroads, and would almost
defeat the practical operation of its engines and cars.
Nor do we think the failure of appellant to offer more
specific instructions than those given deprived it of its
right to complain. The rule is that in civil cases the court
is only required to give such instructions as are offered by
the parties. If, however, an instruction offered is defective
in form or substance, the court should prepare, or direct
the preparation of a proper instruction on the point attempted to be covered bv the instruction offered. L. & N.

R. R. Co.

Law Rep.
Law Rep.

be

V.

Barrod,

250;

A^ico^a

lis

Ky.

W. 233, 25 Ky.
S. W. 1081, 28 Ky.

877, 75 S.

Bros. v. Hurst,

88

87.^

But when no instructions are requested by either party,
and the court on its own motion undertakes to instruct the
jury, the instructions so far as they go should present correctly the law of the case. Soitth Corinqton £ Cincinnati
Street By. Co. v. Core, 96 S. W. 562, 29 Ky. Law Rep.
836 ; Sivope v. Scliafer, 4 S. W. 300, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 160 ;
Turner, Jr. v. Terrill, 97 S. W. 396, 30 Ky. Law. Rep. 89.
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Upon the next trial of the case the court will instruct
the jury as follows :
"It was the duty of the defendant's agents in charge of
its engine and cars on the occasion in question to give reasonable warning of the approach of the train by blowing
the whistle or ringing the bell, and to keep a reasonable
lookout in front of the train as it was moved. It was the
duty of the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to watch
for the approaching train and keep out of its way. If you
believe from the evidence that a reasonable warning of the
approach of the train was not given or a reasonable lookout was not kept, and that by reason of this plaintiff was
struck and injured by one of defendant's cars, while exercising ordinary care for his own safety, you will find for
the plaintiff. Unless you so believe, you will find for the
defendant.

Although you may believe from the evidence that
defendant's agents in charge of said train failed to give
reasonable warning of its approach and failed to keep a
reasonable lookout, yet if you believe from the evidence
that the plaintiff himself failed to exercise ordinary care
to discover the approach of the train and to keep out of
its way, and that such failure on his part, if any, so contributed to his injury that but for said failure his injury,
if any, would not have been received, you will find for de-

"(2)

fendant.

If you

believe from the evidence that a reasonable
lookout was kept, and that reasonable warning of the approach of the train was given, and that plaintiff went upon
the track so close to the approaching train that the injury
to him could not be avoided by the exercise of ordinary
care upon the part of those in charge of the train after they
perceived his danger, or could have perceived it by the
exercise of ordinary care, you will find for the defendant.
"(4) Reasonable or ordinary care is such care as an
ordinarily prudent person will usually exercise under circumstances the same or similar to those proven in this
**

(3)

case.

If

you find for the plaintiff, you will award him
such sum in damages as you may believe from the evidence
will fairly comijensate him for his mental or physical suf-

*'(5)
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the per-

manent imi^airment, if any, of his power to earn money,
which you may believe from the evidence was the proximate result of his injury, if any ; not exceeding in all, however, the sum of $2,000."
No other instructions will be given.
The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for a
new trial consistent with this opinion.
In Kansas City,

Mexico and Orient Ry. Co. v. Loosley (1907) 76 Kan. 103,
court said: "The defendant claims the court erred in reThe plaintiff argues that the instruction tendered wa^
fusing its request.
faulty and hence was properly refused.
For present purposes it may be
conceded that this is true.
it may further be conceded that without a request the court was not obliged to instruct upon the matter involved.
But if
a defective
request actually brings to the court's notice an important principle of law which ought to be stated to enable the jury to render an intelligent verdict, it may be prejudicial error to disregard it; and if an attempt
be made by an instruction to submit the subject defectively covered by the
request to the consideration of the jury, it should be sufficiently explicit and
comprehensive to cover fairly the field of the request."
1

90 Pac.

990,

the

STATE V. LEGG.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
59

1906,

West Virginia, 315.

Sanders, Judge:

This writ of error is to a judgment of the circuit court
of Clay county, convicting the defendant, Sarah Ann Legg,
of the murder of her husband, Jay Legg, and sentencing
her to be hanged.
and 5. By these instructions it is undertaken to define reasonable doubt. We see
They seem to
no objection to these instructions as such.
define reasonable doubt correctly, and no objection to their
correctness is pointed out. But it is urged that the court
erred in gi\'ing them, because they are upon the sams point,
and for the same purpose, and that a continued re])etition
of instructions upon a single point is calculated to prejudice tin defendant. It was entirely unnecessary to repeat
It is manifestly improper to do so.
these instructions.

As

to

instructions Nos.

2, 3, 4
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The purpose of instructing a jury is to aid them in arriving
at a proper verdict, and not to confuse them, and in order
to be of aid, instructions should not be repeated, but when
once given, presenting a particular theory of a case, no
other instruction presenting the same theory should be
given, because to do so is to destroy the very purpose for
which instructions are given, and to mystify and confuse
the jury. It is true these instructions present the definition in different language, but there is no necessity for it
to be defined more than once. Four long instructions upon
reasonable doubt, which has never yet been defined or made
clearer than the words themselves import, can certainly be
of no service to a jury. The practice of repeating instructions should be condemned. It is wrong to do this, and
thereby prominently impress a single feature of a case
upon a juror. Either of these instructions would have been
sufficient, but as to whether or not the repetition of them is
reversible error, we will not determine, because, on other
grounds the judgment will have to be reversed, and upon
a second trial, the necessity for this criticism can be
obviated.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and a new

trial awarded the defendant.
Reversed.^
Tn Gran v. Houston
Bepetition not error vnlr.^s jury misled.
(1895)
Nebr. 813, 64 N. W. 245, the court said: "While there may have been
repetitions which were not necessities, or which in the opinion of counsel
or this court were unnecessary, yet there were none which tended, nor did
they as a whole tend, to mislead the jury, nor can we believe the jury was
misled by them, hence there was no prejudice to the rights of plaintiff in
error, and the action of the court, the grounds for this complaint, furnishes
no tenable reason for a reversal of the case."
1

45

Instructing the Jury

Sec. 3]

CITY OF CHICAGO

V. MOORE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
139

Illinois,

441

1891.

201.

Mr. Justice Shope delivered the opinion of
This was a suit for personal injury, alleged

the court:
to have been

received by defendant because of a defective sidewalk over
and upon which she was passing with due care and caution,
and which appellant was required to keep in safe repair
and condition.
The trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff,
which, on appeal to the Appellate Court, was afiRrmed.
Counsel for appellant have, seemingly, filed in this court
their brief filed in the Appellate Court, containing an elaborate discussion of the facts, which must in this court be
deemed as being settled adversely to their contention by
the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The first point made which we will consider is that, the
court erred in refusing all instructions asked, and giving
one prepared by the court in lieu thereof.
It is insisted
with great earnestness, that under the practice in this State,
and under the statute, the respective parties have the right
to have instructions given or refused by the court as asked
by them, and that it is error for the court to refuse an instruction containing a correct proposition of law applicable
to the facts, although an instruction embodying every material phase thereof be given in an instruction or instructions prepared by the court. It is said ''that there is no
place under our law for instructions by the court sua
sponte, except when counsel have failed to present proper
instructions, and the justice of the case demands that the
judge supply the omission." The contrary to this contention has been so repeatedly held, and the practice of giving
a charge prepared by the court, and containing all of the
material points covered by the instructions asked, has been
so often commended by this court, that the question ought
to be regarded as settled in this state. Hill ef al v. Parsons
et al, 118 id. 132 ;
et al, 110 111.
; Haucliett v. Kimhark
Pulrer,
126 id. 329.
Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v.
this
in
of
practice, we said :
speaking
In the latter case,

Ill
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"The propriety of

it,

the practice thus adopted is challenged,
the proposition contended for seeming to be, that in this
State the functions of the court in the matter of instructing a jury are practically limited to giving or refusing the
written instructions asked by counsel. Such, clearly, is not
the case. True, he may, if he sees fit, limit himself to giving the instructions submitted by the counsel which properly state the law, and then, even though the law be inadequately given to the jury, no error can ordinarily be predicated upon such action, because if counsel had deemed
other instructions necessary, they might and should have
asked them. But where the judge sees proper to do so, it
is competent for him to prepare his own charge to the jury,
but if he does so, he should embody in
either literally or
in substance, all proper instructions asked by counsel."
See, also, Chicago and loiva Railroad Co. v. Lane, 30 111.

App. 443.
The statute prescribes that the
shall instruct as to the law, only,
and that no judge shall instruct a
structions be reduced to writing.
Section 54 provides, that when
"which the judge can not give,"

court charging the jury

is

(Practice act, sec. 51,)
petit jury unless the in(Practice act, sec. 52.)
instructions are asked
he shall mark the same
as
"and
such
he approves he shall write on the
refused,
then prohibited from
margin thereof, given," and he
qualifying, modifying or explaining the same, otherwise
than in writing. The court must see that the instructions

is

it

it

4

it

it

a

is

a

it

a

given to the jury, not only separately, but as a whole, conform to the rules of law and practice in our courts. It by
correct
no means follows, because an instruction contains
must meet the approval of the
proposition of law, that
Each party to the
judge, and must therefore be given.
right to demand that the law applicable to
litigation has
his case shall be given with accuracy and clearness to the
right to demand, and
all that he has
jury. But this
was early held, under this statute, that the court might refuse erroneous instructions, modify them, or give instrucmight deem expedient, {Vanlandingtions of its own, as
ham V. Huston,
Gilm. 125,) and such has been the uniform
holding ever since. And
has been so repeatedly held that
not error to refuse instructions, however applicable
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and pertinent, wlien the material parts are given in other
instructions, that the citation of authority seems unnecessary. Here appellant asked seventeen instructions. A careful consideration of them will show, as it is conceded, that
the instruction prepared and given by the court contained
every important or material proposition embodied therein,
except the fourth instruction asked and refused, in respect
of which, as we shall see hereafter, appellant has no cause
of complaint. If the jury were accurately instructed in respect of each proposition contained in the instructions
asked, proper to be given, the party can not be heard to
complain.
It
however, said, that the instructions prepared by
the counsel presented the questions sharply and incisively,
while those of the court are more moderate in expression
and less forceful. This may be conceded without affecting
the result. As said by the Appellate Court: ''The instructions handed up come to the judge from partisan hands,
and have been drawn as carefully as the skill of
lawyer
can accomplish
to present
partisan view, or to convey
hint, suggestion or intimation of advantage to his client.
The same legal rule may be stated in differently arranged
combination of words by the judge, and be, as
very
likely to be, coldly impartial, and entirely colorless in its
statements of facts on which
based." The utmost
care should be taken by the judge to include within the
charge every i^roposition of law applicable to the facts of
the case embraced within the instructions asked, and such
others as he may deem necessary to the attainment of justice. His language should be clear and impartial, and convey to the jury the law of the case in terms they will comWhen this
done the practice
to be com])rehend.
too
other,
rather
which
than
mended,
the
freqently leaves
the mind of the juror in uncertainty as to what
meant by
the disjointed, and, to his mind, disconnected and conflicting, propositions of law, and which embarrass and mislead
him perhaps quite as often as they lead him to correct conolusions.

**********

error in this record for which the judgment

should be reversed,

is

no

it

Finding

affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.^
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1 A number of courts have declaretl that the practice of charging
the jury
in the language of the court instead of in the language of counsel, is decidedly
preferable, even where the requested charges are unexceptionable in law when
separately examined, for the reason that thereby the charge can be made more
orderly and harmonious and is freed from the partisan spirit and want of
usually show when prepared by counproper perspective which instructions
Eosenstein v. Fair Haven v. Westville E. E. Co. (1905) 78 Conn. 29,
sel.
60 Atl. 1061; Kinney v. Ferguson
(1894) 101 Mich. 178, 59 N. W. 401.
On the other hand, some courts hold that the court is bound to give a corThus, in Morrison v. Fairrect instruction in the language of the request.
mont & Clarksburg Traction Co. (1906) 60 W. Va. 441, 55 S. E. 669, the court
said :
party is entitled to an instruction in his own language, if it correctly propounds the law applicable to the case, and is not misleading and
there are facts in evidence to support it.
State v. Evans, 30 W. Va. 417;
Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312.
Where such instructions
are asked
a court should, without hesitation,
It is a right a party has
give them.
to couch his instructions in his own language, and when he has done so, if
But while this is
they fulfill the legal requirements, they should be given.
true, yet what should be the effect after verdict, where such instruction is
Can we say that it is reversible error for
refused, but modified and given?
the court to make a slight or immaterial change in an instruction?
Must instructions be given literally as offered, and if this is not done, must we overWhile such an instruction should be
throw the verdict?
We cannot so hold.
given, yet a verdict will not be set aside where this is not done, when it
is modified and given, if we can clearly see that the instruction as modified
is the same in legal effect as the one offered."
And in some states it is provided by statute that the court shall instruct
in the language of the request when such request is correct in law.
Alabama, Code, 1903, <$ 5364; North Dakota, Eev. Codes, 1905, $ 7021; South
Dakota, Code Civ. Pro., 1903, $ 256.

"A

KLOFSKI V. RAILROAD SUPPLY COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
235

Illinois,

1908.

146.

Me. Justice Vickees delivered the opinion of the court:
The second count in the declaration alleges that appellant
carelessly and negligently employed an incompetent and
reckless servant and permitted such incompetent servant
to operate and manage ladles filled with molten metal ; that
such incompetency of the said servant was, or ought to
have heen, known to appellant and was unknown to appellee, hy means whereof the appellee was injured, as aforesaid, through the incompetency, recklessness and carelessThe gist of the second
ness of said servant of appellant.
count of the declaration is, that appellant, with notice,
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negligGntly employed an incompetent servant to handle a
ladle full of molten metal, by means whereof the appellant,
by its said servant, carelessly caused the said metal to spill
upon the ground and explode against the appellee.

It

**********

is next urged by appellant that the court erred in giving instruction No. 4. That instruction is as follows :
*'It was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable care
to learn and know whether its servants were competent and
fit for their work, so that it would be reasonably safe for
the defendant's other servants to work with them without
being exposed to unnecessary danger to life or limb by
reasons of incompetency, if any; and if defendant's servant
known as 'Scotty' was incompetent for his work, and if by
reason thereof other servants of defendant were exposed
to unnecessary dangf^r to life and limb, and if defendant by
reasonable care would have known of such incompetency
and danger, if any, before the alleged injury to plaintiff, in
time by reasonable care to prevent such danger, then it was
defendant's duty to use reasonable care not to expose the
plaintiff to the danger, if any, of working with such incompetent servant, if any."

Appellant concedes that this instruction states a correct
proposition of law as far as it goes, but contends that under
the evidence in this case the instruction should have gone
further and explained to the jury that if appellee had knowledge, or equal means of knowledge, with appellant of the incompetency of the servant "Scotty" and made no objection to working with him, appellee would assume the risk
of injury that might result from such incompetency. This
criticism cannot be sustained. The instruction under consideration does not purport to state all the facts upon
which a right of recovery depends. It does not conclude
with a direction to find a verdict for appellee, and does not,
therefore, fall within a class of instructions often condemned by this court which conclude with a direction to
find a verdict for a particular party without stating all the

essential facts to support such conclusion.
It is unnecessary, and aften impracticable, to state the whole law of a
case in one instruction. Efforts to do so are more likely to
confuse than enlighten the jury. Besides, the liability to
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a

it

is

if,

commit error is minimized by stating the law applicable to
a particular question or particular parts of the case in
separate instructions. This court has often had occasion
to announce the familiar rule that instructions are to be
considered as a series, and, when so considered,
as
sufficient. The
whole, they state the law correctly that
jury were informed by other instructions in the series of
the effect the facts omitted from this one would have upon
Mie relative rights of the parties. Instruction No. 36 given
on behalf uf appellant advises the jury that appellee could
not recover under the second count of his declaration unless
he proved that he did not know, and by the exercise of
reasonable diligence would not have known, that the servant "Scotty" was incompetent, careless and reckless. Appellant had the full benefit of the doctrine of the assumption of risk, so far as
applied, resulting from the incompetency and carelessness of the fellow servant of the
appellee by instructions 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 33, 35, 36 and
38 given at its instance by the court.

is

There being no reversible error in this record the judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District
affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

McDIVITT V. DES MOINES CITY RAILWAY
Supreme Court
141

J. —

*

Evans,

of

PANY.

loiva.

COM-

1909.

Iowa, 689,

* *

it

The appellant complains further that the instructions of
the court were contradictory, and that, although the court
held the deceased to have been guilty of contributory neglinevertheless laid upon the plaintilY the burden of
gence,
proving freedom from contributory negligence before she
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''last clear

of the issues, the court presented its
instructions in paragraphs numbered from 1 to 19, inclusive.
The first six are as follows:
The burden of proof is ujDon the plaintiff to estab(1)
lish by preponderance of the evidence each of the following propositions: First, that the deceased, Edith McDivitt Lawson, was struck and injured by the defendant's
car about the time, at the place, and substantially in the
manner alleged in plaintiff's petition; second, that said
a statement

was not g^i^^ty of negligence causing or contributing to her said injury; third, that the defendant was
guilty of negligence substantially as alleged by plaintiff
and hereafter in these instructions more fully specified;
fourth, that said injuries so received by decedent were the
direct and approximate result of the negligence of the defendant; fifth, that the estate of decedent has been damIf you find affirmatively
aged in some amount thereby.
as to each and all of the above propositions, then your
verdict will be for the plaintiff. If you fail to find affirmatively as to any one of the above propositions, your
verdict will be for the defendant.

decedent

**********

The undisputed evidence in this case shows that
(4)
the deceased approached the railway track of defendant,
and, after having so approached the railway track of defendant, waited for the west-bound car to pass her, and
that, after such car had passed, decedent immediately proceeded across the north track, and the mtervenmg space
of almost five feet between the north and south tracks, and
stopped in front of an east-bound car on the south track,
there passing, and was struck by said car without taking
any precautions to avoid the accident. You are instructed as a matter of law that this action of decedent would
constitute negligence, and plaintiff cannot recover unless
The only question
you find as hereinafter instructed.
you for considerasubmitted
to
have
therefore which you
tion is whether or not the defendant's employees in charge
of the east-bound car, which came in contact with the deceased, were guilty of the negligence charged in failing to
avoid the injury which resulted in the death of decedent
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after the deceased stepped from behind the west-bound
ear and onto the south track of defendant, and she was
seen by the motorman in a position of danger * * *

is

in

a

is

is

is

is

it

it

is

a

is

it

is

is

a

it
is

is

6

4

is

6

4

if

it

1,

a

a

if,

You have been heretofore instructed, gentlemen,
(6)
that the decedent was negligent in going upon the track in
front of the east-bound car, which struck her; but you are
further instructed that, while the law holds that plaintiff
cannot recover on account of the contributory negligence
of the decedent in stepping in front of the east-bound car
in the manner in which she did, yet
after the motorman
saw her in
place of danger or about to step upon the
track in front of the approaching car, he negligently failed to stop said car within
reasonable time or distance
under the circumstances shown by the testimony,
and
such failure was the direct and proximate cause of the injury which resulted in the death of decedent, then your
verdict will be for the plaintiff.
From an examination of instruction
will be observed that the jury was instructed, expressly, that,
failed to find that the decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence, the verdict must be for the defendant.
Instructions
and
expressly stated to the jury that the
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence.
This presents the alleged contradiction of which appellant comcontended by appellee that instructions
plains. It
and
expressly state to the jury that the plaintiff may recover notwithstanding contributory negligence, and this
contention
correct; but this does not eliminate the conin
tradiction
the instructions. Appellee contends that the
instructions must be considered as
whole, and this
true. It
argiied also, that the error in the first instruction
cured by the statement in the fourth and sixth; but
contradiction. Our precured only in the form of
It has been
vious cases cited by appellee are not in point.
ambiguous, or where
held that where an instruction
erroneous because of some omission,
standing alone,
may be cured by other instructions that are clear upon
the omitted or ambiguous point; but where an instruction
aflirmatively erroneous, the
free from ambiguity, and
another
contradiction contained
not cured by
error
instruction. There
no way in such case to determine
which instruction the jury may follow. The question pre-
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in this case is almost parallel with Christy v. City
Raihvay Company, 126 Iowa, 428, and the cases therein
cited. The error in this case was somewhat emphasized
by the sixteenth instruction, which contains the following:
sented

"Contributory negligence is such negligence as contributes to an injury" — a definition which was quite unneces-

sary in view of the withdrawal of the question from the
consideration of the jury.
The natural effect of it would
be to impress the jury that the question was still in the
case, and to emphasize the error contained in instruction
The judgment below is reversed, and cause remanded
a new trial. —Reversed.

for

Section

4.

Requests

for Instructions.

CENTRAL RAILROAD
Supreme

V. HARRIS.

Court of Georgia.
76

Georgia,

1886.

501.

Lucinda Harris brought

suit against the Central Railroad to recover damages for the killing of her husband.
The testimony for the plaintiff tended to show that the
husband was in the depot in the city of Atlanta ; that he
walked alongside the train to go beyond the engine, which
projected from the depot into a street-crossing at its end;
that he undertook to cross the track at the street-crossing,
when the train started rapidly without giving any signal
and ran over him.

**********

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for one
thousand dollars. The defendant moved for a new trial
upon the following grounds:

**********

Because the court failed entirely to put before the
jury the main defense relied upon by the defendant, and
to sustain which abundant evidence had been introduced,
(2)

T. p.— 29
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to-wit, that defendant had boarded the passenger train in
the depot without having purchased a ticket, and without
having any intention of leaving the city thereon, but simply to say good-bye to a crowd of colored servants on their
way to Florida, and that he had attempted to jump from
said train when in motion, and from a platform having no
steps attached thereto by which to descend to the ground,
and having a railing extending around the entire platform to prevent persons from getting on and off the car
The charge of the
to which it was attached, at that end.
court failed to call the attention of the jury in any way
to these facts, but singled out the one element of negligence arising from the failure, if such failure existed, to
toll the bell on crossing Pryor street.

Jackson, Chief Justice.

The very able and distinguished counsel for defendant
in error saw the force of this exception to the charge, and
endeavored to meet it by the reply that the counsel for
the plaintiff in error could not use the exception, because
he did not call the attention of the court to the omission of
which he now complains, and cited decisions of this court
bearing upon the necessity of his doing so before he could
take advantage of the omission.
"We think, however, that the cases cited, and the principles on which they rest, do not apply to the clear omission
to notice in the charge a plain defence of the company
arising out of his evidence so as not to escape the observation of the judge, but to omissions to expand the charge,
so as to make more clear the point on which he has
charged substantially, but not as fully as would have been
done had attention been called to it. The courts will not
allow a party to lie in wait for the judge when he charges
substantially the law covering the case, and then object to
the insufficiency of a portion of it; but in every case, the
law of it must be given in substance to the jury, because if
it is not given, the general verdict they give is not upon
the law, the law of the case, but on facts without instructions on the law of the case. The ship is at sea without
chart or pilot, and can never reach the port to which it is
The verdict can never be
bound without their guidance.
a legal verdict unless instructions on the law of the case
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given by him who presides for that pur^Dose. The omission to cover the case substantially must always set it
aside.
An so this court has often ruled. In the case of Hardin, Executor vs. Almand, 64th Ga. 582, the 8th head-note
lays down the rule thus: "Where the case is fully covered by the general charge, the failure to instruct the
jury on a particular branch of it is not error in the absence of a request."
The case at bar is not fully covered,
in that it ignores one defence, and makes an act of negligence in the company affect that defence, if meant to be
alluded to at all, which act could not have possibly affected it.
be

So from an early date this court has uniformly held that
the law of the case must be given to the jury to the extent
of covering the substantial issues made by the evidence,
whether requested or not, or attention be called to it or
not; otherwise the verdict will be set aside.

**********

In all these cases, it is believed, from an examination of
each, the principle is clearly deducible that without any
request of counsel or reminder of the court by counsel, the
instructions of the court must substantially embrace the
rule of law on the issues between the parties which the

If

evidence makes.
that be done substantially, then there
is a line of decisions cited by counsel for the defendant
in error, to the effect that if the charge be not full enough
or clear enough or omits something that would put one
side or the other more fairly before the jury than the
charge given does, then the notice of the court must be
called thereto, or the party complaining will not be heard
here.
there be any exception to this general rule in
this court from 11th Ga. down to 69th, it is very scarce,
and will be found approximating closely to the rule laid
down, if not clearly within it.

If

**********

is reversed solely because the court in
ignored
the defence set up by the defendant becharge
the
low, that plaintiff's husband's own negligence — his own
rash act — in jumping from the cars killed him, without
any negligence at all of the defendant which contributed

The judgment
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of his, — the only negligence proved being the
neglect to ring the bell, which did not affect in the least
the disastrous result of the rashness of the deceased.
Judgment reversed}
to that act

\ Accord:
Owen v. Owen (1867) 22 Iowa, 270; Capital City Brick &
Pipe Co. V. Des Moines (1907) 136 Iowa, 243, 113 N. W. 835; York Park
Bldg. Ass'n V. Barnes (1894) 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440.

MORGAN
Supreme

V. MULHALL.

Court of Missouri.
214

Missouri,

1908,

451.

Lamm, J. — Suing Mulhall, Ernest Morgan hj his next
friend asked $20,000 damages, grounding his right of action on a negligent shooting and wounding.
At a trial
with the aid of a jury, he got a verdict of $5,000. From
a judgment entered, defendant appeals.

The petition follows:
''The plaintiff' for his cause of action showeth to the
court that on the 24th day of May, 1905, upon the petition
of said Ernest Morgan the said circuit court did appoint
Joseph Morgan as his next friend to commence and prosecute this suit, and said Joseph Morgan has consented in
writing to act as such next best friend for said purpose.
"And the plaintiff further showeth to the court that on
the 18th day of June, 1904, in said city of St. Louis and
on the grounds of the Louisiana
Purchase Exposition
Company, the defendant by shooting into a crowd of people negligently shot the plaintiff, Ernest Morgan, with a
])istol

*

*

*

stood mute and neither prayed nor got any
Plaintiff asked none on the trial
instructions whatever.
issue of negligence nor on issues relating to the defence.
Pie asked and got two — one on the measure of damages, the
other a rule of law relating to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony.
In this state
of the record, defendant does not contend the instructions
Defendant
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given were bad law in and of themselves, but his counsel insist it was error to not give instructions bearing upon the
issues and announcing rules of law by which the jury
could be guided to a just verdict on them.

**********

An excellent law writer states the general doctrine
in civil cases to be: '*It is then, a general rule of pro(b)

cedure, subject, in this country, to a few statutory innovations, that mere non-direction, partial or total, is not
ground of new trial, unless specific instructions, good in
point of law and appropriate to the evidence, were requested and refused. A party cannot, by merely excepting to a
charge, make it the foundation for an assignment of error, that it is indefinite or incomplete." (2 Thompson on
Trials, sec. 2341). Judge Thompson supports his text by
a wealth of authorities in a note, adding:
''The English
rule seems to be that non-direction, where specific direction is not requested, is no ground of a new trial, unless it
produce a verdict against the evidence." (Citing Ford
V. Lacey, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 351; Railroad v. Braid, 1 Moore,
P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 101.)
To question that general rule in Missouri at this late day
would be to spin cobwebs before the eyes of justice and
mischievously unsettle the law. This is so because our statute on procedure in civil cases does not contemplate instructions whether or no. Parties litigant have their option to ask or not ask for them. That statute ordains (R.
S. 1899, sec. 748) : "When the evidence is concluded, and
before the case is argued or submitted to the jury or to the
court sitting as a jury, either party may move the court to
give instructions on any point of law arising in the cause,
which shall be in writing and shall be given or refused. The
court may of its own motion give like instructions, and such
instructions as shall be given by the court on its own motion
or the motion of counsel shall be carried by the jury to their
room for their guidance to a correct verdict according to
the law and evidence; which instructions shall be returned
by the jury into court at the conclusion of the deliberations
of such jury, and filed by the clerk and kept as a part of the
record in such case."
In construing that section, the better view is that it is
Doubtless it conduces to the
permissive, not mandatory.
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science of jurisprudence and the orderly administration of
the law to have instructions defining the issues, putting it
to the jury to find the fact and declaring the law on the fact
when found, but it is within the knowledge of the profession
(and our decisions show) that cases are not infrequently
tried, nisi, without them. That mere non-direction is not
misdirection is a familiar, settled rule of appellate procedure. Under that rule, before appellant can predicate reversible error on what a trial court does not say to the jury,
he must first put the court in the wrong by asking it to say
something, or else the court in trying to cover the case by
instructions holds a false voice, or omits in general instructions essential elements of the case.
[Tetherow v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 74; Coleman v. Drane, 116 Mo. 1. c. 394; Browning V. Railroad, 124 Mo. 55; Nolan v. Johns, 126 Mo. 159;
Wilson V. Railroad, 122 Mo. App. 1. c. 672, et seq., and cases
cited; Nugent v. Armour Packing Co., 208 Mo. 1. c. 500;

Flaherty

v. Railroad, 207 Mo. 1. c. 339.)
appellant was as much to blame as the
manifestly,
Here,
court or respondent for the omission to instruct on vital issues ; for he by his silence joined in the general silence and
made it more profound. At most it was common error, if
any, and error common to all is not reversible error. Ho

who does not speak when he should, will not be
speak when he would.
The premises considered, we have nothing to do
to the record and see if it supports the verdict.
ample testimony to support it.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. It is so

All

but look
We find
ordered.

concur.^

v. Fritsrhe (1890) 77 Wis. 329, 46 N.
Tnp.
(1904) 211 111. 229, 71 N. E. 869; Palatine
Meroantile Co. (190.5) 13 N. Mex. 241, 82 Pac. 363; Womaek
29 Gratt (Va.) 192; Texas & Pacifiic Ry. Co. v. Volk (1894)
y

heard to

Accord: Stuckey

V. Skinner

W. 59; Osgood
Co. v. Santa Fe
v. Circle (1877)
151

U.

S. 73.
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EAILWAY COMPANY

Supreme Court of Illinois.
198

Illinois,
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V. SANDUSKY.

1902.

400.

Me. Justice Boggs delivered the opinion of the court :
Between eight and nine o'clock in the evening of April
18, 1898, a cable car which the appellant company was operating northwardly along its tracks in State street, in the
city of Chicago, collided with a junk wagon in which the appellee was riding and threw him from his seat to the surface
of the paved street, and thereby inflicted injuries upon his
person for which he was awarded judgment in the sum of
$1,000 in an action on the case which he instituted against
the company in the superior court of Cook county. On appeal perfected by the company to the Appellate Court for
the First District the judgment was affirmed, and the cause
is before us on a further appeal in the same behalf.

After the plaintiff had rested his case, and while the defendant was adducing its evidence, the court called the attorneys for the parties and read to them the following order
which the court had drawn and entered in the case: ''It is
ordered at this time, while the witnesses on the part of the
defendant are being examined, that the instructions to be
tendered to, examined or given by the court to the jury be
limited to twenty-four, — twelve on the part of the plaintiff
and twelve on the part of the defendant, — and that no instruction in excess of said numbers will be received or examined by the court or given to the jury." The defendant
excepted to the order, and, afterwards, to the decision of
the court in refusing to give or examine twenty instructions
presented in a body, in addition to the twelve handed up
The appellant company, in
under the order of the court.
recognition of the rule but under protest, presented twelve
instructions to be given or refused by the court under the
rule, and also presented twenty additional instructions. The
court declined to examine or pass upon any of the twenty
additional instructions, for the reason they were each in
Counsel
excess of the number of twelve limited by the rule.
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to this ruling of the

court.
So far as we are advised, the power of a trial court to
limit requests for instructions to an arbitrary number from
each litigant has never received the consideration of a court
of review. The power of the judge to prescribe a reasonable rule regulating the presentation of instructions to be
given or refused is everywhere conceded. Rules that instructions will not be considered if presented after the beginning of the argument to the jury, or during the course of
the argument to the jury, or during the course of the general charge, or after the judge has concluded his general
charge, or after the cause has gone to the jury, or after the
jury had come in and disagreed, have been sustained, (11

Ency. of PI. & Pr. 240; Prindiville v. People, 42 111. 217.)
In Prindiville v. People, supra, the rule had been adopted
by the trial court requiring that the instructions should be
presented before the commencement of the argument of the
The appellant presented additional instructions
cause.
while the attorney for the People was making his closing

argument to the jury, and they were refused under the rule.
The instructions were not embodied in the bill of exceptions,
and we held we could not know but that the court ought to
have refused them independently of the rule, and therefore
did not determine whether the rule under consideration
We there indulged in the following obwas reasonable.
servations, (p. 222) which meet our approval, viz.: "The
dispatch of business, the rights of litigants, jurors and witnesses, all require that the time of the court shall not be
unnecessarily consumed in the trial of causes, and to avoid
such consequences courts must be invested with power to
adopt all reasonable rules for the practice of their courts.
Ever since the adoption of the statute requiring all instructions to be reduced to writing before they are given, it is
believed that similar rules have been in force in all of the
circuit courts in th» State. They have varied slightly in
their requirements, but all are designed to attain the same
The rule which is believed to have most generally obend.
tained requires all instructions to be furnished the court by
That, it seems
the commencement of the closing argument.
to us, is well calculated to meet the convenience of both
parties and the court and to economize time, and can in no
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way hinder or prevent the attainment of a fair trial by both
So far as our observation has extended such a
parties.
rule has operated well. It gives ample time after the close
of the evidence and the case fully opened to the jury for both
parties to prepare their instructions, and the court, being
thus apprised of the legal propositions they have assumed,
has, after the instructions are thus presented, usually ample
time for their examination and to determine upon their correctness. It is essential that the court shall exercise such
power, through reasonable and proper rules, as shall enable
him to dispatch business at least so fast as the proper administration of justice may require."
We do not wish, however, to bQ understood to hold that
another mode or manner of regulating the presentation of
instructions than that referred to may not be adopted. We
are inclined, however, to regard as unreasonable a hard and
fast rule that instructions shall be limited to a given number. It is the prolixity and confusing character of the
charge, as a whole, that rules of this character are designed
to obviate. Restriction in point of number, only, of the instructions will not remove the evil. A number of concise,
clear instructions, each of which is confined to a distinct
branch or phase of the contention or distinct proposition of
law, is preferable to one long, diffuse and complicated
instruction, which includes within its range all or several
of the propositions or phases of the case and attempts to
advise the jury as to different and independent legal propositions.
A general charge, consistins: of instructions of the
latter character, though not exceeding the number permitted by the rule, would be more objectionable, from every
proper point of view, than a charge composed of instructions which, though short and clear and of a character to
enlighten the jury, exceeded the number allowed by the
rule. It is unreasonable to a!5<sumo that each of the parties needs the same number of instructions. The issues in
behalf of one may make a number of instructions necessary
while the jury need little information as to those for the
other party. The judge could not, by a general rule applicable to all cases or classes of cases or causes of action, determine and specify, in advance of the hearing, the number
of instructions proper and requisite to be used in all cases.
If the court should wait until the conclusion of the evidence
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m the cause and then determine the number of instructions
he would consider, the rule would be unreasonable in its
operation upon counsel, in that it would interfere with or
prohibit the practice, adopted by many careful and competent lawyers, of preparing their instructions in advance of
The court may refuse instructions which are but
the trial.
repititions of others of the series which he has given, and
thus the number of instructions may be restricted to the
propositions of law really involved; and any rule which
would authorize the refusal of an instruction otherwise
proper to be given, on the ground, alone, that as many instructions as the rule allowed had been given, could not be
5 ,
defended.
But the cause will not be reversed because of the error
of the court in adopting the rule. The bill of exceptions
contains the instructions which the court refused to examine.
Counsel for appellant, in their brief, point out but
one instruction among the twenty which the court refused
to consider, which, in the view of counsel, was necessary to
advise the jury as to any principle of law important to the
The substance of this instruction
defense to the action.
was, that in arriving at a conclusion as to the truth of the
statements made by any witness the jury might consider
the improbable character of such statements.
The fifth instruction given in behalf of the plaintiff below correctly
stated the proposition of law referred to in the instruction
which was not passed upon. It was not necessary it should
As it is not complained that any other
have been repeated.
of the instructions which were refused under the rule were
necessary to the proper presentation of the defense, the
judgment should not be reversed for the error in adopting
the rule.
The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed}
1 In Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co. (1901)
163 Mo. 342, 376,
the court said: "Next for consideration are the instructions, respecting which
v,-e say that nine and one-half printed pages of instructions
is too much for an
average jury to digest and understand.
The only effect of such a midtiplicity of instructionp would be rot to instruct the jury but to confuse and
mislead them; make their verdict mere (jvessworJc.
The changes rung on all
tho phases of this case, and some not of this case, by this vast array of instructions, reminds one of what Judge Scott used to say was 'like the mvdtiydication table set to music'
We have remonstrated with the trial courts
for years about the great impropriety and frequent injustice resulting from
writing or giving instructions by the acre, but without avail, and so resort
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must be had to more drastic measures.
We therefore hold that the great
number of instructions given in this instance, of itself, warrants a reversal

of

the

judgment."

CHESAPEAKE
Supreme

&

OHIO RAILWAY
STOCK.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.
104

Keith, P.,

COMPANY V.

Virginia,

1905,

97.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The eleventh assignment of error is a novel one. After
the jury had been instructed, plaintiff in error presented
the following request to the court :
''The defendant prays the court that should the hypothesis of the facts whereon the several instructions propounded by it be incorrect, or should the said instructions
be inartificially or incorrectly expressed, or should the conclusion of law therein announced be incorrectly stated, that
the court will so amend the same as to accord with the facts
and law of this case, to the end that the jury may be duly
instructed on the phases of the case at bar presented by the
said instructions."
Which the court refused. * * *
This court has held in numerous cases that a trial court is
bound to give any instruction asked for by either party
which correctly expounds the law upon the e\'idence before
"But if such instruction does not correctly exthe jury.

it

it

it

is

is

is

it

it

it,

a

pound the law, the court, as a general rule, may refuse to
or give any other inand
not bound to modify
give
struction in its place. This principle
founded on good
reasons, and
sustained by much authority. A party canfor
an erroneous instruction, devolve upon
not, by asking
the court the duty of charging the jury on the law of the
An instruction, as asked for, may be so equivocal,
case.
might mislead the jury, and thus
that to give or refuse
might have all the effect of an erroneous instruction. In
would be proper for the court to modify the
case,
such
plain." Rosenbaums v.
so
as to make
instruction
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Weeden, etc., 18 Gratt. 799, 98 Am. Dec. 737 ; B. d 0. R. Co.
Polly, Woods £ Co., 14 Gratt. 448; Peshine v. Shepperson, 17 Gratt. 472, 94 Am. Dec. 468.
It cannot be doubted that, if the instruction correctly
states the law, and there be sufficient evidence to support
the verdict, it should be given.
It is equally plain that if
not
state
the
it does
correctly
law, it should not be given.
The sole question is as to the duty of the court to amend an
instruction offered by counsel. The rule as stated in Rosenhaums v. Weeden, supra, and approved in numerous decisions of this court, is that when an instruction offered is
equivocal, so that either to give or refuse it might mislead
the jury, the duty is imposed upon the court so to modify
it as to make it plain ; that if it be right, it should be given ;
if it be wrong, it should be rejected; if it be equivocal, it
should be amended. By what test is a court to measure
the duty thus imposed, and how is a jury to be misled by an
instruction which the court declines to give? An equivocal
instruction of course should not be given, because an
equivocal instruction is an inaccurate expression of the law,
To say that a jury
and for that reason should be refused.
may be misled by a refusal to give an instruction, and therefore the instruction should be amended and given, is to
prescribe a rule so vague and indefinite as to embarrass
rather than to assist trial courts in the performance of their
It is the duty of juries to respect the instructions
duty.
them.
given
It is not to be supposed that they have any
knowledge with respect to those which the court refuses
to give; and finally, if it be conceded that the offer of instructions, their discussion, and the judgment of the court
upon them, take place in the presence of the jurors, it is an
impeachment of their integrity, or of their intelligence, to
assume that they were influenced or misled by what has occurred.
But however this may be, we know of no authority, in this
court or elsewhere, wliich imposes ui)on trial courts the burden sought to be placed upon them by the ''prayer" under
consideration.
The rule which prevails in other jurisdictions is thus
stated Blashfield on Instruction to Juries, sec. 137, and is
supported by the great weight of authority: "In order to
entitle a party to insist that a requested instruction be givV.
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jury, such instruction must be correct both in form

and substance, and such that the court might give to the
jury without modification or omission. If the instruction,
as requested, is objectionable in any respect, its refusal is
not error. A party cannot complain that the court did not,
of its own motiuu, modify and correct the request and then
give it as corrected.
No such duty rests upon the court."

**********

Reversed.

Section

Cautionary Instructions.

5.

(a)

Admissions.

SCURLOCK V. CITY OF BOONE.
Supreme

Court of Iowa.
142

Evans, C.

1909.

Iowa, 580.

J. — The

plaintiff was a resident of the defendant city. On February 26, 1907, she claims to have fallen
upon one of the sidewalks by reason of a loose board thereThe claim is that her grandson, who was walking at
on.
her side, stepped upon one end of the board, whereby the
other end was thrown up against the plaintiff in such a way
It is claimed that she suffered inas to cause her to fall.
ternal injuries either by the fall or by the blow from the
board. It was claimed at the time of trial that she was then
in a poor state of health, and one of the issues of fact in
dispute was whether her then condition was caused by the
accident complained of.

II. It appeared from the testimony on behalf of the
plaintiff that prior to the accident she had always maintainOn Ijehalf of the defendant, Mrs. Miller
ed good health.
and Mrs. Ball, her daughter, both testified that on one occasion, about two years previous, the plaintiff called at their
home at Ames, and that she stated to them at that time
that she was in very poor health. T. L. Jones, one of the
city council, testified also that prior to the accident the
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she was not well.

None of this testimony was denied by the plaintiff, either
directly or indirectly; nor did she refer to it in any way in
her rebuttal testimony.
The court gave to the jury the fol"
lowing instruction.
(IS^^) There is some evidence in this
ease with respect to an admission by the plaintiff in regard
to the condition of her health at a time prior to the accident. Verbal admissions, consisting of mere representations of oral statements, made a long time before, are subject to much imperfection and mistakes, for the reason that
the person making them may not have expressed her own
meaning, or the witness may not have understood her, or,
by not giving her exact language, may have changed the
meaning of what was actually said, and this is especially
true where a long time has elapsed since the alleged admission was made.
Such evidence should therefore be received by you with caution."
This instruction is earnestly
We are constrained to hold
challenged by the appellant.
that it can not be sustained.
This court has heretofore ap1
proved the rule on this point as laid down by Greenleaf.
Greenleaf, section 200; Martin v. Town of Algona, 40 Iowa,

?m; Allen V. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 670.
It will be observed that the instruction under considera-

tion, through probable oversight, falls short of stating the
Greenleaf rule. As set forth in the Martin case, supra, the
following should have been added: ''But when such admissions are deliberately made or often repeated, and are correctly given, they are often the most satisfactory evidence,
and the jury should consider all the circumstances under
which they were made and give them such weight as they
are justly entitled to receive."
This latter proviso gives
An instruction substantially
a proper balance to the rule.
in the form of the one under consideration was condemned
by this court in Hawes v. B., C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa,
315.
See, also, Castner v. Railway Co., 126 Iowa, 586. The
natural effect of the court's instruction as given was to
minimize unduly the testimony of the defendant on the subject referred to, and this is especially so in view of the fact
that the plaintiff' neither denied the statements attributed to
her, nor denied recollection of them, nor offered any ex-

planation.
Tho tendency of this instruction to minimize the evidence

Instructing the Jury.

Sec. 5]

463

referred to was further empliasized by the use of the word
"some" in the first sentence. This court has heretofore
condemned the use of this word in this connection, in that
its tendency is to belittle the evidence referred to. State
V. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369; State v. Borland, 103 Iowa, 174;
State V. Rutledge, 135 Iowa, 581. We feel constrained
therefore to hold that defendant's exception to this instruction must be sustained.

For

**********

the

error pointed out in instruction

121/2

the judg-

ment below must be reversed.''-i.

Accord: Allen v. Kirk (1891) 81 Iowa, 658, 47 N. W. 906; Stewart v.
De Loach (1890) 86 Ga. 729, 12 S. E. 1067; Tozer v. Hershey (1870) 15
Minn. 257; Haven v. Markstrum (1886) 67 Wis. 493, 30 N. W. 720.

Supreme

Court
94

Harrison,

of

KAUFFMAN

V. MAIER.
California.

1892.

California, 269.

J. — The

**********

is

a

a

it,

a

plaintiff brought this action against
the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries
alleged to have resulted from their negligence.
He was in
their employ at the time of the injury, and the negligence
charged upon them was their permitting the shaft of
wheel to protrude into the room where he was at work, by
reason of which his sleeve was caught upon the jagged end
of the shaft, causing him to be carried around
whereby
his arm was so injured as to require amputation.
The
plaintiff recovered judgment in the court below, and
new
trial was granted upon the motion of the defendants, and
from this order the plaintiff has appealed. In their statement upon the motion for
new trial, the defendants have
assigned various errors of law on the part of the court, as
well as many particulars in which the evidence
claimed
to be insufficient.
5.

Evidence was given at the trial tending to show that
shortly after the injury the plaintiff had made statements
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to the effect had it was the result of his own fault, and that
the accident had been brought about by a different cause
from that shown at the present trial. In its instructions
to the jury, the court said: ''The court instructs the jury
that although parol proof of the verbal admissions of a
party to a suit, when it appears that the admissions were
understandingly and deliberately made, often afford satisfactory evidence, yet, as a general rule, the statements of
the witnesses as to the verbal admissions of a party should
be reviewed by the jury with great caution, as that kind of
evidence is subject to much imperfection and mistake. The
party himself may have been misinformed, or may not have
clearly expressed his meaning or the witness may have misunderstood him ; and it frequently happens that the witness,
by unintentionally altering a few expressions really used,
gives an effect to the statement completely at variance with
what the party did actually say. But it is the province of
the jury to weigh such evidence, and give it the consideration to which it is entitled, in view of all the other evidence
in the case."
In thus instructing the jury, the court disregarded the
provision of the constitution that ''judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the
testimony and declare the law."
While it is a matter of common knowledge that the
statements of a witness as to the verbal admissions of
another are liable to be erroneous, and for that reason
should be received with caution, yet such conclusion is only
an inference of fact which must be made by the jury, and
is not a presumption or a conclusion of law to be declared
by the court. The reasons which are to be urged in favor
of receiving such statements with caution are based upon
human experience, and vary in strength and conclusiveness with the facts and circumstances of each case, and
their sufficiency in any particular case is an inference
which the reason of the jury makes from those facts and
circumstances ; but there is no rule of law which directs the
jury to invariably make such an inference from the mere
fact that the proof of the admission is by oral testimony.
That deduction called a presumption which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts is uniform,
and not dependent upon the varying conditions and circum-
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it

it

a

is,

To weigh the evidence and
stances of individual cases.
find the facts in any case is the province of the jury, and
that province is invaded by the court whenever it instructs
them that any particular evidence which has been laid before them is or is not entitled to receive weight or consideration from them.
{People v. Walden, 51 Cal. 588;
People V. Fong Ching, 78 Cal. 173 ; Mauro v. Piatt, 62 111.
450; Commonwealth v. Galligan, 113 Mass. 202; McNeil v.
Barney, 51 Cal. 603; People v. Dick, 34 Cal. 666.)
The instruction above quoted
in substance, an arguto
matters of fact" that
ment to the jury with ''respect
had been presented at the trial, and
comment by the court
upon the weight which they should give to that testimony.
Whether the facts and circumstances proved in the case
were sufficient to cause the reason of the jury to make this
inference was fair matter of argument for the counsel of
the respective parties; but the court forsook its judicial
assumed the office of commenting upon the
position when
weight and credibility of this evidence. The closing parawas for the
graph in the instruction, to the effect that
jury to give to the evidence the consideration to which
was entitled, did not obviate the error, as by its remarks
the court had, in substance, said to them that as matter of
law the evidence was not entitled to any great consideration.
The order
affirmed.
Sharpstein, J., Garoutte, J., and McFarland, J., concurred.^
Accord'.
Knowles v. Nixon (1896) 17 Mont. 473,
Stone (1892) 69 Miss. 826, 13 So. 850.

1
V.

T. P.— 30

43

Pac. 628; Johnson
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Burden of Proof.

CRABTREE V. REED.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
50

Illinois,

1869,

206.

Mb. Chief Justice Breese delivered the opinion of the
court:
The only question between the parties to this record was,
as to the value of a mule the appellee acknowledged he had
struck with a heavy stick, and which belonged to the appellant, causing its death.
The action was case, for killing the mule, and the court,
on behalf of defendant, instructed the jury that the burden
of proof rested upon the plaintiff, and that he was bound
to maintain, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the allegations in the declaration, and that unless they find such
Though
a preponderance, they will find for the defendant.
the defendant had admitted he struck the mule in disciplining him, he not having been broke to work, and that from
the blow the mule died, he contested the fact of killing before the jury, and under the above instruction, the jury
found for him.
This instruction must certainly have misled the jury.
The law is not, in such a case, that there shall be a clear
preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff to entitle him to recover. It is sufficient, if the evidence creates
probabilities in his favor — that the weight of the evidence
inclines to his side.
For this error the judgment must be reversed and the
cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.
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Instructing the Jury

ALTSCHULER
Supreme

V. COBURN.

Court of Nebraska.
38

467

1894.

Nebraska, 881.

Post, J.
This was an action of replevin in the district court of
Douglas county in which the plaintiff in error, Marguerite
Altschuler, sought to recover certain personal prop-

**********

Exception was taken to the following instruction:
"The burden of proof in this case is on the plaintiff to
show by a preiDonderance of the testimony her right to the
possession of the property in controversy at the commence6.

ment of this suit, and unless she has satisfied you by a fair
preponderance of the testimony of her right to such possession, she cannot recover in this action." The criticism of
the instruction is directed to the expression "fair preponderance" of the evidence used therein. In support of
this exception we are referred by counsel to Search v. Miller, 9 Neb. 26, and Marx v. Kilpatrick, 25 Neb. 118, in which
the expression "clear preponderance of the evidence" is
condemned. But in Dunbar v. Briggs, 18 Neb. 94, an instruction was approved which required a counter-claim to
be established by a fair preponderance
of the evidence.
The last case is in point and decisive of the question presented by this exception. In the opinion of the writer, any
attempt to qualify that term by subtle distinctions between
a clear preponderance and a fair preponderance of the
evidence is to be deprecated as an unnecessary refinement
and tending to confuse rather than enlighten the average
mind. "Preponderance" is defined by Webster thus: "An
outweighing; superiority of weight." There can be no preponderance while the evidence is evenly balanced, hut
when the scale inclines toward one side, we know the weight
or superiority of evidence is with that party. Manifestly
there can be no such outweighing unless there is both a
clear preponderance and a fair preponderance.
As well
might we attempt to apply degrees of comparison to the
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term ''equilibrium" by holding the evidence in one case
more evenly balanced than in another. Applicable in this
connection is the language used in Stephen's General View
of the Criminal Law, p. 262, with reference to the term
"reasonable doubt," where it is said that an attempt to
give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is "trying to count what is not number, and measure what is not

**********

space."

We find no prejudicial error in the record and the judgment is accordingly
Affirmed,

(c)

Positive and Negative Testimony.

IN EE ESTATE OF WHARTON.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
132

1907,

Iowa, 714.

a proceeding for the probate of the will of
Stephen Wharton, deceased, offered for probate by A. M.
Harrah, devisee, who is also named as executor, to act
without bond, and contested by George Wharton, his son,
and Esther Wharton, his widow, who, having been adjudged
insane, is represented by a guardian. The grounds of con-

This is

test were want of mental capacity, and undue influence.
There was a special finding of want of mental capacity by
the jury, a general verdict in favor of contestants, and a
judgment entered on such verdict, denying and refusing
admission of the will to probate. Proponent appeals.

Affirmed.

McClain, C. J. — Many errors are assigned as to the
action of the trial court, and it will only be possible to discuss those which seem to this court to be of controlling importance.

**#*»«4<'***

VI.

Another instruction is complained of which directed the jury that, other things being equal, affirmative testi-
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mony is in general entitled to more weight than negative
testimony, and that, if a witness testifies that he did see
certain things, and another witness of equal credibility testifies that he did not see such things, then if everything else
is equal and such witnesses on either side are of equal credibility, the witness testifying negatively is entitled to less
credit than the one testifying affirmatively.
It is said that
this rule, which certainly has some support in our decisions,
has been discredited in Stanley v. Cedar Rapids & Marion
City R. Co., 119 Iowa, 526, 533, and Selensky v. Chicago G.
W. R. Co., 120 Iowa, 113, 116. But in each of these cases
the instruction asked to this general effect was held properly refused, because witnesses who gave the so-called negative evidence, or some of them, were in as good a position
to hear the sounds and signals referred to in the testimony
of the witnesses giving the affirmative evidence as the latter
were. But the instruction given in this case is not open
to any such objection, and, under the evidence to which the
instruction could have been understood by the jury as
having reference, there was no error in giving it.

**********

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
'i
111.

Accord: Loiiisville, New Albany & Chicago Ey. Co.
617; Jones v. Casler (1894) 139 Ind. 382, 38 iST. E.

McLEAN V. ERIE RAILROAD
Jersey Laiv,

(1884)

108

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
69 Neiv

v. Shires
812.

1003.

57.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fort, J. — This was an action for damages alleged to
have resulted from an injury caused by the train of the
defendant company running into a wagon of the plaintiff,
in which the plaintiff was. at the crossing of the said company, at or near Soho, in Essex county.

****#***'#»

Another alleged error was on account of the refusal of
the trial judge to charge the following request:
''That
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affirmative evidence of the ringing of the bell and blowing
of the whistle is generally entitled to more weight than
evidence that it was not noticed or heard." We are unable
to see upon what principle a judge is justified in stating to
a jury that one piece of evidence, which is legitimate, is
not to be treated by the jury the same as other evidence in
the cause. It is for the jury to say whether the testimony
of a witness having an equal opportunit}^ to hear and whose
hearing is equally good, and who testifies that he did not
hear the blowing of a whistle or the ringing of a bell, notwithstanding he listened, shall or shall not be given equal
credit with the testimony of a witness, similarly situated,
who testifies that he did hear.
There was no error in the refusal of the trial judge to
charge the request excepted to.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.^
1

Accord:

Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. O'Neill (1906) 127 Ga. 685,
Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Brock (1904) 69 Kan.

56 S. E. 986; St.
448, 77 Pac. 86,

(d)

Credibility of Witnesses.

CLINE

V.

LINDSEY.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
110

1886.

Indiana, 337.

J. — Lewis J.

Cline died on the 26th day of January, 3884. By his last will, executed on the 22d day of that
month, he bequeathed all of his property to appellants,
children of a brother.
Appellees brought this action to set aside that will on the
ZoLLARs,

ground that at the time it was executed, the testator was
a person of unsound mind, and hence incapable of making a
valid will. With the will out of the way, appellees and the
father of appellants are entitled to the property left by
Lewis J. nine, as his heirs at law, being his brothers, sister, and the descondants of deceased sisters.
Upon a verdict of tlio jury in favor of appellees, the
court ])elc)w, over ajipollants' motion for a new trial, set
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aside the will. Appellants ask for a reversal of the judg
ment upon the alleged error of the court in charging the

jury.
Our attention is first called to the twentieth instruction
given by the court. It is as follows :
'"20th. In weighing the testimony of witnesses, the jury
should consider their capacity to understand the facts about
which they testify, their opportunity of knowing the mental
condition of the testator.
The testimony of the testator's
neighbors, who have long been acquainted with him, and
have had frequent intercourse with him, and whose attention has been particularly called to the testator, who have
had frequent opportunities of observing his mind, is entitled to greater weight than that of a witness of equal
sagacity, whose opportunities were more limited.
The

a

a

is

a

is,

facts upon which the witnesses' opinions are based have
been given you, and of these you are the judges, weighing
the facts as they have been given, in order to determine the
condition of the testator's mind. You are to weigh each
particular incident and fact stated to you by the witnesses,
and to determine from the whole whether or not the testator, at the time of the execution of the will, was or was
not of sound mind. You are to take into consideration the
will itself and its provisions, its unjustness or hardships,
if any exist, to determine the soundness or unsoundness of
the testator's mind."
The objection urged to the instruction by appellants'
counsel
that the court thereby invaded the province of
the jury by charging, as
matter of law, that the testimony of the testator's neighbors, who had long been acquainted with him, etc., was entitled to more weight than
the testimony of other witnesses of equal sagacity, whose
opportunities had been more limited.
Considered without reference to any other charge that
may have been given, the above instruction, in our judgopen to the objection urged against it.
ment,
It may be true, as matter of fact, that the testimony of
the neighbors of the testator, who had the advantages and
opportunities named, was entitled to more weight than the
testimony of other witnesses of equal sagacity, who had had
less opportunities because of less acquaintance with the
testator. But that was
fact to be determined by the jury
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of law.
The instruction, it will be observed, leaves out of view
the essential element of credibility. The neighbors of the
testator may have had greater opportunities and may have
been of equal sagacity with other witnesses having had less
opportunities, and yet be less worthy of credence.
Nor does it follow necessarily, and as a matter of law,
that the testimony of one of two witnesses, of equal
sagacity, is entitled to greater weight simply because he
may have had more acquaintance with, and more frequent
opportunities to observe, the person whose sanity is in
question. The witness who has had less acquaintance, and
less opportunities, may yet be the most reliable witness, because of some special training, experience, or habit of
closely observing persons whom he meets. In all such cases
it is for the jury to determine for themselves to what witness they will give the most credence. They have a right
to consider the fact that some of the witnesses may have
tiad greater opportunities than others. The court may instruct them that they have such right, but it ought not to
invade their province, and undertake to determine for them
as a fact, and not by the court as a question

what witness is the most reliable.
The latter jjortion of the instruction, in which the jury
were charged that they should weigh the facts given by the
witnesses as the facts upon which they based their opinions,
does not relieve the instruction from the objection urged
by appellants' counsel. In the first place, the charge directing the jury that the testimony of the one class of witnesses was entitled to the greater weight is general, and
embraces all that those witnesses testified to; and, in the
second place, it was impossible for the non-expert witnesses, giving their opinions as to the insanity of the testator, to state to the jurj^ everything upon which those
opinions were based. If they could have stated everything
upon which they based their opinions, the opinions would
have been incompetent.
The rule which allows such opinions, is a rule of necessity, and rests upon the proposition
that there may be something about the looks, deportment,
etc., of a person which may contribute to the conclusion that
he is of unsound mind, whicli can not be described in words
1)V tlio witness.
Cartilage T. P. Co. v. Andrews, 102 Ind.
138 (52

Am. R. 653).
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That the instruction was erroneous, because the court
thereby invaded the province of the jury, by directing them
that the testimony of one class of witnesses was entitled to
more weight than the testimony of another class, is well
settled by our cases. Fulivider v. Ingels, 87 Ind. 414, and
cases there cited ; Voss v. Prier, 71 Ind. 129 ; Dodd v. Moore,
91 Ind. 522, and cases there cited; Works v. Stevens, 76 Ind.
181; Woolen v. Wliitacre, 91 Ind. 502, and cases there cited;
Nelson v. Vorce, 55 Ind. 455; Goodiuin v. State, 96 Ind. 550
(569), and cases there cited; Unruh v. State, ex rel., 105
Ind. 117, and cases there cited; Morris v. State, ex rel., 101
Ind. 560, and cases there cited ; Bird v. State, 107 Ind. 154,
and cases there cited ; Vanvalkenherg v. Vanvalkenherg, 90
Ind. 433.
A part of one of the instructions approved in the case
of Bush V. Megee, 36 Ind. 69 (84), is similar to the instruction here condemned, but the probability is that in that
case the attention

of the court was not called to the objec-

tions urged here.
it,

The instruction as given is erroneous, but it does not
follow that because of the error of the court in giving
the judgment must be reversed.

It

a

is

is

is

it

is

it

appears here that an erroneous instruction was given,
not shown by the record that the giving of
was
but
not in the record,
prejudicial to appellants. The evidence
nor
there anything in the record showing, or tending to
show, that the witnesses spoken of in the charge as the
neighbors of the testator, were witnesses below in behalf
of appellees. For aught that
shown by the record, they
may have been called by appellants, and may have testified in their behalf, that the testator was
person of sound
and
hence
capable
of
the
will.
mind,
making

Upon the whole case, we think that the judgment ought
to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
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GUSTAFSON V. SEATTLE TRACTION COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Washington.
28

1902.

Washington, 227.

Eeavis, C. J. — Action for damages for personal injuries.
* *
The court, on the submission of the cause, gave the
following instruction:
''There has been some expert testimony given in this
case. The court instructs you that all evidence given as to
the opinion of a witness should be considered — of the opinion, mark you, of a witness — should be considered and
You are to carefully sepweighed by you with caution.
arate, if a witness is introduced as an expert, what he tes*

tifies to as a fact, and what he testifies as to his opinion.
As to facts that he testifies to that came under his observation, of course, his testimony is to be weighed the same as
any testimony of any witness who is credible, or whom you
find to be credible, who testifies to what he saw, to what he
heard, or to what he knew. But when the testimony of the
witness entered the domain of opinion, then his testimony
should be weighed and considered by you with caution.
Wliile the testimony of experts is competent, its weight and
credibility is a matter entirely for your consideration. Such
testimony should be carefully considered with reference to
the supposed or proven facts upon which the opinion of
the expert or experts are founded."
The giving of this instruction is assigned as error prejudicial to the defendant. It is urged that the instruction applied particularly to the expert witness introduced by defendant, and thus singled out his testimony, and directed
Relative to the proper
that it be weighed with caution.
instruction in the submission of expert testimony to the
jury, there is apparently much confusion, when the reported
cases are examined, and some of them are seeminglj'- irreRogers, Expert Testimony (2d ed.), s 206,
concilable.
states tlie different theories:
" (1) That expert testimony is to be considered like any
other testimony in the case, and tried by the same tests.
(2) That expert testimony is to be received with caution.
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(3) That expert testimony is entitled to little weight.
(4)
That expert testimony is entitled to great weight."
From an examination of the authorities, it would seem
that some confusion arises when the probative value of
opinion evidence and its competency, as legal propositions,
are under discussion, and when it is commingled with what
should be the proper instructions given to the jury. The
great weight of legal opinion seems to be that opinion evidence is less reliable, less valuable, than evidence of facts.
This view is frequently expressed by eminent jurists.
Judge MiLLEK in Middlings Purifier Company v. Christian,
4 Dill. 448; also Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Michigan, 459;
Grigshy v. Clear Lake Water Co., 40 Cal., 396; Hayes v.
Wells, 34 Md. 512. But it does not necessarily follow that
such expressions of the value of expert testimony, although
correct and the general view, should be embodied in instructions to a jury. It certainly cannot be laid down as a general rule to be given to a jury that expert testimony is of
great value or little value. In fact, it may sometimes be of
It depends on a
great value, and sometimes valueless.
variety of circumstances which ought to be considered,

is

it

it

it

is,

among which the most important are the extent of the
knowledge of the expert, his opportunities for observation,
and his skill and experience. It would seem then that the
to be
first view is correct; that
that such testimony
considered and weighed by the same tests as other testimay be appropriate for the court, acmony, although
cording to the nature of the trial and the evidence, to exiJain something of the nature of expert testimony, and to
define the difference between the witness who testifies to
facts and one who testifies to his opinion; and perhaps all
of the instruction under consideration cannot be said to be
But the court, in the instruction, applies
objectionable.
principally to one witness, and, after an injunction to carefully weigh, adds that this must be done with caution, and
repeats in the instruction that this testimony must be considered •with caution. The contention of counsel for appellant that the use of the word ''caution" repeated in the
was placed, tended to single out and
connection in which
impair the weight of the evidence given by the expert, seems
reasonable; and, under the distinction between the functions of the court and those of the jury, fundamental in the
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trial of law
termined

cases, the competency of evidence must be deby the court, and its weight by the jury. The

a

is

a

is

;

;

;

;

N.'

word "caution" in the sense used here and in other instructions of similar import, has been deemed in other
jurisdictions sufficiently prejudicial to reverse the case.
Atchison, etc., R. R. Co, v. Thul, 32 Kan. 255 (4 Pac. 352,
49 Am. Rep. 484) ; PeoiJle v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348 (65
W. 203, 61 Am. St. Rep. 326) Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Whitehead, 71 Miss. 451 (15 South. 890, 42 Am. St. Rep.
Weston v. Brown, 30 Neb. 609 (46 N. W. 826) State
472)
V. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414; Burney v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157
(14 South. 685, 46 Am. St. Rep. 33) Eggers v. Eggers, 57
Ind. 461; Pannell v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. St. 260. It
contrary ruling has been made by some of the
true,
courts.
See United States v. Pendergast, 32 Fed. 198;
Whitaker v. Parker, 42 Iowa, 585; People v. Perriman, 72
Mich. 184 (40 N. W, 425). The last case seems to have
been disapproved in People v. Seaman, supra.
For error in this instruction, the judgment
reversed,
new trial.
and the cause remanded for
Hadley, Fullerton, White and Mount, J. J., concur.

Supreme Court
79

of

HIGGINS V. WREN.
Minnesota.

1900,

Minnesota, 462.

a

a

a

a

a

Action in the district court for Wright county to recover
note
$200, and interest, damages for the conversion of
The case was
and mortgage.
Lizzie Stowell intervened.
which
rendered
vertried before Giddings, J., and jury,
dict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and the
motion for
intervener for $263. From an order denying
new trial, the intervener appealed. Reversed.

Collins,

J.

a

On the trial of this cause there was testimony received
tending to impeach one of the defendants who had testiwitness, as unworthy of credit, on the ground of
fied as
general bad reputation for truth and veracity in the neigh-
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borhood wherein he resided.
The court subsequently
charged the jury as follows:
the jury believe from the evidence in this case that
the reputation of any witness in this case for truth and
veracity in the neighborhood where they reside is bad, then
the jury have a right to disregard his whole testimony, and
treat it as untrue."
At this point defendant's counsel
called special attention to the words ''treat it as untrue,"
and thereupon the court resumed thus: "That
you
have
right to treat his testimony as untrue; that
you
liave the right — the law does not require that you must,
but that you have the right — to treat
as untrue, except
where
corroborated by other creditable evidence, or
by facts and circumstances proved on the trial."
To this part of the charge counsel reserved an exception.
We are of the opinion that this statement of the law was
altogether too broad. This instruction authorized the jury
to wholly disregard and reject all of the testimony given by
satisfied that his general reputation for truth
the witness
and veracity was bad in the neighborhood in which he resided, no matter how truthful all or part of such testimony
might in itself, and standing alone, appear to be. It
well-known
true that this language was taken bodily from
work on instructions to juries, but the author cites no authority in support of it. Nor do we find any. We are of
opinion that the instruction upon this point approved in
one which
N. W. 1083,
State V. Miller, 53 Iowa, 209,
will be better understood and much better serve the pur4

is

a

is

a

if

is

it

it

a

is, is,

"If

pose, as

follows:

is

a

is

a

it

it

if

is

it

is

it

shown that the reputation for truth of
not necessarily destroyed,
witness
bad, his evidence
to be considered under all the circumstances debut
scribed in the evidence, and given such weight as the jury
they believe
believe
entitled to, and to be disregarded
entitled to no weight."
witness merely affects
The successful impeachment of

"Where

his credibility.

Order reversed.

Trial Practice

478

[Chap.

11

FIFER V. RITTER.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
159

Hadley,

J.

1902,

Indiana, 8,

**********

* * *

Complaint is made of certain instructions given to the
jury. Number two informed the jury that they were the
exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of
the weight of their testimony, and that in determining
these things they must take into consideration the interest,
the appearance upon the witness stand, the intelligence, the
opportunities for learning the truth concerning the things
testified about, the apparent candor and correctness of the
statements as compared with the usual and ordinary nature
of things. The particular assault upon the instruction is
directed against the word must, as being an encroachment
upon the absolute and exclusive right of the jury. We can
not adopt this view. Must is here employed in the sense of
duty, and the term is equivalent to telling the jury that it
was their duty to consider the matters enumerated in estimating the credibility and weight of the testimony. And
it clearly was their duty. It was unquestionably their duty
to decide the case according to the weight, — that is according to the convincing force, of the evidence, honestly arrived at, and just as plainly their duty to test the value of
the testimony of each witness by such tests as common exWill any one say that
perience has proved to be reliable.
a juror may discharge his duty by closing his eyes to the
manner, conduct, and appearance of witnesses while delivering their testimony, and giving to the naked words of
The comeach witness full and equal probative force?
petency of evidence is one thing, and its weight another.
Competency is purely a question of law for the court to
declare.
Its weight is a question for the jury to determine. So when a judge tells the jury that it is proper for
them to consider the interest, manner, etc., of the witnesses,
as it is usually phrased, he is but ruling as he may rightly
rule that snch evidence is competent; and, in searching for
the fact established by the evidence, it is the duty of the
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jury to consider all competent evidence that may throw
light upon the truth, and it is no less essential to a correct

result, and quite as much the jury's duty to consider facts
and circumstances properly before them, which go to discredit a witness or to strengthen his testimony, as it is to
consider the statements made by the witnesses. The cases
of Woollen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502, Unruh v. State, ex rel.,
105 Ind. 117, Duvall v. Kenton, 127 Ind. 178, and perhaps
some others, so far as they may seem to hold to a different
rule, are no longer authorities upon the question here involved. That which seems the more reasonable view expressed above, and which follows Deal v. State, 140 Ind.
354, 366, Newport v. State, 140 Ind. 299, 302, Smith v. State,
142 Ind. 288, and Keesier v. State, 154 Ind. 242, may now
be said to be the approved rule.

We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.

(e)

Falsus in Una, Falsus in Omnibus.

CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD

KELLY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
210

Illinois,

COMPANY V.
1904.

449.

Me. Justice Hand delivered the opinion of the court:
This was an action on the case brought by the appellee
to recover damages for the death of his intestate, Joseph
G. Kelly, occasioned, as is alleged, by the negligence of the
appellant in failing to stop its train, upon which Kelly
was a passenger, at Braidwood station a sufficient length
of time to enable Kelly to alight therefrom with safety, by
means whereof said Kelly, while in the exercise of due
care for his own safety and while attempting to leave said
train at said station, was thrown beneath the wheels of said
train and run over and killod. The case was tried before
the court and a jury, and the jury returned a verdict
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against the appellant for the sum of $4000, upon which verdict the court, after overruling a motion for a new trial,
rendered judgment in favor of the appellee, which judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second District, and the record has been brought to this court
by appeal for further review.
The intestate of appellee, on the evening of November
15, 1900, boarded appellant's train at Joliet and paid his
fare to Braidwood. The train arrived at Braidwood a little after eleven o^clock P. M., when Kelly arose from his
seat in the smoking car, shook hands with a friend with
whom he had been talking, and started for the rear door of
the car to get off the train.
The testimony of appellee
tended to show that the train stopped from twelve to thirty
seconds; that it started before Kelly had time to get off, and
that in attempting to get off, the motion of the train caused
him to lose his balance and he was thrown down and run
over by the train and killed ; while the testimony of the appellant tended to show that the train stopped from two to
three minutes, during which time the engine took water;
that the deceased had ample time in which to alight from
the train in safety, and that he lost his life by reason of his
own negligence in attempting to leave the train while it
was in motion and after it had stopped a sufficient length
of time for him to alight therefrom in safety.
There was upon the question of the length of time the
train stopped at the Braidwood station, — which was a material question, — a sharp conflict in the evidence, and in
that state of the record it was important that the jury
should have been correctly instructed as to the law of the
case, especially as to the rule which should govern them
in weighing the evidence of the respective witnesses. On
belialf of the appellee the court gave to the jury the following instruction, the giving of which has been assigned
as

error:

"If

jury believe, from the evidence in this case, that
any witness who testified in the case has willfully sworn
the

falsely as to any matter or tiling material to the issues in
this case, then the jury are at liberty to disregard the
entire testimony of such witness, except in so far as it may
have been corroborated by other credible evidence which
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proved on

has been repeatedly announced as the law of this State,
that the jury are at liberty to disregard the evidence of a
witness who upon the trial has willfully sworn falsely to
a material fact, except in so far as such witness has been
corroborated by other credible evidence or by facts and circumstances proven upon the trial.
{Crahtree v. Hagenbaugh, 25 111. 233 ; Swan v. People, 98 id. 610 ; Hoge v. People, 117 id. 35; Bevelot v. Lestrade, 153 id. 625.)
The instruction is much broader than the rule announced in the
foregoing cases, as it informed the jury they were at liberty to disregard the testimony of any witness who had
willfully sworn falsely to any matter or thing material to
the issues, except in so far as such witness had been corroborated by other credible evidence ivhicJi they do believe,
the effect of which was to eliminate from the consideration
of the jury the evidence of any witness, if any such there
were, who had willfully sworn falsely upon a material matter, even though he were corroborated by other credible
evidence, unless the jury believed such other credible evidence to be true. If the jury may disregard the testimony
of such a witness unless he is corroborated by other credible
evidence which they believe, then the jury may disregard
the evidence of such a witness even though lie be corroborated by other credible evidence, whicli would be in violation of the rule established by this court. It is not the duty
of the jury to accept as true the testimony of a witness who
has testified willfully falsely as to a material fact simply
because he is corroborated by other credible evidence, but
when such witness has been corroborated by other credible
evidence it is the duty of the jury to consider his testimony
in connection with such corroborating evidence and the
other evidence in the case, and to give to it such weight
as they may be of opinion it is entitled to receive at their
hands. The error in the instruction under consideration
is found in this : that it permits the jury to refuse to consider the testimony of a witness who has willfully sworn
falsely with reference to a material fact, although he is
corroborated by other credible evidence, unless the jury believe the other credible evidence to be true. Credible evidence is not evidence which is necessarily true, but is eviT. p.— 31

482
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worthy of belief, — that is, worthy to be considered
by the jury. If it were held the jury were not to consider
the evidence of a witness who had willfully sworn falsely
to a material fact unless he was corroborated by other
dence

evidence, and then only when they believe such
evidence to be true, it would, in effect, be to hold
testimony of such a witness is only to be considthe jury after they have become satisfied of the
truth of the facts testified to by the corroborating witnesses.
If this were the rule, the jury would have reached
a conclusion as to the truth of the matter about which the
witness testified before they would be required to consider
the evidence of the witness, which would make the consideration of the testimony of such witness unnecessary,
even though his testimony were corroborated by other
credible evidence.
"VVe are of the opinion the instruction is in conflict with
a long established rule of evidence in force in this State
and that the giving thereof constituted reversible error.
The judgment of the Appellate and circuit courts will be
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a
new trial.
Reversed and remanded.

credible
credible
that the
ered by

CAMERON V. WENTWORTH.
Supreme Court of Montana.
23

1899.

Montana, 70.

Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff brought two separate actions in claim and

de-

livery to recover possession of two certain race horses. By

consent, the two suits were consolidated for the purposes
of trial. Plaintiff recovered a verdict, and judgment was
entered in his favor. Defendant Wentworth moved for a
Plaintiff appeals
new trial, which motion was granted.
from the order granting a new trial.
1.
One of the grounds upon which the court granted
the motion for a new trial was its error in giving the fol-

lowing instruction.
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is the duty of tlie jury, in passing upon the credibility of the testimony of several witnesses, to reconcile
all the different parts of the testimony, if possible. It is
only in cases where it is probable that a witness has deliberately and intentionally testified falsely as to some material matter, and is not corroborated by other evidence,
that the jury is warranted in disregarding his entire testimony. Although a witness may be mistaken as to some
of his evidence, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that
he has wilfully told an untruth, or that the jury would
have the right to reject his entire testimony."
Plaintiff contends that the word "probable" was used
for "palpable" by mistake, and that the error, if any was
not calculated to mislead the jury.
This argument is
premised upon the assumption that if "palpable" had
been used, the instruction would have been a correct statement of the law, — an assumption which respondent seems
to have regarded as well taken, and which, for the moment,
we will not disturb.
It is undoubtedly the rule that, where a witness has
willfully sworn falsely as to any material matter upon the
trial, the jury is at liberty to discard his entire testimony,
except in so far as it has been corroborated by other credible evidence ; but we do not understand the right to so discard testimony follows, if it be merely probable that the
witness has willfully sworn falsely. In other words, there
must be a belief in the minds of the jury that a witness has
actually and knowingly testified falsely as to some material
matter before they are at liberty to eliminate his testimony
entirely; but a belief that an actual fact exists requires
a considerably stronger support than does a belief that it
probably exists. If a witness has palpably sworn falsely,
it is almost self-evident that he has done so. The range
of probability is passed over, and it has become more than
likely that he has testified falsely, knowingly and intentionTherefore, where perjury is palpable, there need
ally.
be no extended discussion upon which to base a finding that
— the jury may at
the witness has willfully testified falsely,
once act upon the fact so obviously or palpably demonstrated. But to say that a jury can discard testimony, if
they conclude that a witness has probably perjured himself, is to authorize deliberation, not upon the question of
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whether he has iviUfidly sworn falsely, but upon whether it
is likely he has done so. So, although the jury might not
say they believed the witness did willfully testify falsely,
yet, if they could say that it was probable or likely that
he did so testify, nevertheless the right to discard the entire testimony would exist. Reasoning along this line
carries us to where it is easily seen that a jury would diverge in their consideration of evidence, and too often overlook the necessity for belief in existing facts, amid metaphysical gropings for probabilities, to enable them to
ignore testimony.
They should not be allowed to do this;
for
in their judgment, probability of perjury alone exists,
they cannot legally give that effect to evidence which they
in their judgment, the fact of perjury exists as
may,
mere probability that
exists.
demonstrable beyond
Therefore, to expressly authorize jury to act, in discardwrong. It becomes an auing testimony, on probability,
thorization to them to judge of the effect of evidence arbidoes not break down, the force
trarih% and weakens,
of that other and salutary rule which always confines the
judgment upon evidence within
power of a jury to form
discretion,
and in subordination to the
the exercise of legal
rules of evidence.
our opinion that the premise which would regard
But
had read ''palpable" instead
the instruction as sound,
unsound,
false and
and that the instrucof "probable,"
tion would still be inherently bad with the word "palpable"
for the reason that
circumscribes the
imported into
power of the jury in giving effect to evidence by limiting
witness to those
their right to discard the testimony of
palpable the witness has willfully
instances only where
not corroborated by other evidence.
sworn falsely, and
No such principle can find favor where the jury are the
witness, and where
exclusive judges of the credibility of
willfully
they are authorized to ignore his testimony,
It may be that jury, after
false, and not corroborated.
witness has testified to, will befull consideration of all
himself,
yet
may not have been
lieve he has perjured
readily observed at all on the trial that the witness willfully swore falsely. Now, under such conditions, the jury
right to discard his testimony as they
have as clear
had been palpable that the witness
would Imvo had
was willfully falsifying; for the test necessarily is: has the
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witness willfully sworn falsely as to any material matter?
and this is to be ascertained by the jury as a fact, deducible
from other facts or circumstances connected with the trial
and before them for consideration.
But, in sifting and
weighing the evidence, if the fact is found, whether it has
manifested itself palpably, or whether it has been arrived
at by processes of reasoning uj^on other facts or circumstances, is absolutely immaterial in its effect upon the
power of the jury to discard the testimony.
We therefore disapprove of the instruction from the two
standpoints discussed. It is essentially erroneous, and the
text of Mr. Sackett (page 35), which gives it as the law,
finds no support in any lang-uage used by the court in Gottlieb V. Hart man, 3 Colo. 53, which is cited as authority for
its doctrine. It follows that the action of the court below
in granting a new trial must be affirmed.
Another ground for granting a new trial was the refusal
of the court to give the following instruction requested by
defendant:
"You are further instructed that a witness
who testifies falsely in one part of his testimony is to be
distrusted in other parts of his testimony." The instruction offered is substantially the language of Subdi\dsion 3
of Section 3390 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the jury are to be instructed on all proper occasions "that a witness false in one part of his testimony is
to be distrusted in others." Presumably the case was one
where the court should have given the instruction requested, or the substance of
by way of caution to the
jury upon effect of evidence. And we can readily underjury by declaring to them the
stand the aid furnished to
witprinciple meant to be enunciated by the statute, that
to
material
ness who has willfully testified falsely as
any
matter must be distrusted as to other parts of his testinot applicable, however, to unintenmony. The statute
tional errors, or evidence given upon immaterial matters,
to require the
Its sense
and without intent to deceive.
jury to distrust only witness who willfully swears falsely
ought
as to material matters and we are of opinion that
"willfully"
the
and
"mawith
words
to
be
given
always
declares.
terial" expressed as qualifications of the rule
3390,
supra) came to us from CaliThe statute (Sec.
has been
fornia (Code Civ. Proc. Cal. Sec. 2061), where
willfully
witness who
interpreted as applicable only to
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false in a material manner [People v. Hicks, 53 Cal 351;
People V. Soto, 59 Cal. 367) ; and, while it has been held in
that state that the word "false" is not the equivalent of
"mistake", and that the word "willfully" does not change
the effect of the instruction as offered [People v. Sprague,
53 Cal. 491; People v. Righetti, 66 Cal. 184, 4 Pac. 1063,
1185; White v. Disher, 67 Cal. 402, 7 Pac. 826), nevertheless
we are satisfied that the meaning should be made perfectly
clear by avoiding the opportunity for misunderstanding
that may reasonably exist by adopting the construction of
the supreme court of California announced in the cases
heretofore cited and followed in State v. Kyle, 14 Wash.
550, 45 Pac. 147, holding that the qualifying words need
not be expressed.
As a statute affecting the province of the jury in weighing evidence, it requires them to view with distrust the testimony of a witness who willfully swears falsely as to a
material matter. They must distrust such a witness, and,
under their general power of passing upon the credibility
to be attached to each witness, they 7nag discard such testimony entirely, except in so far as it is corroborated by
other credible evidence. [People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179,
48

Pac. 75.)
The order granting a new trial must be affirmed.
Affir7ned.

WARD V. BROWN.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
53
POFFENBARGER,

1903.

West Virginia, 227.

JudgC

:

The court, on its own motion, gave the following:
"The court instructs the jury, that they are the judges of
*

*

*

the evidence and the weight to be given thereto and of the
credibility of witnesses testifying in this case; that if they
believe that any witness has testified falsely in this case as
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to any matters in issue, that then the jury have the right
to disregard such false testimony or give to it and all the
evidence of such witness such weight as the jury may in

their opinion believe it was entitled to." The action of the
court in giving this instruction is also complained of, it

being insisted that the jury should not have been told that
they might give to the false testimony such weight as they
might think it entitled to. Instructions of this class have
been carefully considered in State v. Thompson, 21 W. Va.
741, in which the following was approved
as a correct
enunciation of the law: *'If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness who has testified in this case has
knowingly and willfully testified falsely to any material
fact in the case, they may disregard the whole testimony
of such witness, or they may give such weight to the evidence of such witness on other points as they may think it
entitled to. The jury are the exclusive judges of the weight
of the testimony." In Thompson on Trials, section 2,425,
this instruction is approved as a good model. It is difficult to see, however, how the jury could believe testimony
which they had found to be false could be entitled to any
weight, and the court told them they could give only such
weight as they might believe it entitled to. They were not
directed to give it any weight. The instruction left it wholly
dependent upon whether they believed it entitled to any
weight. But the instruction is bad in this, that it does not
inform the jury that they may reject the whole of the testimony of the witness who willfully testifies falsely as to
material matters.

**********

For the errors noted, the decree entered in this cause on
the 29th day of April, 1899, by the circuit court of Kanawha
County, must be reversed, the verdict of the jury set aside
and a new trial of the issue awarded.
Reversed, remanded.

CHAPTER XIL
ARGUMENT AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL.

BALDWIN'S APPEAL FROM PEOBATE.
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
44 Connecticut,

1878.

37.

Appeal from a decree of a probate court disallowing the
will of Sarah Baldwin ; taken to the Superior Court in New
Haven County.
The appellant was a devisee and legatee
under the will.
The case was tried to the jury, on the
issue of the soundness or unsoundness of the mind of the
testratrix, before Sanford, J.

After the evidence on both sides had been introduced,
one of the counsel for the appellant, while making the
opening argument, proposed to read to the jury from the

decisions of courts in this country and in England, where
wills had been sustained notwithstanding the objections
which had been made to them founded upon the alleged testamentary incapacity of their makers, for the purpose of
showing that the facts set forth in such cases were not inconsistent with the legal signification of soundness of mind,
as applied to the making of wills. The counsel for the appellee objected to such reading, on the ground that it would
divert the attention of the jury from the case on trial, and
tliat the jury had no right to be influenced by what other
courts or juries had done or decided in any other case. The
court overruled the objection, and allowed the cases to be
read.
The jury having returned a verdict for the appellant,
sustaining the will, the appellee moved for a new trial for
error in the above ruling of the court. Other questions
were made, which it is not necessary to state, as they were
not considered by the court.

Caepenter,

J.

On one point in this case we feel con488
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strained to grant a new trial. Some of the other questions
discussed are not free from doubt ; but in respect to them
we express no opinion, as they will not necessarily arise
upon another trial.
The counsel for the appellant were permitted, against
the objection of the appellee, to read to the jury, from
books, 'Cases decided in other states and in England, ''for
the purpose," as it is stated in the motion, '*of showing
that the facts as set forth in such cases were not inconsistent with the legal signification of 'soundness of mind,'
as applied to the making of wills."
The duties of the court and of the jury in the trial of
civil causes are distinct and clearly defined. It is the duty
of the court to declare the law to the jury ; and that carries
with it a corresponding obligation on the part of the jury
to receive the law only from the court. They have no right
to receive the law from books, nor from counsel, nor are
they permitted to act upon their own notions of law, but
the law as laid down by the court is to be the law of the
case

for

them.

It is also the duty of the court to decide what evidence
may and what may not go to the jury ; and the law declares
that all evidence submitted to the jury shall be under the
sanction of an oath. It is the duty of the jury therefore to
hear and consider onl}^ such evidence as the court permits
to be given, and such only as is under oath.
Whether the matter read to the jury be regarded as matter of law, as a statement of facts, or as a mixture of law
and fact, it is equally objectionable.
If as matter of law,
then the jury were re^ceiving the law, which was to guide
their deliberations, from an unauthorized and dangerous
source. If as matter of fact, then the jury were listening
to evidence which was not only irrelevant, and could have
no legitimate bearing upon the question before them, but
it was admitted after the evidence was closed and the argument commenced, and without any legal sanction whatever,
not even being subjected to the test of a cross-examination.
If regarded as a mixture of law and fa^ct, then all the objections which may be urged against it when viewed as law
or fact, apply in full force. In whatever aspect viewed
its tendency was bad, diverting the minds of the jury from
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tile real question they were to try, and the legitimate and
proper evidence in the case.
This is not the ordinary case of reading an authority
to the court upon a question of law in the presence of the
jury, as the counsel for the appellant seems to intimate.
The motion shows that it was proposed to read the cases
to the jury. The reading was objected to *'on the ground
that it would divert the attention of the jury from the case
on trial, and that the jury had no right to be influenced
by what other courts or juries had done or decided in any
other case." The court, in overruling this objection, must
have caused the jury to understand that it was proper for
them to consider the facts stated in those cases, and the
action of the courts and juries thereon, in connection with
the evidence in this case in making up their verdict, and
they may have been, and probably were, influenced thereby.
Whatever effect they had, whether much or little, was improper and tended to prejudice the appellee.
The view we take of this question is in harmony with
the law as laid down elsewhere. Ashworth v. Kittridge, 12
Cush. 193; Commo'invealth v. Wilson, 3 Gray, 337; Washhum V. Cuddihy, 8 Gray, 430; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11
Mich. 501; People v. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65; Carter v. The
State, 2 Carter's Ind. R., 617.
We advise a new trial.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

LOUISVILLE

&

NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY
V.REAUME.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
32

1908.

Kentucky Law Reporter, 946.

Opinion of the court by Judge Carroll, reversing.
Appellee, who was a passenger on one of appellant's
trains, was injured by the derailment of the train at a
point near Zion station, on the line of its railroad between
Cincinnati and Louisville. In an action brought by her to
recover damages for injuries received, the jury returned
a verdict in her favor for ten thousand dollars.
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Much is also said about the misconduct of appellee's counsel in continuing to ask questions that the trial
It is improper for counsel
court had ruled incompetent.
to persist in asking questions that the court has ruled to
be incompetent, the purpose being to impress the jury with
the importance of the facts that have been excluded from
When the court has sustained an obtheir consideration.
jection to a question, it is the privilege of counsel to make

an avowal as to what the witness would say if permitted to
answer, and this avowal he has the right to have put in
record for the purpose of an appeal. But the question excluded should not be again asked the same witness in like

it,
it

or a different form, unless it be that the objection was made
to the question because of the form in which it was put. If
this is the ground upon which the objection is based, counsel should, of course, be permitted to ask the question in
proper form, so that the objection may go to the competency
or relevancy of it. As an illustration of the manner in
which counsel for appellee sought to get before the jury
incompetent evidence, he rei:)eatedly asked, in different
forms and ways — if the railroad company had not settled
or attempted to settle with other persons injured in the
same wreck; and also concerning the condition of the
health of appellee's father and other members of her family. A party will not be permitted, by indirect means, to
acquaint the jury with facts which he is not allowed to
bring to their notice by direct evidence. If this practice
was permitted to go Avithout criticism, or could be indulged
in, without suffering the penalty of reversal, the trial judge,
after exhausting all other means, could not, unless he felt
inclined to resort to contempt proceedings, prevent the
mind of the jury from being prejudiced by the efforts of
counsel to put before them, in an indirect way, evidence that
was incompetent.
Skilled counsel in resorting to practices
of this character, have in view the effect that it will produce on the jury and their expectations are too frequently
well founded, as it is difficult for a jury to escape from
being impressed in some manner by the insistence with
whicli damaging, but incompetent, evidence is offered and
the objections of adverse counsel to it sustained.
If a
practice of this kind is persistently indulged in by counsel,
although the trial judge repeatedly tried to prevent
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would as surely be grounds for reversal as any other substantial error that a party might commit in the trial of a
■case.
The orderly conduct of the trial, the professional
and personal deportment of counsel, the examination of witnesses, and all other matters connected with the proceedings are under the control of the trial judge, and he has
ample power and authority to enforce his rulings and to
prevent counsel from disobeying them. But, the trial judge
is often reluctant to resort to extreme measures in dealing
with attorneys engaged in the trial of a case, and is content
to sustain objections that are made, and let the disapproved
conduct pass with this, or a slight reprimand, that at times
is unheeded, but this court will not permit the non-action
of the trial judge, or rather his failure to take such action
as may be necessary to effectually restrain counsel to prejudice the rights of one of the parties, but will take such
under all the circumstances, seems right
action as to
and i:>roper.
The distinguished counsel who tried the case
for appellee, has since died. He was an able, resourceful
and zealous lawyer. His experience on the bench, where he
presided with honor and dignity, well qualified him to understand and appreciate when counsel, in the trial of case,
were overstepping the bounds of propriety, and he must have
known, as did the excellent judge before whom this case was
tried, that the evidence he was trying to get before the jury
was wholly irrelevant and incompetent. Except for the fact
retrial, will be conducted by other counthat this case, on
sel, and our failure to call attention to the misconduct of
was not
former counsel might leave the impression that
open to criticism, we would not, under the circumstances,
direct attention to it.
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WAGONER V. HAZLE TOWNSHIP.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
215

1906.

Pennsylvania State, 219.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Mestrezat, May 7, 1906.
The proximate cause of Mrs. Wagoner's injuries was

if the jury found, as
they did, that the hole was caused by the negligence of the
defendant township, its liability necessarily followed.
the hole or opening in the bridge, and

The question of Mrs. Wagoner's contributory negligence
The
was for the jury.
The facts were not undisjrated.
plaintiffs claim that after the wheel of the wagon had gone
into the opening in the bridge she attempted to alight
from the wagon, and was in the act of doing so at the
time it was struck by the car of the Lehigh Traction Company, and that her conduct in no way contributed

to her

injuries. What she did on that occasion, and whether she
acted with the prudence required of her, were for the jury.
Prior to the present action the plaintiffs brought suit
against the Lehigh Traction Company to recover damages
for the same injuries, and obtained a verdict of $6,000. The
case, on appeal, was heard by this court last year, and the

a

a

it

a

it,

judgment was reversed and a new trial was awarded. On
the trial of the present action the counsel for the plaintiff
in the presence of the jury and where they could distinctly
hear
made the following offer: ''We now offer in evidence the record in that case, for the purpose of showverdict of six thousing that the jury gave the plaintiff
and dollars, and that the case was appealed to the Supreme
Court and that the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
was not reof the court below, practically saying that
sponsible, but that the township was bound to keep its own
road in repair." Thereupon the defendant's counsel said:
"We object and move that juror be withdrawn, because
of the statement made by the attorney for the plaintiff, in
full voice before the jury, as to the amount of the other
juror and the
verdict." The court declined to withdraw
defendant excepted to the ruling. We think the court committed error ft)r which the judgment must be reversed.

Trial

494

Peactice

[Chap.

12

a

a

a

a

is

it,
it

The offer was clearly incompetent, and the only purpose
it could serve, or effect it could have, would be to place
before the jury the amount of the large verdict in the Lehigh Traction Company case. The counsel should not have
made the otfer, and after he had made
was the duty
of the court to protect the defendant against its effect. The
purpose of the offer was obvious, and its effect would be
Such conduct on the part of counsel
equally apparent.
different from an unintentional or inadvertent remark to
jury which does the opposite party no injury. When
such remarks are made they may or may not have an influence upon the jury, but there can be no question about
the effect upon the tribunal of an offer to show what
former jury, dealing with the same facts, had determined
as to the amount of damages due the plaintiffs for the
criterion for the
injuries which they sustained. It was
jury in considering the case which they evidently would
accept, and which no language of the trial judge could
drive from their minds. The offer got before the jury what
was clearly incompetent and what manifestly would, to
some extent at least, control their verdict. The only way to
juror and compel the
remedy the wrong was to w^ithdraw
plaintiffs to submit the cause to another jury, uninfluenced
by such wholly irrelevant and incompetent matter.

a

is

a

is

it

a

When an attorney in the trial of cause willfully and intentionally makes an offer of wholly irrelevant and incompetent evidence, or makes improper statements as to
the facts in his address to the jury, clearly unsupported by
any evidence, which are prejudicial and harmful to the
the plain duty of the trial judge, of
opposite party,
his own motion, to act promptly and effectively by reprijuror and continuing
manding counsel and withdrawing
the cause at the costs of the -client. In no other way can
justice be administered and the rights of the injured party
be protected.
The imposition of the costs will remind the
client that he has an attorney unfaithful to him as well
The obligation of fidelity to the court
as to the court.
wliich an attorney assumes on his admission to the bar
ever thereafter with him, and when he attempts to decause by interjecting into the trial
foat the justice of
wholly foreign and irrelevant matter for the manifest pur-
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of misleading the jury, he fails to observe the duty

required of him as an attorney and his conduct should reThis condemnation
ceive the condemnation of the court.
can and should be made effective.
The ninth assignment of error is sustained and the judgment of the court below is reversed with a venire facias de
novo.

M'CARTHY V. SPRING VALLEY COAL COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
232

Illinois,

1908.

473.

This is an action on the case in the circuit court of Bureau
county to recover damages for personal injury sustained in
* * *
the appellant's coal mine.
Me. Justice Dunn delivered the opinion of the court:
Complaint is made of the conduct of counsel for the appellee in the course of the trial. The counsel who made

statement to the jury began:
''In this case
Patrick McCarthy, thirty-three years of age, with a wife
and five children," when he was interrupted with an objection, which the court sustained.
In cross-examining one
of appellant's witnesses in regard to the taking of a written statement of a witness for the appellee at the offi'ce of
appellant, appellee's counsel asked if Mr. Bayne, the attorney of the Aetna Insurance Company, was present.
On
objection the question was withdrawn, counsel saying that
he meant Mr. Bayne, the attorney for The Spring Valley
Coal Company.
Several objections were also made in the
course of the argument of appellee's counsel to the jury.
The statement to the jury that the appellee had a wife
and five children was manifestly improper. Its only object
could have been to enhance the damages by getting before
the jury, in this improper and unprofessional manner, facts
calculated to arouse their s^Tupathy, which counsel knew
could not in any legitimate way be brought to their attention. To admit evidence of such facts is error. {Jones &
the opening
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Adams Co. v. George, 227 111. 64.) The fact once lodged in
the minds of the jury could not be erased by an instruction,
and appellee by this statement secured the benefit of the
fact to the same extent as if he had introduced evidence
to prove it.
The question in which Mr. Bayne was referred to as the
attorney of the Aetna Insurance Company was also justly
subject to criticism. The question asked was as follows:
''At the time that this statement was taken from Luke
Frain at the office of The Spring Valley Coal Company,
was Mr. Bayne, the attorney for the Aetna Insurance Company, there?" It is as strange as it is unfortunate that
this question should have been asked through mere inadvertence, as stated in appellee's brief. It is strange that with
the name of appellant in counsel's mouth, the name of Mr.
Bayne, who was then present assisting in the trial as attorney for the appellant, should have associated itself in counsel's mind and speech with the name of the Aetna Insurance
Company as attorney instead of with the name of the apThe question and the circumstances were well
pellant.
adapted to intimate strongly to the jury that the appellant
was insured against liability for accidents of this character,
and that the party which would have to respond for any
judgment which might be rendered was the Aetna Insurance Company. Evidence of this character was not competent. The intimation may not have been true, and it is unfortunate that the suggestion should have been inadvertently made. The only effect it could have would be to convey an improper impression to the jury.
The Appellate Court required a remittitur of $2000 from
the judgment as the alternative of a reversal on account of
the effect on the minds of the jury of the improper stateSuch rement in regard to appellee's wife and children.
mittitur does not, however, cure the error.
{Jones S
Adams Co. v. George, supra.) It is impossible to tell the
effect, on the verdict, of the impressions wrongfully conveyed to the jury's mind by the improper conduct of counsel.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded
for a new trial.
Reversed and remanaed.
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BEOWN V. SWINEFORD.
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
44

1878.

Wisconsin, 282,

Action for an assault and battery.
Ryan, C. J. * * *

II.

**********

Following for once a bad practice, the learned counsel for the respondent, in closing the argument of the case
to the jury, forgot himself so far as to exceed the limits of
professional freedom of discussion.
It appears by the bill of exceptions, that he waived the
opening argument to the jury. A very strict rule might
hold this to give the other side the right to close. If sucli
a waiver should still leave the closing argument to the
plaintiff, it certainly confined it to a strict reply to the defendant's argument, excluding general discussion of the
case. The sole object of all argument is the elucidation of
the truth, greatly aided in matters of fact, as well as in
And
matters of law, by full and fair forensic discussion.
this is always imperiled when either party, by any practice,
is able to present his views of the case to the jury without
opportunity of the other to comment on them. And if the
party entitled to the opening argument, relying on the
strength of his case without discussion, waive the right to
open, he waives the right to discuss the case generally, and
should not be permitted to do so out of his order, and after
the mouth of the other party is closed. His close, if permitted to close the argument, should be limited to comments on the argument of the other side. This is essential
to the fairness and usefulness of juridical discussion at the
bar.

It

sufficiently appears in the present case, that the
learned counsel for the plaintiff did not properly confine his
It is very doubtful if that
closing argument to a reply.
alone would be error sufficient to reverse the judgment, if
an exception had been taken by the appellant, which does
But the learned counsel went
not appear to be the case.
hevond the le£>Mtimate scope of all argument, by stating
and commenting on facts not in evidence.
T. p.— 32
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actions of tort, calling for exemplary damages, evidence of the pecuniary ability of the defendant to pay them
is admissible. Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67; Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240. This appears to be, as Mr. Justice Cole
remarks in Birchard v. Booth, a fair corollary of the rule
of exemplary damages. Perhaps the corollary is not better founded in principle than the rule; but the court takes
them as it finds them established.
It appeared in evidence, that the appellant was an officer
of a railroad company, and that the locus in quo was within
depot grounds of the company.
No evidence appears to
have been given of the ability of the appellant to pay exemplary damages. The learned counsel appears to have
undertaken to supply this want of evidence, by commenting to the jury upon the appellant's connection with the
railroad company, and the wealth and power of the company as a great corporation, and the defendant's ability,
from his connection with
to pay any judgment which
might be rendered against him. The bill of exceptions
states, that "no record was kept of these remarks, and
unable to state more specifically the substances
the court
of the language used." But enough appears to show, not
that the learned counsel commented on facts not in evidence, but in effect testified to the facts himself.
It was
in effect telling the jury that the appellant's position with
the corporation gave him the ability to pay large damages,
and nearly —
not quite — that they might measure the
damages by the wealth of the railroad company itself.
Amongst other evidence of the appellant's ability to pay,
might undoubtedly have been shown that he received
large emoluments from his position in the railroad company; and possibly that the railroad company had assumed
the appellant's tort and the payment of the judgment. And
was not the duty or the right of counsel, was not within
the proper scope of professional discussion, to assume the
facts as proven, or to state them to the jury as existing;
And this
founding his argument pro tanto upon them.
was
was the more marked in the present case, because
in
should
have
been
for
first
what
mere
made
the
time
reply; and still more, because the court below had already
admonished counsel to confine himself to the evidence, and
not to go outside of the record.
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The appellant took his exceptions; and his counsel now

supports it by numerous cases, some of which are — as far
as they go — admirable discussions of professional ethics,
and all of which are well worth the attention of the bar. All
of them support the rule now adopted by this court, that it
is error sufficient to reverse a judgment, for counsel, againsi
objection, to state facts pertinent to the issue and not in
evidence, or to assume arguendo such facts to be in the
case when they are not. Some of the cases go further, and
reverse judgments for imputation by counsel of facts not
pertinent to the issue, but calculated to prejudice the case.
Tucker v. Eenniker, 41 N. H. 317; State v. Smith, 75 N. C.
306; Ferguson v. State, 49 Ind. 33; Hennies v. Vogel, Sup.
Court III, 7 Cent. L. J., 18.
There are cases in conflict with those which support this
rule. But, in the judgment of this court, the rule is supported by the weight of authority and by principle.
Doubtless the circuit court can, as it did in this case,
charge the jury to disregard all statements of fact not in
evidence. But it is not so certain that a jury will do so.
Verdicts are too often found against evidence and without
evidence, to warrant so great a reliance on the discrimination of juries. And, without notes of the evidence, it may
be often difficult for juries to discriminate between the
statements of fact by counsel, following the evidence and
outside of it. It is sufficient that the extra-professional
statements of counsel may gravely prejudice the jury and
alTect the verdict.
The profession of the law is instituted for the administration of justice. The duties of the bench and bar differ
in kind, not in purpose. The duty of both alike is to establish the truth and to apply the law to it. It is essential
to the proper administration of justice, frail and uncertain at best, that all that can be said for each party, in the
determination of fact and law, should be heard. Forensic
strife is but a method, and a mighty one, to ascertain tlie
truth and the law governing the truth.
It is the duty of
counsel to make the most of the case which his client is able
to give him ; but counsel is out of his duty and his riglit,
and outside of the prin-ciple and object of his profession,
when he travels out of his client's case and assumes to supTherefore is it that the nice sense of
ply its deficiencies.
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profession regards with such distrust and aversion the
It is the
testimony of a lawyer in favor of his client.
duty and right of counsel to indulge in all fair argument
in favor of the right of his client ; but is outside of his duty
and his right when he appeals to prejudice irrelevant to
Properly, prejudice has no more sanction at the
the case.
bar than on the bench.
But an advocate may make himself the alter ego of his client, and indulge in prejudice in
his favor.
He may even share his client's prejudices
against his adversary, as far as they rest on the facts in
his case.
But he has neither duty nor right to appeal to
their prejudices, just or unjust, against his adversary,
The very fullest freedehors the very case he has to try.
dom of speech within the duty of his profession should be
accorded to 'Counsel; but it is license, not freedom of
speech, to travel out of the record, basing his arguments
on facts not appearing, and appealing to prejudices irreleIt may somevant to the case and outside of the proof.
times be a very difficult and delicate duty to confine counBut, like other
sel to a legitimate course of argument.
be
performed
and
delicate
must
duties,
by those
difficult
it
It is the duty of the cirupon whom the law imposes it.
cuit courts, in jury trials, to interfere in all proper cases of
This is due to truth and justice. And
their own motion.
if counsel persevere in arguing upon pertinent facts not
before the jury, or appealing to prejudices foreign to the
case in evidence, exception may be taken by the other side,
which may be good ground for a new trial, or for a reversal in this court.
It is with regret that the court is obliged to hold that
both appear to have been done in this case.
It was no fair
inference for argument that, because the appellant was
the servant of a wealthy railroad company, he himself was
wealthy; or that the jury might take into consideration, in
assessing damages, the power, wealth and influence of the
corporation.
Popular prejudice against great corporations is, perhaps, a sufficient difficulty in the way of the
administration of justice, in cases in which such corporations themselves are parties; it is intolerable that it should
be extended to their servants.
For all that appears in
this case, the apjx'llant may be as poor as Job in his downwas legitimate subject of
Ilis wealth, if he had
fall.
it,

the
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evidence, not legitimate subject of argument, without evidence.
And his fortune or misfortune in being the servant of a corporation was legitimate ground for no appeal
against him in a court of justice.
It is to the honor of the bar that this is the first time that
this question has come before this court.
Yet it is not
to be ignored that the practice here condemned has someAnd it is, perhaps, not to be retimes been indulged in.
gretted that the question has first come here in the case
of an eminent member of the bar; a gentleman of high
character, personal and professional, known to every member of this court; whose professional ability needs no adventitious aid, and who probably fell into this error casually and inadvertently. His professional standing shields
him from personal censure, while it will give emphasis to
the rule laid down.
By the Court. — The judgment is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the court below for a new triaL

WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY V. BURR.

TOLEDO, ST. LOUIS
Supreme

&

Court of Ohio.

1910.

82 Ohio State, 129.

This action was originally commenced in the court of
common pleas of Henry ^county, Ohio, by Burr & Jeakle
and The Ohio German Fire Insurance Company as plaintiffs, against The Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad
Company as defendant, to recover damages from said railroad company for the destruction by fire— alleged to have
been commnr^<ited by sparks emitted from one of defendant's locomotive engines — of a sawmill owned by said Burr
& Jeakle and insured by them in The Ohio German Fire
*
*
*
Insurance Company.
Crew, J. — The only error assigned in this case which
need be specially considered in this opinion, is that of the
alleged misconduct of counsel in the argument of the 'Case
Upon the argument of this cause in the
to the jury.
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court of common pleas one of the counsel for plaintiffs
stated to the jury among other things, "that within thirty
days after the occurrence of this fire, Mr. Schmettau, as
counsel for the defendant, made an offer of settlement,
and that offer was repeated as late as the day of the commencement of this trial."
To this statement the defendant by its counsel then and there excepted.
And thereupon, to quote from the record, "counsel who had made
the statement, stated to the jury that he withdrew the
statement objected to," and the court then instructed the
jury as follows: "Gentlemen of the jury, it becomes my
duty to say to you on this question that here is absolutely
no evidence in this case that either party ever wanted to
settle or that any attempt was ever made to settle; and
will say to you further, as a matter of law, that if the
parties had gotten together in an effort to settle this case,
the law wouldn't permit such effort to settle to be given to
the jury in evidence; it is your duty to disregard absolutely the whole of any statement by any counsel to the effect that any effort was made to settle this case or any
And thereupon the argument proceeded.
other case."
That the statements thus made by counsel transcended the
bounds of ligitimate argument and were grossly improper,
is both obvious and conceded, but it is claimed that any
prejudicial effect which such statements may have had was
removed or cured by the subsequent action of court and
counsel.
This conclusion, we think, by no means follows,
nor does it affirmatively appear in this case that such conclusion is justified by the facts.
Wliile it is true that
courts of last resort have frequently, though not uniformly, held the rule to be, that the prejudi.ce, if any, resulting from the misconduct of counsel in argument to
the jury mav be eliminated or cured by the prompt withdrawal of the objectionable statements made by counsel,
accompanied by an instruction from the court to the jury
to disregard sunh statements, yet this rule, so far as our
examination of the authorities has disclosed, is recognized
and applied by the courts in those cases only, where it is
made to appear by the record from a consideration of the
character of th'^ statements made, that their nreiiidicial
o^^ocf hn=; probnljlv boori n^'orte^^ hv snoh witlulrnwal and
As remarked ])y Sliauck, J., in Cleveland,
instruction.

I
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Painesville & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Pritschau, 69 Ohio
St., 447: *'It is due to differences in the character of the
misconduct rather than to differences of opinion in reviewing courts that it has in some cases been held that the
effect of the misconduct may be eliminated by instructions,
and in others that it cannot be."
When we consider, in
the present case, that there was no direct evidence estab-

oriirin of this fire, and that upon the whole of
the evidence adduced on the trial the question of defendant's negligence and consequent liability was at best a
very close question of fact involved in much uncertainty
and doubt, the harmful and extremely prejudicial effect of
a statement by counsel to the jury, that soon after the fire
the railroad company had offered to settle the loss, and
that such offer had been renewed on the very day the trial
commenced,
becomes at once perfectly apparent.
And
Avithdrawal
of
the attempted
these statements from the
jury was, we think, wholly impotent to rid them of the mischievous inference that they were nevertheless true; and
was utterly ineffectual to dislodge or remove from the
minds of the jurors the harmful impression, which such
lishing

th.^

intended, to
statements were calculated, and ob^dously
No other rational conclusion can be reached in
produce.
this case than that plaintiff's counsel by the making of such
statements intended thereby and in that way to get before
the jury a fact which he was not entitled to, and one which
of public policy the law forbade
from considerations
should be mentioned on the trial; and this, for the sole
and obvious purpose of inducing in the minds of the jury
the impression or belief, that the railroad company in making such offer of settlement had, indirectly at least, conManifestly this was the
fessed and admitted its liability.
and
we think it imposstatements,
of
counsel's
purpose
sible to say in this case that su-eh was not their effect.
While it should perhaps be said, that after objection made,
court and counsel did all in their power to counteract and
overcome the effect of these improper and prejudicial
statements, yet the mischief had been done, the poison had
been injected, and that which thereafter O'ccurred was not,
in our judgment, a sufficient antidote.
It is the policy of
encourage
the settlomont of legal controversies,
the law to
and hence it does not permit an offer of compromise to be
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given in evidence as an acknowledgment or admission of
and this salutary rule, which
the party making
grounded upon considerations of public policy, just as imperatively forbids that the fact that such offer was made
shall be mentioned or commented upon by counsel in argushall clearly apis, unless
ment to the jury, and when
pear from the record in the particular case that the verdict
such
of the jury was not affected thereby, the misconduct
of
new
justice,
that
as to require in the due administration
The view that misconduct of
trial be granted therefor.
complained of in this case
counsel, such as
sufficient to
be
warrant and require the granting of new trial unless
jury
of
was
not in any
made to appear that the verdict
the
fully supported by the several
manner influenced thereby,
cases cited in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error, and
by many others.

Judgments

circuit court and

a

Speae, Davis, Shauck and Price,

Supreme Court
100

JJ.,

of

concur.

V. STATE.

of

FERTIG

of

of

comthe court
mon pleas reversed, and cause remanded to the latter court
for re-trial according to lau).
the

Wisconsin,

1898.

Wisconsin, 301.

J.

The errors assigned on behalf of plaintiff
in error will be considered in their order and are as fol*
lows:
(2) permitting the prosecuting attorney to
use improper language, detrimental to the accused, in clos* * *
ing his argument to the jury;
*

*

Maeshall,

a

2.

The prosecuting attorney was pennitted to say, in
closing the case to the jury, roplyirig to remarks of the attorney for the ar-cused regarding the testimony of William
Come
"What would counsel have him do?
Spauiding:
here and shower bouquets on the assassin of his brother?
And also permitwreath of laurels?"
Crown him with
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ting the district attorney to say, in substance, that there was
murder in the heart of the accused as he proceeded to and
effected the homicide, — that he had murder in his heart, in
his eye, and in his brain; that he stood where the tracks indicated to get a good aim; the object of his vengeance was
coming, sitting on the wood in full view; he (the accused)

was a crack shot and knew it; he cocked his gun, drew the
bead on the deceased, and the deed was done, and a son and
brother was sent to his Maker without a moment's warning,
by the act of an assassin, — as vile an act as ever happened
on earth ; so foul that it would be worthy of the vicegerent
of the monarch of hell. That such language, with the earnestness with which we may well assume the words were uttered in the closing moments of an important trial, was
highly calculated to carry the jury along the line of thought
which it indicated, that is, that the accused was guilty, cannot be doubted ; but whether it was outside the case, or tended unfairly to influence the jury, and to swerve them from
the duty of deciding the case on the evidence, and that alone,
in the light of the law governing the subject, is quite anSo long as counsel did not depart from
other question.
evidence
the
produced, but confined his argument to reasoning from that up to the conclusion that it established
guilt, however eloquently and persuasively he may have
handled his subject, it was not only legitimate but commendable.
Within the record in this regard, the field is broad,
and the license of the advocate, and duty as well, permits
him to say with the utmost freedom what the evidence tends
to prove, and that it convinces him, and should convince the
As said in People v.
jurors as well, of the fact in issue.
Hess, 85 Mich. 128: ''To deny to a prosecuting officer that
privilege, would be to deny him the right to pla.ce before
the jury the logic of the testimony which leads his mind to
the inevitable conclusion of guilt, and which he has a right
to presume will load them to the same conclusion, if they
That does not mean that a prosecutview it as he docs."
ing officer may express his opinion independent of the evidence that the accused is guilty, or his opinion of guilt,
which may or may not be based on the evidence, but that he
may state from the record, upon which the issue is to be subTo do the
mitted to the jury, that it establishes guilt.
latter is but to state the evidence, draw inferences there-
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from, and proceed, reasoning naturally from step to step
up to the logical conclusion, and state
all being legitimate
parts of legitimate argument; and
the introduction and
discussion lead to such conclusion, though stated with great
earnestness and with strong feeling and conviction, so long
as the advocate keeps within the record, the accused has no
That appears to be what
legitimate ground of complaint.
was done in this case.
There
nothing to indicate that the
murderer
district attorney asserted that the accused was
or assassin, except with reference to the offense for which
he was being tried, and as he drew that conclusion from the^
evidence.
It was the inevitable conclusion of the line of
pursued
by the prosecutor, from the evidence,
argument
and could not have been otherwise understood by the jury.
It quite unlike Scott v. State, 91 Wis. 552, where the district attorney spoke of the accused as thief, not with referfact
ence to the offense for which he was on trial, but as
tending to establish guilt of that offense.
As to remarks made in repl.y to those of the attorney for
plaintiff in error, regarding William Spaulding,
sufin
to
using
ficient
say that
the term "assassin"
quite
clear that the district attorney was speaking from the evidence in the case as he viewed
and that the jury must
have so understood him. He had
right to assume that the
evidence produced on the part of the state was true, and that
established what
tended to establish, and that
pointed
most strongly to the guilt of the accused as charged.
To
address the jury accordingly can hardly be said to have
been such an abuse of the privilege of counsel for the state,
and so prejudicial to the accused, as to warrant
reversal
True, harsh and violent language should
of the judgment.
not be used by counsel, certainly in criminal prosecutions,
though whether language be harsh and abusive depends
largely upon the evidence in the 'Case, but in the absence of
some manifest abuse of the privilege of legitimate argument, clearly working prejudice to the accused,
cannot be
In Spnlin v. People, '[?>! 111.
considered reversible error.
538, whore the evidence on the part of the state established
the guilt of the accused, the court held that, assuming the
truthfulness of the people's evidence, which assumption the
right to make on the argument,
prosecuting attorney had
was not such an abuse of the privilege of counsel in argu-
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ment to the jury, to speak of the accused, with reference
to the offense for which they were on trial as robbers and
burglars, as to work a reversal on that ground.
So we may
say it was not an abuse of the rules of legitimate argument,
in this case, to speak of the accused, from the evidence of
the state, as a murderer.

By

the court.

*

**********
*

*

The judgment is affirmed.

GERMAN-AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
V. HARPER.
Supreme

Court of Arkansas.
70

1902.

Arkansas, 305.

Wood, J. Appellees sued upon an insurance policy which
contained this clause: "$2,000 total concurrent insurance
permitted, including this policy."
Subsequent to the issuance of this policy, appellees took a policy in another company for $2,000, which it was conceded avoided the policy
sued on, unless the appellant had notice of the additional insurance before the loss, and failed to object to such insurance. Appellant conceded that if its local agent had notice
of the additional insurance, and failed to object thereto, the
forfeiture was waived.
Appellant's local agent testified
that he had no notice of the additional insurance before the
loss.
Witnesses for appellees testified that he had such
notice.
The issue was sharply drawn on this question of
Marshall,
the witness upon whom appellant relied
fact.
to establish the want of notice of the current insurance, reThe cause
sided and was the local agent at Fort Smith.
of
at
Greenwood.
venue,
James
was being tried, on change
Brizzolara, one of the attorneys for appellees, in the first or
"Genopening argument to the jury, used this language:
Marshall's
business methtlemen of the jury, if you knew
ods, you would say, 'God save the plaintiffs, and God save
" Appellant objected to this
all those who deal with him.'
remark of counsel, and the court said to the jury: "Col.
Brizzolara 's remark is entirely imj^roper, and should not
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now instruct you to pay no attenhave been made, and
tion to it in making up your verdict, and it must not be considered by you. and give it no weight, but your duty is to
consider the evidence admitted by the court in the progress
of the trial." Coh Brizzolara was not a witness in the case.
There was no evidence as to Marshall's business methods,
— no impeachment of his business integrity or efficiency,
nor of his moral character in the community where he lived.

The rule of procedure to which this court is committed is
very well expressed in Rudolph v. Landwerlen, 92 lud. 34,
40, where it is said: "Very many abuses in argument may
be sufficiently corrected by the instructions of the court to
the jury, and a large discretion as to the refusing of new
trials because of such violations belongs to trial courts, and
this court will not interfere because of an abuse in argument which was sufficiently counteracted by the action of
tlie trial court in the premises ; but it will interfere where,
notwithstanding the efforts of the trial court to correct the
abuse, the

irregularity appears to

be such as to prevent a
circumstances of each case will

fair trial, and the particular
guide this court to its decision," In Chicago, B. & Q. Uy.
Co. V. Kellogg, 76 N. W. Rep. 462, it is said:
the trans—
gression be flagrant, if the offensive remark has stricken
deep, and is of such a character that neither rebuke nor retraction can entirely destroy its sinister influence, — a new
trial should be promptly awarded, regardless of the want
of objection or exception."
In the language of Judge
123
People,
111. 333:
Mulkey in Quinn v.
"As well might
one attempt to brush off with the hand a stain of ink from a
piece of white linen" as to eradicate from the jury the impression that was created by the remarks of Col. Brizzolara.
The appellant was wholly dependent upon the testimony of
Marshall to sustain its contention.
He testified that he
bad no knowledge and had not acquiesced in the additional
insurance.
In this statement he was in direct conflict with
several witnesses for appellees, yet it was the jury's province to believe him in preference to all the rest.
This the
jurors would not likely have done, even without the derogaStill, they might have done so,
torv statements of counsel.
and it is not for thi-^ r-ourt to sav that they would not have
given more weight to his evidence than the other witnesses,

"If
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had it not been for the improper remarks.
These remarks
were gravely prejudicial.
True, they were not made under the sanction of an oath as a witness.
But the statement of matters of fact by counsel of high character and
excellent standing in the profession might be as readily accepted and believed by the jurors, and make as
profound and ineradicable impression upon their minds,
as if they had been uttered under oath.
The remarks
of the learned counsel, if not directly, certainly by insinuation conveyed to the jury a knowledge on his part of Marshall's business methods which were so inefficient or disreputable as to make him untrustworthy, and one whom all
having business in his line should shun.
The statement of
counsel that an acquaintance with Marshall's business methods would make ihe jurors feel like imploring the Almight>
to save plaintiffs and all who had dealings with him was
well calculated to make the jury regard him as entirely unWe cannot see how it is posreliable, to say the least.
sible for the jury not to have been prejudiced, notwithstanding all the commendable efforts of the presiding judge to
The only 'Cure for such prejudice is a
prevent such result.
For that purpose the judgment is reversed, and
new trial.
the cause remanded.
'
EiDDicK, J., dissenting.

MUHPHY'S EXECUTOR

V. HOAGLAND.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
32

1908.

Kentucky Law Reporter, 839.

Opinion of the court by Judge Lassing, reversing.
This is a contest over the will of John, commonly known
*'
as
Pat" Murphy. * * *

**********

Appellant also complains of the misconduct of counsel
for the contestants during the progress of the trial.
During the course of the cross-examination of the witness, ^fargaret Devereaux, counsel for contestants asked this question: *'Do you know how many of the jurors wanted to
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to the will of John Murphy at the
last trial thereof), and continued, ''Don't jou know, as a
matter of fact, that eight stood for breaking the will?"
This question was at once objected to by counsel for the
propounder and the objection was sustained.
The learned
counsel must have known that any question which referred
to the result or the partial result of a former trial of the
case was very improper, in fact inexcusable.
Propounder 's counsel could not permit the question to go unnoticed,
and the very fact that he objected, but served to emphasize
it's importance in the minds of the jurors.
They may
have, and doubtless did, attach much importance to the
question which was asked and objected to by counsel for the
propounder, and even though it was excluded by the court,
the jurors, being sensible and intelligent men, could not rid
their minds of the information which this question gave
them, to-wit:
That eight jurors had, on a previous trial,
stood for breaking the will. They no doubt reasoned amon^^
themselves that had this not been true, the propounder
would not have objected to its being asked, and, being taken
as true, it was in fact stating to the jury that, while you are
to try this case according to the evidence, we want you to
know that, at least, eight jurors on a former trial believed
that the will should not be permitted to stand.
In the case of the Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jolly,
27 Ky. Law Rep., 119, counsel, in closing his argument in
the lower court, used this language: "That this action had
been in the courts some four or five years, and that the
railroad company was furnished with lawyers and stenographers for the purpose of catching at every little thing
to take the case to the Court of Appeals again, in order to
having lieretofore been
defeat the claim by reversing
technicality," and
reversed in the Court of Appeals on
On appeal this court said:
other similar statements.
''When counsel, in the heat of argument, oversteps the
made by the opposing side, the
bounds and objection
court should exclude the improper matter.
The remarks
of appellee's counsel that this lady had obtained
judghad been appealed from
ment on the former trial; that
and that apby
upon
toiphnicality,
and reversed
this court
pellant was then preparing, witli the assistance of skilled
lawyers and stenographers, to appeal from any verdict
break
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that might be rendered and obtain another reversal, were
' '
improper.
And in the case of the L., H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Morgan,
23 Ky. Law Rep., 121, appellee's counsel had used this language: "The railroad can appeal this case, but the plaintiff, Morgan, is a poor man and has no money to appeal
with, and will have to accept what you do, but the railroad
has money to appeal this case, and it will do so.' '
And this court, in passing upon that case on review here,
said: "There is a latitude allowed in oral argument, but
it should not extend as far as was done in the quotation."
In each of these cases above referred to the judgment was
reversed because of improper argument and other errors.

For

the reasons given the judgment is reversed and cause
remanded, for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

WILLIAMS V. BROOKLYN ELEVATED RAILROAD
COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of Neiv York.
126 Neiv

York,

1891.

96.

This action was brought to recover damages to plaintiff's
premises in Brooklyn, caused by the erection and operation
of defendant's elevated railroad upon the street in front of
them.

Andrews,

J.

*#«♦**♦***
*

*

*

The counsel for the plaintiff, in his address to the jury,
after referring to "the utter disregard of the rights of the
private citizens by corporations," proceeded to read from a
newspaper, "The New York Tribune," an article headed
"Only a Boy Peddler," purporting to be an account of the
death of a boy, "a little fellow fifteen years old, a Roumanian, a stranger in this great city (New York), selling collar
buttons and pocket combs from a modest tray, to help sup-
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port his mother and eight brothers and sisters," caused by
his touching an electric wire which, the article stated, had
been left swinging for months from a pole near which the
This was made by the writer
boy had taken his stand.
the text for comment on the neglect of the city officials in
failing to take effective measures to have electric wires
placed under ground, and the article concluded with the
statement: *'It is shameful that where such perils are in
question there sliould be procrastination, shiftlessness and
incompetency which would not be tolerated in a private
business."
When the counsel for the plaintiff commenced reading
the article the defendant's counsel interposed and objected
to the reading, and asked the court to prevent it. The court
overruled the objection, and the defendant's counsel excepted. The plaintiff's counsel then resumed the reading,
and was reminded by the court that the reading was under
exception, but the counsel proceeded and read the remainder
of the article.
It is the privilege of counsel in addressing a jury to comment upon every pertinent matter of fact bearing upon
the questions which the jury have to decide. This privilege
it is most important to preserve and it ought not to be
narrowed by any close construction, but should be interpreted in the largest sense. The right of counsel to address
the jury upon the facts is of public as well as private
consequence, for its exercise has always proved one of the
most effective aids in the ascertainment of truth by juries
in 'Courts of justice, and this concerns the very highest
interest of the state. The jury system would fail much
more frequently than it now does if freedom of advocacy
should be unduly hampered and counsel should be prevented
from exercising within the four corners of the evidence
the widest latitude by way of comment, denunciation or
appeal in advocating his cause.
This privilege is not beyond regulation by the court. It is subject to be controlled
by the trial judge in the exercise of a sound discretion, to
prevent undue prolixity, waste of time, or unseemly criticism. The privilege of counsel, however, does not justify
the introduction in his summing up of matters wholly immaterial and irrelevant to the matter to be decided, and
wliich the jury have no right to consider in arriving at their
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The jury are sworn to render their verdict upon
The law sedulously guards against the introthe evidence.
duction of irrelevant or incompetent evidence, by which
the rights of a r^arty may be prejudiced.
The purpose of
these salutary rules might be defeated if jurors were allowed to consider facts not in evidence, and the privilege of
verdict.

counsel can never operate as a license to state to a jury
facts not in evidence, or to present considerations which
have no legitimate bearing upon the case and which the
jury would have no right to consider. ^Yhere counsel in
summing up proceeds to dilate upon facts not in evidence
or to press upon the jury considerations which the jury
would have no right to regard, it is, we conceive, the plain
duty of the court, upon objection made, to interpose, and a
refusal of the court to interpose, where otherwise the right
of the party would prejudiced, would be legal error. There
Among them
are many cases sustaining this conclusion.
are Mitchum v. State of Georgia (11 Geo. 6J6) ; Tucl-er v.
Henniker (41 N. H. 317) ; Rolfe v. Rumford (66 Me. 564).
The reading by counsel in summing up to the jury of tlie
newspaper article ' ' Only a Boy Peddler, ' ' was wholly irrelevant to the case. It could have been read for no purpose
except to influence the jury against corporations and to
lead them, under the influence of a just anger ex^cited by
the incident narrated, to give liberal damages to the plaintiif in the case on trial. The refusal of the court to interfere, under the circumstances of this case, was legal error.
The privilege of counsel and the largest liberality in construing it did not authorize such a totally irrelevant and
prejudicial proceeding. The counsel also, during the summing up, read a passage from the opinion of this court in
the Lahr case (104 N. Y. 291), after objection taken by the
defendant's counsel had been overruled by the court. It is
not important to consider the exception to this ruling, as
the appellant is entitled to a reversal for the reason already
stated. It may be observed, however, that it is the function
of the judge to instruct the jury upon the law, and where
counsel undertake to read the law to the jury, the judge
may properly interpose to prevent it ; but if the judge sees
fit to permit this to be done and the law is correctly laid
down in the decision or book used by counsel, it would
not, we think, constitute legal error or be ground of exT. p.—
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ception by the other party, although snch a practice is not
If, however, the reading from a deto be encouraged.
cision was to bring before the jury the facts of the case
decided, or the amount of the verdict, or the comments
of the judge on the facts, to influence the jury in deciding
upon the facts in the case on trial, or in fixing the amotint
of damages, then dearly the reading ought not to be permitted.
We think the judgment in this case should be reversed
upon the exception taken to the reading of the newspaper
article.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.

WILKINSON V. PEOPLE.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
226

Illinois,

1907.

135.

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered the opinion of the court:

It

appears that an action on the case had been brought
l)y one Rose Strang against the Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company for personal injuries, in wliich the defendant and others testified on behalf of the plaintiff. The suit
resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintitf.
William
Elmore Foster and Joseph B. David, who were attorneys
for the railroad company, were engaged with one L. L.
Austin, a claim agent, and Thomas McGuire, a detective,
in endeavoring to obtain affidavits in support of a motion
for a new trial, and claiming to have learned from the
defendant that his testimony in the ^case was not true, after
some preliminary conversations a meeting was arranged
for the 22nd of April, 1904, in the office of Foster, at which
Foster, McGuire, David, Miss Neville, (a stenographer,)
and the defendant were present. Conversations then took
place as to the testimony given by Wilkinson upon the trial
of the personal injury case, at which time it is claimed the
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writing set up in the indictment as an affidavit was read to
the defendant. The defendant, together with Rose Strang
and others, was subsequently indicted in the criminal court
of Cook county for having conspired to extort money from
the said elevated railroad company, upon the trial of which
it is charged the defendant committed the perjury attempted to be assigned.
As above stated, Josex)h B. David was one of the attorneys for the elevated railroad company in the personal
injury case and testified on behalf of the People in this
case. He swears he was also special counsel for the People
in the trial of the conspiracy case, and appears prominently
in the argument of this -case * * *

It

**********

is insisted that the judgment below should be reversed
because one of the attorneys who appears as counsel for
the People and argued the case orally in this court was
a leading and material witness on behalf of the prosecution
in the court below. In justification of his conduct it is insisted that there is no law in this State, statutory or otherwise, forbidding an attorney to be a witness and at the
Doubtless that is true;
same time an attorney in a case.
but courts have generally condemned the practice as one
which should be discountenanced and of doubtful professional propriety. We said, speaking by Justice Breese, in
Morgan v. Roberts, 38 111. 65, on page 85: ''We are not
advised that it is contrary to any statute or to any maxim
of the common law to make the attorney in a cause a witness in the cause he is managing.
This is a matter which
appeals to the professional pride of an attorney and his
sense of his true position and duty. In the English courts,
in several cases, it was held that an attorney cannot appear
in the same cause in the double capacity of witness and
advocate, and it has been so ruled in Pennsvlvania and
in Iowa, on the circuit. In Indiana it was held by Judge
McDonald, now United States district judge, that an attorney in a cause could not be permitted to testify to the
general merits of the ease. In Frear v. Drinlrr, 8 Pa. St.
Rep. 521. the court said that it was a hiirhly indecent practice for an attornev to cross-examine witnesses, address the
jury and give evidence himself to contradict the witness:
that it was a practice to be discountenanced by court and
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counsel ; that it was sometimes indispensable that an attorney, to prevent injustice, should give evidence for his client.
It, however, leads to abuse. But at the same time there was
no law to prevent it. All the court can do is to discountenance the practice, and, when the evidence is indispensable,
to recommend to the counsel to withdraw from the cause.
This subject has engaged the attention of other courts and
of this court, and however indecent it may be in practice
for an attorney retained in a case and managing
to be
incompetent, and must
witness also, we cannot say he
right and proleave him to his own convictions of what
And again, in Ross v.
per under such circumstances."
Demoss, 45 111. 447, Justice Lawrence said: ''On the trial
seems to preponbelow the evidence was conflicting, but
of the evidence
decree.
The
in
favor
weight
of
the
derate
of Garner
somewhat impaired from the fact that he was
proved to have been one of the attorneys in the case, and
had
conditional fee, dependent on the result of the suit.

It
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of doubtful professional propriety for an attorney
witness for his client without first entirely
to become
withdrawing from any further connection with the case,
and an attorney occupying the attitude of both witness
and attorney for his client subjects his testimony to criticvaluable farm
not suspicion but where the half of
ism,
depends upon his evidence he places himself in an unprohis evidence
fessional position and must not be surprised
an honorable one, its
impaired. While the profession
members should not forget that even they may so act as to
lose public confidence and general respect."
The foregoing language of eminent judges of this court
was used in civil cases and
peculiarly applicable to this
case, in which the People are generally understood to be
represented by public officers. Here the witness first appeared as an attorney for the Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company in the personal injury case, and was prominent in procuring affidavits in support of the motion for
new trial, and one of which he attempted to obtain from
He next appeared, he says, as
the defendant, Wilkinson.
in the prosecution of the
People
counsel
for
the
special
conspiracy case, and while he may not have actively appeared in the prosecution of this case on the trial below,
quite apparent that he had more or less to do with shap-
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ing the course of the prosecution, and voluntarily, as we
have already said, appeared as a prominent witness in the
case. There is substantial ground for the inference that he
regarded the litigation throughout as between the elevated
railroad company and the defendant or defendants, rather
than as by the People for the enforcement of public rights.
The fact that he does appear in this record in the unenviable attitude of a willing witness and a zealous attorney
should not, perhaps, work a reversal of the judgment below if the record were in all other respects free from error,
but we cannot overlook such professional impropriety when
our attention is called to it.
Other grounds of reversal urged have received consideration, but we think they are without substantial merit.
For the errors indicated the judgment below will be reversed.

Mr. Justice Carter, dissenting.

Judgment reversed.

CAMPBELL V. MAHER.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
105

Elliott, J.
In

1885.

Indiana, 383.

the course of his argument to the jury the counsel for
the appellee said: ''The record in this case shows that the
plaintiff was not willing to try this case at his home in
Daviess county, among his neighbors, but has brought the
case to Pike county on a change of venue, among strangers." The appellant objected, and the court, as the record
recites, "remarked that it was not improper for counsel to
refer to matters which were disclosed by the record, since
the whole record was before the jury, but that the argument
of counsel had gone too far, and should be limited to the
record." lYliat followed is thus exhibited in the record:
"And thereupon counsel for the plaintiff resumed his seat,
and the counsel for the defendant again turned to the jury,
and, resuming his argument, said: 'The court says T may
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Gentlemen, the record of this case
shows that the cause was brought from Daviess .county to
this county on the motion of the plaintiff.'
To which
statement the plaintiff's counsel again objected, and again
assigned in support of his objection the reasons assigned
by him in support of the objection to argument of defendant's counsel herein above set out, but the court overruled
said objection, to which the plaintiff's counsel excepted,
whereupon the defendant's counsel again turned to the
jury and said: 'Gentlemen of the jury, have only stated
to you what the record in this cause shows to be true, and
"
the court has decided that I have a riglit to do this.'
The trial court was unquestionably wrong in ruling that
everything that appears in the record is the subject of
argument to the jury, for there are many things which
the record discloses that the jury have no right to consider.
Juries, as every one knows, are sworn to try the case ''according to the law and the evidence," and an argument
must be confined to the evidence and the law. AYhere a
party secures a legal right according to law, the fact that
he has secured it can not be used to his prejudice. A change
of venue is a legal right, and where it is awarded by the
court in conformity to law, it can not be used to the prejudice of the party by wiiom it was obtained, nor can it
It would be a perversion of
be commented on in argument.
law to permit the exercise of a legal right, under the order
of the court, to be made the subject of consideration by a
jury. We need not, however, discuss this question further
for it is settled against the appellee by authority. Farnian

refer to the record.

I

V.

Lauman, 73 Ind, 568.
The comments of counsel were not mere general, fugitive

statements, but they were reiterated, and they were also
sanctioned by the ruling of the court, so that there was a
deliberate and emphatic presentation of an improper subject to the jury, and unless we can ascertain from the record
that no harm resulted, we must reverse. The record does
not enable us to declare that the appellant was not injured,
for the case is a close one upon the evidence, and we can
not say tliat the misconduct of the appellee's counsel did the
appellant no injury. There are cases where a reversal will
not be adjudged, although there is some misconduct in argument. Shular v. State, ante, p. 289, and authorities cited;
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''Misconduct of Counsel in Argument," 14 Cent. L. J. 406.
This is not such a case.
Judgment reversed.

HANSELL-ELCOCK FOUNDEY COMPANY
Supreme Court of Illinois.
214

Illinois,

V. CLARK.

1905.

399.

Me. Chief Justice Ricks delivered the opinion of the
court :
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court
for the First District affirming a judgment of the superior
court of Cook county for $8,000 in favor of appellee, against
appellant, for damages for personal injuries sustained by
the appellee while in appellant's employ. Appellee, at the
time of the injury, July 16, 1901, was a structural iron
worker in appellant's service, engaged in the construction of
the St. Cecilia school building, — a three-story structure in
the city of Chicago, — and while so engaged was struck by
a large iron beam, sustaining the injuries for which this
suit was brought.

The court limited the time of the argument to forty-five
minutes for each side, but extended the time seven minutes
for defendant's counsel, at their request, but refused to
grant further extension although requested so to do, and
this refusal of the court is also assigned as error. It is
earnestly insisted by counsel for appellant that because of
this limitation they were unduly hampered in the presentation of the case to the jury. We have always held this
question to be one within the sound discretion of the trial
court, but that where it appears that the discretion has
manifestly been abused this court would reverse the case
for such error. In cases of this character each side should
have ample time to present its case to the jury and to thoroughly argue the facts. The bare possibility of compromising the rights of either the plaintiff or defendant because
of not allowing counsel ample time in which to present a
client's cause should be carefully guarded against. Under
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our system of jurisprudence the power of the jury is so
great, trial courts should be liberal in their allowance to
counsel of time in which to review and argue the evidence.
The trial court, however, who hears the case is in a far better position to judge as to the time proper to be given
counsel for argument than can be a court of review, and
we are not disposed to reverse a case,

for the reason alone,

that the time allowed counsel for argument was too short,
unless we are thoroughly satisfied the complaining party
has in fact been wronged by an undue limitation. In this
case we think the trial court might very properly have
granted counsel more time for argument, but we do not
think we would be justified in reversing the case on the
simple ground that the limitation was unjust. But seven
The
witnesses testified for appellee and nine for appellant.
record shows that the examination of the witnesses began
on the 17th of March, 1903, and that upon the convening
of the court on the 19th the verdict of the jury was returned.
But five witnesses on each side testified as to the condition
We cannot say from a review
and scene of the accident.
of the evidence that the time allotted counsel for argument
was manifestly too short.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

CHAPTER XIII.
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES.
Section

1.

Pukpose, Scope and

Effect.

CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY V. DUNLEAVY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
129

Illinois,

1889,

132.

Mr. Justice Bailey delivered the opinion of

the Court :
This was an action on the case, brought by Annie Dunleavy, administratrix of the estate of John Dimleavy, deceased, against the Chicago and Nortliwestern Railway

Company, to recover damages under the statute for the
death of the plaintiff's intestate. The declaration consisted
of nine counts, to the fifth, sixth and seventh of which a
demurrer was sustained. To the remaining counts the defendant pleaded not guilty, and on trial before the court
and a ,iury, the issues were found for the plaintiff and her
damages assessed at $1800, and for that sum and costs, the
court, after denying the defendant's motion for a new trial,
Said judgment was afgave judgment for the plaintiff.
firmed by the Appellate Court on appeal, and by a further
appeal the record is now brought to this court.
The first count of the declaration alleges that the defendant, on the 26th day of July, 1886, by its servants, ran one
of its locomotive engines with a train of freight cars thereto
attached, from east to west over one of its tracks under a
viaduct at Blue Island avenue, in the city of Chicago ; that
the plaintiff's intestate was then and there in the employ
of said city cleaning and painting the iron columns, etc.,
of said viaduct, and that "the said train was, by and
through the negligence, carelessness and improper conduct
of the said defendant, through its servants in the premises,
run at a high and dangerous rate of speed," and that while
being so run, it was driven against and upon said Dun521
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leavy, whereby he was instantly killed. The second count
alleges that the defendant, through its servants, "so carelessly, improperly and unskillfully managed and conducted
said engine and train, that the said John Dunleavy was
forcibly knocked down by said engine and train" and
thrown under the wheels of the train and instantly killed.
The third count sets up an ordinance of said city requiring
the bell of each locomotive engine to be rung continually
while running within the city, and alleging that the defendant's servants in charge of said train failed to comply with
said ordinance, and that in consequence of such failure said
Dunleavj'- was killed. The fourth count is substantially like
the second. The eighth count alleges that the engineer and
fireman could, by looking, have seen Dunleavy standing at
his work, and by sounding a whistle have given him notice
of the approach of a train, but that they failed to sound
the whistle, and that in consequence of such failure said
Dunleavy was killed. The ninth count alleges substantially
the same act of negligence as the eighth, though in different
language. Each count alleges in proper form that Dunleavy at the time he was killed, was in the exercise of due
care.
At the close of the trial the counsel for the defendant
asked the court to instruct the jury that the evidence in the
case was insufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff,
and that their verdict should therefore be for the defendant.
This instruction the court refused to give, and such refusal
is assigned for error.

The next questions to be considered are those which
relate to the special findings of the jury. Upon this branch
of the case it is urged, first, that the court improperly refused to submit certain questions of fact to the jury; second,
that certain of the questions of fact submitted were not
properly answered; and third, that the special findings of
fact are inconsistent with the general verdict. The statute
under which special findings may be required is but recent,
?ind the rules of practice thereby established have never beWe
fore been presented to this court for its consideration.
must therefore look mainly to the statute itself for our
The
guide in determining the propositions now raised.
statute is as follows:
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Section 1. "That in all trials by jury in civil proceedings in this State in courts of record, the jury may render,
in their discretion, either a general or a special verdict;
and in any case in which they render a general verdict, they
may be required by the court, and must be so required on
request of any party to the action, to find specially upon
any material question or questions of fact which shall be
stated to them in writing, which questions of fact shall be
submitted by the party requesting the same to the adverse
l)arty before the commencement of the argument to the

jury.

Sec. 2. "Submitting or refusing to submit a question of
fact to the jury when requested by a party as provided by
the first section hereof may be excepted to and be reviewed

on appeal or writ of error as a ruling on a question of law.
Sec. 3. "When the special finding of fact is inconsistent
with the general verdict, the former shall control the latter
and the court may render judgment accordingly."
This statute, so far as it relates to special verdicts, is
merely declaratory of the common law. It has been competent for juries at common law, since the statute of 13
Edward 1, to find a general verdict, or when they have any
doubt as to the law, to find a special verdict, and refer
By
the law arising thereon to the decision of the court.
a special verdict, the jury, instead of finding for either
party, find and state all the facts at issue, and conclude conditionally, that if upon the whole matter thus found, the
court should be of the opinion tliat the plaintiff has a good
cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff, and assess
his damages ; if otherwise, then for the defendant. 2 Tidd's

Practice, (Am. ed.) 897, and note.
The rules of law as to special verdicts and their requisites
have long been settled both in this country and in England.
Thus, it is held that they should find facts, and not the
mere evidence of facts, so as to leave nothing for the court
to determine except questions of law. Vhicrnt v. Morrhon,
Breese, 227 ; Brown v. Balson, 4 Rand. 504; Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 406; Henderson v. Aliens, 1 Hen & Mun. 2.35;
Hill V. Covell, 1 N. Y. 522; Lanqleij v. Warren, 3 id. 327;
Kinsley v. Coyle, 58 Pa. St. 461; Thompson v. Farr, 1
Spears, 93 ; Leach v. Church, 10 Ohio St. 149 : LaFromhios v.
Jackson, 8 Cow. 589. To authorize a judgment upon a
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special verdict, all the facts essential to the right of the
party in whose favor the judgment is to be rendered, must
be found by the jury; finding sufficient evidence, prima
facie, to establish such facts, is not sufficient. Blake v.
Davis, 20 Ohio, 231; Hambleton v. Dempsey, id. 168. If
probative facts are found from which the court can declare
that the ultimate facts necessarily result, the finding is sufficient. Alhambra Addition Water Co. v. Richardson, 72
Cal. 598 ; Coveny v. Hale, 49 id. 552. A special verdict cannot be aided by intendment, and therefore any fact not
ascertained by it will be presumed not to exist.
Lee v.
Campbell, 4 Porter, 198 ; Zumull v. Watson, 2 Munf. 283 ;

Laivrence v. Beaiibun, 2 Bailey, 625.
It is manifest of course that a special finding by a jury
upon material questions of fact submitted to them under the
provisions of the statute is not a special verdict, but an esA special verdict cannot
sentially different proceeding.
be found where there is a general verdict, but the special
findings of fact provided for by the statute can be required
only in case a general verdict is rendered. But while this
is so, much light in relation to special findings upon questions of fact, and their office and objects may be derived
from the rules applicable to special verdicts. Both forms
of verdict are provided for by the same statute, and they
must therefore be construed as being in pari materia.
In giving construction to the statute, the first, and perhaps the most important question, relates to the scope and
meaning of the phrase, "material question or questions of
fact." May such questions relate to mere evidentiary facts,
or should they be restricted to those ultimate facts upon
which the rights of the parties directly depend? Evidently
the latter: Not only does this conclusion follow from analogy to the rules relating to si)ecial verdicts, but it arises
from the very nature of the case. It would clearly be of
no avail to require the jury to find mere matters of evidence, because, after being found, they would in no way
aid the court in determining what judgment to render.
Dou])tloss a probative fact from which the ultimate fact
necessarily results would be material, for there the court
could infer such ultimate fact as a matter of law. But
where the probative fact is merely prima facie evidence of
the fact to be proved, the proper deductions to be drawn

Special Interrogatories
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from the probative fact presents a quefc>tion of fact and not
of law, requiring further action by the jury, and it cannot
therefore be made the basis of any action by the court. Requiring the jury to find such probative fact is merely requiring them to find the evidence and not the facts, and results
in nothing which can be of the slightest assistance to the
parties or the court in arriving at the proper determination
of the suit.

The

vievf^

we take is

strongly fortified by the provision

is

is

is

a

it,

of the third section of the statute, that, when a special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the
former shall control. This necessarily implies that the fact
to be submitted shall be one which, if found, may in its nature be controlling. That can never be the case with a mere
evidentiary fact. A fact which merely tends to prove a
fact in issue without actually proving
can not be said
general verto be, in any legal sense, inconsistent with
dict, whatever that verdict may be. Such inconsistency
can arise only where the fact found
an ultimate fact, or
one from which the existence or non-existence of such ultinever the case
mate fact necessarily follows, and that
with that which
only prima facie evidence of the fact

a

a

it

sought to be proved.
The common law requires that verdicts shall be the declaration of the unanimous judgment of the twelve jurors.
Upon all matters which they are required to find they must
be agreed.
has never been held that they must all
But
reach their conclusions in the same way and by the same
method of reasoning.
To require unanimity not only in
their conclusions but in the mode by which those conclusions
are arrived at would in most cases involve an impossibility.
To require unanimity therefore, not only in the result but
also in each of the successive steps leading to such result,
would be practically destructive of the entire system of
jury trials. To illustrate, suppose plaintiff trying his suit
fact alleged
before twelve jurors, should seek to prove
in his declaration by giving evidence of twelve other facts,

having an independent tendency to prove the fact alThe evidence of each probative fact, or the conleged.
might appeal with peculiar
clusions to be drawn from
force to the belief or judgment of some one of the jurors,
The cumulative effect of all the
but less so to his fellows.
it,

each
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evidence might be such as to leave no doubt in the mind of
any member of the panel as to the truth of the fact alleged,
still, if the jury were required to find specially as to each
probative fact, no one of the twelve facts would be at all
likely to meet with the unanimous concurrence of the entire
jury. As to each they would be compelled to confess their
inability to agree, or what would be its equivalent, say they
did not know or could not tell, which, if we apply the rules
governing special verdicts, would be tantamount to a finding
that the fact was not proved or did not exist. If such finding should be required, and should be given the effect of
controlling the general verdict, the result would be, that
under such system of trial, general verdicts could but seldom stand.
However natural the curiosity parties may have to know
the precise course of reasoning by which jurors may arrive
at verdicts either for or against them, they have no right,
under gise of submitting questions of fact to be found
specially by the jury, to require them to give their views
upon each item of evidence, and thus practically subject
them to a cross-examination as to the entire case.
Such
practice would subserve no useful purpose, and would only
tend to embarrass and obstruct the administration of justice; and we may further say that such practice finds no
warrant in our statute.
We are referred to one case in another State, where, in
a suit for personal injuries against a railroad company,
the defendant was permitted under a statute somewhat
similar to ours, to put to the jury no less than one hundred
and thirty-six interrogatories as to the facts, covering, apparently every possible phase of the evidence. The judgment against the railroad company" was reversed for an
erroneous instruction to the jury as to the form to their
answer to questions where the evidence was not sufficient,
but no suggestions seems to have been made that any portion of the questions put to the jury were improper. Whatever may be the view of such practice taken by the courts
of other States, we are unwilling to give our countenance
to its adoy)tion here.
In the present case the defendant's counsel prepared and
submitted fifteen questions of fact upon which the court was
asked to require the jury to make special findings. Of these
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The first was modified and suhmitted to the jury in its modified form. The
residue of the questions were submitted as asked. We do
not understand that the defendant is now complaining of
the action of the court in relation to its eleventh and twelfth
questions of fact. The first, as prepared by the defendant's
counsel, was as follows :
1.
''^^Hiat precaution did the deceased take to inform
himself of the approach of the train which caused the in-

jury?"

This was modified by the court so as to read as follows

''Was the

deceased exercising reasonable care
own safety at the time he was killed?"
1.

:

for his

The ultimate fact which it was incumbent upon the plain-

tiff

to prove, and which the defendant sought to disprove,
was that the deceased, at the time he was killed, was in
the exercise of due care. That was one of the issues made

it was one of the ultimate facts upon
which the plaintiff's right to recover necessarily depended.
What the deceased did to inform himself of the approach of
the train was material only as tending to show reasonable
care on his part or the want of it. His acts in that behalf,

by the pleadings, and

then, whatever they may have been, were facts which were
merely evidential in their nature, and while they doubtless
would have had a tendency to prove reasonable care or
the contrary, there were none of them, so far as the evidence shows, which would have been conclusive of that
question. The question then, as submitted by the defendant's counsel, sought to obtain a finding as to mere probative facts, and the court, therefore properly refused to
require the jury to answer it. The question substituted by
the court submitted to the jury a material and controlling
fact, and one which could be properly made the subject of a
special finding.
Complaint is made to the answers given by the jury to the
fourth and fifth questions. Those questions were as fol-

lows:
4.

''Did

the deceased

look to a&certain

question was approaching?
"Did the deceased listen to ascertain
5.

if

if

the

train in

said train was

approaching?"
To both of those questions the jury answered: "Don't
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know." It is perhaps questionable whether the defendant,
in order to avail itself of the objection that no proper answer was made to these questions, should not have made it
at the time the verdict was returned and before the jury
were discharged, for then the jury might have been required
to complete their verdict by making proper answers. Moss
V. Priest, 19 Abb. Prac. 314.
But however that may be, it
is manifest that the error, if it be one, cannot have been
prejudicial to the defendant unless it can be seen that
answers to said questions most favorable to the defendant,
which of course would have been answers in the negative,
would have constituted a finding inconsistent with the
general verdict.
If then we treat said questions as having been answered
in the negative, would such answers, either alone or in connection with the answers to the other questions, have constituted a finding necessarily inconsistent with the general verdict? To the second question, viz., "If the deceased had
looked before the accident, could he have discovered the
approach of the train in time to have avoided the accident?"
the jury answered, "Yes," and to the third question, viz.,
the deceased had listened before the approach of said
train, could he have discovered the approach of the train
in time to have avoided the accident?" they answered,
he had concentrated his attention in that particular direction, yes." The first question, viz., "Was the deceased exercising reasonable care for his safety at the time he was
killed?" was also answered, "Yes."
The question then presents itself, whether, if it be admitted that the deceased neither looked or listened for the
train, and also that if he had looked he could have seen
and
he had listened with his attention concentrated in
in time to avoid the
that direction, he could have heard
constitute
such conclusive proof
accident, such facts would
of contrilmtory negligence on the part of the deceased as
Undoubtedly
would have barred
recovery.
failure to
affirmatively appears that
look or listen, especially where
looking or listening might have enabled the party exposed
to injury to see the train and thus avoid being injured,
But they are not
evidence tending to show negligence.
charge of negligence can be
conclusive evidence, so that
matter of law. There may be
predicated upon them as

"If

a

a

is

it

a

a

it

if

it,

"If
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various modifying circumstances excusing the party from
looking or listening, and that being the case, a mere failure

to look or listen cannot, as a legal conclusion, be pronounced
negligence per se.
In determining whether the special findings are inconsistent with the general verdict so that the latter must be held
to be controlled by the former, this court cannot look at the
evidence. All reasonable presumptions will be entertained

in favor of the verdict, while nothing will be presumed in
aid of the special findings of fact. The inconsistency must
be irreconcilable,
so as to be incapable of being removed
by any evidence admissible under the issues. Pennsylvania
Co. V. Smith, 98 Ind. 42; McComas v. Haas, 107 id. 512;
Redelsheimer v. Miller, id. 485. Under these principles it
must be held that there is no necessary or irreconcilable
inconsistency between the special findings and the general
verdict, especially in view of the fact that the jury, notwithstanding their finding that the deceased did not look
or listen, also found that he was in the exercise of reasonable care.
We are of the opinion that the record contains no material error, and the judgment of the Appellate Court will
therefore be affirmed.

Judgment afirmed}

1 Clementson,
in his work on Special Verdicts and Findings, ingeniously
observes: — "The submipsion of interrogatories under the statute is a sort of
'exploratory opening' into the abdominal cavity of the general verdict (if
I may be pardoned a surgical metaphor) by which the court determines
whether the organs are sound and in place and the proper treatment to be
Page 45.
pursued."

T. P.— 34
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Constitutionality.

V. NEW MEXICO

AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of the United States.
165

1897,

United States, 593.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court.
The testimony was not preserved, and the case is submitted to us upon the pleadings, the verdict, the special findings
of fact and the judgment; and on the record as thus presented plaintiff in error rests her claim of reversal upon
three propositions : First, that the act of the territorial
legislature, authorizing special findings of fact and providing for judgment on the special findings, if inconsistent
with the general verdict (Laws of New Mexico 1889, c. 45,
page 97), is in contravention of the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, which reads :
*'
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
First, with regard to the constitutional question, the
specific objection is thus stated in the brief :
''It is not contended, although the English authorities
would appear to warrant the contention, that at the common
law the judge might not require the jury to answer special
questions, or interrogate the jury as to the grounds upon
which their general verdict was found ; but it is most earnestly contended that the extent of the power of the judge,
if in his opinion the special findings or answers of the jury
to interrogatories were inconsistent with the general verdict, was to set aside the general verdict and award a venire de novo, while under this statute authority is attempted
to be conferred upon the judge to render final judgment
upon tlie special findings."
We deem it unnecessary to consider the contention of
defendant in error that the territorial courts are not courts
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of the United States, and that the Seventh Amendment is
not operative in the Territories, for by the act of April 7,
c. 80, 18 Stat. 27, Congress, legislating for all the
1874,^
Territories, declared that no party ''shall he deprived of the
right of trial by jury in cases cognizable at common law;"
and while this may not in terms extend all the provisions
of the Seventh Amendment to the Territories, it does secure
all the rights of trial by jury as they existed at common
law.

The question is whether this act of the territorial legislature in substance impairs the right of trial by jury. The
Seventh Amendment, indeed, does not attempt to regulate
matters of pleading or practice, or to determine in what way
issues shall be framed by which questions of fact are to be
submitted to a jury. Its aim is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of right. This
requires that questions of fact in common law actions shall
be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume
directly or indirectly to take from the jurj^ or to itself such
So long as this substance of right is preserved
prerogative.
the procedure by which this result shall be reached is
wholly within the discretion of the legislature, and the
courts may not set aside any legislative provision in this
respect because the form of action — the mere manner in
which questions are submitted — is different from that which
obtained at the common law.
Now a general verdict embodies both the law and the
facts. The jury, taking the la^v as given by the court, apply
that law to the facts as they find them to be and express
The power of the court
their conclusions in the verdict.
to grant a new trial if in its judgment the jury have misinterpreted the instructions as to the rules of law or misapplied them is unquestioned, as also when it appears that
there was no real evidence in support of any essential fact.
These things obtained at the common law; they do not trespass upon the prerogative of the jury to determine all
questions of fact, and no one to-day doubts that such is tlie
legitimate duty and function of the court, notwithstanding
the terms of the constitutional guarantee of right of trial
by jury. Beyond this, it was not infrequent to ask from
the jury a special rather than general verdict, that is. instead of a verdict for or against the plaintiff or defendant
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embodying in a single declaration the whole conclusion of
the trial, one which found specially upon the various facts
in issue, leaving to the court the subsequent duty of determining upon such facts the relief which the law awarded to
the respective parties.
It was also a common practice when no special verdict was
demanded and when only a general verdict was returned to
interrogate the jury upon special matters of fact. Whether
or no a jury was compelled to answer such interrogations,
or whether, if it refused or failed to answer, the general
verdict would stand or not, may be questioned. Mayor &c
V. Clark, 3 Ad. & Ell. 506. But the right to propound such
interrogatories was undoubted and often recognized.
Walker v. Bailey, 65 Maine, 354; Spurr v. Shelburne, 131
Mass. 429. In the latter case the court said (page 430) :
"It is within the discretion of the presiding justice to put
inquiries to the jury as to the grounds upon which they
found their verdict, and the answers of the foreman, assented to by his fellows, may be made a part of the record,
and will have the effect of special findings of the facts stated
by him. And no exception lies to the exercise of this discretion.
Dorr V. Fenno, 12 Pick. 521; Spoor v. Spooner,
12 Met. 281 ; Mair v. Basset, 117 Mass. 356 ; Lanier v. Earle,
5 Allen, 22."
So that the putting of special interrogatories
to a jury and asking for specific responses thereto in addition to a general verdict is not a thing unknown to the common law, and has been recognized independently of any
statute. Beyond this we cannot shut our eyes to the fact
that in many States in the Union, in whose constitutions is
found in the most emphatic language as assertion of the
inviolability of trail by jury, are statutes similar to the one
enacted l)y the territorial legislature of New Mexico; that
those statutes have been uniformly recognized as valid, and
that a large amount of the litigation in the courts is carried
through in obedience to the provisions of such statutes. It
would certainly startle the profession to be told that such
stf^tntes contravene a constitutional requirement of the in-

vi'tlnbility of jury trials.
Indeed, the very argument of counsel for plaintiff in error
is an admission that up to a certain extent those statutes
are undoubtedly valid. That argument is practically that
when the specific findings are returned and found to be
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conflicting with the general verdict the court is authorized
to grant a new trial, but can do no more. But why should
the power of the court be thus limited? If the facts as specially found compel a judg-ment in one way, why should not
the court be permitted to apply the law to the facts as thus
found?
It certainly does so when a special verdict is returned. ^^^^en a general verdict is returned and the court
determines that the jury have either misinterpreted or misapplied the law the only remedy is the award of a new trial,
because the constitutional provision forbids it to find the
facts. But when the facts are found and it is obvious from
the inconsistency between the facts as found and the general
verdict that, in the latter, the jury have misinterpreted or
misapplied the law, what constitutional mandate requires
that all should be set aside and a new inquiry made of another jury? Of what significance is a question as to a
specific fact? Of what avail are special interrogatories
and special findings thereon if all that is to result therefrom is a new trial, which the court might grant if it were
of opinion that the general verdict contained a wrong interpretation or application of the rules of law? Indeed, the
very thought and value of special interrogatories is to
avoid the necessity of setting aside a verdict and a new trial
— to end the controversy so far as the trial court is concerned upon that single response from the jury.
We are clearly of opinion that this territorial statute does
not infringe any constitutional provision, and that it is
within the power of the legislature of a Territory to provide that on a trial of a common law action the court may,
in addition to the general verdict, require specific answers
to special interrogatories, and, when a conflict is found
between the two, render such judgment as the answers to
the special questions compel.

**********

These are all the questions in the case, and, finding no
error in the record, the judgment is

Affirmed.
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RYAN

V. ROCKFORD INSURANCE
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
77

COMPANY.
1890,

Wisconsin, 611.

Cassoday, J.
The learned counsel for the defendant
strenuously contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the general verdict or any of the special findings in
favor of the plaintiff.
The view we have taken of the case
renders it unnecessary for us to determine that question.
The statute requires the court to direct the jury to find a
special verdict when requested as prescribed.
Sec. 2858,
R. S.
Such verdict must ''be prepared by the court in the
form of questions in writing, relating only to material issues of fact and admitting a direct answer, to which the
jury shall make answer in writing.
The court may also
direct the jury, if they render a general verdict, to find in
writing upon any particular question of fact to he stated as
Ibid.
This last provision is applicable to
aforesaid."
the case at bar.
The purpose of thus submitting particular controverted questions of fact is to secure a direct answer free from any bias or prejudice in favor of or against
either party.
It is a wise provision in certain cases when
properly administered.
It has often been demonstrated
in the trial of causes that the non-expert juryman is more
liable than the experienced lawyer or judge to be led away
from the material issues of fact involved by some collateral
circumstance of little or no significance, or by sympathy,
bias, or prejudice; and hence it is common practice for
courts, in the submission of such particular questions and
special verdicts, to charge the jury, in effect, that they have
nothing to do with, and must not consider the effect which
their answers may have upon, the controversy, or the parties.
The learned trial judge, when in health, has frequently so charged. It is certainly a very proper thing to
do when the ])usiiiess or reputation of either party is such
as to naturally stimulate a bias in favor of the one party
It is true tliat jui-ies, under such a charge,
or the oilier.
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sometimes return inconsistent answers ; but it is usually because such is the honest result of their unbiased judgment
upon different branches of the evidence.
In the case at bar the learned trial judge seems to have
been particularly anxious to prevent such inconsistent answers ; and hence he explained to the jury what different answers to each particular question so submitted would be consistent, and what inconsistent, with a general verdict in
favor of one or the other party.
This was peculiarly calculated to secure special answers which would be consistent
with a general verdict rather than in accordance with the
weight of evidence upon each of such particular questions.
The effect of such instructions was very much the same as
though the court had charged the jury that after they had
determined upon a general verdict then they should answer
the particular questions submitted in the way they had thus
been informed would be consistent with such general verThis was misleading, and well calculated to defeat
dict.
the very object of the statute in authorizing such submission.

Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

By

the

CHICAGO

&

ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY V. GORE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
202

Illinois,

1903.

188.

**********

Mr. Justice Boggs delivered the opinion of the court.
We do not conceive that it was improper practice to permit counsel for appellee to read the special interrogatories
to the jury, and in connection therewith discuss the evidence, for the purpose of convincing the jury that under the
evidence the interrogatories should be answered in the afThe obfirmative or in the negative, as the case might be.
counsel
of
avgiinieut
appealed
to the
jection is not that the
their
or
sympathies,
or
that
to
it
prejudice of the jurors
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transcended legitimate grounds of debate, but simply that
it was error to allow counsel to read the interrogatories to
the jury and discuss the evidence which bore upon the answers which counsel conceived should be made by the jury
The statute which authorizes the submission of
thereto.
special questions of fact to be answered by a jury requires
that such questions shall be stated to the jury in writing,
' '
shall be submitted by the party requesting the same,
and
to the adverse party before the commencement of the arguThe end designed to be attained by the
ment to the jury."
argument of counsel is to lead the jury to the proper decision of or answer to the issues made by the pleadings. It
was entirely legitimate for counsel to review the evidenc
and suggest to the jury what, under the proof, their general
verdict should be, and none the less to suggest the answers
which, in the view of counsel, the evidence demanded should
In Timins v.
be returned to the special interrogatories.
Chicago, etc., Railroad Co., 72 Iowa, 94, it was said: "It
is competent for an attorney to read special interrogatories
to the jury, and to discuss the evidence applicable thereto,
and to suggest the answers which in his judgment ought to
be

rendered."
The judgment of the Appellate Court must be and is

affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CAPITAL CITY BANK V. WAKEFIELD.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
83

ItIVEN,

IV.

1891.

Iowa. 46.

J.

At the conclusion of the instructions the court sub-

mitted the three special interrogatories, with this instruc"You will decide upon them in the same manner as
tion.
You will be
your general verdict, and answer the same.
careful, however, that these answers are in harmony with
The appellant conand suj)port your general verdict."
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tends that this instruction ' ' requires the jury to answer the
interrogatories, not with reference to the facts of the case
as shown by the evidence, but with reference to their general verdict only."
That the findings and verdict should
be in harmony is not questioned, nor that the court may instruct the jury to exercise care in that respect.
Special
findings are of ultimate material facts only, and, when
found, the result — the general verdict — follows therefrom.
It is clear that a jury should first decide from the evidence
what the ultimate facts are; that is, the essential facts
which control as to what the verdict should be.
With these
facts found, they should then decide to what result— what
The jury were sworn to degeneral verdict — they lead.
cide the case according to the law as given by the court, and
the evidence.
The general tenor of previous instructions
is that they should decide the case upon the evidence, and
then they were specifically told that they must decide upon
these special questions in the same manner as their general
Thus far the jury could be in no doubt but that
verdict.
were
to decide the special questions from the evidence.
they
The caution which follows could not lead to a different conTrue, it would have been more exactly correct if
clusion.
it had cautioned them to be careful that their general verdict was in harmony with the answers, as the answers control ; but we do not think, in view of what preceded, that the
jury could have understood that they were to decide upon
their answers to the special interrogatories from anything
People v. Murray, 52 Mich. 289; 17 N.
but the evidence.
W. Rep. 843.
Our conclusion upon the whole record is that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
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COFFEYVILLE VITRIFIED BRICK COMPANY
V. ZIMMERMAN.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
61

1900.

Kansas, 750.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action for damages by the plainSmith, J. :
tiffs below, the father and mother of Arthur Zimmerman,
who was killed by the falling of an embankment under which
he was at work while in the employ of plaintiff in error.
The action was brought under section 418, chapter 95, General Statutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1899, Sec. 4686), and there
was a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs.
One of the instructions given by the court to the jury, over the objection
of plaintiff in error, was as follows :
''Your answers and findings should be consistent each
with the other, and should be consistent with the general
verdict, in order that any amount, if any you find in favor
of the plaintiff, must be consistent and in harmony with
the answers

that

you make to these special

questions.

Whatever verdict may be returned in this case, if not for
the defendant, it is largely upon the answers you make to
these questions, and they should be consistent each with the

other. ' '
It was clearly erroneous for the court to require the jury
to make their answers to the particular questions of fact
harmonize with the general verdict, or to suggest that the
findings should be consistent each with the other. Each of
he questions propounded should be answered truthfully, in
accordance with the preponderance of evidence upon the
question submitted.
Under our statute, when the special
finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict, the
former controls the latter, and the court may give judgment
acoordingly.
(Gen. Stat. 1897, ch. 95, §297; Gen.' Stat.
The questions should be answered without
1899, § 4550.)
anv reference to their effect on the general verdict.
(Dry
Goods Co. V. Kahn, 53 Kan. 274, 36 Pac. 327.)

For the error in the instruction given, the judgment of
the court below will be reversed and a new trial ordered.
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LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY

&

CHICAGO EAILWAY

COMPANY V. WORLEY.
Court of Indiana.

Supreme

107

Elliott^

J.

*

1886.

Indiana, 320.

**********
*

*

The appellant submitted to tlie court interrogatories, and
asked that they should be submitted to the jury, but the
court, instead of submitting those asked by the appellant,
The
prepared and submitted interrogatories of its own.
prayer for the submission of the interrogatories to the jury
was not a proper one, for the court was not asked to instruct the jury to answer the interrogatories in the event
that they returned a general verdict.
Taylor v. Bruk,
91 Ind. 252.
We have, however, examined the interrogatories, and
find that those propounded by the court substantially cov-

ered those asked by the appellant, so far as they were comOur decisions are that it is proper
petent and material.
for the trial court to revise interrogatories submitted by the
parties, and to prepare and propound for itself proper in-

terrogatories to the jury.

Killian

v.

Eigenmann,

57

Ind.

480.

''Could the deThe 'Court submitted this interrogatory.
fendant have lawfully fenced its track at the point where

It is contended that
said mules entered upon the track?"
this interrogatory is not a proper one, as it calls upon the
jury to decide a question of law, and not of fact, and thus
We
casts upon them a duty that the court should perform.
can perceive no answer to this contention, and appellee's
Our statute makes it the
counsel have not suggested any.
duty of the court to submit to the jury only questions of
fact, and the question here submitted is, it seems to us, one
The purpose of addressing interrogatories to
of law.
juries is to elicit de<;isions upon matters of fact, and not to
ask them to state conclusions of law.
Whether the track
of a railroad company is, or is not, lawfully fenced, is a mere

540
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conclusion to be deduced from the facts.
We have repeatedly decided that parties are entitled in special verdicts
and in special findings to a statement of the specific facts,
and that statements of mere conclusions will not be sufficient.
Pittshurg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186,
and authorities cited; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Batch,
105 Ind. 93 ; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind.
582 ; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151.
The jury should be reThat principle governs here.
quired to state facts, and not conclusions of law, and the answer to the question propounded in this instance could be, as
it was, nothing more than the statement of the jury's conclusion as to whether the railroad company could lawfully
fence its track at the place where the mules entered upon it.
Whether it could lawfully fence at that place depended upon
the character and surroundings, and when these are fixed
the question whether it could be lawfully fenced becomes
There are many
one of law for the decision of the court.
facts which make it improper for a railroad company to
fence, as, for instance, the fact that to fence would interfere with the discharge of the company's duty to tlie public,
or would make the place dangerous to its servants, and it
is for the jury to state the facts, leaving the law to be applied by the court to the facts found by the jury.
It was held in the case of Jeffersonville etc., R. R. Co. v.
Underhill, 40 Ind. 229, that an allegation that the railroad
was ''not fenced according to law," was the statement of
a legal conclusion, and this general principle is declared in
many cases. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bishop, 29 Ind.
202; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 35 Ind. 380;
Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brown, 44 Ind. 409; Singer
Manufacturing Co. v. E finger, 79 Ind. 264.
We think it clear on principle and authority that the court
erred in ; iilimitting the interrogatory under immediate
In view of the fact that the court remention to the jury.
jected interrogatories submitted by the appellant, and undertook to substitute those of its own, the error must be reIt would defeat the manifest
garded as a material one.
purpose of the statute to allow conclusions of law, rather
than statements of facts, to be made by the jury, for the
purpose of the statute is to get upon record the specific and
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material facts in the form of answers to interrogatories.
Judgment reversed.

CHICAGO

&

ALTON KAILROAD COMPANY
V. HARRINGTON.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
192

Illinois,

1901.

9.

The East St. Louis freight yard of the Toledo, St. Louis
and Kansas City railroad, (^commonly called the *' Clover
Leaf,") is what is called a stub-yard, and the only way of
getting into and from the yard with cars is from the east
end of it. A main or lead track runs from the east end of
the yard to the freight house at the west end.
From this
main or lead track a number of switches branch off westerly, on which are received freight cars coming from other
roads, at all hours of the day and night.
The switch
tracks are connected with the main or lead track by
switches.
On January 27, 1897, early in the morning, and while it
was yet dark and was snowing, a switch crew of the appellant company transferred a number of cars of perishable
freight from appellant's road to a switch track of the Clover Leaf road, and, in doing so, omitted to place the cars a
sufificient distance down the switch track to allow a lO'Comotive and cars to pass along the lead track without coming in
contact with the last car so placed on the switch track, and
also omitted to close the switch, but left it open.
Several hours before the servants of the appellant company had thus transferred its cars to a switch track of the
Clover Leaf road, a switching crew of the Clover Leaf road
had gone out of the yard up to Madison, or Miller's Station,
to take some cars, and returned to the freight yard of the
Clover Leaf road after appellant's switching crew had finThe switching crew of
ished their work and left the yard.
the Clover Leaf road, which thus entered the freight yard
between four and six o'clock on the morning of January 27,
Of these five men one was the
1897, consisted of five men.
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fireman and one was the engineer.
Besides the fireman
and engineer there was a foreman and there were also two
When the
Appellee was one of these helpers.
helpers.
switching crew of the Clover Leaf road come down the lead
track, two freight cars were fastened to the locomotive
ahead of
so that the two freight cars were pushed forWhen the switching crew enward by the locomotive.
tered the freight yard, the engineer and fireman were in
their proper places upon the locomotive.
The foreman was
in the cab of the engine.
One of the helpers was on top of
the forward car of the two cars which were pushed by the
Appellee, the other helper, was standing upon the
engine.
foot-board in front of the engine and between the engine
and the second or last of the two cars.
The engineer was
named Neff. The fireman was named Thomas or Thompson.
The foreman was named Donahue.
The helper on the
forward car was named Fox.
They were shoving the two
cars westward to the freight house, and
was the intention
off
to cut the cars
and leave them.
Wlien the servants of the appellant transferred appellant's cars, containing perishable freight, from appellant's
road to one of the switchtracks of the Clover Leaf road in
the freight yard of the latter, they left the switch open, and
the hindmost of appellant's cars projected over from the
side switch, upon which said cars stood, on to the main or
The result was that, when the engine and the
lead track.
which the switching crew of the Clover
two cars ahead of
Leaf road were pushing, reached the switch track on which
appellant's servants had left its cars, the cars, so pushed
by the Clover Leaf switching crew, ran into and collided
The result of this collision was that
with appellant's cars.
the locomotive, on the front foot-board of which appellee
was riding, and the rear car of the two cars in front of the
locomotive, came together, breaking appellee's legs, tearing
off finger, and otherwise severely injuring him.
The negligence, charged in the declaration against the
servants of appellant, was that they left the cars, containing perishable freight, on the switch track, and neglected to
close the switch.

**********

Mr. Justice Magruder delivered

the

opinion of the court.
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Fourth — An objection is also made by appellant to the
action taken by tlie trial court in reference to tbe special interrogatories submitted to the jury, calling for special find-

ings upon their part.
In the first place, the court declined to give the interrogatories submitted by appellant, and prepared interrogatories
of its own motion, which were submitted.
This was not
error; we have decided that a trial court may refuse requests for special findings, and substitute others on its own
motion.
{Chicago <f Alton Railroad Co. v. Pearson, 184
111. 386; Norton v. VoMe, 158 id. 402).
By the first interrogatory submitted by appellant, the
jury were asked whether it would not have been safer, if
appellee had placed himself on the rear foot-board of the
engine on the night in question, as the train was entering
the yard of the Clover Leaf.
This interrogatory was properly refused, because an affirmative answer to it could not
have controlled a general verdict had it been in favor of
appellee.
(Chicago d Northive stern Bailway Co., C. DitnThe second interrogatory, which releavy, 129 111. l.'^S).
quired the jury to find whether *'the act of plaintitf, in
negligently placing himself on the foot-board of the engine
next to the car," contributed to cause the injurj^ was properly refused because it assumed that appellee was negliThe third interrogatory which required the jury
gent.
to find whether the accident to the plaintiff was caused by
the negligence of one Fox, who was on the first car of the
train, was properly refused, because it called for an evidentiary fact only, and so, could not have controlled
a general
Upon this subverdict for appellee.
ject the Appellate Court in deciding this case well
say:
''Although
Fox and appellee were fellow-servants of a common master, and engaged in the same
line of duty, yet that master, was not appellant; hence the
fact, that they were fellow-servants, could not be availed of
by appellant to protect itself against the negligence of Fox,
if appellant's negligence contributed to the injury.
the
inquiry had been whether the negligeu'ce of Fox was the sole
cause of the injury, the condition of the matter would have
Although the neglibeen different from what it now is.
gence of Fox might have caused the injury, yet the negligence of the-servants of appellant might also have contrib-

If
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uted to the injury, and an affirmative answer, tliat did not
fully negative the latter, would have established an evidentiary fact only.
The reasons given, wh}^ the court did not
err in refusing to give the third interrogatory, apply as
well to the fourth interrogatory. ' '
The interrogatories submitted by the court of its own motion, were as follows :
''1st. If you find a general verdict for the plaintiff in
this case, you will also answer and return with your verdict
the following questions :
' '
Did the act of the plaintiff, John Harrington, in placing
liimself on the foot-board of the engine next to the car contribute to cause the injury he received?
"2nd. Was the plaintiff, John Harrington, using proper
care for his own safety by being upon the foot-board of the
engine between the car and the engine when he was in-

jured?"
The jury answered "No" to the first interrogatory, and
"Yes" to the second. As is stated by the Appellate Court,

the two interrogatories, submitted by the court of its own
motion, contained all that was important in the fifth and
sixth interrogatories asked by the appellant, and, hence,
no error was committed in refusing to submit the latter to
the jury.
The main ground, however, upon which the appellant
charges that the interrogatories submitted by the court on
its own motion were erroneous, is that they began with this
you find a general verdict for the plaintiff
statement:
The contention is that it was erroneous to
in this case."
put the words, "for the plaintiff," 'after the words, "general verdict."
It would have been better if the court had
left out the words "for the plaintiff:" but their insertion
could not have done appellant any harm.
Tlie third section of the act in regard to special findings
and special verdicts, provides that, when a special finding
of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former
shall 'Control ; and we said in Chicago S Northwestern Rail"This necessarily
loay Co. V. Dimleavy, supra (p. 144) :
implies that the fact to be submitted shall be one which, if
found, may in its nature be controlling.
That can never be
*
*
*
Such inconthe -case with a mere evidentiarv fnct.
sistency can arise only where the fact found is an ultimate

"If
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fact, or one from which the existence or non-existence of such
ultimate fact necessarily follows, and that is never the case
with that which is only prima facie evidence of the fact
sought to be proved."
In Chicago & Nortliivestern Railivay Co. V. Dunleavy, supra, we also said that an error committed in the giving of specific interrogatories, or in the
answers of the jury to the same, cannot be regarded as being prejudicial to the defendant, "unless it can be seen that
answers to said questions most favorable to the defendant,
which of course would have been answers in the negative,
would have constituted a finding inconsistent with the general verdict."
Interrogatories asked by the defendant are
framed for the purpose of controlling any general verdict
In the case at bar,
that may be returned for the plaintiff.
the answers, which might be given to the interrogatories
framed by the court, might have had the effect of controlling a general verdict for the plaintiff, but could have had no
effect in controlling a general verdict for the defendant.
If the jury had answered, that the act of the plaintiff, John
Harrington, in placing himself on the foot-board of the engine next to the car, did contribute to cause the injury he
received, and if they had answered that the plaintiff was not
usino" proper care for his own safety by being upon the footboard of the engine between the car and the enarine, then the
special finding would have been inconsistent with the general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and such general verdict would have been controlled bv the special findine;. But,
in case of a oreneral verdict for the defendant, an affirmative
answer to the first interrogatorv framed bv the court, and
a negative ans-^^er to the second interrogatorv framed by
the court, would have been consistent with such s'eneral verdict for the defpndant. and not inconsistent with it.
If. in
defendant,
case of a general verdict for the
the first interrojratorv had been answered in the nep-nh'vp and the
second in the a^rmative. it mav not have affected the o:eneral verdict in favor of the defendant, because the evidence
mav have shown that the defendant was not s"uiltv of neglio-enop. and. if the defprirlnnf wa« not e:uiltv of neelisfence
the rtlaintiff was not entitled to re?ovpr even if he was not
p-niUx'

of poritributorv neglisTPnop.

The infprrogatorips,

bv th p court were docionpd to secure a special
finding as to certain matters which might supersede the genon>.rv->i'ffod

T. P. — .^'^ -
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eral verdict, if the verdict should be for the plaintiff, and
it was not improper to put the matter to the jury in that
way.
''The facts, upon which a jury should be asked to
find specially, should be material facts, which, if found,
would be controlling. "
{Chicago S Northwestern Railway
Co. V. Dunleavy, supra; Terre Haute d Indianapolis Railway Co. V. Voelker, 129 111. 540; Pike v. City of Chicago,
155 id. 656).
The theories of appellant, as embodied in
the special interrogatories submitted by
were presented
in the instructions given by the court.
It also said that the interrogatories given hj the court
were defective in limiting the exercise of due care to the
time when the plaintiff was injured.
This criticism
without force, because we have held that the words at the
time," when used in an instruction in such cases, refer to
the whole transaction or series of circumstances, and not to
the precise moment when the injury occurs.
Here, the
words ''in placing himself upon the foot-board of the engine," etc., refer to the circumstances which preceded that
act, as well as the act itself of standing on the foot-board of
Alton Railroad Co. v. Fisher,
the engine.
{Chicago
Michigan Southern Railway Co.
141 111. 614; Lake Shore
V. Ouska, 151 id. 238; McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 id. 270;
Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. JohnLake Shore
sen, 135 id. 653.)

is

a

careful examination of the record, we are unable
to discover any reason, which would justify us in reversing
the judgments of the lower courts in this case.
afAccordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court

After

firmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD
COMPANY V. AYERS.
Supreme

Court of Kansas.
56

1895.

Kansas, 176.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Maetin, C. J. : I. The original action was brought by the
defendant in error against the plaintiff in error to recover
damages for the alleged negligent burning of a grain elevator, a hay press, some baled and a quantity of loose hay,
and other property.
The trial resulted in a verdict and
*
*
*
judgment for the plaintiff.

**********

a

a

a

1

it

it,

II. The defendant pleaded and largelj^ relied upon the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a defense, such
negligence arising from permitting dry hay to accumulate
around the building in large quantities, extending therefrom
to the tracks of the company, so as readily to catch fire from
sparks emitted from the locomotive when properly manA great deal of the evidence related to the condition
aged.
of the building and the premises around
the same being
used for the baling of hay and the storing of the same, both
baled and loose.
The defendant submitted 10 particular
questions of fact in relation to the condition of different
parts of the premises, three questions pertaining to the age
of different parts of the building, and one as to the same
never having been painted.
The first 10 questions were
not
being as follows: "Is
objectionable in form. No.
rubbish
dry
fire
in
and
that
grass
the
caught
fact that the
had accumulated near the northeast corner of the building?" instead of directly asking the jury "Did the fire catch
in the dry grass," etc.
leadnegative or
Questions in
ing form should never be submitted, and these were both

:

leading and negative, and any direct answer to them by yes
The court refused
or no was liable to be misunderstood.
to submit the 14 questions referred to, and was proceeding
to state the reasons therefor, when defendant's counsel objected to any argument in the presence of the jury, but this
was overruled, the defendant excepting, and the court, referring to the first 10 questions, said, among other things
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''Suppose these questions should be answered as the defense asks that they should be answered — that this combustible material was scattered around there — it does not
show that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. * * * it
We
gives no light to the court or any reviewing court."
regard the remark as improper in the presence of the jury.
It was a statement as a proposition of law that the scattering of combustible material upon and over the plaintiff's
That was one of the prinpremises was not negligence.
be
submitted
to the jury, and they would
ciple questions to
be very liable to interpret this remark of the judge as a declaration that all the evidence as to the existence of combustible matter around and about the premises was immaThe first 10 questions seem quite pertinent to the
terial.
issue, although the answers to them in the manner most
favorable to the defendant may not have been sufficient
We
alone to overthrow a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
of
to
test
the
combe
this,
however,
the
do not understand
If the
petency of particular questions of fact requested.
questions are plain and direct in form, are within the issues, are not repetitions, and there is evidence upon which
they may be intelligently answered, they ought to be submitted, so that the detailed facts may appear of record ; thus
enabling the trial court, upon further proceedings, or a
reviewing court afterward, to form an intelligent judgment
upon the particular issues sought to be elucidated by the
It would have been proper to subquestions and answers.
mit the other four questions, for they were remotely within
the issues, but they were not especially material, and the
refusal of the court to submit them would not be reversible
It is generally error to refuse to submit questions
error.
of fact drawn in proper form, material to the case, and
Section 286 of the civil code has
based upon the evidence.
been uniformly held to grant a right to the parties to have
(Bent v.
proper questions of fact submitted to the jury.
Hofham,
Bid.
Co.
v.
PhUhrick, 16 Kan. 190; C. B. V. P.
22 id. 41 -^A.T.S S. F. Bid. Co. v. Plunkett, 25 id. 188, 198;
City of Wtmdotte v. Gibson, 25 id. 236, 243; W. d W. Bid.
Co. V. Fechheimer, 36 id. 45, 51 ; Kansas City v. Bradbury,
Of course, it is the duty of the court to re45 id. 381 , 388.)
vise the questions, to strike out or amend those drawn by
the attorneys in improper form or equivocal in their mean-
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ing, and those outside of or immaterial to the issues, as also
such as are not based upon any evidence in the case.
{Mo.
Pac. Ely. Co. v. Eolley, 30 Kan. 465, 472, 473.)

**********

The judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded
for a new trial.
All the Justices ^concurring.

Section

Compelling

5.

Jury

to Give Direct Answers.

CLEVELAND, COLUMBUS, CINCINNATI & INDIANAPOLIS EAILWAY COMPANY V. ASBURY.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
120

Berkshire,

1889.

Indiana, 289.

J. — This

was an action instituted by the aprecover
damages
on account of personal injuries
})ellee to
which she claims to have sustained because of the fault of
the appellant.

The appellant, at the proper time, moved the court to
require the jury to retire to their room to consider further
of their answers to interrogatories numbered 4, 5, 6, 8, and
10, submitted to them at the request of the appellant, and
to return definite, certain, and direct answers thereto,
which motion was overruled, and an exception saved.
These interrogatories, and the answers thereto, are as
follows :
Did not Daniel Asbury, the owner of said horse,
*'4.
hoar the whistle of the approaching train while driving said
horse between the residence of Martha Helms and the crossing where the accident occurred?
'*
Answer. We do not know by the evidence that it was
tlie train whistle.
'*5.
Could not the plaintiff and Daniel Asbury have seen
tlie approaching train, or the head-light of its locomotive,
if they had looked from a point on said highway thirty-five
feet south of said crossing, in time to have averted the accident?
^'Ans. We don't know.
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point thirty-five feet south of the crossing
where the accident occurred on the highway or street along
which Asbury drove, how far from said crossing could the
approaching train be seen"?
"Ans. In daylight it might have been seen a mile.
"8. How often was said whistle sounded before the accident as said train approached the crossing?
^'Ans. We don't know what crossing was meant.
"10. Was not a bell attached to said engine, and was
not said bell rung continuously from said tile-shed crossing
''6.

a

to the place where the accident occurred?
"Ans. There was a bell attached, but we do not know
that it was rung continuously."
The answers to these interrogatories were evasive and
There was evideece bearing upon every fact
improper.
covered by these interrogatories, and the jury should have
It would
answered them definitely and in direct language.
have been no more improper had the jury returned a general verdict, "We, the jury, do not know whether we ought
to find for the plaintiff or defendant," than to have returned
the answers they did to the said interrogatories ; and the
court should have declined to receive the answers returned,
as it would have declined to receive a general verdict in the
form we have given, upon proper objection made.
If there was a disagreement among the members of the
jury as to the answers that should be made to the interrogatories, or if the evidence was such that they could not find
the facts, or any of them, to which the interrogatories related, then the jury should have so informed the court, and
in receiving the answers as made the court committed an
It should have sustained the motion of the appelerror.
lant, and required the jury to retire and return proper answers to the interrogatories, or, in case of a disagreement,
There seems to have been a disinto so inform the court.
clination on the part of the jury to answer the interrogatories; the answer to the eighth especially indicates that:
"How often was said wliistle sounded before the accident
There was but
as said train approached the crossing."
one crossing in question, and that was the one where the accident happened, and tlie jury could but understand that
that was the crossing referred to in the interrogatory, and
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what

crossing

is

meant."
The evidence was not complicated, and there was very
little conflict, if any, as to many of the facts inquired for
in these interrogatories, and especially those relating to the
care and caution exercised by the appellee and her husband.
The appellant was entitled to full and fair answers to its in-

terrogatories.

We are aware of the rule that the court may refuse to require the jury to retire and make more definite answers to
interrogatories, and that it will not be available error if the
answers demanded would not, if given, change the result as
to the judgment to be rendered.
McCormick, etc., Co. v.
Gray, 100 Ind. 285 ; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hedges, 105
Ind. 398.
But had the interrogatories under consideration
been answered in the affirmative, they would have controlled the general verdict.
Affirmative answers to these interrogatories would have
disclosed, beyond question, contributory negligence on the
part of the appellee and her husband, and gone far in the
direction of establishing due care on the part of the appel-

**********

lant.

Because of the error of the court in overruling the motion to require the jnry to retire and make more definite
and certain the answers to the interrogatories, the judgment
must be reversed.
Judgment reversed, with costs.

Section

6.

Effect of Answers

on General Verdict.

RUNYAN V. KANAWHA WATER
COMPANY.

&

LIGHT

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
68

West Virginia,

1911.

609.

Action by C. D. Runyan, administrator of Walter Runyan,
A verdict
against the Kanawha Water & Light Company.
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Brannon, Judge:

been set aside, he
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brings error.

The Kanawha Water & Light Company, a corporation
irnishing electricity for public consumption in the city of
harleston, had its wires on a bridge over the Kanawha
Iver for conveyance of electricity.
Walter Runyan was an
mploye of the bridge company engaged in painting the
>ridge, and while so employed came in contact with an elecric wire, and was so badly burned by the electricity that he
'ied.
His administrator sued the Kanawha Water & Light
ompany, and recovered a verdict for $5000, and the court
'
aving set the verdict aside, the plaintiff comes to this
'

**********

ourt.

The main defense in the case is contributory negligence.
The general verdict finds against that defence ; but def end-mt insists that that verdict is overruled by a finding in an■^wer to an interrogatory.
This has given us some perplexThe interity, and is the question of gravity in the case.
' '
careful,
If Walter Runyan had been
conrogatory is this :
sidering the knowledge he had of the wires, would he have
Is
been injured?"
The answer is, ''We think not."
this inconsistent with the general verdict so as to overrule
It must be so inconsistent that both cannot stand toit?
gether.
If possible they must be construed so as to harmonize; or rather, as applied to this case, we must be able
to say that the finding finds a fact which inevitably overIt must ex'clude every concluthrows the general verdict.
sion that would authorize a verdict for plaintiff. Peninsular
As a practical quesLand Co. v. Ins. Co., 35 W. Va. 666.
tion in this case, Does this finding find as a fact that Runyan
was guilty of contributory negligence defeating the action?
If it does not, it is not the overthrow of the general verdict.

It

does not find facts to enable the court to say whether such
This consideration at
contributory negligence was a fact.

finding any force to overthrow the general
This interroo-ntorv was put to get from the jury
verdict.
an expression to sustain the charge of contributory neglionce denies this

gence.

It

does not ask the

jury whether such and such

facts exist, facts whirh would in law constitute negligence,
as it must.
The law is that an interrogatory must put only
questions of fact from which a legal proposition may be
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What facts arising on the evidence does this inThe interrogatory must ask
terrogatory inquire about?
as to facts such as, if answered as desired by the interrogator, will make a verdict for his adversary inconsistent.
deduced.

Any question the answer to which would
and which would not be so inconsistent,

Ency. PL & Prac. 328.

be inconclusive,
should not be put.

"Questions which require the
jury merelj' to answer as to acts or omissions which may or
may not in their opinion be evidence of care or negligence,
or from answers to which, either way, the court cannot say,
as a matter of law, whether care or negligence is the result,
are not material."
Clementson on Special Verdicts, 73.
This interrogatory, without specifying facts on which to
base the opinion, simply asks the jury whether in its opinVirtually it asks the jury
ion Runyan exercised care.
whether in its opinion Runyan was guilty of contributory
negligence, a mixed ciuestion of law and fact, I may say of
Such an interrogatory is not good.
law.
The failure to
ask as to facts on which carelessness, or in other words,
contributory negligence, is sought to be predicated is a fatal
defect in this interrogatory, and must render its answer
The answer does not find in words that Runyan
abortive.
was guilty of contributory negligence, and could not, since
a question calling upon a jury to find on a question of law
20 Ency. PL & Prac. 326 ; Clementmust not be submitted.
son on Special Verdicts, 117, 217.
He is not proven negli20

gent.

It

does not appear.

But take the question and answer as they are.
This finding says that if Runyan had been careful he would not have
Does this come up to the standard of full
been injured.
contributory negligence?
No.
It does not tell in what
Runyan having a right
he was careless, or to what degree.
to be where he was in work, he could go near or over the
wires, unless he knew that there was positive actual danger
staring him in the face. If he by accident fell upon or caught
his foot in the wires, this would not bar recovery.
He
might not have used the highest degree of care and yet not
be found guilty of contributory negligence defeating the action.
We cannot see what was the extent of his knowledge
of danger, whether or not he knew of defects in insulation. He was called on to use only ordinary care required of
a prudent man under the circumstances; but this finding

Trial Practice

554

[Chap

13

does not indicate what care or carelessness he used. We cannot from the finding say, or guess, whether he exercised the
only care required by law, ordinary, or was chargeable with
In the one case he would not be guilt'
gross negligence.
of contributory negligence defeating the action; in the othe
We cannot say which from the question and an
he would.
swer.
The main verdict finds no negligence, and we arv.
asked to say from the special finding that there was; and
thus make the special finding inconsistent with the main
verdict, when the special one does not give facts which, in
law, impute contributory negligence.
There is another defective feature of this finding to show
its inadequacy to overcome the general verdict.
It is in
"Answers
the inconclusive language, ''We think not."
expressing only the inclination of the minds of the jury, as
to say, 'We think not' are insufficient and too uncertain to
Hopkins v. Stacey, 43 Ind. 554.
base a judgment on."
cited
authority
there
Eminent
says, "An opinion is not a
legal verdict, and verdicts must be positive, certain and
This position may be assailed
free from all ambiguity."
as technical ; but remember that special finding, to overcome
general verdicts must be certain and clearly and plainly ingrant that there are authorities holdconsistent with it.
20 Ency. PI. & Prac. 344.
cannot say
ing otherwise.
would for this defect alone reject the answer; still
that
it must be said that the answer is indefinite and leaves the
mind in doubt whether the jury intended to find a definite
The
Why did it not say "No," if so intended?
fact.
"direct,
law says that answers to interrogatories should be
20 Ency. PI. & Prac. 342.
definite, certain and complete."
Again this question 10 called upon the jury to say whether
if Runyan had been careful he would have been hurt. "Only
such questions as can be fairly and intelligently answered
Interrogatories requiring the jury to
should be submitted.
speculate as to what might have happened in a certain contingency should not be submitted." Atchison dc. v. LanTherefore, we must regard the annigan, 42 Pac. 343.
swer mere speculation, and not on specific facts, not a flat
Findings must be free of obscurity. "They must
finding.
destroy the general verdict, if at all, only by their own inClementson on S])ecial
herent clearness and strength."
Thompson on Trials, § 2693 says: "The
Verdicts 135.

I

I

I

J
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court will not strain the language of the special findings to
override the general verdict.
If possible they will be interpreted to support the verdict rather than overturn it.
No presumption will be made in their favor ; nor will they
control the general verdict, unless they are invincibly antagonistic to it."
Another objection to this finding, depriving its answer
of force, is, that it assumes a very material fact, that is,
that Runyan knew the condition of the wires, their danger,
etc.
This had a tendency to lead the mind of jurors to conclude that Runyan had such knowledge, that even the judge
thought so, else he would not have allowed such an interAn interrogatory must not assume material
rogatory.
facts.
20 Encv. PI. & Prac. 322 ; Elliot v. Reynolds, 16 Pac.
698; Toledo R. Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185.

**********

Therefore, we reverse the order setting aside the verdict,
and render judgment upon that verdict for the plaintiff.
Reversed

EVANSVILLE

&

SOUTHERN TRACTION COMPANY
V.

SPIEGEL.

Appellate Court of Indiana.
Indiana Appellate,

Lairy,

J.

and rendered.

1911.

; 94 Northeastern, 718.

This is an action brought

by the appellee,

George P. Spiegel, against the appellant for damages occasioned by the death of Carl Spiegel, the minor son of appellee, which death is alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of appellant in the operation of one of its cars
on Main street in the city of Evansville, Indiana.
The direction of Main street is a little east of north, and the appellant company has a double street car track near the cenWilliams street enters Main street from
ter of said street.
the east, at a point almost opposite to the place where Sycamore street enters it from the west, so that the soutli line
of Williams street, at the point of its connection with Main
street, is almost opposite to the point where the north line
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of Sycamore street connects with it on the west.
The accident in wliich Carl Spiegel lost his life occurred about
noon on the 4th day of October, 1907.
He came out of
Williams street riding a bicycle, and started diagonally
across Main street toward Sycamore street, and was struck
and killed by a street car going south on the west track.
On behalf of appellant, it is urged that its motion
for judgment on the interrogatories notwithstanding the
general verdict should have been sustained, for the reason
that these answers show that the decedent was guilty of
The general verdict
negligence contributing to his death.
in favor of the plaintiff is a finding of every material fact
The special failings of the jury
necessary to a recovery.
will overthrow the general verdict only when both cannot
stand, and this antagonism must be apparent on the face of
the record beyond the possibility of being removed by any
evidence admissible under the issues made by the pleadings.
The evidence actually introducd cannot be considered in
Cox v. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind, 374,
passing upon this question.
5 N. E, 5; Indiana National, etc., Co. v. Long, 27 Ind, App.
(3)

N. E. 410,
(4) Under the issues formed by the pleadings in this
case, evidence might have been introduced which would
bring the case within the operation of the doctrine known
This doctrine is clearly stated
as the ''last clear chance."
by a writer in the Quarterly Law Review (vol. 2, p. 507), as
follows: ''The party who last has a clear opportunity of
avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his
This
opponent, is considered solely responsible for it."
has been frequently recognized and applied by our courts.
219,

59

Even though it be conceded that the answers to
the interrogatories show that the plaintiff's decedent negligently approached and entered upon the track of the ap'j)enant in front of an approaching car, and thus negligently
\3xp0sed himself to the danger of a collision, this would not
necessarily preclude a recovery from injury resulting from
Answers to interrogatories showappellant's negligence.
overthrow a general verdict in
would
not
facts
such
ing
favor of the plaintiff, for the reason that evidence may have
been introduced proving or tending to prove that, after said
(5)
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decedent was in the position of danger in which he had so
negligently placed himself, the defendant knew of his perilous position, or might have known it by the exercise of ordinary care, in time to have prevented the injury, and that
it negligently failed to take advantage of the last clear
chance to prevent the injury.
It is the duty of this court
to reconcile the interrogatories with the general verdict if
they can be so reconciled by any evidence which might have
been introduced within the issues; and, to this end, the
court, in ruling upon this motion, will treat the case as
though this evidence had been introduced and acted upon
In view of what we have said, we are of the
by the jury.
opinion that the answers to the interrogatories are not in
irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict, and the motion of appellant for judgment in its favor on such interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict was properly overruled.
[Reversed

DEVINE

V.

on other

grounds.]

FEDERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
250

Illinois,

Mr. Justice Cooke delivered

1911.

203.

the opinion of the court :
This was an action brought in the municipal court of the
city of Chicago by John F. Devine, as administrator of the
estate of Ralph W. Chance, deceased, against the Federal
Life Insurance Company, to recover the sum of $1000 alleged to be due on a policy of insurance claimed to have
been issued by the company to Chance in his lifetime.
The
1907,
Chance was struck and
policy was dated May 4,
killed by a train of the Illinois Central Railroad Company
The defense to the acon the morning of May 30, 1907.
tion was that the i^olicy had never been in force, as it had
not been delivered to Chance and he had never paid any
The claim of the administrator
part of the first premium.
was, that by an arrangement with Robert J. Jeffs, the gen-
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eral agent for the insurance company and the person who
secured the application of Chance, the policy was delivered
by the company to Jeffs for Chance, and it was held by Jeffs
to secure the pajTnent of three notes given by Chance to
Jeffs, one for the amount of the first premium, one for $50
and one for $10.14.
After the death of Chance, and on
Jeffs,
who
had held the policy from the time
June 3, 1907,
of its issuance until that date, returned it to the insurance
The jury found the iscompany, endorsed ''not taken."
sues for the plaintiff and returned a verdict for the full
Judgment was rendered on
amount of the policy, $1000.
this verdict and an appeal was taken to the Appellate Court
for the First District, where the judgment of the municipal
The case is brought here by appeal
court was affirmed.
of
importance.
upon a certificate
It is first contended that this judgment should be reversed
for the reason that the general verdict is contrary to certain
The jury were
special findings of fact made by the jury.
asked to answer twelve special interrogatories which were
Of the twelve, three were so framed
submitted to them.
that no answer was required by reason of the answers given
By the first interto certain others of the interrogatories.
logatory the jury were asked, "Was the policy sued on in
this action delivered by the Federal Life Insurance ComTo this
pany to Ealph W. Chance during his lifetime?"
' '
''
and it is claimed that this finding
no,
the jury answered
is so inconsistent with the general verdict that it must be
held to control the same and that the court should have enIn determining whether
tered judgment for the appellant.
a special finding is so inconsistent with the general verdict
that the latter must be held to be controlled by the former
All reasonable presumpwe cannot look at the evidence.
tions will be entertained in favor of the general verdict
while nothing will be presumed in aid of the special finding
The inconsistency must be so irreconcilable as to
of fact.
be incapable of being removed by any evidence admissible
(Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.
under the issues.
Applying this rule, we find that
V. Dunleavy, 129 111. 132.)
there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between this special
By its terms the
findin'g of fact and the general verdict.
application for a policy of insurance may be made a part of
The application may or may not provide
tlio policy itself.

Sec. 6]

Special Interrogatories

559

that the insurance shall take effect only upon the delivery of
the policy to the insured.
Unless expressly made so by the
contract itself, an actual delivery of a policy of insurance
to the insured is not essential to the validity of the contract,
and the rule under such circumstances is, that a policy becomes binding upon the insurer when signed and forwarded
to the insurance broker to whom the application for insurance was made, to be delivered to the insured.
^^^lere an
a])plication is made for insurance there is no liability until
t)ie application is accepted, but the acceptance and issuing
of the policy complete the contract.
(Rose v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. 240 111. 45.)
The finding of the jury that the policy had never been delivered to Chance was not the determination of any ultimate fact, or of a fact which had a controlling effect upon any ultimate fact.
This finding is not
so inconsistent with the general verdict that it should control, and the court did not err in ignoring this finding and
entering judgment on the verdict.
It is urged that special findings numbered 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10
and 12 are also inconsistent with the general verdict.
We
do not so regard them.
The third finding was that the deceased had not paid the premium on his policy in cash ; the
fifth, that he did execute a note for the amount of the premium ; the sixth, that the note was executed on May 10, 1907,
and delivered to Jeffs ; the seventh, that the note was payable in installments of $2.50 each, and that the first installment became due on May 29, !I907; the eighth, that Chance
did not pay the installment falling due on May 29, 1907 ; the
tenth, that none of the installments mentioned in said note
were paid during the lifetime of Chance; and the twelfth,
that the policy sued on contained the provision, '^ failure to
pay any premium or note, or interest thereon, when due, will
forfeit, without notice, the policy and all payments thereon,
It is not necessary that a
excepting as herein provided."
premium on a policy of life insurance should be paid in
cash.
It can be paid by the giving of a note, or otherwise,
That Chance executed a note
if so agreed by the parties.
and delivered it to Jeffs, the agent, for the amount of the
first year's premium, and that at the time of his death he
was in default in the payment of this note, would not necessarily invalidate the insurance notwithstanding the provision found to have been contained in the policy, as Jeffs
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may have taken the note under such circumstances as would
constitute an absolute pajonent of the premium.
A further
reason why these special findings do not show a forfeiture
i)f the policy is, that by the twelfth finding the policy contained a clause providing for a forfeiture under certain
''
circumstances,
excepting as herein provided. ' '
What the
exceptions are is not shown by any of the special findings.
For anything that is disclosed by these findings, the circumstances may have been such that they come within some exception contained in the policy which would prevent a forfeiture.
As we view the special findings of the jury, and
testing them by the rule above referred to, we do not regard
any of them as inconsistent with the general verdict.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the
Appellate Court is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Me. Chief Justice Vickees took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Section

7.

Effect of

Answees Inconsistent
Othee.

With Each

DRAKE V. JUSTICE GOLD MINING COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Colorado.
32

1904,

Colorado, 259.

Me. Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the court.
The controversy here is between the owners of the Washington and Justice lode claims, situate in Gilpin county, as
to the ownership of ore bodies of a vein under the surface,
and within the exterior boundaries of the Washington lode
The claim of each party
extended downward vertically.
is based upon ownership of the apex.
The cause was tried before a jury, and the court, upon
request, submitted, and the jury answered, three interrogatories, and also returned what the parties call a general verdict, in favor of the defendant, on which judgment for it
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was entered by the court.
The i)laintiffs in error claim
that the answers to these three interrogatories were in their
favor, and are so inconsistent with the general verdict that,
under section 199 of our civil code so providing, the special
findings of fact, in such circumstances, must control the
general verdict.
Where a special finding of fact, inconsistent with the
general verdict, is so irreconcilable therewith as to be incapable of removal by any evidence admissible under the
general issues, the general verdict cannot stand, and judgment entered upon it is improper.
Every presumption and
intendment, however, is to be indulged in favor of a general
verdict, and in ascertaining whether such inconsistency
exists, recourse may not be had to the evidence actually adduced at the trial, but may be to the issues as made by the
pleadings; and if, by any possible competent evidence that
might be produced thereunder, the apparent inconsistency
can be overcome, it may be disregarded, and the general
verdict permitted to stand.
But in the view we take of
whether there is such an inconsistency as the plaintiffs in
the case, it is not necessary, for two reasons, to decide
error assert.
1.
We do not so hold, but for the purpose of the present
opinion we assume, with both parties, that the verdict returned is a general verdict, and, with plaintiffs in error, that
it is in such irreconcilable conflict with the three special
findings of fact to which they allude, as to have made it the
duty of the trial court to disregard the general verdict, and
enter judgment upon the special findings, had action of the
Such an incourt been seasonably and properly invoked.
consistency may be waived by the party against whom it
operates, or he may, in the appropriate way, complain of it.
If, however, a party desires to have heard in an appellate
tribunal his objection to the entering of a judgment on a
general verdict which is inconsistent with special findings,
he must first call the attention of the lower court thereto
by a motion for judgment upon the special findings, notA motion for a new
withstanding the general verdict.
Here plaintiffs in error negtrial does not save the point.
lected to move for judgment on the findings, and therefore
thev mar not. on this review, for the first time be heard as
to the alleged inconsistency. — 2 Thompson on Trials, <^ 2696.
T. p.— 36

Trial
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Many cases in Indiana, where such questions seem to have
arisen more frequently than in any other state, expressly
hold that such a motion is a necessary condition precedent to
the right to be heard in an appellate tribunal. — Bartlett v.
Pittsburgh, etc, Ely. Co., 94 Ind. 281; Anderson et al v.
Hubble, 93 Ind. 570; BricUey v. Weghorn et al, 71 Ind.
497 ; Adamson v. Rose, 30 Ind. 380.
Additional authorities
are collected in 20 Enc. PI. & Pr. 375.
2.
The foregoing is upon the assimiption that only three
interrogatories were answered by the jury, and all of them
were in favor of plaintiffs, and inconsistent with the general verdict returned for defendant.
The record, however,
discloses that three other interrogatories submitted by the
court were answered by the jury clearly and distinctly in
favor of the defendant, and they support, in every parThese six answers, taken toticular, the general verdict.
jury
show
the
so misunderstood the isthat
gether, do not
sues or were in any way so confused as to make a new trial
Such being the case, the doctrine seems to be
necessary.
well settled that contradictory and inconsistent special findings destroy each other, and the general verdict stands.—
Ind., etc., Gas Co. v. McMath, 26 Ind, App. 154; Midland
Steel Co. V. Baugherty, 26 Ind. App. 272; 2 Thompson on

Trials, -§
PI. & Pr.

For additional authorities,

2692.

see

20

Enc.

354, 364 et seq.

The judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Affirmed.

ST. LOUIS

&

SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COM-

PANY V. BRICKER.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
61

1899,

Kansas, 224.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Smith, J. : The findings of the jury being inconsistent
with one another, the verdict cannot stand. It is found that
the direct cause of the injury was the failure of the fore-
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man in charge of the bridge repairers to give timely warning to the defendant in error, and neglect of the foreman to
inform the men who were unloading the timbers that there
was any one under the bridge at work.
It is also found
that defendant in error knew that his coemployees were at
work above him, and that they were about to throw off a
This, coupled with the finding that
stick of timber.
Bricker could have avoided the injury complained of had he
remained where he was at work and watched which side of
the bridge the stick of timber was about to fall, tends to the
conclusion that the defendant in error was guilty of contributory negligence, and that his own want of care, and not
that of the foreman, caused the injury.
While want of
ordinary care on the part of the foreman is expressly found
in at least six of the answers to particular questions, yet a
strong showing of contributory negligence on the part of
plaintiff below appears in three other answers.
The inconsistency between these different findings is so
palpable and clear as to render them irreconcilable.
In
one answer the jury say that plaintiff below had no timely
warning of danger, and in another that his situation and
information were such that he needed none — in effect, saying that a warning would not contribute to the knowledge
he already possessed of his dangerous position.
The general verdict, based on such findings, must be set aside.
{Shoemaker v. St. L. d S. F. Ely. Co., 30 Kan. 359, 2 Pac.
517; A. T. & S. F. Rid. Co. v. Weber, Adm'r, 33 id. 543,
6 Pac. S77;A.T.£ S. F. Rid. Co. v. Maker, 23 id. 163.)
The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and a
new trial ordered.

CHAPTER XIV.

SPECIAL VERDICTS.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. PECK.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
8

Beewer,
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Kansas, 660.
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this case a special verdict was returned at the instance
Objection was made to the verdict on the
of the plaintiff.
ground that it did not state all the facts established by the
Special verdicts and findings upon particular
evidence.
questions of fact are by the laws of 1870 matters of right.
It is no longer discretionary with
Laws 1870, p. 173, sec. 7.
Under these circumto
require
them or not.
the court
stances it becomes important to determine the scope of a
Considerable difspecial verdict as fixed by our statute.
juand
ference of opinion has existed in reference to
be
of
service
will
dicial construction in this court
doubtless
Wliat
Under our
special verdict?
in many cases.
statute the jury can be called upon to respond in three ways
— by
special verdict, and by regeneral verdict, by
of fact.
particular
True, this
questions
turning answers to
latter mode of interrogating the jury can be resorted to
nevertheless
only in conjunction with the first, but
A general verdict embraces both the law
distinct mode.
It states the result of the whole controand the facts.
It determines the ultimate rights of the parties.
versy.
It combines the decisions of the court with the opinions of
True, the jury receive the law in the instructhe jury.
tions of the court, but they apply the law to the facts, and,
So that unhaving combined the two, declare the result.
verdict they really perform two functions, that
der such
of finding the facts, and then that of applying the law to
Any one at all familiar with the experiences
those facts.
aware that the errors of the jury result
of court-room
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oftener from their misapplication of the law as stated, to
the facts, than from their misapprehension of the facts.
A
special verdict, on the other hand, finds only the facts, and
leaves to the court tbp duty both of determining the law and
of applying it to the facts.
It is thus defined in sec. 285 of
the code of civil procedure. Gen. Stat., 684 : ' ' A special verdict is that by which the jury finds facts only.
It must present the facts as established by the evidence, and not the
evidence to prove them."
It was decided in 1 Miles, 26,
that "if instead of finding facts the special verdict sets out
the evidence, a new trial will be granted."
Whether that
be the necessary result or no, it is clear that a special verdict should not be a recital of testimony, but a iinding of
certain facts as established by such testimony.
But what
How minutely may they, must they, be subdivided?
facts?
The facts stated in the pleadings ; as minutely, and no more
so in the special verdict, than in the petition, answer, and
reply.
The special verdict must conform to the pleadings.
The word "facts" is used in this section in the same sense,
and refers to the same things as when used in sec. 87 of the
code, which declares that a "petition must contain a statement of the facts 'Constituting the cause of action, in ordiThere
nary and concise language without repetition."
are in every cause of action certain essential substantive
Every pleader knows
facts, certain elements, so to speak.
The omission of any one
this when he prepares a petition.
The failof these elements renders the petition defective.
Now these
ure to prove one defeats the cause of action.
essential elemental facts are the ones the special verdict
A history of the case in the
must find, no more, no less.
nature of a recital of the testimony, or a detail of the various steps in the transaction is not the function of a speIt responds to the various facts of the peticial verdict.
The
tion like a special denial, touching ea-ch separately.
It says, (T^aws
statute clearly points to this construction.
1870, p. 173, ch. 87, sec. 7, amending sec. 286 of the code,)
"the court shall direct the jury to find a special verdict in
writing upon all or any of the issues in the case." The issues are to be passed upon in the special verdict. In Bacon's
Abridgement, vol. 10, p. 313. it is said, citing as authority
Unitpd St flies v. Briqht, Bright 's Trial, 199,
in a special
find
beyond is surverdict the jury find the issue, all they

"If
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The special verdict is simply the response of
the jury separately to the several issues presented by the
pleadings.
xhe judgment will be affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.

*****

STANDARD SEWING MACHINE COMPANY V.
ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania.

201

1902.

Pennsylvania State, 645.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Mestrezat, March 3, 1902 :
This was an action of assumpsit on a fire insurance policy issued by the defendant.
On the trial the court below
instructed the jury to return a special verdict and to answer
the following questions :
Did Bedient take possession of the property in the
1.
interest of the machine company, and let Markle and Merryman hold it for the company after the assignment for the
benefit of creditors and prior to the fire in question?
Did the machine company thus acting through Be
2.
dient subject the property to hazard not contemplated by
the policy and stipulated against by the provisions thereof?
This is to be estimated by the
3.
What was the loss?
cost of repairing or replacing the propertv with material of
like kind and quality so as not to exceed the limit thus indicated.^
1 Form of special verdict.
in the form of questions to

This method of preparing

a special

verdict,

—

be pnt to the jury upon all the material facts in
It is sometimes prescribed by
and convenient one.

the cape, is a common
statute.
In any event, the jury cannot be expected to draw up their own form of
As said in Pittsburgh, Ft.
special verdict, and it must be done by counsel.
W, and C. Ey. Co. v. Ruby, (1871) 38 Tnd. 294, "Jurors are very competent
to understand the evidence, find facts, and draw conclusions from the facts
found ; but as a general rule, and especially in complicated cases, they are
They do not know
not equal to the task of preparing a syiecial verdict.
what facts should be found to cover the issues, nor the manner of stating
them.

' '

Another familiar method is for counsel on each side to prepare a special
verdict in the form of a statement of the facts which they believe have been
estniilished by the evidence, and submit the same to the trial judge, vho thereupon hands both forms, with or without amendment, as he deems proper, to
the jury under proper instructions, and the jury may then adopt either one,
in the form presented to them or with such changes as they wish to make,
Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Ruby, supra; 22 Encyc.
fiR their verdict.
PI.

&

Pr.

993.
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The first question was, by agreement of counsel, answered in the affirmative ; the jury returned a negative reply
to the second question; and to the third question, the answer was $1,747.
Subsequently the court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,747.
This appeal is by the defendant and error is alleged in the
ruling of the court on the measure of damages, in the construction put upon the policy of insurance by the court, and
in entering judgment on the special verdict, the defendant
claiming that the facts found were not sufficient to sustain
the judgment.

The last reason assigned for reversing the judgment of
the court below may be considered first.

It is the province of a special verdict to find and place on
record all the essential facts in the case.
This includes the
disputed as well as the undisputed facts.
What is not
found by the verdict is presumed not to exist, and no inferences as to matters of fact are permitted to supply the
facts themselves which the verdict should have found.
In
entering judgment, the court is confined to the facts found
In- the special verdict, and unless they are sufficiently found
no judgment can be entered.
The jury must find the facts
and the court declare the law on the facts so found.
Such
are the requisites of a special verdict as held in all our
In Wallingford v. Dunlap, 14 Pa. 33, it is said:
cases.
"It is of the very essence of a special verdict that the jury
should find the facts, on which the court is to pronounce
And the court will not intend
judgment according to law.
found by the jury. * * *
not
fact
any
especially
anything,
The undisputed facts ought to have been incorporated in
*
*
*
The court is confined to the
the special verdict.
And when a special
verdict.
facts found by the special
verdict is given, the court ought to confine its judgment to
* * *
But this special verdict is so defective
that verdict.
and erroneous, and the judgment so anomalous in being entered partly on the verdict and partly on what was called
undisputed facts, that we must do what has often been
done before, reverse the judgment and send the case back
Me. Justice Mercur, delivering the
for a new trial."
opinion of the court in Vansyckel r. Stewart, 77 Pa. 126,
says: "It (special verdict) must include both disputed and
The court will not infer a fact not found
undisputed facts.
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must declare the law on these facts alone.

As all the essential facts must be found in the verdict, it
follows that it cannot be aided by intendment or by ex-

trinsic facts appearing upon the record."
In Tuigg v.
Treacy, 104 Pa. 498, Clark, J., speaking for the court, says :
"We cannot resort to the testimony, or to such extrinsic
matters as were undisputed at the trial, or avail ourselves
of such even as appear upon the record.
It is of the very
essence of a special verdict, that the facts found are those
upon which the court is to pronounce judgment, according to
law.
What is not thus found is presumed not to exist, the
verdict being conclusively the complete result of the jury's
deliberation upon the whole case presented."
In delivering the opinion of the court in the comparatively recent case of McCormicJc v. Royal Insurance Com' '
pany, 163 Pa. 194, Chief Justice Sterrett says : Nothing
is better settled, on principle as well as authority, than that
all the facets upon which the court is to pronounce judgment
should be incorporated in the special verdict.
It is the exclusive province of the jury, in the first place, to determine
all disputed questions of fact, from the evidence before
them; and then their special verdict is made up of those
findings of fact, together with such undisputed facts as may
* * *
The
be necessary to a just decision of the cause.
court, in considering a special verdict and entering judgment thereon, is necessarily confined to the facts found and
embodied in the verdict; the latter cannot be aided by intendment or extrinsic facts that may appear in the evidence."
Applying these principles to the case in hand, it is apparAs said by
ent that the verdict hero is fatally defective.
Chief Justice Black in Thayer v. Society of United Brethren, 20 Pa. 63, "the jury found a special verdict, but it
Here the verdict
omits almost every importance fact."
found but three of the many facts necessary to support a
judgment.
It is silent as to whether a policy of insurance,
the basis of this action, was issued to the plaintiff, and the
terms of the policy; as to what property was insured and
where situated; as to the loss of or damage to the insured
property and whether it occurred within the life of the policy; and as to the cause of the loss, whether by fire or otherOther omissions of fact might be suggested, but
wise.
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those named are sufficient to show that the verdict is wholly
inadequate to sustain the judgment entered by the court
A special verdict more barren of facts is not to be
below.
found in the reported cases.
*

*

*

the judgment is reversed and a venire facias de

novo is awarded.^

There is some authority to the contrary, as in Wisconsin, but see Hodges
Easton (1882) 106 U. S. 408, where it was held that the practice of rendering judgment on a special verdict which found only the disputed facts but
not those undisputed, was a denial of the right of trial by jury.
1

V.

WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY V. RAY.
Supreme

Court of Indiana.
152

Jordan,

J. — The

1899.

Indiana, 392.

appellant railroad company owned and
operated as one of its branches a railroad extending from
the city of Detroit, Michigan, through Columbia City, Indiana, to the city of Peru, in the latter State.
Appellee is
the administratrix of William 0. Ray, deceased, who was at
and prior to his death in the employ of appellant as a
brakeman on one of its local freight trains.
He was accidentally killed while coupling cars at Columbia City, by
catching his foot in an unblocked guard-rail, and while in
such condition was run over by the ear which he was attempting to couple.
To recover for this alleged negligent killing, the appellee
successfully prosecuted this action in the lower court, and,
upon a special verdict by the jury, obtained a judgment for
$5,000.
The alleged errors of which appellant complains,
in the main, are based upon the decision of the court in overruling a demurrer to the amended complaint, and in denying its motion for a judgment upon the special verdict of the
jury, and in overruling its motion for a new trial.
We may, at least for the present, pass the consideration
of the sufficiency of the complaint, for the reason that substantially the same facts, and the same theory thereunder,
are disclosed by the special verdict, and if we can hold
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that, under the facts therein found, appellee is entitled to a
judgment, such holding will certainly result in sustaining
Counsel for appellant earnestly insist that
the complaint.
their motion for a judgment in favor of appellant, upon the
Preliminary
special verdict, ought to have been sustained.
of
consideration
this
we
insistence,
to the
may properly
refer to some familiar and well settled rules applicable to a
special verdict, one of which is that it is the very essence of
such a verdict that it state all the material facts within the
issues of the case, and no omission of a fact therein can be
Its failure to find a fact in favor
supplied by intendment.
of the party upon whom the burden of establishing it rests
is the equivalent of an express finding against him as to
When the party having the onus in a case asks
such fact.
a judgment upon a special verdict, the material facts therein found, within the issues, must establish his right, under
the law, to a judgment, otherwise he must fail in his demand; but where, as in this case, the moving party is not
the one upon whom the burden of the issue rests, his right
to be awarded a judgment does not depend alone upon the
presence of material facts, but he may be entitled to the
judgment by reason of the absence of some essential fact
which it was incumbent upon his adversary to establish.

For

the reasons stated, the facts set out in special verdict
do not entitle appellee to a judgment against appellant.
* * *
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
to the lower court, with instructions to sustain appellant's
motion for judgment in its favor on the special verdict.

DARCEY V. FARMERS' LUMBER COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
67 Wisconsin,

1894.

245.

Plaintiff was an employee
Action for personal injuries.
in defendant's sawmill, and had been such for about twenty
days before the 15th day of July, 1891, when the injuries
He was twenty-three years of
complained of occurred.
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duty was to take edging and slabs from a certain line of rollers and put them on the ** slashing" table,
in which were a number of "slashing" saws; and when at
work he stood in an alley between the slashing table and the
said line of rollers. Near him was a large rotary saw,
called the * 'cut-off" saw, which revolved vertically, and was
hung at right angles with the line of rollers, and projected
into the alley in which plaintiff worked, but with room to
pass along the alley; and this saw was at all times running
* *
at a high rate of speed. *
The negligence charged was
in leaving the lower part of the saw uncovered.
The jury returned the following special verdict: * * *
Judgment for the plaintiff was entered on this verdict,
and defendant appealed.
*
*
*
WiNSLOW,
age.

J

In

answer to the fifth question, the jury find that the dangers and risks from the exposed saw would be apparent to
any person using ordinary care and observation in like situation with the i:)laintiff.
This must include the risk from
which the plaintiff's injurj^ resulted, or else it is wholly irrelevant, and we so construe it.
The question and answer,
therefore, meian that the plaintiff was chargeable with
knowledge of, and therefore assumed, the risk from which
the accident resulted by remaining in the employment withThis is a form of contributory negligence.
out objection.
2 Thomp. Neg. 1014, sec. 19; Nadau v. White River L. Co.,
76 Wis. 120-131.
In answer to the sixth question, the jury
find that there was no contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff.
Now, the only irround upon which it was claimed that
contributorv negligence could be imputed to plaintiff was
(as charged bv the court) flint he remained in the emplovment after he knew, or ought to have known, the risk which
he incurred.
This makes it very clear that the sixth question and answer amount to a findins: that the plaintiff was
But we have
not chargeable with knowledge of the risk.
finding
finding
is
a
that he was chargeseen that the fifth
knowledge.
The
direct
such
with
contradiction beable
tween these two findings makes a judgment for the plaintiff
on the verdict impossible, and a new trial must be had.
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By the court. — Judgment reversed, and action remanded
for a new trial.

BAXTER V. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
104

1899.

Wisconsin, 307.

Action by an employe of defendant to recover compensation for personal injuries received by him by the explosion
of a locomotive engine, claimed to have been caused by defendant's keeping it in use with knowledge, or reasonable
means of knowledge, that it was defective to a degree which
rendered such an accident among the natural and reasonable probabilities, and one which, in the exercise of ordinary
care, it should have apprehended.
Marshall^

J.

The chief controversy on the trial was as
the defective condition of the boiler, which

to whether
caused the explosion, ought to have been discovered by the
defendant before that event, and guarded against. To cover
that field by the special verdict, defendant's attorneys requested the court to submit for answers these four questions : '■*■Could the defects have been discovered without re''Was it the ordimoving the flues from such boiler?"
nary custom and practice among persons generally, using
locomotive boilers of a like kind, under similar circumstances, to remove the flues for the purpose, only, of in"Was the boiler of enspecting the shell of such boiler?"
gine No. 249, up to the time it exploded, used, operated,
treated, and inspected by the defendant in tlie manner usually and ordinarily followed by persons generally, who use,
operate, treat, and inspect locomotive engine boilers of a
''If you answer
like kind under similar circumstances?"
use,
did
such
'Yes' to question No. 10,
operation, treatment,
and inspection cause or reveal any defects which caused the
injury to plaintiff?"
Such questions were rejected and in
lieu thereof, following the question of whether the boiler
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was defective in fact and the nature of the defects, this
question was submitted;
you find in answer to question
No 5 that the boiler was defective at the time of said ex
plosion, then could the defendant company through its
agents and servants, by reasonable and proper care, tests,
or inspection, have discovered such defects before the exIn connection with such question the jury were
plosion?"
instructed
as follows:
"Reasonable care as used in
this question means such care as ordinarily careful
and reapersons exercise under like circumstances,
sonable tests and inspections
mean such tests and
inspections as are made and employed by ordinarily
]irudent persons engaged in the same business and under
like circumstances."
That ruling is assigned as error and
Apit appears to be one of the chief grounds of complaint.
l^ellant's counsel do not contend but that the real fact in issue was, by the 'Court's question as explained, placed before
the jury for determination, but they contend that the right
of defendant to a special finding as to every material fact
in issue, stripped of all conclusions of law, was violated because the question required the application of legal definitions and explanations in order to enable the jury to properly answer
the result being that the final conclusion emconclusion of law than
bodied in the answer was rather
lengthy
argument upon
one of fact and in support of that
the character of
special verdict under the statute was
presented.
It seems hardly necessary at this day to discuss questions
It is
so elementary as what constitutes
special verdict.
finding upon all the material issues of fact raised by the
failure to distinguish between such facts and
])leadings.
the numerous evidentiary circumstances which may be the
subjects of controversy on the evidence and are relied upon
to establish the ultimate facts upon which the 'Case turns,
A conoften leads to unjust criticism of special verdict.
reached by
clusion
process
not one of law because
AYliile
of reasoning from many primary circumstances.
such circumstances may be in dispute, the real question is,
Do they lead with reasonable certainty to, and establish,
the fact alleged by the pleading upon the one side and denied by the pleading upon the other? If the subject of the
allegation in the complaint be one of law, or of mere evia

is

it

is

a

A

a

a

a

;

a a

it,
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the pleading, and hence no

By the complaint,
necessary place in the special verdict.
certain facts are alleged to exist constituting the plaintiff's
Those
cause of action and warranting the remedy sought.
facts, if put in issue by the answer, and controverted on the
evidence, in case of a special verdict, must appear to exist
thereby, or the conclusion of law must be against the plaintiff.
The object of a special verdict is solely to obtain a
decision of issues of fact raised by the pleadings, not to
decide disputes between witnesses as to minor facts, even if
such minor facts are essential to and establish, by inference
Goesel v. Davis, 100 Wis. 678 ;
or otherwise, the main fact.

Eberhardt v. Sanger, 51 Wis. 72 ; Jeivell v. C, St. P. S M. R.
Co., 54 Wis. 610; Klochinski v. Shores L. Co., 93 Wis. 417;
Ward V. C, M. & St. P. R. Co., 102 Wis. 215. A strict compliance with, this rule requires that the verdict be made up
of sufficient questions to at least cover, singly, every fact in

is

it

a

a

a

a

a

a

is

it

i'^

If that could always be kept in
issue under the pleadings.
view, the legitimate purpose of such a verdict in promoting
the administration of justice would be uniformly accomplished, and the opinion entertained by some that its use
harmful would cease to exist.
Testing the ruling of the trial court by what has been
free from any reasonable criticism.
Neither of
said,
response to
the questions which were refused called for
Each
called
for findraised
the
by
pleadings.
issue
any
ing as to some essential as matter of law to, or bearing on
the existence of, the main fact, each being, however, of
The real fact in issue was
strictly evidentiary character.
as to whether the condition of the boiler which caused the
The
explosion ought to have been known to the defendant.
The dequestion submitted plainly covered that subject.
which
defendant
was
care
with
the
chargeable
was
gree of
legal question.
WTiether that degree of care was
strictly
exercised in the instance under consideration was strictly
The instruction properly laid down the
question of fact.
law for the guidance of the jury, and the question called for
an answer as to whether the defendant came up to the legal
standard in the particular instance.
The jury were thus
called upon to find the fact, not the evidence of the fact,
leaving
to tlio court to ap|)ly tlioreto the proper legal
No doubt the finding of evidentiary facts
principles.

Chap. 14]

Special Vekdicts

575

helpful in tying the jury down to the precise
in
controversy, by keeping before them the barquestion
riers they must overcome in order to reach the conclusion
contended for by plaintiff ; but so long as the ultimate question is properly one of fact, or of mixed law and fact properly pleadable as matter of fact, and essential to the cause
of action upon w4iich a recovery is sought, it is strictly the
proper subject of a question, and those facts from which it
is or may be inferable may properly be omitted.
The idea advanced by counsel for the defendant that the
statutory right to a special verdict is only satisfied by questions that do not need to be -considered in the light of legal
principles given to the jury by the court, is contrary to the
universal practice and the settled law upon the subject.
Often, whether certain conduct complained of is negligence,
where the evidentiary facts are all established, is a question
of fact, in respect to which different minds may reasonably
come to different conclusions.
In that situation it is necessary to carefully instruct the jury regarding the standard
of care necessary to the performance of the duty alleged to
^lave been violated, leaving it to them to determine whether
'he alleged wrongdoer came up to the legal standard in
the particular instance complained of.
The question of
contributory negligence, of proximate cause, and what is
reasonable, are only, ordinarily, determinable by viewing
evidentiary facts in the light of legal principles.
The ultimate fact being only properly determinable by viewing evidentiary facts in the light of legal standards, instructions
bv the court in regard to such standards are necessary.
When such ultimate facts are established, the legal liability
follows as a conclusion of law.
At that point the jury
should not be instructed.
They are to find the facts,
guided bv the law regarding such facts, but regardless of
the legal effect of their conclusions.
The issues of fact
raised by the pleadings are to be passed upon by the jury.
The legal conclusion to be drawn from such findings is to be
referred to the court with an additional conclusion by the
jury, express or implied, that if the court should be of the
opinion, upon the whole case, as found, that plaintiff has a
good cause of action, they find for the plaintiff*, otherwise
for the defendant.
Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How. 427.
fiometimes
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*

Further, it is proper, and on request it is error to
refuse, to give instructions requested as to each question
*

submitted, that may be reasonably necessary to enable the
jury to answer it intelligently and according to the law govBut no instructions as to the effect of
erning the subject.
an answer upon the ultimate rights of the parties is proper.
Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 611; Ward v. C, M. &
St. P. R. Co., 102 Wis. 215.1
1

General

iyistmctions

on the law of the case are never proper where the
a special verdict
Stayner V. Joyce (1889) 120

jury are required to return
Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 89.

CHAPTER XV.
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

PLUNKETT

ELECTRIC RAILWAY

V. DETROIT

COMPANY.

Supreme

Court of Michigan.
140

J.

1905,

Michigan, 299.

Plaintiff,

city fireman, was pipeman
on a hose truck, which was proceeding west on High street
at 7 :45 p. m., February 2, 1900, when it was struck at Hastings street by a north-bound Hastings street car belonging
to defendant.
Plaintiff was thrown and injured.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for the injuries sustained, and on the trial, under a charge submitting the question of defendant's negligence, and that of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff, to the jury, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $2,500. Defendant thereupon entered a motion for judgment in its favor non obMontgomery,

a

stante veredicto, for the reasons :
^'
For that under the evidence given in said cause
First.
a verdict should have been directed by the court in favor of
the defendant at the conclusion of the trial thereof.
'^Second.
For that this court charged said jury, in substance and effect, that the said plaintiff by and through the
persons with whom he was riding, was guilty of contrib-

utory negligence."
This motion was granted, and judgment non obstante veredicto was entered for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.
The defendant and the court below mistook the practice

at the common law, judgment non obstante veredicto could
be entered only when the plea confessed the cause of action
and set up matters in avoidance which were insufficient, although found true, to constitute a defense or bar to the action.
The rule was later relaxed, and made to apply in
favor of the defendant, so that it is now generally held that
the defendant is entitled to a judgment non obstante vere577
T. P.— 37
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dicto when the plaintiff's pleadings are not sufficient to sup11 Enc. PL & Prac. 912 et
port a judgment in his favor.
So, too, if there be both a general and special verdict,
seq.
and the latter be inconsistent with the former, judgment
may, in some cases, be based upon the special verdict, disregarding the general verdict.
But we know of no case in
which it is proper practice to enter a judgment non obstante
veredicto, unless it appears on the record that the verdict of
In all
the jury cannot be supported as matter of law.
other cases the proper practice is to move for a new trial,
or review the case on writ of error and exceptions.
There
must be either a general or special verdict to support a
This
judgment, or the pleadings must authorize its entry.
question is ruled by Central Sav. Bank v. O'Connor, 132
Mich 578.
See also, Schmid v. Village of Frankfort, 134
Mich. 619, and County of Montmorency v. Putnam, 135
Mich. 111.
Counsel for appellant has presented the case
upon the assumption that the circuit court had power to
consider the question which he assumed to passed upon, and
has pointed out that the court mistook the rule as to imputed negligence, and that his holding is at variance with
the ruling of this court in McKernan v. Railway Co., 138

Mich. 519.
Defendant's counsel 'Contend that there are other reasons
why the verdict should have been for the defendant.
We
must decline to enter upon a consideration of these questions.

The judgment is reversed, and the case will be remanded,
that the plaintiff may move for judgment on the verdict.

Plaintiff will recover costs.
Moore, C. J., and Grant, Blair, and Ostrandeb,
curred.

FLOYD V. COLOEADO FUEL

&

BissELL,

J.,

con-

IRON COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of Colorado.
10

JJ.,

1897,

Colorado Appeals, 54.

delivered the opinion of the court.
Goorge Floyd was employed in the converting mill of the
Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, and was a foreman in
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He had under him three men.
charge of one of its cupolas.
Their duties were to attend to the cupolas, withdraw^ the
molten iron and distribute and care for the slag or refuse
which rose to the surface of the iron after it was melted.
This slag or refuse was drawn off through what is termed a
cinder notch or tap hole in the cupola and through a runner.
These runners are half circular troughs of iron, about eight
feet long and weigh in the neighborhood of seven or eight
hundred pounds.
They are fastened on to the cupola by a
collar.
The runners last for a considerable time unless the
molten iron rises too high and flows into them. This will eat
them out and necessitate their rej)lacement.
This was the
condition of one of the runners in charge of Floyd in June,
It was observed by Crow, the superintendent of the
1893.
con\"erting mill.
Douglass was a machinist in charge of
repairs and was sent by Crow to put in a new runner.
When he came up with some helpers, he called on Floyd and
his men to assist him in the work.
While doing it Floyd
The runner slipped, fell on his foot, mashed
was injured.
and he was disabled for long time to do his usual work
There
or any other wiiich compelled him to be on his feet.
very considerable dispute between Floyd and Crow respecting the terms of the order and the obligations and duties of the parties, but according to the view which we take
of the present record and of the judgment which was entered, we are not concerned with these details or with the
discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses.
Floyd
brought this suit against the company to recover damages.
The -case went to trial and resulted in verdict in his favor
nonsuit
for $1,250.
The defendant company moved for
case,
and
direction
to
plaintiff's
at the conclusion of the
the jury to find
verdict for the defendant when the testiAfterBoth motions were denied.
mony was closed.
for
new
motrial
and
wards the company filed motion
This term
tion for judgment noii nhsfanfe veredicto.
used because
was so denominated by the mover, and in
terms was an application for judgment dismissing the action notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, although the
entirely from that class of motions.
remove
grounds of
It was wholly based on considerations foreign to such applications, and its eight several grounds as specifically
stated, were rested on parts and portions of the testimony,
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and on it as a whole the defendant attempted to maintain
the right to a judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict because from the evidence sundry and divers facts apIt was granted and
peared which would bar a recovery.
This judgthe court entered judgment for the defendant.
ment and order of the court is the only error assigned and
therefore the only one which will be considered.
In support of the assignment, the plaintiff insists that a
judgment non obstante veredicto may not be entered on the
Many cases are cited to this
motion of the defendant.
and
proposition
It is urged to
thej^ uniformly support it.
the contrary that the rules, proceedings, and practice which
prevailed at the common law are inapplicable under the
code, which can alone be looked to, to ascertain whether the
defendant may make such a motion and obtain relief which
was formerly granted in like cases, wherein application was
made by one entitled to present it.
We do not regard the
as
an
We discover in a case which was
open one.
question
not called to our attention that this question has been set at
rest by an authoritative decision of the supreme court rendered since the code went into effect, and the practice is setQuimhy v. Boyd et al., 8 Colo. 194.
tled by that case.
Therein the court holds that this motion may not be
made by the defendant, nor can he obtain relief of an analogous character otherwise than by one in arrest of judgment.
Since this is true, it must be conceded that the result sought could not be secured by this procedure.
The
liberality which pervades the code practice, and the purpose and intent of the legislature to require the courts to
disregard errors of an unsubstantial character and to affirm judgments which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties, compel us to consider another question
which may be regarded as collateral to the first.
This is
whether the motion can be considered as one in arrest of
But this reaches only those defects which are
judgment.
apparent on the face of the record and which are not cured
by a verdict or saveid by a failure to demur, and which
do not require the consideration of matters not apparent
in ilie record proper, nor dependent on testimony for their
solution.
We have been able to find no exceptions to this
1 Black on Judgments,
rule.
Sec. 98; Commonivenlth v.
Watts, 4 Leigh, G72; Banner v. Sayne, 78 Ga. 467; Brown
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Lee, 21 Ga. 159; Balliett v. Humphreys, 78 Ind. 389;
Sedgivick v. Daivkins, 18 Fla. 335; Hardesty v. Price, 3
Colo. 556.
The evidence is no part of the record for the purposes
of such a motion.
For this reason no argument to support it can be predicated on the theory that the evidence is
insuffi'cient to warrant the recovery.
Bond et al. v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604.
The motion does not attack the sufficiency of the complaint as a statement of a cause of action nor is there any
other defect in the record pointed out or adverted to in
the argument by which the judgment of the court below
can be sustained, or which could in any event be deemed
sufficient to support a motion in arrest of judgment.
Since
the motion is neither one non obstante veredicto nor in
arrest, and can be supported on neither hypothesis, there
is no way known to the practice by which the defects or deficiencies in the case made by the proof can be reached,
The code distinctly
except by a motion for a new trial.
provides that wherever the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, the court shall have full power to set it
aside and grant a new trial.
It is an easy and a swift
remedy, available to the parties and within the power of
That which was made and the judgment which
the court.
was entered does not accord with the practice which must
prevail in such cases.
Under our system this was an action for the recovery of damages, and as such, was triable
If the court refuses to nonsuit the plaintiff
only by jury.
or to direct a verdict for the defendant, the case must go
If
to the jury and the issues be determined by them.
their conclusions are unsatisfactory, or the court deems
them unsupported by the e^^dence, it has full power to set
The
the verdict aside, but only one course can be pursued.
It is the
issues must be resubmitted to another jury.
defendant
to have
right of the plaintiff as well as of the
questions of fact settled in the mode provided by law. We
know of no way save by the consent of parties whereby a
suit to recover damages can bo otherwise tried.
V.

The court erred in entering the judgment,

and it will

therefore be reversed.
Reversed.
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CRUIKSHANK V. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
75

Mitchell,

1899,

Minnesota, 266.

J.

This was an action to recover upon a ''hail insurance
policy," one provision of which was that,
''In case of loss by hail to the crops insured, the assured
shall mail a written notice to the company at its office in
the city of St. Paul, Minn., within forty-eight hours after
the time of such loss, stating the day and hour of the
storm, also the probable damage to each part of the crops
insured."
So far as material for the purposes of this appeal, the
defense was that the insured had not given notice of loss
in accordance with this provision of the policy.
The policy contained a warranty that the insured was
the owner of all the land upon which the crops covered by
the policy were growing, but a breach of this warranty, if
any, was a matter of defense, and no such defense was
pleaded.

When the evidence closed the defendant moved the
court to direct a verdict in its favor, but the court denied
the motion and submitted the case to the jury, which found
Thereupon the defenda verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
ant made a motion, not in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in case that should be denied,
for a new trial, but merely for judgment notwithstanding
The court denied the motion, and from the
the verdict.
judgment entered upon the verdict the defendant appealed.
Originally at common law, judgment notwithstanding
the verdict could only be granted in favor of the plaintiff,
the remedy in favor of the defendant being to have the
judgment arrested; but either by statute or by judicial relaxation of this rule, judgment notwithstanding the verdict became quite generally allowable in favor of either
party.
But in either case the motion was based on the
record alone, and the granting or denying it depended
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The rendition of judgment notwithupon tile pleadings.
stading the verdict was discretionary with the court.
It
would only be granted when it was clear that the cause of
action, or the defense, put upon the record did not, in point
of substance, constitute a legal cause of action or defense.
It was never granted on account of any techincal defect
in the pleadings, but in such case the court would order a
repleader.
By enacting laws 1895, c. 320,^ the legislature was not
creating a new remedy, but merely extended, as has been
done in many other states, the common law remedy to
cases where, upon the evidence, either party was clearly
entitled to judgment.
In thus extending the remedy it
must be presumed that the legislature intended it to be governed by the same rules which applied when it was
granted upon the record alone ; that is, that it should not be
granted unless it clearly appeared from the whole evidence that the cause of action, or defense, sought to be established could not, in point of substance, constitute a legal
cause of action or a legal defense.
The court has acted on this construction of the statute
and refused to order judgment even where there was a
total absence of evidence on some material point, but where
it appeared probable that the party had a good cause of
action or defense, and that the defect in the evidence could
be supplied on another trial.
This is just such a case.
From the record it appears probable that the plaintiff
has a good cause of action and that the defects, if any, in
the evidence, are largely technical and could be supplied
The alleged defects in the evidence
on another trial.
suggested are of the following character: that the letter
from plaintiff's father to Kenaston was not formally introduced in evidence, that there was no evidence that the

"In

1 The statute is as follows:
all cases where at the close of the testimony
in the case tried a motion is made by either party to the suit requesting the
trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party making such motion, which
motion \yas denied, the trial court on motion made that judgment be enthe verdict, or on motion for a new trial, shall order
tered notwithstanding
judgment to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to have
a verdict directed in his or its favor; and the supreme court of the state on
appeal from an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial in the
action in which such motion was made may order and direct judgment to be
entered in favor of the party who was entitled to have such verdict directed
in his or its favor whenever it shall appear from the testimony that the
party was entitled to have such motion granted."
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letter from Kenaston to the defendant was never mailed,
and that there was no evidence that the person who came
to adjust the loss was McClure, or that M.cClure was at
that time defendant's adjuster.
The statute permits a
party to make his motion in the alternative.
Defendant
has elected not to do so, but to stand exclusively on its
right to judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict
against it.
Not being entitled to this relief, it is not entitled, at least as a matter of right, to a new trial on the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence.
Indeed, counsel for the defendant conceded this upon the argument.

Judgment affirmed.

CHAPTER XVI.
ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
For What Defects?
PELICAN ASSURANCE COMPANY V. AMERICAN
FEED AND GROCERY COMPANY.
Section

1.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

1909,

122 Tennessee, 652.

Mr. Chief Justice Beard delivered the opinion of

the

^^ourt.

In

the case at bar errors are assigned upon the action of

trial judge in admitting over objection incompetent
testimony, in overruling a motion for peremptory instructhe

tion, in giving .certain instructions to the jury, and failing
to grant requests that were submitted.
It will be observed that these errors if committed, occurred in the trial
of the cause, and would have constituted grounds of a motion for a new trial, made in the court below, to the end
that a retrial might be obtained, or, failing in this, then to
preserve the same in the record, so that the ruling of the
trial judge in declining the motion might be preserved to
the plaintiff in error.
Railroad v. Johnson, 114 Tenn.
633, 88 S. W. 169.
Resting upon matters extrinsic to the
technical record, they could only be preserved for review
in this court by a properly filed bill of exceptions.
If,
as is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, they can
here be made the subject of investigation, by reason of the
motion in arrest having been overruled, then we can see
no distinction between that and a motion for new trial;
for the very errors that are now made the subject of complaint are those which would have been properly raised
on this latter motion.
It is apparent that, to secure a reversal on account of these errors, it would be necessary to
lools beyond the ''face of the record" into the evidence introduced.
This cannot be done.
It is well settled by the
585

Trial Practice

586

[Cliap. IG

authorities that a motion in arrest of judgment lies alone
for some error which vitiates the proceeding, or is of so
serious a character that judgment should not be rendered.
It "can onl.y be maintained for a defect upon the face of
the record, and the evidence is no part of the record for
this purpose."
Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 5 Sup. Ct.
296, 28 L. Ed. 835; Van Stone v. Stilhvell E. T. C. Co.,
142 U. S. 128, 12 Sup. Ct. 181, 35 L. Bd. 961; 23 Cyc. 825.
Applying this rule of correct procedure to the present
case, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.

GRAY V. COMMONWEALTH.
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
92

RiELY,

J.,

Virginia,

1895.

772.

delivered the opinion of the court.

After the jury had rendered their verdict the prisoner
moved the 'Court in arrest of judgment, on the ground that
one of the jurors was incompetent ; which motion the court
overruled.
It appears from the bill of exceptions that
when
examined on his voir dire, suggested himjuror,
the
self that he might not be competent to serve, as he was
deputy sheriff when the killing took place, which was
more than two years prior to the trial, and had the warrant for the arrest of the prisoner, but, on being fully examined by the court, answered that he made no arrest
and had not formed or expressed any opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and could give him a
PTe was thereupon accepted by
fair and impartial trial.
the court as a juror, without ol)jection from either side.
The prisoner claimed that ho had discovered, after the
iurv was sworn, that the said juror had not only the warrant for his arrest, but also, with a number of other persons, had pursued him for some days, and had several
It is
times visited the neighborhood in searcli of him.
corto
of
in
judgment
arrest
not the province of a motion
That lies only to correct an error like the one alleged.
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rect an error that is apparent on the face of the record.
Commonwealth v. Stephen, 4 Leigh, 679; Watt's Case, Id.
672; Bishop on Cr. Pro. (3d ed.), sections 1282 and 1285;
and 4 Minor's Institutes (3d ed.) Pt. I, 939.
The ground
nowhere
appears in the record.
of the objection
This
bill of exceptions was not, therefore, properly taken. But
even if the proper proceedings had been resorted to, the
statement set forth in the bill of exceptions, which is not
supported by the affidavit of the prisoner or any one else,
did not disqualify the juror or furnish ground for a new
trial, and certainly not when the objection was not brought
to the attention of the court until after the verdict.
Bristow's Case, supra.

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed.
A-ffirmed.

HUBBARD V. RUTLAND RAILROAD
Supreme

Court of Vermont.
80

COMPANY.
1907.

Vermont, 462.

RowELL, C. J. Case for negligently injuring the plaintiff
by a collision of trains, on one of which he was a passenPlea, the general issue, and trial by jury.
ger.
Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
The defendant conceded the right of recovery, but denied the claim for damages, both in character and extent, in manner and form
alleged.

The defendant moved in arrest, for that *'the verdict is
largely based on facts not in issue under the declaration
and concessions of the defendant made on trial and accepted by the plaintiff, and varies materially from the issue made on trial, and finds facts foreign to such issue,
and is for for entire damages, without discrimination between facts made material and immaterial by the issue,
and is insufficient."

It

is conceded

that when the motion goes to defects in

Tkial Pkactice

588

[Chap.

16

a

is

a

a

is

a

is

a

it

it

it,
it

the pleadings, an inspection of the record alone is to govBut
ern, and that the evidence cannot be looked into.
it is contended that when the motion goes to defects in the
verdict, as this motion does, the rule is different; that the
verdict is a part of the record, but any defect in it is not
apparent on its face ; that it is not a pleading, and if a mofollows that
tion in arrest will lie for defects in
defects,
and that this
discover
those
must be looked into to
necessitates an examination of the evidence upon which
rests.
judgment may be arrested for defects in the verThat
clear.
But motion for that purpose stands like
dict
motion in arrest for defects in the pleadings, and like that,
must be tested by what appears on the face of the record,
of which the verdict
Mr. Gould says, in speakpart.
ing of Lord Mansfield's disapprobation of the rule, that
when there are good and bad counts, and
general verdict for the plaintiff for entire damages, without discriminating between the counts, no rule appears to be more
clearly warranted by the original principles of the law
than that the judgment, which
only an interference of
law from the facts ascertained upon the record, must always be formed from the face of the record itself, and
from that alone; and as the jury must be presumed to
know nothing of the sufficiency or the insufficiency of
counts, the conclusion seems perfectly just, in legal theory,
that the damages are as likely to have been assessed in
whole or in part on the bad count as on the good count.

r!--id's PI.

c.

X,

sec. 58, n.

(7).

Mr. Tidd says that the only ground for arresting judg-

if

•

#

*

2

is

it

it

ment at this day is, some matter intrinsic, appearing on
the face of the record, that would render the judgment
erroneous and reversible; for though
seems to have been
otherwise formerlv, yet
now settled that judgment
cannot be arrested for extrinsic or foreign matter not apnenring on the face of the record, but that courts are to
iudge upon the record itself, that their successors may
know the frrounds of their judgment.
Tidd's Pr.
'/'OIR)
The defendant contends, as we have seen, that
the testimony cannot be looked into when the verdict does not
show the defect on its face, there can be no remedy in such
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And that is true if, as here,
if anywhere, the defect appears only in the testimony, for
that is not a part of the record, and the court must judge
upon the record, and upon that alone.
But the verdict
being a part of the record, if the record as a whole shows
And it will show
and must
the defect, it is enough.
the
law
show
recognizes
defect that
as ground
Thus,
for motion in arrest.
the verdict varies subinstead of finding the matstantially from the issue, as
ter in issue, the jury finds something foreign to the issue,
the judgment must be arrested, for the court cannot tell
Here the
for which party judgment should be rendered.
verdict does not show the defect on its face, but taken
with the rest of the record, which shows what the issue
was, the record as
whole shows the defect on its face.
The same
true when the verdict finds only part of the
matter in issue, omitting to find either way another material part.
These instances are sufficient to show how
defects in
verdict not apparent on its face are made to
appear for the purposes of
motion in arrest.
Judgment affirmed.
in arrest.
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a case by motion

Supreme Court

of

BULL V. MATHEWS.
20 Rhode

Rhode Island.

1897.

Island, 100.
a

I.,

is
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This
motion in arrest of judgTiLLiNGHAST, J.
misjoinder of causes of action.
ment on the ground of
The action
trespass on the case for trover and conversion, and the declaration contains
count in trover and
conversion, and also the ordinary counts in assumpsit. At
the trial of the case in the District Court
decision was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $19.10 and costs; but
there
nothing in the record to show whether the judgment was based on the count in trover and conversion,
or on those in assumpsit.
No plea was filed in the case,
but as the defendant entered an appearance the general
issue
Gen. Laws E.
deemed to be filed.
cap. 237, sec.
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But whether, in this

case the general issue as to the
connt in trover, which would be not gnilty, or as to the
counts in assumpsit, which would be non assumpsit, is in,
3.

Within five days after
we have no means of determining.
the rendition of said decision the defendant filed his motion in arrest of judgment in the District Court, whereupon the case was certified to this court.
It is a familiar rule of common-law pleading that counts
sounding in tort cannot properly be joined with counts
sounding in contract, and also that such misjoinder is
fatal, not only on demurrer, but also on motion in arrest
Ency. PI. & Pr. vol. 2, p. 803, and cases
of judgment.
The effect of such
cited; Haskell v. Boiven, 44 Vt. 579.
misjoinder is clearly expressed in Chit. PI. 9 Am. ed. 206,
''The consequences of a misjoinder are more
as follows:
important than the circumstances of a particular count
being defective; for in a case of misjoinder, however perfect the counts may respectively be in themselves, the
declaration will be bad on demurrer or in arrest of judgSee also Gould's PL cap. 4, sec. 87,
ment, or upon error.
and cases cited.
The ordinary test for determining whether different
causes of action may be joined is to inquire whether the
same plea may be pleaded and the same judgment given
on all the counts of the declaration; and unless this question can be answered in the affirmative the counts cannot
See also Court
See Drury v. Merrill, ante, 2.
be joined.

of Probate v. Sprague, 3 R. I. 205.
A Implying this test to the case at bar, it will at once be
If the pleader in
seen that there is a fatal misjoinder.
this case had simply omitted to strike out the money counts
which are printed in the writ, perhaps we might disregard them; but as he has filled them out in the ordinary
way where the case is assumpsit, we feel bound to presume
that he intended to rely thereon, as well as on the count

in trover.
It is true that, since the case was certified to this court,
the plaintiff's counsel has filed an affidavit setting forth
that by reason of mistake and oversight he neglected to
strike out the money counts, and also that at the trial in
the District Court, the o\'idonce introduced was confined
to the count in trover, which was the only count relied on.
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But as a motion in arrest of judgment raises only those
objections which are apparent upon the re<}ord; State v.
Paul, 5 R. I. 189 ; Black on Judgments, vol. 1, Sees. 96-8 ;
and as the affidavit forms no part of the record, we are
not at liberty to consider it.
Judgment arrested.

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY V. CITY OF CHICAGO.
Appellate Court of Illinois.
144

Illinois Appellate,

1908,

293.

Mr. Peesiding Justice Thompson delivered

the opinion
of the court.
This is an action in case begun the 16th day of May,
1895, in the Circuit Court of Cook county, Illinois, by the
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company against the city of Chicago to recover three-fourths
of the damages sustained by it on account of the destruction of property of which "the plaintiff was possessed as
of its own property," during riots there in July, 1894.

**********

The action is based ujoon a statute of this state providing as follows:
"That whenever any building or other real or personal
property except property in transit, shall be destroyed or
injured in consequence of any mob or riot composed of
twelve or more persons, the city, or if not in a city then
the county in which such property was destroyed, shall be
liable to an action by or in behalf of the party whose property was thus destroyed or injured for three-fourths of the
damages sustained by reason thereof.

"No

person or corporation shall be entitled to recover in
any such action if it shall appear on the trial thereof that
such destruction or injury of property was occasioned or
in any way aided, sanctioned or pennitted by the carelessness, neglect or wrongful act of such person or corpora-
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tion ; nor shall any person or corporation be entitled to recover any damages for any destruction or injury of property as aforesaid, unless such party shall have used all
reasonable diligence

to prevent such damage.

**No action shall be maintained under the provisions of
this act, by any person or corporation whose property
shall have been destroyed or injured as aforesaid, unless
notice of claim for damages be presented to such city or
county within thirty days after such loss or damage occurs and such action shall be brought within twelve months
after such destruction or injury occurs, * * *"
It is urged the motion in arrest of judgment should have
been sustained because the declaration is insufficient in
that it does not state a cause of action by failing to state
facts but only stating conclusions in several particulars.
Tt is argued (1) ''that ownership is not alleged as a conclusion nor by way of uncertain or incomplete statement,
by way of argument, by evasion, nor is there any allegation from which it can necessarily be inferred.
All that
is alleged is possession;" (2) "that the declaration should
locate the mob as within the city of Chicago;" (3) the statute ''requires that such party shall have used all reasonable diligence to prevent such damage," while the declaration only avers that the injury was not occasioned through
any neglect on the part of the plaintiff to use reasonble diligence to prevent such injury; (4) that "the declaration
does not aver that a notice of plaintiff's claim for damages
was presented to the city within thirty days after the destruction or damage to its property occurred."
The numerous alleged defects in the declaration which
have been presented for our consideration are purely forThe defects complained of could not have been
mal.
reached by a general demurrer.
They could only have
been grounds for a special demurrer assigning the causes.
A judgment after verdict can only be arrested for substanAll defects which would not have been fatal
tial faults.
a
demurrer
are cured by pleading to the issue,
on
general
and are aided by verdict.
When the pleading states the
essential requisites of a cause of action, the court will presume that the particular fact or circumstance which appears to be defectively or imperfectly stated or omitted
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A defective or inaccurate statewas proved at the trial.
ment of a cause of action is cured by a general verdict but
where no cause of action is stated a verdict will not cure
the defect.
Gould on PI., chap. X.
Counsel for appellant state in their original argument
(p. 21): ''The declaration states the name of the plaintiff.
It states that 'said plaintiff was possessed as of its
own property,' of the railway equipment, etc., described
and claimed to have been injured or destroyed, and for
which judgment is asked.
It also avers 'that the property
of the plaintiff was destroyed or injured.'
These averments only amount to an assertion that the plaintiff ivas
the owner of the property mentioned and that the legal
title was in the plaintiff.
Such an averment is only a
mere statement of a conclusion of law and amounts to nothAt common law the possessor of
ing as an averment."
personal property is prima facie the owner of the property.
The averments that "iDlaintiff was possessed as of its own
property," and "the property of the plaintiff was destroyed or injured," amount to an allegation of ownership by the plaintiff, when the declaration is first questioned after verdict.
On a
Beigen v. Biggs, 34 111. 170.
motion in arrest of judgment "every intendment will be
indulged in favor of the declaration, and if it contain.^
terms sufficiently general to comprehend by fair and reasonable intendment any matter necessary to be proved, and
without proof of which the jury could not have given the
verdict, the want of an express averment in the declaration has been cured by the verdict."
Danley v. Hihhard.
222 111. 88; Fountain Head Drain Dist v. Wright, 228 111.
We hold that the conclusion to be drawn from the
208.
averments of the declaration is that the plaintiff is the
owner of the property destroyed or injured.
The declaration avers that "within the territorial limits
of tlie city of Chicago, aforesaid, in consequence of a certain mob or mobs, riot or riots, each of which was then
and there composed of twelve or more persons within the
territorial limits of said city of Chicago, a large quantitv."
This language locates the mob within the city of Chietc.
cago in the language of the statute and fully answers the
second reason urged in arrest of judgment.
We do not think it necessary to comment on the third
T. P.— 38
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and fourth reasons urged in arrest of the judgment further
than to state that under the rule announced in Danley v.
Hihhard, supra, the allegations contained in the declaration concerning these matters are sufficiently general to
comprehend by fair and reasonable intendment the matters necessary to be proved in the respects complained of,
and the court did not err in overruling the motion.

Ajjirmed}
They cannot be availed
to matters in abatement.
v. Cunningham
(1906) 126 Ga. 684, 56 S. E.
(1882) 87 N. C. 115.

The same rule applies
on motion in arrest.

1

of

(i4; Hawkins v. Hughes

Section

Hiiger

2.

Time foe Making Motion.

CHICAGO AND ALTON EAILROAD COMPANY
V. CLAUSEN.
Supreme

Court of Illinois.
173

Illinois,

Me. Justice Caetweight
court

1898.

100.

delivered

the opinion of the

:

Appellee brought this suit against appellant to recover
damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the
starting of a train on which he was a passenger, while he
was attempting to get off at appellant's station at GardThere was a judgment for appellee, which
ner, Illinois.
has been affirmed by the Appellate Court.
It is argued at much length that the trial court improperly overruled a demurrer to the first original count and
five amended counts of the declaration upon which the case
No error has been assigned upon
finally went to trial.
such ruling on the demurrer, either in the Appellate Court
or this court, and none could be so assigned for the reason that after the demurrer was overruled the defendant
pleaded the general issue and thereby raised an issue of
It has always been the rule in this
fact, which was tried.
State that if a party wishes to have the action of a court
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in overruling his demurrer reviewed in this court he must
abide by tlie demurrer.
By pleading over he waives the
demurrer and the right to assign error upon the rul*
*
*
ing.
Defendant made a motion in arrest of judgment, which
was overruled, and that is assigned for error; but having
once had the judgment of the court on its demurrer it could
not again invoke it for the same reasons by motion in arAfter a judgment overruling a demurrer to a derest.
claration there can be no motion in arrest of judgment on
account of any exception to the declaration that might
have been taken on the argument of the demurrer.
Rouse
V. Coimty of Peoria, 2 Gilm. 99; Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood,
11 111. 68; American Express Co. v. Pinchney, supra; Independent Order of Mutual Aid v. Paine, 122 111. 625.^
While the defendant, by pleading over, waived its demurrer and the right to assign error upon the ruling of
the court on the demurrer, it did not waive innate and substantial defects in the declaration which would render the
declaration insufficient to sustain a judgment, and the question whether it is so far defective may be considered under
The question which may be
the assignments of error.
thus presented is not as broad as those questions which
may be raised by demurrer, for the reason that defects
in pleading may sometimes be aided by the pleadings of
the opposite party, or be cured by the Statute of AmendThe
ments and Jeofails, or by intendment after verdict.
declaration
of
to
the
various
counts
the
objections made
are, that the statements therein are too general and in
definite in. failing to show how the starting of the train
operated to throw plaintiff from it and in what manner it
was started, and that the various counts allege certain duties on the part of the defendant, and charge the neglect
and violation of other duties, and the doing of other acts
foreign to the duties so alleged, as the jause of the sup-

2

a it

is,

1 This is the orthoilox rule, and seems to be based on no better reason tlian
qijotntion
from Tidd : "After judgment
that suggested in the followinrr
on demurrer, there can be no motion in arrest of judgment, for any exception
that the
that might have been taken on arguing the demurrer; the reason
matter of law having been already settled, by the solemn determination of the
court, they will not afterwards suffer anyone to come as amicus curiae, and tell
is wrong;
them that the judgment which they gave on mature deliberation
is otherwise after iudgTTient bv default, for that is not given in so solbut
Tidd'e Practice, *918.
manner."
emn
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So far as the declaration is defective in
posed injuries.
the respects complained of, the defendant's plea of the
general issue, of course, could not aid or supply any omisIt is also true that the Statsion or informality therein.
ute of Amendments and Jeofails does not extend to cure
It prodefects which are clearly matters of substance.
vides that judgment shall not be reversed for want of any
allegation or averment on account of which omission a
special demurrer could have been maintained, but it does
not protect a judgment by default against objections for
Many such objections, however,
matter of substance.
have always been cured, at the common law, by a verdict.
At the common law, independently of any statute, the rule
any defect, imperfection
''that where there
was and
or omission in any pleading, whether in substance or form,
fatal objection upon demurrer,
which would have been
the issue joined be such as necessarily required, on
yet
the trial, proof of the facts so defectively or imperfectly
not to be prestated or omitted, and without which
sumed that either the judge would direct the jury to give
or the jury would have given the verdict, such defect, imChitcured by the verdict."
perfection or omission
This rule was quoted and approved in Keety's PI. 673.)
gan v. Kinnare, 123 111. 280, and Chicago and Eastern IlliThe intendment
nois Railroad Co. v. Eines, 132 id. 161.
effect
the verdict and
of
joint
from
the
in such case arises
was given, and
the declaration
the issue upon which
contains terms sufficiently general to comprehend, by fair
and reasonable intendment, any matter necessary to be
proved, and without proof of which the jury could not have
in
given the verdict, the want of an express statement of
Under this rule
cured by the verdict.
the declaration
cause of acdefective statement of
verdict will aid
defective cause
statement of
tion, but will never assist
Where the declaration
Chitty's PI. 681.)
of action.
do not fairly impose the duty
and the issue joined upon
on the plaintiff to prove the omitted fact, the omission will
not be cured, {Joliet Steel Co. v. Shields, 134 111. 209), and
with all the intendments in its favor, the declaration
judgment, such dewill not sustain
so defective that
{Wilson v. Myfects mav be taken advantage of on error.
31 id. 515; Chicago and
ricTc, 26 111. 34; Scho field v. Settley,
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Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Hines, supra; Culver v.
Third Nat. Bank, 64 111. 528.) * * *
When these rules are applied to the declaration in this
case, we are satisfied that, although not very well drawn,
it is clearly sufficient to sustain the judgment. * * *
The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

NEWMAN V. PERRILL.
Supreme

Court of Indiana.
73

1880.

Indiana, 153.

Elliott, J.

The questions presented by this appeal
arise upon the ruling of the court sustaining the appellee's
motion in arrest of judgment.

**********

Appellant argues that, as the court had overruled demurrers to the complaint, it could not afterwards rightfully sustain a motion in arrest.
We do not think that
the court, by ruling wrongly upon the demurrers, precluded
itself from afterwards ruling rightly upon the motion in ar-

rest. If, when the motion was presented, the court deemed
the complaint so clearly bad as not to be sufficient to sustain a judgment, it was right to arrest the proceedings at
that stage, notwitlistanding the fact that at an earlier stage
the court had entertained a different opinion.
A complaint fatally defective is vulnerable to attack,
even upon appeal, and there can certainly be no error in
declaring a fatally defective complaint bad on motion in
arrest, although demurrers may have been previously overIt is the duty of the court not to permit a judgruled.
ment to be entered upon a complaint which is so clearly inThere
sufficient as to afford the judgment no foundation.
a
sufficient
judgment
valid
without
complaint,
can be no
and, where a party's complaint is incurably bad, he cannot
justly complain of any ruling which prevented him from
obtaining a judgment based upon it.
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Judgment affirmed.^
To the same effect see Turnpike Co. v. Yates (1901) 108 Tenn. 428, 67
W. 69; Field v. Slaughter
(1808) 1 Bibb. (Ky.) 160; Griffin v. The Jus
In Iowa this practice is expressly authorized by
tices (1855) 17 Ga. 96.
Frum v. Keeney (1899) 109 la. 393, 80 N. W. 5U7.
statute.
1

S.

KELLER V. STEVENS.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
66

1886,

Maryland, 132.

Yellott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellee instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County, to enforce a mechanics' lien. * * *
*

*

*

On the 17th day of April, 1886, judgment was

extended in favor of plaintiff for $389.92, with interest
from date, and costs, and on the same day judgment fiat
On
executio was entered on motion of plaintiff's attorney.
the 20th of April, 1886, after final judgment had thus been
entered, the appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment.
The motion was overruled and from this determination of
the court below an ajjpeal has been taken.
There can be no doubt that, if a motion in arrest had
been made subsequently to the judgment by default and
antecedently to the entry of final judgment, the motion
would have been strictly in conformity with regular pro*
* *
cedure.
But this motion in arrest was filed after the rendition of
It therefore comes too late. What jua final judgment.
dicial action is invoked by the interposition of a motion in
The party presenting the motion asks the court
arrest?
not to enter final judgment because of some supposed defect in the proceedings which he undertakes to make apBut the judgment having been already entered,
parent.
if he wishes to have it removed from the record, he must
endeavor to accomplish that result by a motion to strike
out.
But the record shows that this appeal is from the decision of the court below overruling a motion in arrest of
judgment filed after a final judgment had been entered in

Arrest of Judgment

Sec. 3]

599

There was no error committed by the Circuit
Court in the disposition which it made of the motion, and
its ruling should be affirmed.
the cause.

Ruling affirmed.

Section

3.

Effect of Motion.

STATE EX EEL. HENRY
Supreme

W. BOND V.

Court of Missouri.
230

FISHER.

1910,

Missouri, 325.

[On January 16, 1904, Sallie Bond filed a suit against
the relator, Henry W. Bond, in the circuit court of St.
Louis, upon a foreign judgment rendered against hioi in
the state of Tennessee.
Henry W. Bond filed defend 3s *o
this action, and on June 21, 1907, the cause came on for
The court made a finding against the defendant,
trial.
Henry W. Bond, whereupon, at the same term, he filed his
motion in arrest of judgment, which motion was continued,
and thereafter, on June 22, 1908, said motion was sustained,
for the stated reason that the judgment was not responsive to the issues.
Neither party took any steps to appeal
from or review this order of the trial court.
Nothing further was done for a year, when the said cause was set for
trial for the 5th day of October, 1909.
Relator at once
filed a motion to strike the cause from the docket, on the
ground that the order in arrest of judgment had put an end
to the cause, which motion was overruled.
Relator then
filed a petition in the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition restraining the Hon. D. D. Fisher, judge of the circuit
court of St. Louis, from proceeding further with said
A preliminary rule was issued requiring respondcause.
ent to show cause why a permanent writ of prohibition
should not issue.] ^
This is an original proceeding instituted
Woodson, J.
in this court, seeking to prohibit the respondent, as judge
of the circuit court of tlie city of St. Louis, from taking
and further exercising jurisdiction over the parties to and
^
The matter inclosed in brackets is a condensation
statement of facts published with the opinion.

by the editor

of

the
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of Sallie Bond

I.

There are but two legal propositions presented by
this record for determination: First, what is the legal effect of an unappealed from order of the circuit court of this
State sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment ; and, second,
"We

At

*

*

*

will dispose of these propositions in the order stated.

common law an unconditional order sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment was a final disposition of the
cause, that is, it prevented the rendition of a subsequent
But, if the order was made condifinal judgment therein.
tional upon an amendment, or such other action as would
remove the cause of arrest, and the condition complied
with, then a venire facias de novo should be awarded, in
which case the order in arrest would not constitute a bar
to the entry of a final judgment therein.
In Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, vol. 23, p. 836, the
doctrine is stated thus: "The granting of a motion in arrest of judgment prevents the entry of a final judgment in
the cause, unless it is made conditional upon an amendment, or such other action as will remove the cause of arAnd if it does not award a venire facias de novo, it
rest.
operates as a discontinuance and dismisses defendant without day."
In Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, vol. 2, p. 820,
the rule is stated in this language: ''In civil cases the sustaining of a motion in arrest of judgment has the effect
of putting an end to the case."
The rule is tersely and clearly stated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Butcher v. Metis, 1

Miles 233, in the following language:
"An arrest of judgment is in effect nothing more than
superseding a verdict for some cause apparent upon the
record, which shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
benefit of the verdict.
It is often followed by a judgment
for the defendant, that he go without day, but it is not of
The court may, after
itself a judgment for the defendant.
an arrest of judgment, award a repleader or a venire de
Wliich of these courses is the
novo without a repleader.
proper one, depends upon the nature of the defect for which
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If it

appears by the record that
of action, the court will give judgarrest
after
the
of
judgment on the verdict, that the
ment,
plaintiff take nothing by his writ, and that the defendant
If issue be joined upon an immaterial
go without day.
point, there being a sufficient cause of action alleged in the
declaration, the proper course is to award a repleader.
If the pleadings be sufficient and the issue well joined, but
the verdict is imperfectly found, it is usual to award a
venire de novo; and this it is said may be done upon the
motion of the defendant, without a motion in arrest of
judgment.
''The venire de novo is an ancient proceeding of the
It was in use long before the practice of
common law.
It follows, of course, upon the grantgranting new trials.
ing of a new trial ; but as a distinct proceeding it is commonly adopted after a bill of exceptions or after a special
verdict imperfectly found, but always for some cause apparent on the record, and if granted when it should not be,
it is error, and the award of it may be reversed.
"A new trial, on the other hand, is commonly granted
after a general verdict for some cause not apparent on tne
record, and it is not assignable for error. (Hanihleton v.
Veere, 2 Saund. 169 (n. 1) ; Good title v. Jones, 7 T. R. 43,
48 ; Witham v. Lewis, 1 Wils. 48, 56 ; Com. Dig., tit. Pleader,

R. 18;

1

Sellon's Practice, ch.

11, sec. 3

(C. D.)

;

Miller

v.

JRalston, 1 Serg. k Rawle 309; Ehersoll v. Krug, S'Binn. 53;
Lessee of Pickering v. Rutty, 1 Serg. & Rawle 515.)
"In this case the fault was in the verdict. Of course it
appears upon the record. A venire facias de novo is therefore proper.
"In regard to the objection that the defendant is no
longer in court on this action, it should be observed that
the judgment was arrested at this term, and no judgment
He is therefore still
has been entered for the defendant.
in court and bound to take notice of the further proceedBut if the term had been allowed to
ings in the cause.
elapse after the arrest of judgment, and the cause had not
been continued by a cnria adv. vult, according to strict notions of practice, the action would have been discontinued,
and the defendant without day in court.
Venire de novo
awarded.'*
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And the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Raber
Jones, 40 Ind. 1. c. 441, in discussing this question used

this language:

''The complaint

does

not aver that the

judgment against the corporation was recovered upon the
policy.
It is a clear principle of pleading, that in declaring upon a statute, the averments must be sufficient to bring
the case within the statute.
The complaint was, therefore,
radically defective, in not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the court properly arrested
the judgment.

''When the judgment was

arrested, however, there
should have been an end of the case.
No judgment for th"
defendant should have followed.
The arrest of judgment
ends the case.
Each party pays his own costs, and the
plaintiff is at liberty to proceed de novo in a fresh action.
3B1. Com. 393, note u."

The case of Kaufman v. Kaufman,

139,

2

Wharton

(Pa.)

147, announces the same doctrine.
authorities seem to be uniform upon this proposiThe only modification that has been made of that

1 c.

The

tion.
common law rule is contained in section 804, Revised StatThat section reads as follows: "When a judgutes 1899.
ment shall be arrested, the court shall allow the proceedings in which the error was, to be amended in all cases
when the same amendment might have been made before
trial, and the cause shall again proceed according to the

practice of the court."
Under the provisions of this statute, the order of the
court sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment does not
necessarily result in a new trial, any more than it did at
common law. Such an order has that effect only in those
cases where the motion is sustained for an error which
could have been cured by an amendment made before the
trial occurred. This was so held by this court in the case
of Stid V. Railroad, 211 Mo. 1. c. 415, where Lamm, J., in
speaking for the court, used this language: "Speaking with
prer-ision, a motion in arrest is not a motion for a rehearing. If granted, it does not necessarily result in a new
trial. If an amendment be allowed, the cause by statutory
command proceeds 'according to the practice of the court.'
(R. S. 1899, sec. 804.)"
This construction of that statute is in harmony with the

Sec. 3]
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spirit of our legislation upon the subject of nonsuits and
arrests of judgments, as expressed in section 4285, Revised
Statutes 1899, which, insofar as is material, reads as follows: ''If any action shall have been commenced within
the time respectively

prescribed

in this chapter, and the

plaintiff therein suffer a nonsuit, or, after a verdict for him,
the judgment be arrested, or, after a judgment for him,
the same be reversed on appeal or error, such plaintiff
may commence a new action from time to time, within one
year after such nonsuit suffered or such judgment arrested
or reversed."
The only remaining matter to be determined in this connection is, was the motion in arrest sustained for an error
which might have been ^cured by a timely amendment before the trial was had in the circuit coart of the city
of St. Louis? The order sustaining the motion in arrest
specifically sets out the reason for the court's actions in

that regard, namely, for the reason that the judgment ivas
not responsive to the issues. Clearly, this was not an error
which could have been cured by an amendment before the
trial was had in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis,
within the meaning of said section 804, for the obvious
leason that the judgment could not in the very nature of
things have been rendered until after the trial was had
And since the order of the court sustaining the
{therein.
motion in arrest was unconditional, unappealed from, and
the term at which it was entered having long ago elapsed,
it became absolute and final, and, therefore, constitutes a
complete bar to all further proceedings in said cause.

**********

We are of opinion that the preliminary rule heretofore
issued should be made permanent.
It is so ordered. All concur.
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CINCINNATI, INDIANAPOLIS, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO

EAILWAY COMPANY

Supreme Court of Indiana.
122

V. CASE.
1889,

Indiana, 310,

Coffey, J. This was an action by the appellee against
the appellant to recover damages for negligent delay in
shipping appellee's cattle from the town of Fowler to the
city of Indianapolis.
Upon issues formed the cause was tried by a jury, who
returned a verdict for the appellee.
Appellant moved in arrest of judgment, which was overruled, and an exception taken.
Appellant then filed its motion and reasons for a new
trial, which was overruled and exception reserved. Judgment on verdict.
The first and second errors assigned here call in question the sufficiency of the complaint, and the third questions
the propriety of the ruling of the circuit court in overruling the motion for a new trial.

No objection to the ruling of the circuit court in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment is urged in this
court. It is not even assigned here as error.
It is now claimed by the appellee that as the motion in
arrest of judgment preceded the motion for a new trial, the
right to move for a new trial was cut off, and that it canSuch seems to be the
not, for that reason, bo considered.
* * *
established practice in this state.
It is claimed by the appellant that no good reason can be
given for the rule established by these numerous cases,
But it must
and that therefore, they should be overruled.
not be forgotten that they establish a rule of practice
wliich has prevailed in this State for many years, well
understood by the profession. A rule so firmly established
and so well understood as this should not be disturbed, except for some strong reason. The rule can work no hardship, as a party may, after a motion for a new trial, move
in arrest of judgment and thus secure the benefit of both
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motions. We know of no good reason why this long list of
cases should be overruled.
We find no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.^
1 ' '

This rule, however, extends only to cases where the party has knowledge
of the fact, at the time of moving in arrest of judgment; therefore, a new
trial was granted after such a motion, on affidavits of two of the jury, that
Bui. Ni. Pri. .325, 6.
they drew lots for their verdict.
Bed
(Pr. Reg. 409.
2 Tidd's Practice,
quaere, whether such affidavits would now be received.) "
•913.

JEWELL V. BLANDFORD.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
7

1838.

Dana, 472.

**********

Opinion of the Court, by Chief Justice Robertson".

First, did the previous motion in arrest of judgment preclude Jewell from a right to ask a new trial? and, secondly,
was he entitled to a new trial?
First.
Cases may, we know, be found in the British
in
which
books,
judges in England decided that a motion
for a new trial comes too late after an unsuccessful motion
to arrest the judgment ; and the only reason given for such
a practice seems to have been that assigned by Bayley,
justice; and that is because, as he said, by moving to
arrest the judgment, the party acknowledged that there
was no valid objection to the verdict.
But that assumption is, in our judgment, unreasonable, and the estoppel deduced from it seems to be equally so.
If it be true that a motion in arrest is an implied waiver
of a right to a new trial, should not a motion for a new
trial equally operate as an implied admission that there is
no cause for arresting the judgment? And considered as
an original question, is there, should there be, any such
implied admission or waiver in either case? We think not.
Indeed, in England this is a mere matter of practice only.
and arose in England, from the peculiar organization and
powers of its courts. There is no principle in it.
Our practice is different, and is, therefore, in our opinion,
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more consonant with justice and all the ends of the law.
We do not hesitate, therefore, to decide that the motion
for a new trial did not come too late in this case, and the
more especially as, by not objecting to it when made, the
plaintiff in the action waived the technical objection which
the British practice, if it had been adopted here, might
have authorized him then only to make.

CHAPTER XVII.
NEW TRIALS.
Section

1.

General Purpose.

GUNN V. UNION RAILROAD COMPANY.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island. 1901.
23 Rhode

Island, 289,

Rogers, J. — This suit is trespass on the case for negligence brought in the Common Pleas Division, wherein,
upon a jury trial, the plaintiff obtained a verdict against
the defendant for $10,000; and thereupon the defendant
brought it to this Division on a petition for a new trial on
the ground, among others, that the verdict was against the
law and \\\q evidence and the weight thereof.
On December 28, 1'jOO, this Division filed its opinion granting the
petition on the ground that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. See 22 R. I. 321. On the same day,
wit, December 28, 1900, the plaintiff moved that this
Division dismiss the defendant's petition for a new trial
and direct the Common Pleas Division to enter judgment
on the verdict of the jury in said action, —
''First. Because the record in said case shows that to
grant a new trial on the grounds therein set forth would
be in violation of the constitution of Rhode Island, and
also of the constitution of the United States, to wit, of the
fourteenth amendment to said constitution of the United
States, wherein it is provided that no state shall 'deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process

of law,'
"Second.

Because the court in its opinion has 'granted
the defendant's petition for a new trial' on grounds which
the record shows deprive the plaintiff of his right to a trial
by jury, and of his property, 'without due process of law.' "
607
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At the time our State constitution went into operation
section 5 of "An act to establish a Supreme Judicial Court"
was in full force, which gave that court the power to grant
new trials in cases decided therein or in any Court of Common Pleas for various reasons specified; and said section
contained this clause, viz.: "and the said court shall also
have power to grant new trials in cases where there has
been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have
been usually granted at common law."
Digest of 1822,
p. 109.

It

is clear that our ancestors prior to our present State
constitution found trial by jury so fallible that it was
necessary to provide for more than one trial. In England
as well as in the older States of America, two hundred years
ago, trial by jury was in a state of evolution.
The old law
of attaints against a jury as a means of reversing a verdict
against the evidence was apparently obsolete both in England and in this country before the American Revolution.
Note to Erving v. Cradock, Quincey, 560, by Horace (Mr.

Justice) Gray.
Sir William Blackstone,

writing in or about 1765 (3
says:
"Formerly the prin-

Com. Chitty's ed., 388-392),
cipal remedy, for reversal of a verdict unduly given, was
* * *
But such a remedy as this laid
by writ of attaint.
the injured party under an insuperable hardship by making
a conviction of the jurors for perjury the condition of his
redress.
The judges saw this; and therefore very early,
even upon writs of assise, they devised a great variety of
distinctions, by which an attaint might be avoided, and the
verdict set to rights in a more temperate and dispassionate
*
* *
When afterwards attaints, by several
method.
statutes, were more universally extended, tlie judges frequently, even for the misbehaviour of jurymen, instead of
prosecuting the writ of attaint, awarded a second trial:
and subsequent resolutions, for more than a century past,
have so amplified the benefit of this remedy, that the attaint
is now as obsolete as the trial by battle which it succeeded;
and we shall probably see the revival of the one as soon as
* * *
Tf every verdict was final in
the revival of the other.
the first instance, it would tend to destroy this valuable
method of trial, and would drive away all causes of consequence to be decided according to the forms of imperial
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law, upon depositions in writing, which might be reviewed
in a course of appeal. * * * The jury are to give their
opinion instanter; that
before they separate, eat, or
drink. And under these circumstances the most intelligent
and best intentioned men may bring in
verdict, which
they themselves upon cool deliberation would wish to re
verse.
"Next to doing right, the great object in the administration of public justice, should be to give public satisfaction
If the verdict be liable to many objections and doubts in
the opinion of his counsel, or even in the opinion of bystanders, no party would go away satisfied unless he had
prospect of reviewing it. Such doubts would with him be
decisive he would arraign the determination as manifestly
unjust, and abhor
tribunal which he imagined had done
him an injury without
possibility of redress.
new trial, under proper regulations, cures
''Granting
all these inconveniences, and at the same time preserves
entire and renders perfect that most excellent method of
the glory of the English law. A new trial
decision, which
rehearing of the cause before another jury, but with as
little prejudice to either party, as
had never been
heard before.
"Nor
granted where the scales of evidence hang
nearly equal; that which leans against the former verdict
ought always very strongly to preponderate."
Bright v. Eynon, Burr. 390, decided in the King's bencli
in 1757, was motion for new trial upon which the judges
Lord
gave their opinion, granting the new trial, seriatim.
Mansfield, inter alia, said, page 393, — "Trials by jury, in
power, somecivil causes, could not subsist now without
where, to grant new trials. If an erroneous judgment be
given in point of law, there are many ways to review and
right. Where court judges of fact upon depositions
set
in writing, their sentence or decree may, many ways, be regeneral verdict can only be set
viewed and set right. But
no more than having the
new trial; which
right by
causes more deliberately considered by another jury, where
reasonable doubt, or perhaps
there
certainty, that
justice has not been done.
mere sound in every case:
"The writ of attaint
now
does not pretend to be
in many
remedy. There are
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numerous causes of false verdicts, without corruption or
bad intention of the jurors.
They may have heard too
much of the matter before the trial, and imbibed prejudices without knowing it. The cause may be intricate ; the
examination may be so long as to distract and confound
their attention.
unjust verdicts obtained under these and a thousand
like circumstances, were to be conclusive forever, the determination of civil property, in this method of trial, would
It is absolutely
be very precarious and unsatisfactory.
necessary to justice, that there should upon many occasions,
be opportunities of reconsidering the cause by a new

"If

J-^jn]

"It

************

*************

is not true 'that no new trials were granted before

1655,' as has been said from Style, 466."
After referring to Slade's case, which was

in 1648, reported in Style, 138, and to Wood v. Gunston, in 1655,
Style, 466, Lord Mansfield proceeds : "The reason why this
matter cannot be traced further back is, 'that the old report-books do not give any accounts of determinations

made by the court upon motions. '
"Indeed, for a good while after this time, the granting of
new trials was holden to a degree of strictness, so intolerable, that it drove parties into a court of equity, to have, in
effect, a new trial at law, of a mere legal question, because
the verdict, in justice, under all the circumstances, ought
not to conclude; and many bills have been retained upon
this ground, and the question tried over again at law,
under the direction of a court of equity. And therefore of
late years the courts of law have gone more liberally into
the granting of new trials, according to the circumstances
of the respective cases. And the rule laid down by Lord
Parker, in the case of the Queen against the corporation of
Helston, H. 12 Ann B. R. (Lucas, 202) seems to be the best
general rule that can be laid down upon this subject; viz.
'Doing justice to the party,' or in other words 'attaining
the justice of the case.'
"The reasons for granting a new trial must be collected
from the whole evidence, and from the nature of the case
considered under all its circumstances."
Mr. Justice Denison concurring, added "that it would be
difficult perhaps to fix an absolutely general rule about
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granting new trials, without making so many exceptions to
it as might rather tend to darken the matter than to explain
it; but the granting a new trial, or refusing
must depend
upon the legal discretion of the court, guided by the nature
and circumstances of the particular case, and directed with
view to the attainment of justice."
Mr. Justice Foster agreed to the propriety of what had
been said, as to such cases in which the juries give verdicts
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4

is

is

a

a

against evidence, and even as to cases where there may be
contrariety of evidence, but the evidence upon the whole,
in point of probability, greatly preponderates against the
verdict; (which, depending on
variety of circumstances,
matter of legal discretion, and cannot be brought under
any general rule;) but in all cases where the evidence
nearly in equilihrio, he declared that he should always think
himself bound to have regard to the finding of the jury, for
"ad questionem facti respondent jiiratores."
Other eases in which new trials were granted in England
prior to the American Revolution, are Berks v. Mason,
Sayer, 264, decided in 1756; Goodtitle v. Clayton, in 1768,
Burr. 2224; and N orris v. Freeman, in 1769, Wil. 38. In
Marsh v. Boiver, Black. W. 851, heard in 1773, the action
was for words spoken, and the words were fully proved on
the trial, but the jury found for the defendant.
The court
new trial solely on the ground of triviality, derefused
claring "that they would not grant new trial for the sake
of sixpence damages, in mercy to the plaintiff as well as

defendant,"
The authorities above cited satisfy us that, at the time
of the separation of the American colonies from the mother
country, the common law of England authorized the granting of new jury trial, in proper case, on the ground that
the former verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
In this State the decisions of this court, as well those denynew trial, recognize that the granting, as those granting
strong preponderance of testinew trial upon
ing of
mony has been the long-established rule. See Johnson v.
Blanchard,
24; Patton v. Hughesdale, 11 R.
R.
188;
98, 103; Chafee v. Sprague, 15 R.
Watson V. Tripp, 11 R.
386; Lake v. Weaver, 20 R.
135; Sweet v. Wood, 18 R.

I.

I.

I.

I.

I.
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large number of cases in other States upon the
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proposition that when a verdict is clearly against the
weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the court to set it
aside and order a new trial, see 16 A. & E. Enc. of Law
(1st ed.), 554, note 7.

,

;
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it,

The plaintiff in the case at bar contends that it was an
essential provision of the common law that motions for new
trials should be addressed to the trial court. One judge,
went upon circuit, and the
however, as we understand
new trial, and though
judges in banc sat upon motions for
the opinion of the judge that sat on the jury trial was listened to with much respect, yet
was not final otherwise
there would have been no reason for the others sitting and
going through the idle form of expressing their opinion as
they were wont to do. Reference to the old cases hereinbefore cited seems to show that. In Marsh v. Boiver, supra,
"Lord Mansfield, who tried
the report of the case says:
Circuit,
reported," &c. but "The
the cause on the Home
court unanimously declared," etc.

In

A.

E. Enc. of Law (1st ed.),
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the following
statement, viz.: "In the absence of statute regulations, the
new trial must be
that an application for
general rule
addressed to the court in which the cause was tried, and
necessary,
may be made
under circumstances rendering
to the judge who presided at the trial, during vacation. This
rule
particularly applicable, and of nearly universal application in case of motions for new trial for errors of fact.
judge dies or goes out of office, however, his sucWhere
cause has
cessor may entertain the motion, and where
change
another
from
to
one
district
by
been transferred
motion may be heard by the
of lines or otherwise, such
proper tribunal in the new district, while power to entertain
such motions has been conferred by statute in many and
perhaps all of the states upon courts other than those in
which the trial took place, in cases and under circumstances
and conditions differing greatly in the different states."
this statement,
Waterman on New Trials, 1214,
In
"Notwithstanding, however, the evident want of qualviz.
correct opinion as
ification of the Appellate Court to form
to the conformity of the evidence with the verdict, in this
discretion in
generally permitted to exercise
country
the premises."
16
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Our statute provides that a new trial by jury may be
granted "for reasons for wliieli a new trial is usually granted at common law. ' ' We have already expressed the opinion that the verdict's being against the weight of the evidence was a common-law reason at the time of the adoption

of our State constitution ; but while reasons are prescribed,
methods of procedure are not, and it seems to us utterly unreasonable to try to stretch the application of the word
reasons, to methods of procedure, so that in the lapse of
years, reaching it may be to centuries, no change, or devel
opmont, or imiDrovement, no adaptation to altered condi
tions or circumstances, can be made or permitted without
making unconstitutional the very same reasons that are still
being adhered to.
Granting a new trial is exercising n discretion, and, with
us, as in many other States, is a power not confided to a
The exercise of that discretion, when desingle justice.
pending upon the weight of the evidence, necessitates some
knowledge of the evidence, and in this State that knowledge
is furnished by a stenographic report of the evidence — questions, answers, and rulings — typewritten out at length,
made by a sworn officer of the court and verified by the al
lowance of the justice presiding at the jury trial, or, if that
In this way all
be not possible, then verified by affidavit.
the judges have equal opportunities of judging of the evidence, and are not dependent upon the prejudices or peculiarities of any one man; and, as they will not grant a new
trial because of the verdict being against the weight of the
evidence, unless it is against a clear and decided preponderance thereof, if they have any question in the matter they
will invariably sustain the verdict.
Though the justice
presiding at a jury trial has some opportunity, perhaps, of
weighing the evidence, that other justices have not, yet he
is also subjected to greater probability of having prejudices
awakened, so that in some states the disadvantages are
deemed to outweight the advantages of his sitting on a
petition for a new trial, and, in this State, it is provided
by statute, that "no justice shall sit in the trial of any
* * *
in which he has presided in any inferior court,
cause
or in any case in which the ruling or act of such justice
sitting alone or with a jury is the subject of review, except
Gen. Laws E. I. cap. 221, s 4.
by consent of all the parties."
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In Missouri v. Letvis, 101 U. S. 22, 31, Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion, said : ' ' The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United
States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies.
Great diversities in these respects may exist in two states
separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this
line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other
side no such right. Each state prescribes its own modes of
judicial proceeding."
In Broiun v. Levee Commissioners, 50 Miss. 468, the Supreme Court of Mississippi speaking of the meaning of the
phrase "due process of law," uses these words which are
quoted approvingly by Mr. Justice Matthews in Hiirtado v
California, 110 U. S. 516, 536, viz.: ''The principle does
not demand that the laws existing at any point of time shall
be irrepealable, or that any forms of remedies shall neces
sarily continue. It refers to certain fundamental rights
which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours is a
derivative, has always recognized. If any of these are disregarded in the proceedings by which a person is condemned to the loss of life, liberty, or property then the
deprivation has not been by 'due process of law.' "
Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations
(6th ed.), 434, says: "The principles, then, upon which the
process is based are to determine whether it is 'due process' or not, and not any considerations of mere form. Administrative and remedial process may be changed from
time to time, but only with due regard to the landmarks
established for the protection of the citizen."

In our opinion it is not necessary in order not to contra-

vene the constitution either of this State or of the United
States that the justice presiding at the jury trial should
first pass upon the question whether the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence, or that he should sit with the
court required to pass upon that question, in granting a new
trial for that reason.
We are of the opinion that this court has the constitutional right to grant a tt^w trial in a civil case when in its
opinion the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
and that granting such new trial in the case at bar, would
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not be a violation of the constitution either of this State or
of the United States. The plaintiff's motion, therefore, that

this Division dismiss the defendant's petition for a' new
trial and direct the Common Pleas Division to enter judgment on the verdict of the jury in this action, is denied.

CALDWELL

V. WELLS.

Supreme Court of Idaho.
16

1909.

Idaho, 459.

Stewaet, J. — This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's
and materialman's lien under the laws of this state. Upon
the issues presented by the pleadings the court submitted
certain interrogatories to a jury. The jury made answer
to such interrogatories, and the answers were in favor of
The trial judge adopted the findings of the
the defendant.
jury as the findings of the court and entered judgment in
favor of the respondent, A notice of intention to move
for a new trial was served as follows :
"Take notice, that plaintiff, J. W. Caldwell, intends to
move the above-named court to vacate and set aside the
judgment rendered in the above-entitled cause, and to grant
a new trial of said cause, upon the following grounds, to

wit:
"3.

Insufficiency

of the evidence to justify the judg-

ment.

"4.

That the judgment is against the evidence.
*'5.
That the judgment is against law.
* * *
The motion for a new trial was overruled and the
plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order
overruling the motion for a new trial.
*

* *

**********

An application for a new trial is directed to the
verdict of the jury or the decision of the court. The verdict and the decision are supposed to be based n]">ori the
facts. The judgment is based upon the verdict, or the decision or findings of the court. If the verdict or findings of
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the court do not support the judgment, the remedy is not
by moving for a new trial. If, however, the verdict or decision of the court are not supported by the evidence, then
the remedy is to move for a new trial and this requires a
re-examination of the issue of fact. When a new trial is
granted, the finding or verdict is set aside, in which case the
judgment must also fall. In the case of Boston Tunnel Co.
V. McKenzie, 67 Cal. 485, 8 Pac. 22, the court says of Sawyer
V.

Sargents}

"It

is

it,

was held that a motion for new trial cannot be based
on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the judgment, nor can
says the court, be based on the
ground that the judgment
against law. The motion should
be directed at the decision, and not the judgment. '*

is

a

it

a

a
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is

Whether the judgment
authorized by the findings cannot
the
motion for
new trial, for
not be raised on
involved in re-examination of the issues of fact; so in this
case
was not error in the trial court to overrule the motion for
new trial, for the reason that counsel for appellant failed to specify the statutory grounds upon which
such motion could be entertained.
To have entitled the
appellant to have the facts reviewed or have this court determine whether or not the trial court's decision was sup-

65 Cal. 259,

3

1

Pac. 872.
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ported by the evidence, or against the evidence and the law.
counsel should have specified in the notice of intention to
new trial such matters as grounds for granting
move for
new trial. In other words, the motion should have been
directed to the decision of the court, rather than the judgment.
Whether the judgment
correct cannot be deter
new trial; whether the decision
motion for
mined upon
of the court as contra-distinguished from the judgn1on^
was correct, could have been determined upon motion for
reason for
now trial, had such matter been specified as
.q:ranting such new trial. Of course in this case the failure
of the evidence, or that
<"o properly specifv the insufficiencv
law,
would
the decision was aorainst
not have precluded the
court from considering the other proper specifications conthe record
tained in the notice, had tliere been anvthino:
admitted by counsel for
to support such grounds but
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appellant that the sole and only ground upon which a new
trial could have been granted was the insufficiency of the
evidence, and that the decision of the court was against the
evidence and law, and as these grounds were not specified,
* *
the court committed no error in overruling the motion.
For these reasons the judgment is affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.
Sullivan, C. J., and Ailshie, J., concur.

ARMSTEONG V. WHITEHEAD.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
81

Whitfield,

1902,

Mississippi, 35.

C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
sued appellee for $144. In the course of the

Appellant
trial appellee, defendant below, reserved various exceptions
to the action of the court in admitting and excluding evidence.
So it was, however, that ultimately the judgment
was rendered in favor of appellant, plaintiff below, for only
$59. Defendant below made no motion for a new trial, being
satisfied with the result. Plaintiff below, dissatisfied with
the amount of the recovery, made a motion for a new trial,
which was overruled, and then brought the record to this
court by appeal. Defendant below, finding plaintiff below
had appealed, petitioned the circuit clerk for a cross-appeal
and has here cross assigned errors predicated upon the action of the court below in admitting and excluding evidence
in the course of the trial, the court having overruled his
objections, and he liaving excepted at the time. Appellant,
plaintiff below, moves to dismiss the cross-appeal because
the defendant below made no motion for a new trial.
In Chasfine's case, 54 Miss. 503, following the statute
prior to the code of 1892, §739, it was held that this court
would not pass upon the action of the court below in overruling a motion for a new trial, where that particular action
of the court had not been excepted to below, but the court,
nevertheless, looked to the bill of exceptions, and the record,
and for instructions improperly refused, and evidence im-
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properly admitted, reversed the case.

But, let it be marked,
there was a motion for a new trial in that case, and the
court below acted on that motion overruling it. In Sprengler's case, 74 Miss. 129 (s. c, 20 So. 879, s. c, 21 So. 4), the
court pointed out the fact that § 739 of the code of 1892
changed the rule that this court would not pass on the action of the court below in overruling a motion for a new
trial where such action in overruling the motion had not
been excepted to. But, let it be marked again, there was in
Sprengler's case a motion for a new trial, and a judgment
of the court below overruling the motion. The important
thing to note in Chastin's case and Sprengler's case is that
in both the party appealing had specifically called the attention of the court below to the errors complained of, not
simply by excepting in the course of the trial, but by repeating the exceptions in motions for new trials on which
the court acted. It would be very unfair to the court below, for this court to pass upon errors assigned here for
the first time, which had never been called to his attention
in a motion for a new trial below. The object of the motion
for a new trial, and the reason requiring it to be made and
acted on in order that this court may review the action of
the court below, is clearly set out in 14 vol. Ency. of PI.
and Pr., p. 846,

Generally. — The office of a motion for a new trial is
two-fold: first, to present the errors complained of to the
trial court for review and correction, or to secure a new
trial; second, to preserve the same errors in the record, so
that the ruling of the trial court in granting or refusing a
'^a.

new trial may be reviewed by the appellate court. It is a
general rule that all errors correctible by motion for a new
trial and not so assigned are deemed to have been waived
by the applicant for the new trial. Unless the motion for a
"new trial has been presented and considered by the lowei*
court and its ruling preserved, the errors assigned in surh
motion will not be reviewed by the appellate court.
''h. To Obtain Bevicw hy Trial Court. — To secure a review in the trial court of errors committed at the trial, the
complaining party must except to the errors and irregularities at the time when the ruling of the court thereon are
made, and must call attention of the trial court to such
rulings by assigning them as errors, and as grounds for a

ii
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new trial

such errors will be deemed waived.
; otherwise
To Obtain Review by Appellate Court. — (1) Necessity of Motion and Ruling Thereon. — It is a well-known rule
of appellate courts that errors of the trial court occurring
during the trial will not be reviewed unless such errors

" c.

have been called to the attention of the trial court, and an
opportunity given to correct them. It is necessary, therefore, to present such error to the trial court by a motion for
a new trial and to secure a ruling on the motion."
And in Thomp. on Trials, sec. 2712 :
"Motion Necessary to Preserve Errors in the Record for

Revieiv. — The motion is necessary to enable the court to
correct such errors, occurring at the trial, as do not appear
on the face of the record proper, as where it is insisted that
there is no evidence to support the verdict, or that the verdict is against the law and the evidence, or that the evidence
does not authorize the judgment, or that there is an error in
the verdict of the jury, or where it is alleged that court
erred in matter of law, either in admitting or rejecting evidence, or in giving or refusing instructions, or where it is
alleged that there has been misconduct on the part of the
jury, or that the damages assessed are inadequate, or excessive, or in a criminal case, for an alleged error because
of the non-arraignment of the defendant.
The grounds
upon which the motion is to be made are expressly enumerated in a majority of the practice acts of the various States,
and include generally such errors in the mode of trial as do
not otherwise appear on the record, but which are proper
matters of exception. And when no motion for a new trial
is made in the trial court to correct such errors, most of the
decisions hold that they are deemed to have been waived,
and that the appellate court will refuse to review them."
Judge Thompson properly calls attention to the distinction which exists in such cases between those exceptions
which would appear upon the face of the record and which
the judge would be supposed consequently to have always
in mind, and the very different character of exceptions
which are made in the current course of a trial and set forth
in the ordinary bill of exceptions, and which do not appear
elsewhere. Here we have a case in which it would have been
very easy for the defendant to have put the record in such
<hape by making a motion for a new trial, and having the
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court overrule
as would have enabled him when the appellant brought the whole record here, to cross-assign error.
The defendant did not choose to do that. He did not Ccill the
attention of the court below, as
was just he should have
done, to the errors on which he finally relied, by setting
them out in
motion for
new trial, and, of course, there
being no such motion, the court below acted on no such motion.
Unlike Chastine's and Sprengler's cases, the case
new trial at all on the part of the
contains no motion for
defendant below, and for reasons given in the authorities
cited the motion will be sustained.
Cross-appeal dismissed.
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also assigned as error, that illegal evidence was admitted. The plaintiff in error cannot avail himself of this
He made no motion in the court below to set
exception.
aside the verdict of the jury; and the court below as well
as this Court may well suppose he was satisfied with the
verdict. Had he moved to set aside the verdict, on the
ground that the allegation and proof did not agree,
very probable the court would have granted his motion. In
jury no matter how many errors are saved,
case tried by
and exceptions taken to the ruling of the court during tlie
made to set aside the verdict, and
motion
trial, unless
overruled, all such errors saved will by the
that motion
appellate court be deemed to have been waived. The rulings
of the court during the trial are often necessarily hastily
made for new trial on the ground
motion
made, and
made
at the trial, the court may at his
of erroneous rulings
convinced that
leisure critically review his rulings, and,
they were erroneous, will correct them in the only manner
new trial,
he can by setting aside the verdict and granting
writ of error.
and thus save to the parties the expense of
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would be unfair to the trial-judge not to give him an o^jportunity to correct his rulings, if the exceptor is not satisfied with the verdict and intends to take his writ of error.
The exceptions taken during the course of the trial are con
ditional. The exceptor will take advantage of them, provided he is not satisfied with the verdict. If dissatisfied, he
will move to set it aside ; and if his motion is overruled, he
will except; but if satisfied, he makes no such motion,
acquiesces in the verdict and waives his exceptions.
He
be
satisfied with the verdict at the time, for the reason
may
that he would have no hope of changing it to his advantage
by a new trial. It would certainly be unfair, in the absence
of a motion to set aside the verdict, and after considerable
time had elapsed, and the chief witnesses of his adversary
dead, to permit him to have erroneous rulings during the
trial reversed, after he had by his own action at the rendition of the verdict given his adversary to understand^ that
he acquiesced in the verdict.
A new trial for errors committed during the trial can only be had after motion made
in the court below and overruled, as this Court will not ex
mem motu grant a new trial in case no such motion was
made in the court below.
[Hiimplireys v. West, 3 Rand.
516; Miller r. Shreivshury, 10 W. Va. 115; Riddle v. Core,
21 W. Va. 530.)
Of course it is different if the error is in
the pleadings, as in such case there was a mistrial.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed with costs
and damages according to law.

Affirmed.

DUBCICH V. GRAND LODGE ANCIENT ORDER OF
UNITED WORKMEN.
Supreme Court of Washington.
33

Washington,

1903.

651.

judgment of the superior court for King
entered March 13, 1903, upon the verdict
county,
of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff in an action upon
a life policy in a mutual benefit society.
Affirmed.

Appeal from

a

Morris, J.,
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Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that, as no motion for new trial was made, the judgment
cannot, for that reason, be reviewed here. The errors specifically assigned, however, all involve rulings made by the
trial court during the progress of the trial. The office of
the motion for new trial, in its necessary relation to the
appeal, is to give the trial court opportunity to pass upon
questions not before submitted for its ruling such as misconduct of the jury, newly discovered evidence, excessive
damages, error in the assessment of the amount of recovery,
and similar questions. The motion seems to serve no necessary purpose, as far as concerns the review on appeal of
questions once submitted to, and decided by, the trial court.
It is true, if such questions are raised a second time, under
the motion for new trial, the trial court may consider them,
and may review its own rulings made at the trial to the extent of correcting them by granting a new trial. But such
review by the trial court is not necessary in order that questions once actually decided by it in the cause may be considered on appeal. This court in effect so held in Johnson
V. Maxwell, 2 Wash. 482, 27 Pac. 1071, and Kennedy v. Derrickson, 5 Wash. 289, 31 Pac. 766. In the last named case
the court said :
''The only effect which the failure to make such motion
can have upon the proceedings in this court is to limit the
questions which may be properly presented here."
It is contended that those decisions were based upon § 450
of the Code of 1881, which provides that ''the supreme court
may review and reverse on appeal or writ of error any
judgment or order of the district court, although no motion
for a new trial was made in such court;" and it is urged
that no such provision now exists in our statutes. Our attention has, however, not been called to any existing statute
which affirmatively provides that the motion is necessary
as a preliminary to the review on appeal of questions passed
upon during the progress of the trial. We think, in the
absence of such a statute, that the provisions of § 6520, Bal.
Code, are broad enough to authorize the review of such
questions here without a motion for new trial. We refer
particularly to the following in said section:
"Upon an appeal from a judgment, the supreme court
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may review any intermediate order or determination of the
court below which involves the merits and materially affects the judgment appearing upon the record sent up from

superior court."
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

the

Section

HAERINGTON
Supreme

2.

V.

Disqualification of Jurors.

MANCHESTER
RAILROAD.

&

Court of New Hampshire.
62

New Hampshire,

LAWRENCE
1882,

77.

Case, for personal injuries. After the trial, and a verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff moved to set the verdict aside "because the foreman of the jury was an uncle of
the defendants' treasurer, a stockholder in the corporation,
and a witness on the trial. The juror was regularly drawn
from a town in the county, and had been in attendance as a
juror eight days before the trial. The juror understood
Motion
that the defendants' treasurer was a stockholder.
denied.
Allen, J. It is repugnant to the natural sense of justice
that one pecuniarily interested in the event of a trial, or
related to either party to the cause, should decide, or take
part in deciding, its merits. The preservation of confidence
in jury trials, and of purity in the administration of justice, requires that jurors should be free from objections
which are everywhere recognized as disqualifying, and that
they should be *'as impartial as the lot of humanity will
dmit." Bill of Rights, Art. 35. The smallest pecuniary
nterest in the result of a cause disqualifies a juror from sitting, and is a sufficient ground for a challenge for cause
{Page v. Contoocooh Valley Railroad, 21 N. H. 438; Smith
V. B. C. (& M. Railroad, 36 N. H. 458) ; and near relationship
by blood or marriage to a party in interest has always been
Bean v. Quimhy, 5 N.
regarded as having the same effect.
H. 98; Gear v. Smith, 9 N. H. 63; Sanborn v. Fellows, 22 N.
H. 473 ; Moses v. Julian, 45 N. II. 52, 56. The stockholder
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it,

of a corporation having for its object a dividend of profits,
though not a party in a strict or technical sense when the
corporation sues or is sued, is necessarily interested in the
result of the proceeding, and is so far a party in interest
as to come within the disqualifying rule ; and neither he, nor
his near kindred, would ordinarily be permitted to sit as a
juror. Page v. Contoocook Valley Railroad, supra; Smith
V. B. C. & M. Railroad, supra; Moses v. Julian, supra;
Quinehaug Bank v. Leavens, 20 Conn. 87 ; Place v. Butternuts Mfg. Co., 28 Barb. 503 ; Ranger v. Great Western Railway Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 1854. The nephew of the foreman of
the jury was not only a stockholder in the defendant corporation, but was also an important officer testifying in the
He
case, and to some extent representing the defendants.
was so far identified in interest with the corporation, and
known to the juror to be so, that the relationship was a disqualifying objection, and a sufficient cause for challenge.
It has not been the usual practice to disturb a verdict for
a disqualification of one of the jurors rendering
when the
objection has not been taken until after verdict, and was

a

it

it

6

it

a

a

2

it

a

a

;

it,

known, or by reasonable diligence might have been known,
before the trial or before verdict
to the party making
and the burden of showing want of knowledge, and due dilirule, been
gence in discovering the objection, has, as
trial.
for
new
In
Rollins v.
moving
on
the
party
placed
juror
was decided that the fact that
Ames,
N. H. 349,
magistrate, taken the depositions of the witnesses
had, as
of one party was good ground for challenge, but objection
was not made until after the verdict; and the verdict was
not disturbed, because only one of the two attorneys for the
excepting party made and submitted his affidavit that he
It did
was not aware of the objection before the verdict.
not appear that the other attorney, or the party himself,
was aware of the fact of ]oa;n] in^npacitv in season to have
before verdict. In State v. HascalJ.
taken advantage of
N. H. 352, 360, the objection was that the juryman was
drawn more than the required time of twenty days before
was too late to take the obwas decided that
court, and
jection after verdict, on the ground that the party and his
counsel had had opportunity to examine the venires and discover the irregularity before trial, and, failing to do this,
To the same effect are Wilcox
the objection was waived.
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School District, 26 N. H. 303, where only one selectman
was present at the drawing of jurors, and the irregularity
did not appear in the return upon the venire, but only in the
records of the town; Bodge v. Foss, 39 N. H. 406, 407, where
the objection was, that the officers who attended to the drawing of jurors had not been chosen under a new organization of the town after its division by the legislature: and
Pittsfield V. Barnstead, 40 N. H. 477, 497. In all these cases
the objection was taken after verdict, and neither the parties nor their attorneys had knowledge of the objection at
the time of trial.
Having opportunity, and failing to seasonably examine the returns upon the venires and the
records of the town, the objection could not prevail. In
State V. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383, 385, the objection was, that
the juror was prejudiced by previous conversation about
the case, and it did not appear that the prejudice was not
known to the respondent or his counsel before verdict, and
In Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass.
a new trial was refused.
juror
93, the objection that a
was an infant was not taken
until after verdict ; and though the fact of infancy was not
known to the party or his counsel during the trial, it was
decided that there had been sufficient opportunity to learn
the fact, and make the objection at the time the jury was
impanelled to try the case, and that objection after verdict
came too late.
In the opinion, it is said that the same rule
applies to a juror disqualified by reason of interest or relationship; and Jeffries v. Randall, 14 Mass. 205, and Wood .
V ard V. Dean, 113 Mass. 297, are cited as authorities.
Even
in a capital case, application of the rule has been made to
a juror not of the county or vicinage as required by the constitution.
See anonymous case referred to in Amherst v.
Hadley, 1 Pick. 38, 41, 42. In Qninehaug Bank v. Leavens,
20 Conn. 87, objection after verdict was made, that n juror
was the father of a stockholder of the bank, and that the
fact was not known to the defendant or his counsel before
verdict.
This was decided to be a sufficient ground for
challenge, but the objection came too late, the defendant not
having been diligent in inquirv to learn the fact before verdict.
The general rule derived from the cases is. that if the
party has used reasonable diligence to ascertain the competency of a juror, and has failed to discover disqualifpng
V.

T. p.— 40
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facts afterwards proved, and which might operate to his
prejudice in the trial, the verdict will be set aside; otherwise not. Proffat's note to Rollins v. Ames, 9 Am. Dec. 79,
S2.
It does not appear, from any facts in the case, that
the plaintiff used diligence in discovering the relationship
of the juror to a stockholder of the defendants, and the motion to set the verdict aside was properly denied.
Judgment on the verdict.^
Claek, J., did not sit : the others concurred.

1

Sections 2-8 of
may be granted.
for the study of
law grounds and
with the grounds
Common Law.

GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL.

this chapter deal with various grounds upon which new trials
For the jjurpose of affording a convenient basis of reference
these cases, the following summary is given of the common
of the statutory enactments of the various states dealing

for granting new trials.
Tidd enumerates the common law grounds for new trial as
1.
Want of due notice of trial; 2. Material variance between
follows:
3.
Want of
the issue or paper-book delivered and the record of nisi prius;
a proper jury;
Misbehaviour of the prevailing party, towards the jury or
4.
5.
Unavoidable
absence of attorneys or witnesses, or the diswitnesses;
6.
Perjury of witcovery of new and material evidence since the trial;
7.
Misdirection of the
nesses on whose testimony the verdict was obtained;
8.
Error
judge, or the admission or exclusion of evidence contrary to law;
or mistake of the jury in finding a verdict without or contrary to evidence;
10.
Excessive
Misbehaviour of the jury in casting lots for their verdict;
9.
2 Tidd's Practice, *903,
damages.
AlabamM,:
No statutory

Arizona:

"New

enumeration

Rev. St. 1901,

of grounds.
sec.

1472.

trials may be granted
motion for good cause

rested on
shall direct.

' '

and judgments
may be set
such terms and conditions

on

aside or aras the court

Kirby's Digest, 1904, sec. 6215.
Arkansas:
"1. Irregularity in the proceeding of the court, jury or prevailing party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by which the party was prevented from having a fair trial.
Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party.
2.
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
3.
against.
Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence
4.
of passion or prejudice.
Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large
5.
or too small, where the action is ui)on a contract, or for the injury or detention of j)roperty.
Thfit the verdict or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or
6.
ia contrary to law.
Newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which he
7.
could not with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
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Error of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the party mak8.
' '
ing the application.
Code Civ. Pro., sec. 657.
California:
' '
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party,
1.
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
2.
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding
on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determinaion v^f chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one
of the jurors.
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
3.
against.
Newly discovered evidence material for the party making the applica4
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced

at the

trial.

Excessive dan.ages, appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or ])rejudice.
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision; or
6.
that it is against law.
7.
Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making
"
the application.
5.

Colorado:
Code Civ. Pro., Sec. 256.
Same as the California statute, with term "referee" added under 1st
ground, and the words "or inadequate" inserted before damages under 5th
ground.
Connecticut:
Practice Act, sec. 815.
*'
The superior court, court of common pleas, district court of Waterbury,
and any city court, may grant new trials of causes that may come before them
respectively, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence, want of actual
notice of the suit to any defendant, or of a reasonable opportunity to appear
and defend, when a just defense in whole or in part existed; or for other
reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases."
Delaware:
No statutory

enumeration

of grounds.

District of Columbia:

Comp. St., 1894, Ch. 55, sec. 6.
The justice who tries the cause may, in his discretion, entertain a motion,
to be made on his minutes, to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial upon
exceptions, or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages; but such motion shall be made at the same term at which the trial was had. ' '
' '

Florida :
No statutory enumeration of grounds.
Georgia:
1 Code, 1911, sec. 6088.
all applications for a new trial on other grounds, not provided for in
this Code, the presiding judge must exercise a sound legal discretion in
granting or refusing the same according to the provisions of the common law
and practice of the courts."

"In

Code Civ. Pro., sec. 4439.
Same as the California statute.

Idaho:

Illinois:

Kurd's

St., Ch. 110, sec. 57.
where a new trial shall be granted on account of improper
instructions having been given by the judge, or improper evidence
admitted
or because the verdict of the jury is contrary to the weight of the
evidence or
for any other cause not the fault of the party applying for such new trial
'
said new trial shall be granted without costs, and as of right."

"In

all

cases
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Burn's Ann. St., sec. 585.
Same as the Arkansas statute, except 4, which
' '
damages.

[Chap.

Indiana:

reads simply,

17

"Excessive

Indian Territory:
St. 1899, sec. 3556.
Same as the Arkansas statute.
Iowa:
Code, 1897, sec. 3755.
Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the term "referee" occurs after
"jury" and after the second use of the word "court," in 1, and the term
"report" occurs after the word "verdict" in 6; and another ground is added
as follows:
' '
That the pleadings of the prevailing party do not state facts suffi9.
cient to constitute a cause of action or defense, as the case may be, specifying wherein they are defective. ' '
Kansas:

G. S. 1909, sec. 5899.
Because of abuse of discretion of the court, misconduct of the jury
or party, or accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, or for any other cause whereby the party was not afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence and be heard on the merits
of the ease.
Erroneous rulings or instructions of the court.
2.
That the verdict, report or decision was given under the influence of
3.
passion or prejudice.
4.
That the verdict, report or decision is in whole or in part contrary to
the evidence.
For newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which he
5.
could not with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial."
*'

1.

Kentucky:

Code, 1900, sec. 340.
Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the words
are added to 2.

Louisiana:

"A

new

Garland's Rev. Code,
trial shall be granted;

1901,
1.

"or of

his attorney"

sec. 560.

If

the judgment

appear

clearly

con-

If the party has discovered, since the trial,
2.
trary to law and evidence;
evidence important to the cause, which he could not, with due diligence, have
If the cause has been tried by a jury, and it be shown
obtained before; 3.
that the jury has been bribed, or has behaved improperly, or that impartial
justice has not been done in the cause."
Maine:

E.

Ch. 84, sec. 54.
the supreme judicial or of a superior court may, at the
same term at which it is rendered, set aside a verdict and grant a new trial
in a case tried before him, when in his opinion the evidence demands it."
S.

1903,

"Any justice of

Maryland :
No statutory

enumeration

of grounds.

Kev. Laws, 1902, Ch. 173.
The courts may, at any time before judgment, set aside the ver112.
dict in a civil action and order a new trial for any cause for which a new
trial may by law be granted.
A new trial may be granted, upon motion, for a mistake of
Sec. 113.
law or for newly discovered evidence in a case heard by the court."
Massachusetts:

"Sec.

Michigan :
No statutory

enumeration

of grounds.

Rev. Laws, 1905, sec. 4198.
Minnesota:
"1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, referee, jury or prevailing party, or any order or abuse of discretion, whereby the moving party wa«
deprived of a fair trial:
Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;
2.
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which could not have been

prevented by ordinary

7>rndence;

4.
Material evidence, newly discovered, which with reasonable diligence
could not have been found and produced at the trial.
5.
Excessive or insufficient damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
6.
Errors of law occurring at the trial, and either excepted to at the time,
or clearly assigned in the notice of motion.
That the verdict, decision or report is not justified by the evidence,
7.
or is contrary to law."

Mississippi :
No statutory

enumeration

of grounds.

Missouri:

Ann. St., 1906, sec. 800.
every case where there has been a mistake or surprise of a party, his
agent or attorney, or a misdirection of the jury by the court, or a mistake
by the jury, or a finding contrary to the direction of the court, or a fraud
or deceit practiced by one party on the other, or the court is satisfied that
perjury or mistake has been committed by a witness, and is also satisfied that
an improper verdict or finding was occasioned by any such matters, and that
the party has a just cause of action or of defense, it shall, on motion of the
proper party, grant a new trial, and, if necessary, permit the pleadings to be
amended on such terms as may be just."
' '

In

Montana:

Eev. St., 1907, sec. 6794.
Same as the California statute.

Nebra^lca:
Code Civ. Pro., sec. 314.
Same as the Arkansas statute except that term "referee" occurs after
"jury" and after the second use of the word "court" in 1, and the term
"report" occurs after the word "verdict" in 6.
Nevada:
C. L. 1900, sec. 3290.
Same as the California statute except 2, which

of

the

jury."

reads merely "Misconduct

New Hampshire: Pub. St., 1901, Chap. 230.
new trial may be granted in any case, when through accident, mistake or
misfortune justice has not been done and a further hearing would be equitable. ' '

"A

New Mexico :
No statutory

enumeration

of grounds.

Code Civ. Pro., sec. 999.
New York:
"The judge presiding at a trial by a jury may, in his discretion, entertain
a motion, made upon his minutes, at the same term, to set aside the verdict,
or a direction dismissing the complaint, and grant a new trial upon exceptions; or because the verdict is for excessive or insufficient damages, or otherwise contrary to evidence, or contrary to law."

Norlh Carolina:

Eevisal of 1905, sec. 554.
judge who tries the cause may, in his discretion, entertain a motion,
to be made upon his minutes, to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial
upon exceptions, or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages."

"The

Eev. Codes, 1905,
Same as the California statute.

North Bal-ota:
Ohio:

sec.

7063.

Gen. Code, 1910, sec. 11576.
Same as the Arkansas statute, except that the words 'referee, master" occur after the word "jury" and the word "referee" occurs after the second
use of the word "court" in 1, and the word "report" occurs after the word

"verdict" in

6.
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Comp. Laws, 1909, sec. 5825.
Same as the Arkansas statute except that the word "referee" occurs after
"jury" and after the second use of the word "court" in 1, and the word
' '
" in 6.
''
occurs after ' ' verdict
report

OHahnma:

Lord's Oregon Laws, sec. 174.
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, .i"ry or adverse party, or
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by Mhich such party was prevented from having a fair trial;
Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;
2.
Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
3.
Oregon:

"1.

against

;

Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and pro4.

duced at the trial;
Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence
5.
of passion or prejudice ;
Insuflficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
6.
that it is against law;
Error in law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the party mak7.
ing the application."

Pennsylvania :
No statutory
See:

2

enumeration
Ash. 3L

of grounds.

Code of Laws, 1902,
Circuit courts shall have power to grant new trials in cases
where there has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new trials have
usually been granted in the Courts of law of this State."
Sec. 286,
Same as the North Carolina Statute.

South Carolina

"Sec.

:

2734.

South Dalcota:
Code Civ. Pro., sec. 300.
Same as the California statute,
Tennessee :
No statutory

enumeration

of grounds.

Texas:
Sayles Civ. St., sec. 1370.
New trials may be granted, and judgments may be set aside or arrested on
motion for good cause, on such terms and conditions as the court shall direct.
C. L. 1907, sec. 3292,
Same as the California statute.

Utah:

Vermont :
No statutory

enumeration

of grounds.

Virginia:

Code, 1904, sec. 3392.
any civil case or j)roceeding, the court before which a trial by jury
is had, may grant a new trial, unless it be otherwise specially provided,
A
new trial may be granted as well where the damages awarded are too small as
where they are excessive. ' '

"In

Washington:
1

-

4, same

E. & B. 's Ann. Codes, sec. 399,
as 1 - 4 in California.

"5. Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
6.
Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large
or too small, when the action is upon a contract, or for the injury or detention of property."
- 7 in C.-ilifornia.
Same as
7 - 8,
West Virgivia:
'^ndo, lOOfi, sec. 3985.
Same aa Virginia.
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irijiconsin:

St. 1898, sec. 2878.
The judge before whom the issue is tried may, in his discretion, entertain a motion to be made on his minutes to set aside a verdict and grant a
new trial upon exceptions or because the verdict is contrary to law or contrary to evidence, or for excessive or inadequate damages."
' '

Wyoming:

Comp. St., 1910, sec. 4601.
statute except that the words ' ' referee, master ' ' occur after the word "jury" and the word "referee" occurs after the second use of the word "court" in 1, and the word "report" occurs after the
*
" in 6.
word * verdict
Same

as the Arkansas

JOHNS V. HODGES.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
60

18S3.

Maryland, 215.

**********

Ritchie, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
After

verdict was rendered, the defendant, discovering that two of the jnrors were under twenty-five years of
age, on the ground of this want of proper age and his previous ignorance of
filed motion for new trial, and also
petition that the Court refuse to certify the verdict of the
jurv to the Orphans' Court, because void and illegal.
The Court refused to grant new trial and also to grant
the petition, which
treated as in the nature of
motion
for new trial upon the ground that the objection was not
a

a

a

a

it

a

n

it,

the

it

a

it

a

a

If

a

taken in time.
In the course of its opinion upon the point presented the
Court forcibly remarks: ''It was competent for the defendant to have made the proper inquiries, and after having satisfied himself on the subject, to have made the objection before the juror was sworn, but this he neglected to
party to
do.
He waited until he had lost his case.
verdict
suit may omit to make such inquiries until after
aside
lias been rendered against him, and may then set
good
on discovery and proof of the existence of
cause of
challenge against any one of the jury,
would introduce
an additional element of uncertainty in the administration
of justice, and lead in many cases to great and unnecessary
delay and expense.'*

Under our present jury system, while the law aims to ex-

632
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elude persons under twenty-five years of age from serving
on juries, from tlie nature of the methods prescribed by the
statute for drawing a jury, no certain means are provided
for the absolute exclusion of such persons. The presumption arises, therefore, not that the officers charged with the
duty of preparing the lists have wholly succeeded in securing those free from all statutory disability, but that they
have succeeded so far as diligence and good faith within the
scope of their opportunities have enabled them to do so.
That the officers charged with the selection of the jury will
endeavor to discharge that duty according to law is an obligation not peculiar to those who provide the jury under
our present system; but has been incident to the summoning of jurors from time immemorial.
But the presumption
that jurors only have been provided who have the proper
legal qualifications has not been of that character as to renThe right of challenge
der needless the right of challenge.
itself is a safeguard provided by law in contemplation of
the contingency that the officers whose duty it is to select
only qualified persons have failed in the performance of that
duty. It is a means specially provided by which a party to
a suit ma}^ readily and effectually protect himself against
any oversight or neglect committed in the original selection.
That men may be, and are, summoned, who are not contemplated by the law as the subjects of jury duty, is common
And as the consequences of such an error can
experience.
be readily obviated by inquiry and challenge when they
come to be sworn, it is laches not to avail of so simple and
efficacious a means of protection, where prejudice is apprehended or may be rendered im]:»ossible, as examination
Not to exerand challenge before the jury is empanelled.
a
matter
when
so
simple
as
the
right,
age of the
cise this
juror is to be ascertained, or where he resides, but to proceed to trial unimformed, and then endeavor after verdict
to avail of a defect in these respects, would be not only to
entail a loss of time, labor and money that a little diligence
at the outset would have prevented, but to offer an inducement to suitors to await the verdict before questioning the
f|iialification of the jnror, that, if favorable, the objection
may be suppressed, and if ndverse, that it may then be called
into requisition. No snch lottery is to be encouraged.
Among the numerous cases which decide that what ia
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for challenge cannot

be relied on to set aside the verchallenge has not been exercised, are

dict, if the right of
Minna Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch. 290; Hollingsworth v.
Duane, 4 Dall. 353 ; Amherst v. Hadley, 1 Pick. 38 ; People
V. Jewett, 6 Wendell, 386; United States v. Baker, 3 Bene
diet, 68; Gormley v. Laramore, 40 Ga. 253; Wassum v. Fee
ney, 121 Mass. 93 ; Rex v. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cress, 417.
The fact that the party was not aware of the disqualifi
cation when the jury was empanelled is not material; because he might have known it. In the cases in 4 Dall., 3
Benedict, 121 Mass., and 40 Ga., just cited, the disqualification was not known when the juror was sworn. The case
in 121 Mass., was very similar in its facts to those relied
The objection was to the infancy of
on by the appellant.
the juror, which was unknown to the defendant until the
Gray,
time of making his motion to set aside the verdict.
C. J., in delivering the opinion of the Court, fully reviews
the decisions bearing on the subject.
Lord Tenterden, in
Rex V. Sutton, goes so far as to say: ''I am not aware that
new trial has ever been granted on the ground that a juror
was liable to be challenged, if the party had an opportunity
of making his challenge."
a

**********

Rulings affirmed, and cause remanded.

FITZPATRICK

V. HARRIS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
16

1855.

B. Monroe, 561.

* * *

A new trial was asked upon the ground that Elliott
had been improperly admitted to testify, and that one of the
jurors who sat on the last trial had also sat on the first
trial.

* * *

Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the

court.

Though the affidavit of the defendant states that he did
not know until after he was accepted, that Salyers, who was
one of the jury on the last trial, had been one of the jury on

G34:
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the former trial, (when a verdict was found for the plaintiff,) it is not a sufficient ground for a new trial. The objection might have been made at any time before the juror
was sworn, and, as we think, at any time before the entire
jury was sworn, and the fact should have been made known
as soon as discovered, at any time before the jury retired,
when it might have been in the power of the parties to cure
or waive the objection.
Besides, the record of the former
trial furnished to the parties and their counsel the means of
knowing the names of the jurors who had then tried the
case, and even if they were not personally known, the identity of name would suggest the probable indentity of the person ; and even without the trouble of examining the record,
the fact that there had been a previous trial, authorized, and
should have suggested, the question to be asked of the juror
himself, whether he had been one of the former jury. With
such opportunities of ascertaining the fact, the failure to
disclose it until it is made the ground of asking a new trial,
raises a presumption of bad faith, or of wilfuU neglect,
which can only be overcome by showing such extraordinary

makes out no ground for

a

is

it,

circumstances, if there can be any such, as will account for
ignorance where the party ought to have knowledge, and
excuse neglect where he is bound to be diligent. In this
case the affidavit of Salyers proves that he and the defendant were familiar acquaintances and friends. — And thus the
circumstances strengthen instead of repelling the unfavorable presumptions in the case. And we may add, that even
if the defendant himself were ignorant, it is not shown that
his counsel, who conducted the defense, did not know the
fact now brought forward, nor, if they were ignorant of
any reason shown for their neglecting the means of knowlThe affidavit, therefore,
edge so easily within their power.
new trial.

Affirmed.
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V.

STEELE.

Court of Tennessee.

1901.

107 Tennessee, 1.

Wilkes,

J.

This is a suit against the Endowment Bank
of the Order of Knights of Pythias to recover $3,000, the
amount of a benefit certificate in the fourth class upon the
life of J. K. Steele, j)ayable to his wife as beneficiary.

**********

It

is assigned as error that the Court below erroneously
refused to grant a new trial on the grounds of incompetency
and misconduct of the jury.
It appears that three of the
jurors who sat upon the case, to wit, Munroe, Felts and
Flanaghan, had served upon the jury in Shelby County with-

5090.
a

that

a

is

good objection generally, after verdict,
not
juror who sat on the case was incompetent propter

While

it

§

4

6,

I.,

in two years before they were called upon the jury in this
case, and were therefore incompetent.
It appears that the
jury was placed in the box and tendered to the parties in a
body. Counsel for the Order, when the jury was thus tendered, asked the question of them collectively if any one of
them had served as a juror on a regular panel in any Court
in Shelby County within the last two years, and each shook
his head.
It appears also that when this jury was made up on the
Monday preceding the trial, for service generally in the
Court, two of them, Munroe and Flanaghan, were examined
separately and individually by the presiding Judge, and
each answered that he had not served on any regular jury in
the county of Shelby within the two years next preceding.
The other juror, Felts, appears not to have been present and
was not examined on that occasion, but it is reasonably certain from the record that he was examined when he was afterward chosen, though he sitates he was not.
We are of the opinion that these jurors were not the good
and lawful men to whom the parties were entitled as jurors
of the Constitution. Neeley v.
Section
under Article
were not competent to serve
180.
They
Bax.
The State,
as jurors, and were subject to challenge. Shannon's Code,
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defectum, and it does not matter whether the fact was known
to the parties or not, yet this rule proceeds npon the idea
that the juror miglit have been examined before being selected or the parties might have ascertained the fact and excluded such juror by challenge.
But in this case the counsel for the company exercised reasonable precaution to ascertain if the jury or any one of them was incompetent by
inquiring of the jurors themselves, and had the assurance of
competency, from the presumption that the trial Judge examined them upon that point when they were placed on the
regular jury, and the actual fact of a second examination by
Tlic jurors explained that they were mistaken
himself.
about the time when they served, and did not intend to
However this may have been,
state a falsehood or mislead.
the fact of incompetency existed, and counsel for the company was misled and deceived, after taking proper precautions to ascertain the fact, and by the jurors themselves
while either actually or virtually under oath, and it was not
simply a case of want of knowledge of incompetency nor a
waiver of incompetency, with or without knowledge of its
existence, in which case the exception being propter defectum, must be considered as waived ; but it is a case where
the exception was reasonably made, or would have been
made but for the incorrect or false statements of the jurors,
which misled the defendant's counsel and influenced his action. It is true counsel might have examined the jury books
of the Court, and such other Courts in Shelby County as
had jurors, but this would have been an extraordinary precaution, which would have consumed time and delayed the
Court, and he could not be required so to do.

of the Court below is reversed, and the
cause remanded, and appellee will pay costs of appeal.
The judgment
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UNITED STATES V. CHRISTENSEN.
Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.
7

1890,

Utah, 26.

Anderson, J.
The defendant was indicted for unlawful cohabitation,
He moved for a new trial upand was tried and convicted.
on the ground, among others, of misconduct of the jury
tending to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case,

based upon affidavits showing that one John Harris, who
was one of the petit jury which convicted him, was on the
grand jury which found the indictment, and tliat the fact

was not known of him or his counsel until after the verdict,
and that the juror stated falsely on his voir fizre that he had
not formed or expressed an unqualified opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused of the offense charged.
The motion was sustained, and a new trial granted, and the
United States excepted to the ruling of the court, and now
prosecutes this appeal from the order of the court granting
a new trial.
When the juror Harris was called, he was
sworn on his voir dire, and interrogated by defendant's
counsel as follows : ' ' Do you know the defendant ? Do you
know any of the witnesses named on the back of the indictment? Have you talked with any person regarding this
case?
Have you ever formed or expressed an opinion as
To each of
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant?"
these questions he answered in the negative, and was accepted as a juror in the case.
The only question to be determined is whether the court
erred in sustaining the motion for a new trial. In the case
of People V. Reece, 3 Utah, 72, 2 Pac. Rep. 61, it was held
that where a juror falsely stated, upon examination under
oath as to his qualifications as a juror, that he was a citizen
of the United States, and neither of the defendants knew or
had reason to believe until after verdict that he was not a
citizen, the defendants could not be deemed to have waived
their right to a jury of twelve men possessing the qualification of citizenship, and, being guilty of no negligence or
want of watchfulness, were entitled to have the verdict set
aside, and a new trial granted. In People v. Lewis, 4 Utah,
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Pac. Eep. 543, the defendant was convicted of grand
One of the trial jury which convicted him was a
larceny.
member of the grand jury which found the indictment
against him. Neither the defendant nor his counsel knew
this until after the verdict. The defendant moved for a
new trial, which was overruled, and the ruling was affirmed
in this court upon the ground of the defendant's negligence
in not making sufficient inquiries as to the qualifications of
The jurors were sworn on their voir dire, and
the jurors.
interrogated as to their statutory qualifications, to which no

42,

5

Counsel for defendant then examined
answer was given.
the jurors as follows :
''Are you acquainted with the defendant, Walter Lewis,
here? Have any of you heard so much about his case as to
form or express an opinion, an unqualified opinion, concerning his guilt or innocence? If any of you have, make it
will not put questions directly to each of you."
known.
The jurors were then asked if any of them were related to
the prosecuting witness, and if they had formed or expressed an opinion from anything they had heard him say, and hi'
''You don't seem to answer, and will not put thv
added:
No statement of th'
question to any of you particularly."
was
made to the jurors,
facts constituting the alleged offense
and hence, the court say, the jurors could not well have
known whether they had an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or not, and that, taking into consideration the timidity and apparent unwillingness of many
jurors to answer questions unless they are individually interrogated, it is not surprising that there was no response
to the questions of defendant's counsel. The court was of
the opinion that interrogating the jurors in such a general
way was such negligence that the defendant could not, after
an unfavorable verdict, successfully move for a new trial,
when, with the proper diligence, good ground for a chalThe court
lenge of the juror would have been discovered.
said, however, that "an express unqualified answer that the
juror is a citizen, or that he has not formed or expressed an
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, is sufficient to relieve the defense from further investigation unless there is something to put the party upon furthf^r inquiry." In the present case the defendant's counsel asked
the juror whether he had formed or expressed an opinion

I

I
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:is to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and he answered that he had not, and under the ruling in People v. Lewis,
supra, the defendant was not bound to pursue the investiga-

tion further. It is not shown that the juror Harris had
formed or expressed an unqualified opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant further than the fact that he
was one of the grand jury that found the indictment against
him, and as to this fact he was not interrogated.
The case
of Rice V. State, 16 Ind. 298, was precisely like the one at
bar in its facts. One of the trial jurors had been one of the
grand jury which found the indictment.
The juror was not
asked as to whether he had been on the grand jury that
found the indictment, but was asked whether he had formed
or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
The fact that he
accused, and answered that he had not.
the
had been on
grand jury was not discovered until after
verdict, and, on a motion for a new trial, the affidavit of the
juror was filed in support of the verdict to the effect that at
the time of being examined he had no opinion as to the defendant's guilt, and had forgotten the circumstance of his
The court held that the
having been on the grand jury.
defendant was entitled to a new trial, and was guilty of no
negligence in not sooner discovering the fact of the juror's
incompetency, but that, if the fact had been known to the accused at the time the jury was accepted and sworn, he could
not afterwards have been heard to make the objection.
An objection to a juror such as is raised in this case is not
such as allienage,
like merely technical disqualifications,
non-residence, and the like, which do not tend to impeach
It is possibly
the fairness and impartiality of the jury.
true that the juror in this case had no opinion at the time
of his examination as to the guilt or innocence of the acHe may have forgotten that he was on the grand
cused.
jury that found the indictment. He may have voted against
finding the indictment, or may have been absent when it was
found, as twelve of the fifteen jurors constitute a quonmi,
and may transact business ; but the presumptions of the law
are all to the contrary, and, in the absence of any showing to
that effect, ho must be presumed to have participated in the
finding of the indictment, and to have formed an opinion as
It might be posto the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
sible, also, even if the juror had formed an unqualified be-
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lief of the defendant's guilt from the evidence submitted to
the grand jury, to change the opinion by evidence at the

if he were a man of candor and intelligence. But the
defendant has a right to be tried by an impartial jury. A
juror who, acting on his own oath as a grand juror, and upon the sworn testimony of witnesses, has already formed an
opinion as to the defendant's guilt, and has solemnly accused him of a crime, should not be deemed an impartial or
proper juror to try him. Having served on the grand jury
which found the indictment and having formed or expressed
an unqualified opinion or belief that the prisoner is guilty
or not guilty of the offense charged, are each a ground of
challenge to a juror for implied bias. 2 Comp. Laws 1888,
And where the accused properly ex§ 5022, subds. 4, 8.
amines the jurors concerning their qualifications, and they
do not answer truthfully, he is thereby not only deprived of
his right of challenge for cause, but may also be prevented
from exercising his right of peremptory challenge. If, in
such a case, a defendant, in trying to ascertain whether
the jurors are competent or not, without negligence on his
part, is denied a new trial, the greatest injustice might be
done. In this case the names of the grand jurors did not
appear on the indictment, the law only requiring that the
name of the foreman should appear ; and there was nothing
to notify defendant that the juror had been on the grand
jury that found the indictment, nor to put him on inquiry.
It is true if he had searched the records of the court he
would have ascertained that fact, and it would have been
commendable prudence and diligence to have done so; but
we do not think his failure to do so is such negligence as
should deprive him of the right to be tried by an impartial
jury, especially in view of the false answer given by the
juror. The motion for a new trial was properly granted.
In support of the views above expressed, see Com. v. Hussey, 13 Mass. 221; Dilworth v. Com., 65 Amer. Dec. 264;
Bennett v. State, 24 Wis. 57 ; Hayne, New Trials, § 45, and
Our attention has been
See, also section 64.
cases cited.
called to a number of cases where, upon the same state of
facts as are presented here, a different conclusion has been
reached, but we think the weight of authority as well as of
trial,
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reason is iu accordance with this opinion.
The ruling of the
district court is affirmed.
Zane, C. J., and Henderson, J., concurred.

FLORENCE, EL DORADO & WALNUT VALLEY RAIL
ROAD COMPANY V. WARD.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
29

1883,

Kansas, 354.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Valentine, J. : This action grows out of a condemnation
proceeding instituted in Butler county by the Florence El
Dorado & Walnut Valley railroad company, to acquire a
right-of-way for its railroad over the lands of J. R. Ward
and others. Ward, being dissatisfied with the award of the
commissioners, appealed to the district court of said county
by which appeal he became the plaintiff, the railroad company became the defendant.
The case was then tried beThe jury consisted of Robert F.
fore the court and a jury.
Moore, R. H. Steele, Harry Jones, James Hughes, and
others. In impaneling the jury the following proceedings,

among others, were had:
R. H. Steele, examined by plaintiff's attorney: Q. Have
the facts, or what purported to be the facts, been related in
your presence or hearing. A. Yes, sir ; to a large extent.
have heard a great deal of the case.
Have you heard what purported to be the facts of the
Q.
damages the plaintiff has sustained?
A.
have heard the
iircumstances of the land and the conditions through which
the road ran through there, explained to me.

I

I

**********

R. H. Steele, examined by defendant's attorney: * * *
Have you from Mr. Ward or others heard of a comQ.
promise having been made by the defendant railroad company to Mr. Ward in regard to this suit?
(Plaintiff objects as immaterial and irrelevant, which the
court overrules, the plaintiff at the time excepting.)
A. Yes, sir j I have.
T. P.—

il
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what you heard, was any amount stated?
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A.

It

was.
Q.

Did you, at the time you heard it form any opinion as

to whether that amount was more or less than Ward ought
to receive?
(Plaintiff objects as immaterial, which objection the
court overrules.)
A.
believe
did.

I

I

(Defendant's counsel challenge R. H, Steele for cause

)

The court overruled defendant's challenge for cause, to
which ruling the defendant at the time excepted.
The jury found a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and assessed the amount of
the damages at the sum of $1,050.
The defendant then
moved the court for a new trial upon various grounds, and
among others, on the ground of misconduct on the part of
the jury.
The alleged misconduct was principally that of
R. H. Steele. On the hearing of the motion for a new trial,
the several jurors were examined orally with reference to
certain matters occurring during their deliberations with
reference to their verdict. A portion of their evidence is
as follows:
[It was shown that Steoile, in order to get the verdict

above $1,000, stated to the other jurors that the defendant
had offered to pay the plaintiff $1,000, and also that unless
the verdict was above $1,000, the plaintiff would have to
pay the costs.] ^
Upon the foregoing evidence, these questions arise: 1.
Was the juror Steele a competent and impartial juror? 2.
Was he guilty of misconduct while the jury were deliberating upon their verdict?
The plaintiff claims that the juror was competent and impartial, and that he was not guilty of any misconduct; while
the defendant claims the reverse. * * *
The plaintiff also claims that the defendant did not exhaust its peremptory challenges ; that, at the time the jury
were impaneled and sworn and the trial commenced, the defendant still had one peremptory challenge, which it might
1

The matter inclosed in brackets is

editor.

a condensation

of facts made by the
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have exercised in discharging Steele from the jury if it had
so chosen; but that it did not so choose, and therefore
We have examined
Steele remained a member of the jury.
claim
seems to be correct.
this claim of the plaintiff, and the
The record does not show that the defendant exercised
more than two of its peremptory challenges, while, under
the statutes, each party is entitled to three.
(Civil Code,
defendant
did
not
exercise all
This
fact,
that
the
§ 271.)
its peremptory challenges, we think must have an important bearing in the case. It is our opinion that the juror
Steele was not a fair and impartial juror, though his preconceived opinions in the case were not so manifestly prejudicial as to render him an unmistakably incompetent
juror. It is also our opinion that he was guilty of unquestionable misconduct in acting as he did in the jury room,
and while the jury were deliberating upon their verdict, but
his misconduct was not so flagrantly wrong, or so manifestly prejudicial in its influences, as to make it clear that the
verdict might have been affected thereby. And while we
think that the court below should have discharged the juror
Steele on account of his admitted opinions in the case, yet
it is difficult for us to say that the court below committed
material error in refusing to do so ; and while we think that
the court below might very properly have granted a new
trial on the grounds of his prejudice and misconduct, and
the previous failure on the part of the court to discharge
him, yet it is difficult for us to say, under all the circum
stances of the case, that the court below committed any material error in refusing to so grant such new trial. Parties
are usually held to the strictest vigilance in impaneling
juries, and generally if an improper person is allowed to
remain on the jury through the fault or negligence or want
of proper diligence on the part of any party, such party
In the present case, the defendant knew
cannot complain.
that the juror Steele believed that the defendant had offered
to confess judgment for a certain amount, and it knew that
the juror believed that he knew what that amount was;
and yet the defendant failed to challenofo the juror peremptorily, although at the completion of the panel it still retained one of its peremptory challenges, unused and unexer"We think, under such circumstances, it would be
cised.
proper to hold that the defendant was willing to take the
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of his acting fairly
and impartially in the case; and that if he did not do so
with reference to the facts of which the defendant knew the
as he was, and to take the chances

juror had knowledge, the defendant should not complain.

A

party should not be allowed to decline to exercise his peremptory challenges in discharging supposed incompetent
jurors, and thereby to keep the question open as to their
incompetency until after it is ascertained that the verdict
is against him, and then allowed him to again raise the
He should be compelled to use
question as to competency.
all reasonable means to discharge all objectionable jurors
before the commencement of the trial ; and the failure to do
so must be considered as a waiver of all known objections.
And afterward if the juror should act as it might reasonably be supposed he would act under the circumstances, the
party failing to remove him, when he could so easily have
done so

if

he had so chosen, should not be allowed to comthe present case, the incompetency of the juroi'

plain. In
was slight and not very clear, and his misconduct was also
slight, and not necessarily prejudicial to the defendant's
rights, and probably neither his incompetency nor his misconduct had any effect upon the verdict of the jury; but
even if it had, it was partially the fault of the defendant
in not removing him by one of its peremptory challenges.
According to the testimony of the several jurors, nearly all
of them were in favor of assessing the damages at from
$1,100 to $1,200, instead of $1,050, as they finally did ; and
it seems almost certain that if the juror Steele had not said
a word, the verdict would not have been any less than it
was. Such seems to be the testimony of all the jurors, and
their testimony was oral, and in the presence of the trial
Hence we cannot say, under all the circumstances,
court.
that the court below committed material error in refusing to
grant the defendant a new trial on the ground of the incompetency and misconduct of the juror Steele.

**********

The judgment of the court below will
All the justices concurring.

be

affirmed.
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V. OLD COLONY

COMPANY.

or Paety.^

STREET RAILWAY

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
31

a

1910.

Rhode Island, 253,

Johnson, J. * * *
After verdict, the defendant in due time filed
new trial upon the following grounds :

a

motion for

"Sixth.

That said defendant did not have a fair trial of
said cause before a competent and impartial jury, inasmuch
as one member of said jury, namely, Louis Sisson, was repeatedly intoxicated while said trial was in progress and
testimony was being taken therein before said jury, and
was asleep during a part of the time when said trial was in
progress and testimony was being taken therein, and was
biased and prejudiced against the defendant, as shown by
remarks made by him to other persons while said cause
was being tried and during adjournments taken bv said
court, and misconducted himself in other ways, all of which
will be shown by affidavits to be filed in court in support
of this motion, said affidavits when filed to become a part
of this motion by reference.

***

*

#

*

*

*

*

*

*j)

After hearing counsel and considering the affidavits, the
trial justice denied the motion so far as it was based on the
verdict being against the evidence and the weight thereof,
and against the law. He also denied it so far as based upon the condition and misconduct of the juror Sisson and his
* * *
bias and prejudice.

**********

(1) We have, therefore, in this case, a mass of testimony to the effect that, for at least two days, a juror, during the progress of the trial was so much under the influence of liquor that he was asleep a large part of the
He so far lost his power of self-control as to be untime.
1 As to misconrluct of an attorney ns ground for a new trial,
"Argument and Conduct of Counsel," s^ipra, Chapter XII.

see cases under
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able to walk steadily in and out of the jury-box, and by
his foolish and childish actions, while testimony was being
put in, revealed his own inattention and disturbed the jurors
near him. He was boisterous and profane in his language,
and talked freely about the case with strangers during the
court recesses. According to a great number of witnesses,
he was, during the court proceedings, so much intoxicated
that it was impossible for him to understand and weigh intelligently the evidence that was introduced in the case.
The authorities are unamimous in recognizing the grave
danger of the use of intoxicating liquor by jurors, and condemn in the strongest terms the indulgence in drinking by
jurors while sitting in the trial of a case. Some jurisdictions, especially Iowa and Texas, have held that the mere
fact of drinking spirituous liquors by jurymen during the
trial of a case, without regard to the quantity used or itfe
effect, is sufficient ground for the granting of a new trial.
Ryan v. Harroiv, 27 Iowa, 494; Jones v. The State, 13
Texas, 168.
The great weight of authority, however, is in favor of the
proposition that, if a juror, during the progress of the trial,
drinks intoxicating liquor to such an extent that he is intoxicated or under the influence of liquor so that his facul
ties are affected, while sitting in the case, the verdict should
Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 ; Hedican v. Pa.
be set aside.
Fire Ins. Co., 21 Wash. 488; Broivn v. The State, 137 Ind.
240 ; State v. Ned, 105 La. 696 ; State v. Jenkins, 116 No. Car.
972; Davis v. Cook, 9 Nev. 134; 17 Amer. & Eng. Encyc.

Law, p. 1234.
Perry v. Bailey, supra, was a case in which two affidavits
were filed, stating that one of the jurors, during the progress of the trial, had been under the influence of liquor.
The court held that, although the affidavits were not full
and positive yet it was clear that the juror had drunk so
much as to unfit him for the proper discharge of his duty,
and consequently the verdict should be set aside. In the
opinion. Judge Brewer, said, at page 546:
"We tliink however, the great weight of authority estabThat if a juror during the prolishes these propositions:
gress of the trial drinks intoxicating liquor on the invitation and at the expense of the party who afterwards has the
verdict, or if at his own expense he drinks so much as to
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be under the influence of liquor while sitting in the case, the
verdict ought not to stand ; and on the other hand, the mere
drinking of spirituous and intoxicating liquors by a juror
during the progress of a trial is not, in and of itself, sufficient to set aside a verdict (authorities).
Aware as all are
of the subtle and potent influence of liquor on the brain, no
judge should for a moment permit a trial to proceed where
it appeared that any juror was under the influence of intoxicating drink, or permit a verdict to stand which was not
the cool, deliberate judgment of sober men."
Hedican v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., supra, was a case where,
during the trial at an evening session of the court and during the defendant's argument, a juror was intoxicated.
This fact was brought to the attention of the court after
the session was concluded and the court permitted counsel
at the following morning session to make their arguments
without limitation as to time. All the testimony had been
put in before the juror became intoxicated, and this fact
was urged against the motion for a new trial. The court
held that a new trial must be granted because of the misconduct of the juror. The court said, at page 490 :
"Parties are entitled to have a cause submitted only to
sober jurors, and the court will not undertake an inquiry into the state or condition of mind of a juryman who has been
intoxicated during the progress of a trial, but will assume
Drunkthat he was incompetent to determine the cause.
enness during the progress of a trial is not only the gravest
breach of a juryman's duty, but it is also a most serious
contempt of the court and the administration of the law.**
In Brouni v. The State, supra, the court granted a new
trial on the ground of intoxication of one of the jurors during the trial and at page 241 said :
"It seems to be well settled in this state as well as in
other jurisdictions that drinking intoxicating liquor during
the recess of the court is not such misconduct of the juror
as vitiates the verdict, unless the drinking is to such an extent as to produce intoxication; but where a juror drinks
to such an extent as to become intoxicated, such conduct renders the verdict invalid and the court, upon proof of such
misconduct, should set it aside and grant a new trial."
In Davis v. Cook, supra, the court said, at page 147 :
"In vindication of the character of courts and the purity
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of jury trials a verdict participated in by a jury-man with
passions inflamed and reason impaired by ardent spirits

should not be allowed to stand.
Trial by jury regarded by
our ancestors as the principal bulwark of their liberties and
the glory of the English law, would degenerate into a mockery of justice if verdicts were capriciously determined by
intoxicated jurors.
The judgment must be reversed."
In American & Eng. Ency. of Law, supra, the law is
stated to be as follows :
^'If during the progress of the trial or during their deliberations on the verdict jurors partake of intoxicating
liquors to such an extent as to affect their ability clearly,
impartially and calmly to consider the evidence the verdict
will be set aside ; and the rule applies, it seems, where such
an inordinate amount is drunk as to make a juror sick^ or
to render it probable that he was incapacitated."

The cause is remanded to the Superior Court for a new
trial.

CEAIG

&

COMPANY V. PIERSON
PANY.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
169

DOWDELL,

C.

J.

LUMBER

COM-

1910.

Alabama, 548.

* * *

The main question in this case arises out of the action
of the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial.
The principal ground of the motion was the alleged improper conduct of J. 0. Acree, one of the parties to the
suit. It was not denied on the hearing of the motion that
after the evidence in the case was conchided, and the court
had recessed for dinner, before hearing the argument,
Acree invited one of the jurors trying the case to dine with
him at a certain hotel, which invitation was accepted, and
''Misconduct or irthat vXoree paid for the juror's dinner.
regularity on the part of the jurors, if not induced by the
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prevailing party, will not ordinarily be ground for setting
aside the verdict, unless it was calculated to prejudice the
unsuccessful party. When, however, the misconduct is due
directly to an improper act by the prevailing party, the
verdict will be set aside without reference to the question of
resulting injury." — 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.)

"It

is the general rule that a new trial will be
granted if jurors .ire entertained during the trial by the
party in whose favor a verdict is rendered. So it has been
held ground for a new trial that the prevailing party furnished jurors with cigars or intoxicating liquors." — Id. p.
p. 1204.

1235.

Aside from protecting the rights of parties, in the fair
and impartial administration of justice, respect for the
courts calls for their condemnation of any improper conduct, however slight, on the part of a juror, of a party, or of
any other person, calculated to influence the jury in returnSo delicate are the balances in weighing jusing a verdict.

tice that what might seem trivial under some circumstances
Not only the evil,
would turn the scales to its perversion.
in such cases, but the appearances of evil, if possible, should
be avoided.
The learned judge who tried the case below, in overruling
the motion for a new trial, evidently proceeded on the theory
that the defendants waived their right of objection in failing to bring the matter to the attention of the court at their
first opportunity after knowledge acquired by them or their
Here
attorney of the alleged misconduct of the said Acree.
recess
the knowledge was acquired during the
period of the
court for dinner or lunch, and on the reconvening of the
court, without objection made, the argument of the case
proceeded, and the charge of the court to the jury was given, and the jury permitted to retire to make a verdict, and
not until a motion for a new trial was the alleged misconduct made known to the court.
The general rule is that, in the impaneling of a jury, matter going to the disqualification of a juror, if within the
knowledge of a party or his attorney, should be taken on
objection at the time the juror is put upon him for acceptance or rejection; and a failure to so object is accounted a
waiver on his part of the objection. But this rule does not
and should not apply in case of misconduct on the part of
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juror, arising after his acceptance as such and a trial
entered upon. In the present case the alleged misconduct
was that of a part}^, and the remedy of the injured party
was by a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.
It is true he might have brought the matter to the attention
of the court before proceeding further with the trial, but his
failure to do so ought not to deprive him of his remedy on
a motion for a new trial.
It does not lie in the mouth of
the party guilty of the misconduct to object on the ground
of speculating on the verdict of the jury, since his own misconduct produced the conditions.
To require a party to
make his objection pending the trial might still further prejudice him, especially if it should happen that he was mistaken in making the charge, though ever so honest.
We are of opinion that the motion for a new trial should
have been granted, and that the court erred in refusing it.
a

For

the errer of overruling the motion for a new trial,
the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed a/nd remanded.
Evans,
Sayre,
and
concur.
Anderson,

JJ.,

BAKER V. BROWN.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
151

Walker,

J. —

#

1909,

North Carolina, 12.

* *

The defendant moved to set aside the verdict because the*
to one of the jurors.
This was not
])roper conduct on the part of the plaintiff, when unexplained, i)ut the evidence shows that it was inadvertent and that
what he said did not even remotely relate to the case tried
by the jury of which he was a member, and was utterly

plaintiff had talked

It

had no influence whatever upon the jury or
the juror with whom the plaintiff talked, and the Court so
finds the facts to be. As was said by Judge Pearson, in
Slate V. Tilghman, 33 N. C, at p. 552, ''Perhaps it would

harmless.
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have been well had his Honor, in his discretion,
the verdict and given a new trial as a rebuke to
and an assertion of the principle that trials must
be fair, hut above suspicion.
This, however, was

set aside
the jury

not only
a matter

a

is

it

it

is it

it

a

it

a

is

a

is

it

if

if

it

it,

of discretion, which we have no right to reverse.
Our inquiry is, was the misconduct and irregularity such as to
vitiate the verdict, to make it in law null and void and no
verdict?" That case is an authority for the position that,
under the facts of this case, the motion for a new trial was
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
"When the
circumstances are such as merely to put suspicion on the
verdict by showing, not that there ivas, but that there might
have been undue influence brought to bear upon the jury,
because there was opportunity and a chance for
matter within the discretion of the presiding judge; but
the fact be that undue influence was brought to bear upon
the jury, as
they were fed at the charge of the prosecutor
or prisoner, then
would be otherwise."
State v. Brit
tain, 89 N. C. 483. See, also, State v. Harper, 101 N. C.
r61; State v. Morris, 84 N. C. 757; State v. Tilghman, supra; State V. Gould, 90 N. C. 658; State v. Barber, 89 N. C.
523.
In Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N. C. at p. 481, Justice Bynum, for the Court, thus formulates the rule: ''The line of
distinction
that to vitiate and avoid
must apverdict
pear upon the record that undue influence was brought to
bear on the jury. All other circumstances of suspicion address themselves exclusively to the discretion of the presidclothed
ing judge in granting or refusing new trial. He
with this power because of his learning and integrity and of
the superior knowledge which his presence at and participaHowever
tion in the trial gives him over any other forum.
great and responsible this power, the law intends that the
to further the ends of justice; and
judge will exercise
would be diffioccasionally abused,
though doubtless
cult to fix upon
safer tribunal for the exercise of this disIt
cretionary power, which must be lodged somewhere."
does not appear in this case that the jury were influenced in
the slightest degree, in deciding upon their verdict, by what
On the contrary,
the plaintiff said to one of the jurors.
appears that they were not and could not have been so influenced.
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Upon a review of the whole case, we find no error in the
rulings and judgment of the court.
No error.

FLESHER V. HALE.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
22

1883.

West Virginia, 44.

This is a writ of error to an order, made by the circuit
court of Lewis county, March 16, 1882, setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial in an action of
assumpsit brought by the plaintiff in error in the county
court of said county, February 29, 1879, against the defendant in error for one thousand six hundred and forty-seven
dollars and eighty-four cents, and transferred by operation
The defendant
of law to said circuit court before trial.
pleaded non assumpsit and filed specifications of set-off, and
the verdict was for two hundred and seventy-one dollars
After the
and twenty-seven cents in favor of the plaintiff.
rendition of the verdict the defendant moved the court to
set the same aside, which motion the court sustained and the

plaintiff excepted and tendered his bill of exceptions, which
shows that the defendant in support of his motion read
three several affidavits in which the affiants state, that Allen Snow, one of the jurors who tried the case, was intoxicated and drunk to such a degree that most of the time during the argument he was asleep and incapable of rendering
a decision or determining the case in the manner and way
of a sober juror.

Snyder, Judhe:
The court having set aside the verdict and granted a new
trial upon the facts before stated, the single question presented to this Court is, did the court in so doing err? Our
statute provides that:
'*No irregularity in any writ of venire facias, or in the
drawing, summoning, or impaneling of jurors, shall be sufficient to set aside a verdict, unless the party making the ob-
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jection was injured by the irregularity, or unless the objection was made before the swearing of the jury." Acts
1882,

sec. 19, chap. 83, p. 190.

it,

Applying the spirit of said statute and, perhaps, extending the rule and policy of
the courts Virginia and of this
is

is

it

a

is

;

a

;

a

it,

a

it,

is

is

a

it

is,

it

if

is

it

it

State have repeatedly held, and
now the settled law
of this State, in both criminal and civil trials, that the verdict of the jury will not be set aside for objections to
jurors, on grounds which existed before they were sworn,
unless
made to appear that by reason of the existence
of such grounds the party objecting has suffered wrong or
injustice.
Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 228, and cases
there cited. In this class of cases the objections to the
jurors were of such character that,
made before the jury
was sworn, they would have been sustained and the jurors
objected to held to be disqualified; but notwithstanding this
and the fact that the parties, were ignorant of any grounds
of disqualification until after the verdict, the court refused
did not appear that said
to set aside the verdict, because
grounds had operated so as to inflict injustice.
however, different in cases where the disqualiThe rule
fication arises from the misconduct of the jurors after they
have been sworn. While
requires clear and satisfactory
proof to establish misconduct in member of the jury after
he has been sworn, because the presumption of right acting
which obtains with reference to the conduct of every person acting in an official position unless the contrary
shown, applies in full force with reference to the conduct
of sworn jurors, yet when misconduct
established of such
nature that prejudice might have resulted from
prewhich unless rebutted
sumption of prejudice arises from
by the successful party will vitiate the verdict and require
new trial.
Woods v. State, 43 Miss. 364-72 State v. CartiirigU, 20 W. Va. 32; State v. Robinson, Id. 713.
''Where facts are established which show that improper
influences were brought to bear upon the jury, or that they
were guilty of improper conduct, such as might have resultpresumption arises
ed prejudicially to the losing party,
unless
there
the
verdict
of
their
and
testipurity
against
mony which shows that their verdict was not affected by
will be set aside; and the bursuch influences or conduct,
upon the party claiming
den of producing such testimony
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the right to keep the vardict.
The rule is one of public
policy. In order to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice, it is not only necessary that judicial
trials should be conducted with reasonable regularity, but
that verdicts should be free from the taint of suspicion of
improper conduct or influences." — Thomp. & Mer. on
Juries, §439; Phillip's Case, 19 Gratt. 485; Com. v. Bohy,
12 Pick. 496; Thompson v. State, 26 Ark. 323.
While these are the general rules established by the
courts in regard to verdicts where the disqualification or
misconduct of the jurors was unknown to the parties until
after verdict, there is another rule which limits these rules
and applies to all classes of cases, whether the disqualification of the jurors existed before being sworn or arose out
of misconduct during the trial. All the authorities agree
that, where a new trial is asked on account of irregularity
or misconduct of the jury, it must appear that the party
so asking called the attention of the court to it at the time
it was first discovered or as soon thereafter as the course
of the proceedings would permit, and if he fail or neglect
to do so, he will be held to have consented to have vvaived
all objections to such irregularity or misconduct, and, unless it be a matter which could not have been waived, or
which could not have been remedied or obviated, if attention
had been called to it at the time it was first discovered,
he will be estopped from urging it as a ground for a new
trial. — Diliuorth's Case, 12 Gratt. 689; Coleman v. Moody,
4

H. & M.

1

;

Dower v. Church,

21

W. Va.

23

;

Fox

v.

Hazel-

ton, 10 Pick. 275; Oleson v. Mender, 40 Iowa, 662; Tjee v.
McLeod, 15 Nev. 158; State v. Tidier, 34 Conn. 280; Dolloff
V. Stimpson, 33 Me. 546; Martin v. Tidwell, 36 Gn. 332;
Parks V. State, 4 Ohio St. 234 ; State v. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383.
The knowledge of the attorney in such case is the knowledge of his client. — Russell v. Quinn, 114 Mass. 103; Fessenden V. Sayer, 53 Me. 531 ; Parker v. State, 55 Miss. 414 ;

People, 80 N. Y. 500.
This rule proceeds upon the ground that a party ought
not to be permitted, after discovering an act of misconduct
which would entitle him to claim a new trial, to remain silent and take his chances of a favorable verdict, and afterwards, if the verdict is against him, liring it forward as a
ground for a new trial. A party cannot be permitted to
Cox

V.
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lie by, after having knowledge of a defect of this character, and speculate upon the result, and complain only when
the verdict becomes unsatisfactory to him. — Selleck
v.
Sugar H. T. Co., 13 Conn. 453; Orrok v. Com. his. Co., 21
Pick. 456; Rex v. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cres. 417.
It follows, therefore, that when a party moves for a new
trial on the ground of misconduct on the part of the jury,
which took place during the trial, he must aver in his motion and show affirmatively that both he and his counsel
were ignorant, until after the jury had retired, of the fact
of such misconduct.
Thomp. & Mer. on Juries, § 428 and
cases cited ; Id. § 456.
In the case at bar, the counsel certainly, and, we may
presume from his being present at the trial, the defendant
also had notice of the misconduct of the juror, Snow, at the
time it occurred.
In fact, ''it was mutually agreed that tht?
case might be tried and determined by the remaining eleven
jurors." This agreement was made in the presence of the
judge of the court by the counsel both of the plaintiff and
defendant. After this agreement was made, no motion or
effort was made to remove the said Snow from the jury
box.
He was not even requested to retire, and, probably,
had
he
no knowledge of the agreement, and so he continued on the jury.
Afterwards when, during the subsequent
])rogress of the trial, the court called attention to the fact
tliat said Snow was still on the jury, the counsel for the
plaintiff and defendant ''agreed that it was immaterial what
l)ecame of said Snow," and he was, no doubt, in consequence of said agreement allowed to remain on the jury unCertainly by this conduct the defendtil after the verdict.
-nt consented to have the said Snow remain on tlie jury
after he knew of his misconduct, and, under the rule of law
before stated, he thereby waived all right to object to the
verdict on that ground and estopped himself from relying
on said misconduct as a ground for a new trial, unless his
situation and rights were such at the time he made the discovery, that the objection could not have been obviated, or
that ills right, was such that no waiver or consent could

7.

<^

it,

conclude him.
If he had made the objection and insisted on the court
could, under our statute, have had another juror sworn in
Or by consent the cause
his place. Code, ch. 159,
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might have been tried by the court, or by the remaining
jurors or seven of them. Code, ch. 116, § 29; Dilworth's
Case, 12 Gratt. 708; Tooel's Case, 11 Leigh. 714; State v.
Van Matre, 49 Mo. 268.
The objection, therefore, if it had been made could have
been obviated at the time, and that the rights of the defendant were such that he could waive them is equally clear.
This is a civil action and in such cases any consent of the
parties is binding. They relate to and affect only individual rights which are entirely within their personal control, and which they may part with at their pleasure.
The
design of such actions is the enforcement of merely private obligations and duties. Any departure from legal
rules in the conduct of such actions with the consent of the
litigants is, therefore, a voluntary relinquishment of what
belongs to them exclusively. — Thomp. & Mer. on Juries, §
8; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Durham v. Hudson, 4
Ind. 501; Comonwealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush. 80; Sarah v.
State, 28 Ga. 576.
Upon the foregoing authorities as well as upon justice
and reason it is plain, that the defendant could have waived
as in fact he did waive the irregularity arising from the
misconduct of the said juror. Snow, and his conduct and acquiescence after he was apprised of the misconduct of said
juror, in permitting him to remain on the jury, must be regarded as a consent that he should so remain notwithstanding such misconduct; and, consequently, it would be unjust
to permit the defendant, after having taken his chance of
a favorable verdict, to take an advantage of an irregularity, which he had waived and consented to, for the purpose
of avoiding an unfavorable verdict.
am, therefore, of opinion that the said order of the
circuit court setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial is erroneous and must be reversed with costs
to the plaintiff in error; and this Court proceeding to enter
such judgment as the said court ought to have entered, it
is considered that the defendant 's motion to set aside
the verdict be overruled and that the plaintiff recover from
the defendant the sum of two hundred and seventy-one
dollars and twenty-seven cents, the amount of the verdict
of the jur}^, with interest thereon from the 16th day of
March, 1882, till paid and his costs in the prosecution of his

I
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action in said circuit court expended, which is ordered to
be certified to said court.
The other Judges concurred.
Judgment reversed.

CORLEY V. NEW YORK & HARLEM RAILROAD
COMPANY.
Appellate Division of the Supreme
1896.
12

Court of New York.

Appellate Division, 409.

Baeeett, J. (concurring) * * *
The affidavits conclusively establish that, when the plaintiff was called to the witness stand during the examination
of Dr. Kellogg, he made use of crutches and was lifted and
helped along by his father, and that he returned to his seat
in the same manner; but that, nevertheless, for two weeks
and over before the trial the boy had entirely discarded
his crutches in the house where he lived, and had done so
with his mother's consent. The affidavits stating that he
had abandoned the use of crutches indoors before the trial
His mother, herself, deare numerous and uncontradicted.
poses that she ''did request and instruct her son Martin
to use crutches at all times within the house and when he
went without the house, for the first three or four tueeks
after his return from the hospital; and that during the
subsequent intervening weeks prior to the trial your deponent requested and instructed her son Martin to use
crutches when he ivalked without the house, upon the street,
It will be observed that Mrs. Corley here
and elsewhere."
pointedly omitted to state that after the first three or four
weeks following his return from the hospital she gave her
It is
son any instructions to use crutches in the house.
overwhelmingly established that, during the latter period,
he never used them in the house and frequently omitted
their use out of doors. Indeed, he played and ran about
Tlie use of
in the streets quite the same as other boys.
crutches in the court room was, therefore, wholly unnecesT. p.— 42
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sary.
The boy had nothing to fear from the people in the
court room nor from the narrowness of the aisle to be traversed on his way to and from the witness stand. But^ if
he had anything to fear from these surroundings, the danger could only have been enhanced by the use of cratches.
The reason which is given for their use seems quite shallow.
It is, in truth, but a transparent pretense. There could
have been but one purpose, and that was to hoodwink the
jury — to deceive them as to the boy's sufferings and to appeal to their sensibilities. It was bad enough to present
to the jury the false picture of a suffering boy upon crutches.
But that was not all. He was lifted up, helped upon
his crutches, supported while thereon and assisted, as he
proceeded, apparently with great difficulty, to and from the
witness stand. This was a gross, and regret to say, a deliberate deception. For, it appears, by uncontradicted
testimony, that immediately after the trial the boy was secluded and rigidly kept within doors.
His parents were
determined
the
evidently
that
spectacle presented in the
court room should not be publicly followed by too marked
and dangerous a contrast.
And yet, while he was thus
withdrawn from general observation, he was permitted,
without crutch or assistance, to play upon the roof of the
house and actually to climb upon the rear fire escape.

I

It

is a mistake to suppose that a new trial can only be
granted when a case therefor can be classified under some
well-defined head such as surprise or newly-discovered eviThe true rule is well
dence. The court is not thus limited.
stated in Graham and Waterman on New Trials, 1009, as
follows: *'It need scarcely be said that any unconscionable
advantage obtained during a trial by one party over the
other, through fraud or artifice, to the injury of the latter,
will be good ground for a new trial. So obvious a principle
of common right and justice requires no comment and needs
no illustration." I (|uite agree that verdicts should not
lightly be disturbed, and that the court, in granting new
trials, should act with great caution. But the rule above
stated — a rule which was fully recognized in Ward v. Town
of Southfield (102 N. Y. 287) — is founded upon justice and
It should be firmly applied when the facts clearnecessity.
ly warrant its application. I can conceive of nothing bet-
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ter calculated to encourage fraudulent litigation than the
minimizing of such misconduct as is here disclosed.
The order should, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial
granted, with costs of this appeal to the appellant.
The
costs of the former trial should abide the event.

Section

4.

Accident, Mistake and Surprise.

MEHNERT V. THIEME.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
15

1875,

Kansas, 368,

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Brewer, J.: The plaintiffs in error were sued upon a
promissory note. Mehnert filed an answer in person, alleging part payment to the amount of $166.10, and that after the maturity of the note he and his co-defendant had
given a mortgage due in twelve months as security, and that
this time had not passed. They made no appearance at the
trial, and judgment was rendered for the face of the note
and interest.
On the same day they, by an attorney, filed
a motion to vacate the judgment, and grant them a new trial,
on the ground that they were prevented from making their
defense by "accident, which ordinary prudence could not
This
have guarded against, and unavoidable misfortune."
motion was overruled, and this is the error complained of.
Mehnert 's affidavit was the only testimony offered upon said
motion.
He testified that he filed the arswer, and that it
was true; that he lived twelve miles from Fort Scott, where
the court was in session; that he had a large amount of
stock, and no male help on his place, and was consequently
obliged to be home every night ; that in order to be present
in court in time on that morning he rose between three and
four o'clock, attended to his home duties, and started with
his team for Fort Scott between five and six o'clock, drove
with all possible dispatch, and made no stoppages on tlie
road; that he reached the court-house about ten o'clock
and found that the case had been called and disposed of a
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few minutes prior thereto ; that the delay in driving in was
caused by the bad almost impassable condition of the roads.
Was this accident which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, or unavoidable misfortune? It does not
appear that the roads were for that season of the year, December, exceptionally bad, or that by an unexpected change
in the weather they had become suddenly bad, or that Mehnert did not by frequent travel have full knowledge of their
At that time, it is no uncommon thing
actual condition.
for country roads to be very rough, and in very bad condition.
Common prudence would dictate that one who was
acting as an attorney, and attending to business in court
then in session, should not run the risk of getting into court
in the morning over such roads from a remote part of the
The real difficulty was, that Mehnert was attemptcounty.
ing to perform the double part of suitor and attorney.
While this is perfectly proper, yet whoever attempts it subjects himself to the obligations and liabilities of both. It
is the duty of an attorney having business in court to be
present during its sessions. There is his business ; there is
his work. Oftentimes that which will excuse the absence of
a suitor, will come far short of excusing the absence of his
Now, Mehnert, was acting as an attorney, inattorney.
trusted with business in the court then in session. Instead
of employing some one to take care of his stock on his farm,
and being himself in readiness to attend to his case, he is
with full knowledge of his great distance from the courthouse, and the almost impassable condition of the roads, attempting to take care of both stock and lawsuit. He succeeded in the former, but failed in the latter, and failed
simply from omitting the ordinary precautions which men
Hill v. Williams, 6 Kas.
take under similar circumstances.
17.

The judgment will be affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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V. O'NEIL.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
47

Opinion by Strang, C.

661

1891,

Kansas, 116.
:

* * *

Was the defendant entitled to a new trial because of unavoidable accident, as claimed in his affidavit filed with
his motion for a new trial? We think not. The alleged
accident consists in a failure of the defendant to receive a
telegraphic message in time for him to attend the trial of
The accident was llierely the miscarriage of an
the case.
arrangement by the plaintiff with his own attorneys and
the telegraph operator at the station nearest his home, for
the transmission and delivery to him of a message giving
him information concerning the trial of his case. His
failure to receive the message in time was not the result of
accident at all, but of the negligence of his own agent. If
there had arisen a storm of such a character as to have prevented the transmission of the message over the wires in
time to notify the defendant so he could be present at the
trial, or of such a character as to have prevented the defendant traveling to the place of trial, it might be said he
was prevented by accident, but a mere failure of his own
agents to do as he alleges they promised to, in connection
with the transmission or delivery of a message, is not an
accident. The affidavit shows that the message was received by the acent at 8 o'clock in the morning, and that he did
not get it delivered in the country to the defendant until it
was too late for him to attend the trial. It was not the
business of the agent, as the agent of the telegraph company, to deliver the message away from his office, in the
He was only required to do so in this instance
country.
by his agreement with the defendant, and whatever he did
or neglected to do under such agreement, he did or neglectWe do not think a failure
ed as the agent of the defendant.
deliver
a message to him, as
of the defendant's agent to
per request or agreement, in time for him to attend the
trial furnishes the defendant with any cause, known tc the
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law, for a new trial. He made an arrangement with his
He in no wise relied on any arown agents for notice.
rangement with the plaintitf, nor with the court. He relied
upon his own agents, and without any accident or excuse,
so far as we know, they failed him, and we cannot relieve
him from the consequences.
We find no mateiral error in the record of this case, and
thei:efore recommend that the judgment of the trial court
be affirmed.
By the court : It is so ordered.

All

the

Justices concurring.

STAUNTON COAL COMPANY V. MENK.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
197

Illinois,

1902.

369.

Mr. Chief Justice Mageudee delivered the opinion of
the court :
The alleged ground, upon which it was sought by the
appellant in the court below to set aside the verdict and
grant a new trial, was that the circuit court tried the case
out of its order on the docket at the request of appellee's
attorneys, and without notice to the appellant, and without
any good cause for so trying the case out of its order.
Second — But, even if the case was set for trial out of its
order upon the docket, section 16 givQ. the court the right
to take such action for good and sufficient cause.
That
section only provides, that causes shall be tried in the order
they are placed on the docket, "unless the court for good
and sufficient cause shall otherwise direct." It nowhere
appears in the affidavits, that the court did not have good
and sufficient cause for setting the case for trial on Wednesday, October 10, 1900.

**********

Third — Tlie affidavits, filed by the appellant in the court
below, do not show that duo diligence was exercised by it in
this matter, and do not show sufficient excuse for not being
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present in court at the time when the case was set for trial.
Arfidavits, filed in support of applications to set aside judgments by default, or entered in ex parte proceedings, are to
be construed most strongly against the party making the
application.
{Grossman v. Wolillehen, 90 111. 537).
According to the statements in the affidavit of appellant's
attorney, he knew that the number of the case at bar was
76 on the law docket for the September term, and that there
were seventy-five law cases and sixty-four criminal cases on
that docket ahead of the case at bar, and entitled to prior
trial. This being so, it was the duty of the appellant to
take notice, or at least it is presumed to have taken notice
of every step taken in the cause.
{Schneider v. Seihert,
50 111. 284).
In his affidavit the attorney states that, in the
due course of business, the cases ahead of No. 76 could not
have been tried in their order before the latter part of
October, or the middle of November, 1900. He also states
that he wrote to the clerk of the court on the 10th day of
October to inquire when said cause would be for trial, and
received notice on the 12th day of October from the clerk,
that the case had already been tried on October 10. The
attorney had no reason to suppose, so far as is shown by
the affidavits, that the present case would not be reached
in its regular order upon the docket before the latter part
of October or the middle of November, 1900. There is
nothing to show, that the case would not have been reached
It is
as early as the day, upon which it was set for trial.
case
his
reached.
is
the duty of a party to be present when
His negligence in ascertaining when the case will be reached
If appellant relied upon the
does not excuse his absence.
opinion of its attorney as to the time when the case would
The negligence
be reached for trial, it did so at its peril.
of the attorney in such matters is the negligence of the
client.
{Mendell v. Kimhall, 85 111. 582; Walsh v. Walsh,
114 id. 655; Laivler v. Gordon, 91 id. 602; Schidtz v. Meisel-

bar,U4[d.26).

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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V.

1898.

Alabama, 428,

* * *

The defendant afterwards moved the court for a new
The cause is here on bill of extrial, which was overruled.
It is based
ceptions reserved on the trial of that motion.
on the ground that the attorneys for the defendant were
absent by alleged unavoidable delay in consequence of being engaged in the trial of two causes in Birmingham, one
in the Federal and the other in the city court in that city.* *
The law firm employed by defendant to defend its suit,
consisted of three members, all residing in Birmingham.
The case was orginally set for trial on October 26, 1897,
but by an agreement of counsel on both sides, and with the
consent of the court, it was reset for November 3, following. The attorneys for defendant did not appear at Decatur on the last day named. One of them telegraphed on
''We are enthe 2nd, to the clerk of the court in Decatur:
gaged in United States Court. Pretty sure can be in Decatur Friday or Saturday;" requesting the clerk to show
the message to Mr. Brown, attorney for plaintiff, and have
The clerk replied
case passed to Friday or Saturday.
same day, that Brown was not there and judge refused to
Brown lived in Hartselle, Ala.
make order in his absence.
On the 3d., the same attorney telegraphed to Brown in Decatur : ''If case reached please pass until tomorrow. Our
If I cannot
firm engaged in city and United States courts.
If the case will
come will send some lawyer in my place.
today."
wire
To this Brown
me
not be reached tomorrow,
replied: "Telegram received after case was disposed of
Judgment against defendant for about
this forenoon.
Defendant's attorney then telegraphed to Brown
$120."
or Judge Speake, expressing surpi-ise at the taking of the
judgment after seeing his telegram, and stating that he
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would be up that night with his witnesses, ready to try the
case, and requesting Brown to keep his witnesses there or
To this Brown replied:
get them back, if they had gone.
**
Witnesses are gone.
Heard nothing of your telegram until my client and witnesses were here ready and demanding
trial. Big damage suit against Morgan county on trial,
which will last several days."
It is not shown that defendant's counsel attempted to
have either of their cases in the city or Federal court laid
over, in order that one of them might go to the Decatur
court to try this cause, which had been previously set by
their consent on the 3d of November.
Reasons are stated
why one of the counsel engaged in the city court case was
needed to try that cause, and another to try the cause in the
Federal court, but no facts are shown why it was necessary that the third one should remain in Birmingham on
account of either of said causes, further than the expression
of a conclusion that it was necessary for him to do so. It is
not shown why defendant's counsel, when apprehensive of a
conflict in the trials of their causes in Birmingham and at
Decatur, did not communicate with plaintiff and his attorney. Brown, both of whom lived at Hartselle, before the
latter left home to come to Decatur to try said cause, and
attempt to make arrangements for the postponement of this
cause.
It appears they presumed it would be done as a
matter of courtesy, and they delayed timely effort to effect
such an arrangement.
The attorney of defendant, who did
the correspondence by wire, in one of his messages to plaintiff's attorney, stated that if he could not come at a certain
time, if the case was laid over till then, he would send
another attorney to represent him. He does not show, that
he might not have done this and had the case tried when
set. It also appears, there were other capable lawyers living in Decatur, who had no connection with this case, who,
for aught appearing, could have represented defendant. It
was the duty of defendant or his attorneys to have made
some arrangement for the trial of the cause, by the appearance of one of them, or by a suitable representative for the
purpose, and not to have depended on a courtesy to be
shown them by opposing counsel, especially when it woul 1
have been at considerable expense to his client to do so.
We will not attempt to deal with the question of courtesy
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The judge who tried this cause,
sitting as a fair arbiter in the premises, with all the facts
before him, decided that it was not his duty to grant a new
trial, and we are unable to hold that he erred in so doing.
This conclusion is fully justified by previous decisions of
this court.— ^rocA; v. S. S N. A. RR. Co., 65 Ala. 79',Broda
V. Greemvald, 66 Ala. 538; McLeod v. Shelby Mfg. d Imp.
between opposing counsel.

Co., 108 Ala. 81.

Affirmed.

HOSKINS V. HIGHT.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
95

1891,

Alabama, 284.

Stone, C. X* * *
The power to set aside verdicts and grant new trials is
inherent in our courts of common-law jurisdiction; and in
the exercise of this power the court is called upon to use its
equitable discretion to prevent a palpable and material
As said by Clopton, J., in Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala.
wrong.
630, ''The power is essential to prevent irreparable injustice, in cases where a verdict wholly wrong is the result of
inadvertence, forgetfulness, or intentional or capricious
disregard of the testimony, or of bias or prejudice, on the
part of juries, which sometimes occurs."
When, in the exercise of this inherent power, the trial
court grants a new trial, the presumption is that it has
rightfully used its discretion ; but, if the contrary appears,
and it is plainly shown that the trial court has a4:)used its
power, this discretion, being judicial in its character, should
be revised on appeal. — Edsall v. Ayres, 15 Ind. 286; Lloyd
V. McClure, 2 Greene (Iowa), 139; Frieley v. David, 7 Iowa,
3.

The grounds upon which a new trial may be granted are
In
as varied as the circumstances of each individual case.
the exercise of a sound discretion, the court must consider
the particular surroundings, and have special regard to the
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of each s-aparate case. But text-writers
and different courts recognize many different grounds for
Surprise and mistake are
the granting of new trials.
placed in this category; and there are many instances
where new trials have been granted, because one party to
a suit has been taken by surprise, or has been prejudiced, on
account of a mistake or inadvertence for which he was not
(Mjuitable demands

;

7

a

It

a

'
'

is,

responsible, and which was not occasioned in any way by
his negligence. No doubt it was intended that the ground
upon which the new trial in this case was asked and granted
should receive its force and efficacy from this division of
the causes that justify such equitable interposition by the
court. We shall so consider it ; for the ground as stated in
the motion
that the defendant "was prevented from
making his defense thereto by accident or mistake, and
without fault on his part.
In order to obtain new trial on the ground of mistake
and surprise, there are certain requirements which must be
fulfilled as conditions precedent to the exercise by the
trial court of this discretion.
must be shown that the
surprise or mistake occurred in reference to some matter
material to the issue involved; that injury resulted therefrom and that the party asking for new trial has not been
guilty of negligence or fault in the premises. — Beadle v.
Graham, m Ala. 102; Brooks v. Douglass, 32 Cal. 208;
Jackson v. Worford,
Wend. 62 Huber v. Lane, 45 Miss.

Walker v. Kretsinger, 48 111. 502; Fretivell v. Lajfoon,
16 Amer.
Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 532.
The first duty of
party surprised at the trial, or upon
the discovery of
mistake that will prejudice his interest,
to take proper legal steps to continue or delay the cause;
for "he can not neglect this in the hope of securing
verdict in spite of the surprise (or mistake), and then obtain
new trial." In the case of Shipp v. Siiggett,
B. Monroe

608;

a &

Mo. 26

9

a

a

is

a

;
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a

a

if

a

a

a
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5,

the court observed; "The correct practice in such
for the party at once, upon the discovery of the cause,
case
during the progress of the trial, which operates as
suror
prise on him, to move
continuance
postponement of
the trial, and not attempt to avail himself of the chance
verdict on the evidence he has been able to
of obtaining
introduce, and
ho should fail, tlien to apply for
new
of
the
on
To
surprise.
ground
trial
tolerate such
prac-

(Ky.)
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tice would have the effect of giving to the party surprised
an unreasonable and unfair advantage, and tend to an unnecessary and improper consumption of the time of the
court." We approve this language, and announce the rule,
that before a party can be granted a new trial on the
ground of surprise and mistake, which was known or discovered before or during the trial, he must first move for a
continuance, or take such legal steps to postpone the trial
of the cause as the circumstances of the particular case may
require. Washer v. White, 16 Ind. 136; Young v. Com., 4
Gratt. 550; Gee v. Moss, 69 Iowa, 709; Wells v. Sanger, 21
Mo. 354; Rogers v. Bine, 1 Cal. 429; Bell v. Gardner, 71
111. 319 ; Boyle v. Sterga, 38 Cal. 459 ; Beivey v. Frank, 62
Cal. 343; 16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 533. This motion for a continuance, or effort to postpone the trial, is
affirmative matter, and should therefore, appear of record.
In its absence, this court can not presume such motion or
effort was made; and the cause must be considered in the
light of such facts and matters of record as appear in the
transcript. This conclusion is decisive of the only question presented by this appeal, for no motion for a continuance, nor any effort to postpone the trial, was made when
the absence of the important witnesses was discovered. The
trial court should not have granted the motion for a new
trial, under the circumstances shown in the record.
We could rest our opinion here ; but, considering that this
phase of the question has never before been presented to
us for review, we deem is best to decide the correctness
of the lower court's ruling in granting a new trial upon the
ground stated in the opinion, and the evidence produced to
substantiate such ground.
The accident or mistake that prevented the defendant
from making his defense, was the absence of certain witnesses, whose names he had given to his counsel to have
These witnesses were never subpoenaed, and
summoned.
this is, no doubt, at least one of the reasons they were abThese witnesses were not subpoenaed by reason of
sent.
the mistake or negligence of the defendant or his counsel,
have the clerk of the court subpoena the witnesses.
The
clerk had no recollection of any such direction, and never
whose recollection was that counsel directed his clerk to

Sec. 4]

New Trials

669

instructed the clerk of the court to subpoena the said witnesses.

While it is true that a new trial may be granted to a
party who was deprived of the benefit of the evidence of a
witness who was excusably absent, and whose testimony
would have probably affected the result, yet, in order to
claim the benefit of a new trial on this ground, it must, as
a general rule, be shown that the witnesses had been regularly summoned and that their absence was not caused
through the negligence of the party asking for a new trial
As said in 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 541, ''It is a
general rule, that a new trial should not be granted on account of the absence of witnesses, when a continuance has
not been asked for, or the absence of the witnesses is caused
by any form of neglect by the party applying for a new
triaV—Huhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal. 123; Tilden v. Gardiner, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 663; Love v. Breedlove, 75 Tex. 649;
Gee V. Moss, 68 Iowa, 318; Young v. Com., 4 Gratt. (Va.)
550; Wells V. Sanger, 21 Mo. 354; Rogers v. Hine, 1 Cal.
429.

The result is the same, whether the absence of the witnesses was caused by the mistake or negligence of the party
"The mistake or negligence of the ator of his attorney.
torney appearing for the party to a suit is the mistake or
negligence of the party; and no new trial will be allowed
where such mistake arises from negligence or lack of skill."
—Handy v. Davis, 38 N. H. 411 ; Heath v. Marshall, 46 N.
H. 40. The failure to make defense to a suit, by reason of
mistake of the defendant or his counsel, caused by negligence, can not justify the granting of a new trial, it matters
not how effective or just the defense may be. — 16 Amer. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law, 549, n. 4.
Under the principle above announced, the judgment of tho
City Court granting a new trial is reversed, and a judgment
is here rendered overruling the defendant's motion for a
new trial.
Reversed and rendered.
a
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GOTZIAN V. McCOLLUM.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
8

1896.

South Dakota, 186.

Fuller, J.

Based upon a claim of ownership, this action was against a sheriff, to recover the value of a stock
of boots and shoes seized and sold under an execution issued upon a judgment in favor of the Norwegian Plow
Company, against Asa Covell and another; and the appeal
is from an order setting aside a verdict and granting the
defendant a new trial. At the trial and after plaintiff and
appellant had made a prima facie case and rested, and in
support of that part of the answer in which it is alleged
that Asa Covell, the judgment debtor, was in fact the
owner of the property in controversy, said Covell was called
on the part of the defendant and respondent, and testified
that he was not the owner thereof, but that said property
belonged to C. Gotzian & Co. when the same was seized and
At this stage in the i3roceedings an apsold on execution.
plication for a continuance was made by resj^ondent's counsel, based upon the ground of surprise in the testimony of
*

*

*

From counsel's affidavit for a conthe witness Covell.
tinuance, upon which this verdict was set aside and a new
trial was ordered, it appears that said Asa Covell, whom
defendant had called as a witness, at all times claimed the
property, and had recently made certain affidavits in which
he had stated specifically, upon oath, that he was at the
time of the seizure thereof the owner of all the property
described in the complaint herein, and that relying upon
said witness, and believing that he would testify upon the
trial that he was the owner of the property at the time the
same was seized and sold by the sheriff in satisfaction of
said judgment against liim, and regarding such direct and
solemn declarations as sufficient assurance that he would
again so testify, counsel had deemed it unnecessary to call
and produce at the trial certain other accessible witnesses
named in his affiflavit, a^ir! bv whom he would if a continuance were granted, be able to prove certain specified facts,
tending to show that said (V)V(>11, tlic judgment debtor, and
not C. Gotzian & Co., owned the entire stock of boots and
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shoes at the time the same was seized and sold at execution
sale by the defendant sheriff.
Upon the hearing of the motion for a new trial, respondent relied wholly upon his affidavit for a continuance ; and,
in opposition thereto, appellant submitted affidavits to dis-

prove the recitals thereof concerning facts to which certain
witnesses would testify, if present, and tending to rebut
statements contained in said affidavit relating to the question of good faith, ordinary prudence, surprise, and the
exercise of diligence to prevent the same. If, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the court, upon the showing made ought to have granted a continuance, it was entirely proper, upon the same showing, to correct the error
Both rulings being within the
by awarding a new trial.
exercise of a judicial discretion, neither would be reviewed
From a
on appeal, in the absence of an abuse thereof.
knowledge of the nature of his previous statements under
oath, respondent's counsel were justified in presuming that
the witness Covell would testify at the trial that he was the
owner of the property, and they were reasonably justified in
omitting to subpoena other witnesses in possession of facts
Obviously, the witrelating to the question of ownership.
ness would not have been called upon by counsel for respondent to testify in support of the one vital issue tendered by the complaint of appellant, and traversed by the
answer; and, when he did so, it is equally clear that reThat there are many
spondent, at least, was surprised.
or
designedly make statements
witnesses who unconsciously
in private consultation, before the trial, more probative,
direct, and certain than ever reach the ear of the court and
jury from the lips of the witness when under the solemnity
of an oath, is a fact well known to every law^s^er; but where,
as in this instance, a witness has positively and deliberately
sworn upon two or three recent occasions that he was at
all times the owner of the identical property in dispute, and,
when called as a witness for the sole purpose of establishing
such fact, not only testifies that he did not own said property, or any part thereof, but that the same belonged to a
claimant against whom he was called as a witness, a different, and, we trust, a far more unusual, case is presented.
To allow a case to be continued, so near the close of a long
jury trial, would necessitate the trouble and expense of
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retrial, in any event; and, in the face of this fact, the
court evidently denied the application without serious reflection, and with the intention at the time to correct the
error, if any was made, by granting a new trial, when applied for, in case it should be found that substantial injury
had resulted therefrom. Upon the entire record, we think
the trial court was justified in concluding that reasonable
care and diligence had been used to procure testimony on
the part of the defense, and that, notwithstanding the surprise, ordinary prudence had been exercised by the attorneys for respondent in preparing for trial, and that the injury resulting from their disappointment in the testimony
of the witness Covell might be remedied by another trial
of the cause. An application for a continuance or for a
new trial on the ground of surprise being addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, the exercise thereof will
be reviewed only in cases where there is manifestly an
abuse of such discretion ; and a stronger case must be made
to justify a reversal on appeal when a continuance or a
new trial has been granted that when such application has
Alt v. Raihvay Co. (S. D.), 57 N. W. 1126.
been refused.
The order from which this appeal was taken is therefore
a

affirmed.

HILL V. McKAT.
Supreme Court of Montana.
36

1908.

Montana, 440.

Mr. Chief Justice Brantly delivered the opinion of the
court.

This action was brought to obtain a decree adjudicating
the respective rights of the parties plaintiff and defendant against each other and among themselves, to the use
of the waters flowing in Indian creek, a tributary of Ruby
river, in Madison county. * * *
The defendant McKay (appellant) is the owner of certain lands situated on Mill creek, another tributary of
]{uby river. He also owns a flouring-mill, situated on the
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stream, which is propelled by waterpower.
It seems
that the water diverted by him through his mill ditch, and
for the irrigation of his lands in Mill Creek, does not,
after its release, return to Indian creek, but flows into the
channel of Mill creek.
The issue at the trial, so far as
appellant is concerned, was whether the right asserted by
him through his mill ditch was superior to the rights of
the other claimants during the season of the year when
irrigation was necessary for farm purposes, or whether
it was available only during the other portions of the
year.
The appellant claims as the successor in interest of one
Hall, now dead, who, with others, built the mill and constructed the ditch in 1866.
The court found that ''it was
the intention of those who built the mill ditch and appropriated the waters of Indian creek thereby to use the waters for mill and power purposes when the waters in Indian creek were not needed for irrigation purposes."
It
was accordingly adjudged that the defendant's use must
be confined to the autumn, winter and early spring months,
when the "waters of Indian creek are not required for the
proper irrigation of lands." This defendant has appealed
from an order denying his motion for a new trial. The
ground of his motion was surprise, in that two witnesses,
introduced by him to establish his right, made statements
at the trial directly contrary to what they had induced
him to believe they would make when he had interviewed
them to ascertain what their testimony would be touching
his right. His affida\4t in support of the motion states,
in substance, that he was charged by his counsel with the
duty of finding and producing witnesses in support of his
water-right through his mill ditch; that in performance
of this duty he questioned witnesses John Hatfield and
William Ferm as to the use of the water in the mill during
the time Hall was one of the owners of it; that he questioned them fully, but neither of them disclosed to him any
fact or information tending to impair the superiority of
his right during Hall's ownership, or tending to show that
Hall ever recognized any right in Indian creek superior to
the mill ditch right; that, on the contrary, Hatfield, when
questioned by affiant as to the conduct of Hall when the
farmer?, ^hithout his consent diverted the water from the
sHme
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mill ditch, told him that Hall ''went and took it," meaning
and intending that affiant should understand thereby that
jTatfield would testify that under such circumstances Hall
reclaimed the water, thus asserting the superior right of
the mill ditch; that, relying upon the information so given
him by Hatfield and Ferm, and believing that they had
fully stated the facts to which they would testify, affiant
called them to testify in his behalf, and took no steps to
secure testimony from other witnesses to establish the
facts ; that Hatfield testified upon the trial directly contrary to what he had informed affiant prior to the trial, by
saying that Hall had an understanding with the farmers
below the head of his ditch that when they wanted the
water they could take it and shut the mill down; that the
farmers took the water whether it was needed for the mill
or not ; that this arrangement was the result of a bargain,
made about the year 1866 with one Bateman and sundry
other persons; that William Ferm testified that Hall had
obtained permission from certain unnamed persons to
build the mill ditch, with the understanding that when they
needed the water it was to be returned to them ; that Ferm,
being called by plaintiffs as their own witness in rebuttal,
testified positively that Hall had told the witness that he
used the water from Indian creek with the consent of the
people living along the stream below; that both these witnesses constantly associated with the plaintiffs and their
witnesses; and, upon information and belief, he charges
that their testimony at the trial was the result of collusion
with plaintiffs. It is further alleged that if a new trial
should be granted, the appellant can produce six witnesses,
naming them, whose testimony will show that Ilall, his
])redecessor, always possessed and asserted the right to
the use of the mill ditch, to the exclusion of all other rights
The affidavits of these witbelow the mouth of that ditch.
nesses were also used in support of the motion, and, generally, support the Hall right, as claimed by the appellant.
The plaintiffs filed no counter-affidavits, and hence the

statements of the appellant, so far as they are statements
of fact, are not controverted.
Do the facts stated make out a case upon which the court
* * *
should in its discretion, have granted a new trial?
Coming, now, to the merits of the motion, it is the gen-
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eral rule that a new trial will be granted on the ground of
surprise only when it is clearly shown that the movant was
actually surprised, that the facts from which the surpriseresulted had a material bearing on the case, that the verdict
or decision resulted mainly from these facts, that the alleged condition is not the result of movants own inattention
or negligence, that he has acted promptly and claimed relief at the earliest opportunity, that he has used every
means reasonably available at the time of the surprise to
remedy the disaster, and that the result of a new trial will
jDrobably be different,
{O'Donnell v. Bennett, 12 Mont. 242,
29 Pac. 1044; Schellhous
v. Ball, 29 Cal. 605; Doijle v.
Sturla, 38 Cal. 456; Chicago & Great Eastern Ry. Co. v.
Voshurgli, 45 111. 311; Hull v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 64
Minn. 402, 67 N. W. 218; 1 Spelling on New Trial and Appellate Practice, sec. 201 ; 14 Encyclopedia of Pleading and
Practice, 723.) If, at the time the condition arises, the
party can make use of other evidence at hand or can avoid
the threatened disaster by securing a continuance, or by
submitting to a nonsuit, he must do so ; and not only so, but,
after these means have failed, he must by his showing make
it clear that his allegation is not a mere pretense to cover
his own lack of diligence.
As was said in Schellhous v.
Ball, supra; ''It is the duty of the courts to look upon applications for new trials upon the ground of surprise with suspicion, for the reason that from the nature of the case
surprise may be often feigned and pretended, and the opposite party may be unable to show that such is the case.
Hence, the party alleging surprise should be required to
show it conclusively, and by the most satisfactory evidence
within his reach." In Chicago S Great Eastern Ry. Co. v.
Voshurgh, supra, the court said: ''In applications for new
trials on such ground it is not only necessary that the party
should have been surprised, but that it was in a matter
material to the issue, and that it produced injury to the
party ; that it was not the consequence of neglect or inattention on the part of the party surprised; also, that he used
all reasonable efforts to overcome the evidence which
worked the surprise, or that it was not within his power to
have done so by the employment of reasonable diligence."
Applying this rule to the appellant's affidavit, we find
that it is insufficient in several particulars. It does not ap-
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pear therefrom, except by way of conclusion of the affiant,
what inquiry appellant made of the witnesses whoso conduct is complained of; nor does it appear, except in thy
same way, what they told him they would testify to. Except the statement of Hatfield that Hall said he "went
and took it," referring to the water, we have but the conclusion of the appellant as to what the purport of the
statements to him by the witnesses were. They may have
had the purport and evidentiary value assigned to them by
the appellant, but that this is true we cannot say, because
the details of them are not before us. The evidence heard
by the trial court is not before us. Therefore, we cannot
say, except from the statements in the affidavit, that the
court based its findings as to the mill ditch mainly upon
their testimony. So far as we know, there may have been
other evidence in the case, and sufficient to justify the finding, even if the witnesses had testified as appellant supposed they would. For, while we may infer from the affidavit that they were the only witnesses called by appellant,
there is no positive statement that such was the case, or
that they were the only witnesses who testified as to the
mill ditch. From the affidavit, as a whole, coupled with the
fact that many other witnesses were found after the trial
was over who could furnish the desired evidence, we think
the inference permissible that the appellant was negligent
in the search for evidence to sustain his contention prior
to the trial, and that the judge who decided the motion
thought so.
There is a total want of any showing of prompt action
and diligence on the part of the appellant in his effort to
avoid the result of his alleged surprise at the testimony,
when it came out. He made no application for a continuHe did not call the attention of counsel to the matance.
ter ; nor was it called to the attention of the court. It does
not appear that he did not have other evidence at hand or
within reach which would have been available. In fact, so
far as we can judge, he sat silent during the trial, and,
though the cause was tried by the court sitting without a
jury, and it was held under advisement from June 4th, the
date of the trial, until August 30th, the appellant made no
application to have the cause reopened, but still remained
silent, thinking no doubt, that the result would be satis-
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Evidently the surprise upon which he relies is the
surprise at the result, rather than at anything that occurred during the trial.
factory.

A consideration, which is conclusive, however, is that it

is not at all apparent that there is any probability that
the result reached by the trial judge would be different if a
new trial were granted.
As stated above, the evidence
is not before us, and though it may be conceded that the
new witnesses whose affiidavits are embodied in the record
would testify as they allege, in the absence of the evidence, we cannot say that a different result would probably be reached.
We are of the opinion that no abuse of discretion is
shown, and that the order denying a new trial should
It is so ordered.
be affirmed.

Afirmed.

Mr. Justice Holloway and Me. Justice Smith concur.

NELLUMS V. NASHVILLE.
Supreme

Court of Tennessee.

1901.

106 Tenessee, 222.

Wilkes,

J.

This is an action against the Mayor and City
Council of Nashville for damages, for personal injuries,
sustained by Mrs. Nellums on account of a defective plank
walk upon what is called in the record Belleville street.
There was a trial before a jury in the Court below and verdict and judgment for the city, and the plaintiff has appealed and assigned errors.
The first error assigned is that the Court below should
have granted a new trial upon the ground of surprise and
In support of this assignment
newly discovered evidence.
plaintiff states that the city did not disclose its real defense until its last witness, Pat Cleary, was examined.
This witness, in substance, stated that the city of Nashville had never done any work on the west side of Relleville Street, nor had it in any other manner accepted the
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same as a street since

it was included within tlie corporate

is,

limits of the city in 1890.
The insistence
that this was great
plaintiff, inasmuch as the fact of nonuser
ance was not specially pleaded, and the
used by the public, and was in
thickly

surprise to the
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it
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it

is

a

it
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a

and nonacceptstreet had been
settled part of
the city, and had been recognized as
street by the public
in numerous ways, and at many times, after
was taken
into the city and prior to the accident.
The affidavit upon which the application for
new trial
based states this feature of surprise, and adds that
plaintiff will make proof of user and many other facts
showing acceptance on the part of the city, and
supported, as to the latter feature, by the sworn statements of
number of witnesses.
quite
The city filed only one plea, that of not guilty, and upon
this the plaintiff took issue.
Under the plea, and upon this issue, we think
clear
that the city might show by evidence that
had never
accepted that portion of the street where the accident oc* * *
This being true, the plaintiff was bound to
curred.
take notice of every defense that could be legally advanced
under the plea of the general issue.
Conceding the proposition to be correct that the evidence was within the
issues presented by the pleadings, surprise cannot be predicated upon the fact that evidence was not anticipated
along any line embraced within the pleadings. The doctrine
thus laid down in Vol. 16, page 544 (old Ed.) Am.

Eng. Ency. Law.

"The

a

a

it

it

is

is

different from
fact that an adversary's evidence
If
would be,
was supposed
not sufficient.
what
there has been any want of diligence in ascertaining what
the testimony of
witness would be,
new trial will be
is

it

2

is

&

refused."
In 15 Ency. Pleading
Practice, 733,
bound to come prepared to meet the
said: "A party
case made by his adversary, and he cannot plead surprise
In support of this
at material and relevant testimony."
proposition are cited Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 10 N. Y.
447; Knapp v. Fisher, 49 Ver. 94; Davis v. Buggler,
Chand. (Wis.), 152; Bragg v. Moberhj 17 Mo. App. 221;
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Tex. 229; Anderson v. Duffield, 8
Tex. 237, and a number of other cases.
22

We do not find any reversible error in the action and
judgment of the Court below, and it is affirmed with costs.

Section

5.

Verdict Contrary to Evidence.

SERLES

V. SERLES.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
35 Oregon,

1899.

289.

This is an action by W. L. Series against Clara Series,
S. C. Zuber, and John Hough, to recover damages for trespass in detaching and removing a dwelling house from the
realty of the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury was for
plaintiff in the sum of $400, and against the defendants
Series and Zuber, ind judgment having been entered
* * *
After the rendition of the
thereon, they appeal
verdict, the defendants interposed a motion to set it aside,
and for a new trial, based upon several grounds: First,
tliat of newly discovered evidence ; Second, excessive damages; and, Third, that tlie evidence was insufficient to warrant the verdict, — that the verdict is against the evidence,
This mois not justified thereby, and is contrary to law.
tion was overruled, the court saying: ''Tlie question of
whether the verdict is a proper one upon the evidence is
not now involved, only to the extent as to whether there
was any evidence to support it, and there is no doubt that
there was, and the court cannot review their decision upon the preponderance of the evidence."

Reversed.
the facts,

Mr. Chief Justice Wolverton, after stating

delivered the opinion of the court.

It

is strenuously urged, however, that the court below decided the motion for a new trial upon an erroneous
principle of law, in this : That it was governed, as is shown
2.
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a

a

a
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is

if

a

it
is

a

is

§

it

is

it

a

a

is

is is

is

is

it

a

it

is

is

it

if

is

;

a

it

a

is

a

it

is

if

a

is

is

if,

by its written opinion, by the idea that, if there was any
evidence in the record to support the verdict, it was without power to disturb the same or set it aside; whereas, it
is insisted that it is the duty of the court, in the consideration of the motion for a new trial, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, to weigh all the evidence submitted
to the, jury, and
upon the whole case, the verdict appears
manifestly unto be against the weight of evidence and
just, to allow the motion. The trial judge seems to have
assimilated the ground for granting a new trial to that
non-suit, and
motion for
which
proper in support of
there was any evidence to
hence, his conclusion that,
was his duty to uphold it. It
support the verdict,
mowell
established
in this jurisdiction, that
rule of law,
demurrer to the
in the nature of
nonsuit
tion for
not only admits all that the evidence
evidence, and
that might be legitimately
proves, but all inferences
fact under the issues
to
prove
drawn therefrom tending
there
and,
any evidence offered from which such an
the duty of the court to
inference could be drawn,
test of the
to go to the jury, as the motion
permit
competency of the evidence to prove the fact to which
directed.
And the question is, upon such motion, whetli
er there
any evidence tending to prove the material albased, and this
legation upon which the cause of action
whether
given
amount of evidence
one of law.
But
question of fact for
sufficient to sustain an allegation
there
any evidence tending to prove
the jury; so that,
the duty of the court, upon the motion fov
a given fact,
to
to go to the jury, and to take their
permit
nonsuit
verdict touching it: Vanhehber v. Plunheit, 26 Or. 562
(27 L. R. A. 811, 38 Pac. 707), and cases therein cited.
235, subd. 6),
Under the statute (Hill's Ann. Laws,
verdict and grant
authorized to set aside
the court
new trial for ''insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
against law." This
verdict or other decision, or that
statute does not appear to have received any direct construction by this court; but there are authorities elsewhere
pertinent to the inquiry, and they leave no doubt but that,
is

in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support
authorized to weigh and conthe verdict, the trial court
sider all the evidence which has been submitted to the
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is

it

it

is,

jury, and if it is ascertained that the verdict is against the
clear weight thereof, or is one that is manifestly unjust,
or that reasonable men would not adopt or return, to set
it aside and grant a new trial. A similar statute has received express construction by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Metropolitan R. R. Co. v.
Moore, 121 U. S. 558 (7 Sup. Ct. 1334). It was there held
that the language used in the statute, which gave a right
to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence, was not to
be limited to its insufficiency in point of law, but that it
extended also to its insufficiency in point of fact.
Such
evidence is said to be insufficient in law only where there
is a total absence of proof, either as to the quantity or
kind, or from which no inference could be drawn in support of the fact sought to be established. But insufficiency
in point of fact may exist where there is no insufficiency
in point of law; that
there may be some evidence to
sustain every element of the case, competent both in quantity and quality under the law, and yet
may be met by
countervailing proof so potent and convincing as to leave
no reasonable doubt of the opposite conclusion.
So

is

it

if

it

it

it

(7

a

it

it

a

a

it

a

it

a

that, upon
review of the whole evidence, the testimony
in support of the cause of action or defense may be so
slight, although competent in law, or the preponderance
verdict may seem
against
may be so convincing, that
to be plainly unreasonable and unjust; and in many cases
might be the duty of the court to withdraw the case from
verdict in
particular way, yet in
the jury, or to direct
others, where
would be proper to submit the case to the
jury,
might become its duty to set aside the verdict and
grant
new trial.
The statute of the District of Columbia, which was under consideration, was evidently taken
from the New York practice act; and the court in MetroSup. Ct. 1334),
politan R. R. Co. V. Moore, 121 U. S. 558
decisions,
York
seems to have followed the New
upon the
principle that, where one jurisdiction adopts the statute
also adopts the construcof another state or jurisdiction,
tion given such statute by the courts of the latter jurisdicIn Slater v.
tion.
See Algeo v. Duncan, 39 N. Y. 313.
Drescher, 72 Hun. 425 (25 N. Y. Supp. 153),
said that
an objection to the verdict, because
was against the
the
of
means
had
same thing as
weight
evidence,
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of the evidence to supstatute
is
port it. The Ohio
substantially the same as our
own, and it is there held that the court, by force thereof
may grant a new trial where the verdict is "against or
contrary to the weight of the evidence:" Weaver v. Columbus, S. d H. V. Ry. Co., 55 Ohio St. 491 (45 N. E. 717).
The California statute is in the exact language of ours,
and the courts of that state, from the time of their earliest
cognizance of the statute, have construed it as conferring
the power to weigh the evidence and determine its suffisatisfied
upon the whole, the judge
ciency; and that
against the indubitable preponderance
that the verdict
unjust, or such as reasonor clear weight of evidence, or
able men would not return under the circumstances of the
aside,
authorized, in his discretion, to set
case, he
not subject to review by the supreme
which discretion
Hall v. The Emily
court, except for an abuse thereof:
was said in People v. Lum
Banning, 33 Cal. 522. So,
was the duty of the
Yit, 83 Cal. 130 (23 Pac. 228), that
he
new trial
not satisfied that the
judge to grant
whole was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
evidence as
And in People v. Knutte, 111 Cal. 453 (44 Pac. 166), the
'jourt, speaking through Van Fleet, J., says: "The case
was argued here by both parties upon the assumption that
the new trial was granted upon the ground that the evidence was deemed insufficient to sustain the verdict; and,
stated in the order of the
while no specific ground
court,
may be safely taken, from the court's action in
advising the jury to acquit, that this assumption of coun*
*
While
the exclusive province of
correct.
sel
nevertheless one of the most
the jury to find the facts,
important requirements of the trial judge to see to
intelligently and justly
that this function of the jury
In this respect, while he cannot competently
oxercised.
or control the jury in passing upon the eviwith
interfere
very salutary superdence, he nevertheless exercises
In the exercise of that
visory power over their verdict.
that the evidence
himself
power, he should always satisfy
sufficient to sustain the verdict found, and,
whole
as
not, he should unhesitatingly
in his sound judgment
See, also, Lorenzana
say so, and set the verdict aside."
c.'Camarillo, 41 Cal. 467; Kile v. Tuhhs, 32 Cal. 332, 339;
is

is

it
is

■f

a

a

is

it

is it
is

it

is

*

it

is

a

a

if

it

it

is

is

it

is

is

is

if,

been based upon the insufficiency
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Cal. 413; Walton v. Maguire, 17

is

is

it

is

it

is

is

;

is

is

it

is

is

it

if

is

a

it

if

a

a

it

it

if,

it,

Cal. 92.
It must be understood, of course, that a mere dissatisfaction of the judge with the verdict is not sufficient ground
for disturbing
but the court must exercise its judgment
in each particular case, and
from all the testimony given
the jury,
satisfied that the verdict
against the clear
weight or preponderance of evidence, or that the jury has
acted unreasonably in returning the verdict, or has been
misled or misdirected, or has acted through improper motives,
aside and grant
the duty of the court to set
new trial:
Wright v. Southern Express Co., 80 Fed.
85, 93; Mt. Adams, etc., Ry. Co. v. Loivery, 20 C. C. A. 596,
74 Fed. 463, 477.
There may be sufficient evidence to go
prima facie case, yet there may be
to the jury to make
opposing evidence so strong, palpable, and overwhelming
as to dissipate any reasonable idea that the prima facie
case should prevail; or the case as first made may be so
strong, and the countervailing testimony so weak and unsatisfactory, as to preclude an honest and rational judgment against the case first made.
the
In either case,
jury should disregard the better showing,
would plainly
be the duty of the court to interpose, upon motion for
new trial, and set the verdict aside; and this
the rationale of the statute, in providing that the verdict may be
set aside for insufficiency of evidence.
Mr. Justice Beewee has laid down what seems to us to
l)e the proper rule for the guidance of the trial judge, in
Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kmikel, 17 Kan. 172. He says:
"The one (the trial judge) has the same opportunity as the
jury for forming a just estimate of the credence to be
placed in the various witnesses, and,
appears to him
that the jury have found against the weight of evidence,
his imperative duty to set the verdict aside. We do
not mean that he
to substitute his own judgment in all
cases for the judgment of the jury, for
their province
to settle questions of fact and when the evidence
nearly
that
balanced, or
such
different minds would naturally
and fairly come to different conclusions thereon, he has
no right to disturb the findings of the jury, although his
own judgment might incline him the other way. In other
words, the finding of the jury
to be upheld by him as

684

Trial Practice

[Chap.

17

against any mere doubts of its correctness.
But when
his judgment tells him that it is wrong; that, whether from
mistake, or prejudice, or other cause, the jury have erred,
and found against the fair preponderance of the evidence,
— then no duty is more imperative than that of setting
aside the verdict, and remanding the question to another

jury."

We think the court in the case at bar proceeded upon an
erroneous principle of law in limiting its inquiry to ascertaining whether there was any evidence from which the
jury might infer the facts which were attempted to be
proven.
It should have gone further, and weighed the
evidence in accordance with the principles hereinbefore
Larsen v. Oregon Ry. S Nav. Co., 19 Or. 240
enunciated:
247 (23 Pac. 974) ; State v. Billings, 81 Iowa, 99 (46 N. W.
862) ; City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Light S Water Co., 16
Wash. 288 (47 Pac. 738); Hawkins v. Reichert, 28 Cal.
534; Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565; Bennett v. Hobro, 72
Cal. 178 (13 Pac. 473); Reid v. Young, 7 App. Div. 400
(39 N. Y. Supp. 899); First Nat. Bank v. Wood, 124 Mo.
72 (27 S. W. 554).
The defendants were entitled to have
their motion for a new trial passed upon in pursuance of
correct principles of law, and, the trial court having failed
in this, the cause will be remanded, with directions to determine the motion under the rules herein announced. The
cumulative character of the newly-discovered evidence renders defendants' position upon the first ground untenable;
and, as it pertains to the second, viz., that the damages assessed are excessive, that was a matter within the discretion of the trial court. By anything we have said in this
opinion it is not intended to indicate in any manner our
impressions touching the weight of the evidence submitted
to the jury, and the court below, having seen the witnesses
and observed their manner, must act entirely upon its own
judgment in passing upon the motion.
Reversed.
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HARRISON V. SUTTER STREET RAILWAY
COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of California.
116

Van Fleet,

1897.

California, 156.

J. — Plaintiff

a

a

if,

had verdict and judgment
against defendants for eight thousand dollars, as damages suffered by the heirs of his intestate through the
death of the latter, resulting from injuries received in a
collision between a car of the railroad company, on which
lie was a passenger, and a wagon of the brewing company,
occasioned by the negligence of the defendants.
The court below granted defendants a new trial, on the
ground that the verdict was excessive; and the plaintiff
appeals from such order, urging that it was wholly unwarranted under the e\adence, and was an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court.
Certain preliminary objections are interposed by defendants, and reasons suggested why the order appealed from
cannot be reviewed, but these objections, while possibly possessed of some merit, being purely technical, and the court
being of opinion that the order must be affirmed on the
merits, it will prove more satisfactory to both parties, and
more in accord with the disposition of the court, to so dispose of the appeal.
That the granting of a new trial is a thing resting so
largely in the discretion of the trial court that its action
in that regard will not be disturbed except upon the disclosure of a manifest and unmistakable abuse has become
axiomatic, and requires no citation of authority in its supIt is true that such discretion is not a right to the
port.
'exertion of the mere personal or arbitrary will of the
judge, but is a power governed by fixed rules of law, and
to be reasonably exercised within those rules, to the ac
But so long as a case made
complishment of justice.
presents an instance showing a reasonable or even fairly
debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken,
as
quessuch action will not be here set aside, even
tion of first impression, we might feel inclined to lake

^
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different vie\v from that of the court below as to the propriety of its action. More especially is this true where,
as here, the question rests largely in fact, and involves the
proper deduction to be drawn from the evidence. The
opportunities of the trial court, in such instances, for
reaching just conclusions are, as a general thing, so superior to our own, that we will not presume to set our
judgment against that of the former, where there appears

any reasonable room for difference.
Appellant does not seriously question the correctness of
these principles, but he contends that the record does not
disclose a proper case for their application. He contends
that there was no room for the exercise of discretion ; that
the evidence as to the amount of damages suffered was
wholly without conflict; that there was nothing to indicate
passion or prejudice, except the amount of the verdict itself, and that there was no showing, by affidavit or otherwise, of any improper conduct on the part of the jury. As
to the last suggestion, it is impertinent to the inquiry.
Granting a new trial for the misconduct of the jury, such
as may be shown by affidavit, is something wholly different
and apart from the right which the statute gives to grant
such relief on the ground of excessive damages. The former contemplates some overt act of impropriety, such as
receiving evidence out of court, reaching a verdict by
chance, and, the like; while an excessive verdict implies no
misconduct of the jury necessarily, but simply that the result has been induced through excited feelings or prejudice, of which the jury may not, perhaps, have been even
aware, but which has, nevertheless, precluded an impartial
consideration of the evidence. Whether the verdict is excessive is to be determined solely from a consideration of
the evidence in the case, and whether it will fairly sustain
the conclusion of the jury — a question which cannot be
aided by the showing of extrinsic facts, by affidavit, or
otherwise.
As to the suggestion that the evidence touching ''the
amount of damages" was without conflict, we are not wholly certain that we appreciate exactly what counsel means.
There was no evidence given as to the amount of the damThe damages sued for were in their nature
ages suffered.
unliquidated, and no witness pretended to fix the precise
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should recover. We presume counsel
means that the evidence as to the circumstances which tin
jury had a right to regard in determining the award of
damages, such as age, condition of life, etc., of deceased,
was without conflict. But if this were true, which we do
not think can be fairly said, the question as to the proper
deduction and conclusion to be drawn from such evidence
would still remain for the jury, and whether their consideration of the evidence for this purpose was influenced
by passion or prejudice would not necessarily be affected
by the fact that the evidence was without conflict.
A jury,
if excited by prejudice, might as readily award unjust damages where the evidence was uncontradicted as where it
was in sharp conflict.
The evidence tended to show that deceased was about
sixty-nine years of age, but his physical appearance would
seem to have indicated more advanced years.
Dr. Dorr,
one of his physicians, testified that he looked older; that
he appeared between seventy-five and eighty years of
age; while Dr. O'Brien, a physician who examined him on
behalf of one of the defendants, after the accident and
before his death, testified that he considered him a debilitated man; that in his judgment the result of the injury
would not have been serious but for his age and debility.
According to the testimony of his widow his health was
very good, but he had suffered all his life from sick headache, for which she had been required to nurse him.
His income was about one hundred and ten dollars per
month, that is, it did not appear that he was in steady or
permanent employment, but the evidence tended to show
that he was an expert accountant, who straightened out
books and tangled accounts when called upon, and that his
earnings averaged that sum monthly.
According to the Carlisle mortality tables, he had an expectancy or probable lease of life of a fraction over nine
years and a half.
He had dependent on him a wife and an
adult unmarried daughter.
Upon these facts the jury were instructed, as to the
question of damages, in effect, that they should estimate
and determine the amount that the deceased would in all
reasonable probability have earned in the years yet remaining to him ; and, deducting from this the amount which

688

Trial

Peactice

[Chap. 17

lie would reasonably require for his own personal use and
maintenance, give a verdict which would pecuniarily comIt is conceded that this instruction gave
pensate the heirs.
the correct rule for the guidance of the jury.
In view of this evidence, and the rule of compensation
by which the jury were to be governed, we think it quite
manifest that we should not be justified in holding that
there was an abuse of discretion in setting aside the verdict. The jury would seem to have proceded upon the
theory that the deceased's expectancy of life would be
fully realized, and that he would continue to the end with
the same earning capacity as that possessed by him at the
time of his death, for their verdict implies that he would
have earned, over and above the amount required for his
personal needs, the large net sum of eight thousand dollars, and this would necessarily contemplate constant employment without interruption from sickness or other cause
and with a rate of earnings in no way diminished, since it
will readily be perceived that according to his income his
utmost gross earnings in the given time would not have
exceeded twelve thousand dollars.
Such a result does not accord with ordinary human ex'perience. The deceased's expectancy of life was not a certainty, but a mere probability. It is true he might have
lived even longer than the limit of such expectancy, but
the chances were much against it. He might also have
retained his vigor and ability to labor to the last, but ordinary experience teaches that the weight of advancing years,
after the age attained by deceased, bears strongly against
Under these circumstances we do not think
such result.
it should be said that the conclusion of the trial judge was
without support in the evidence.
But appellant urges that it is only where the verdict
is so grossly disproportionate to any reasonable limit of
compensation warranted by the facts, as to shock the sense
of justice, and raise at once a strong presumption that it is
based on prejudice or passion rather than sober judgment,
that the judge is at liberty to interpose his judgment as
against that of the jury; and that such an instance is not
shown. The rule invoked is correct, as addressed to the
function of the trial court, or when asking this court to set
aside the verdict where it has been refused by the court
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below. But when we are asked to review the act of that
court, where in the exercise of its discretionary power it
has seen fit to set aside the verdict on this ground, a very
different rule prevails. Every intendment is to be indulged here in support of the action of the court below,
and, as elsewhere suggested, it will not be disturbed if the
question of its propriety be open to debate.

Order granting new trial affirmed.
Hareison, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred.

GRAHAM

V.

CONSOLIDATED
PANY.

TRACTION

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
65

COM-

1900.

New Jersey Laiv, 539.

On rule to show cause.
Before Justices Depue, Van Syckel and Gummeee.

Per Curiam.

This suit was brought by the plaintiff as administrator
of Melville T. Graham, deceased, under the act which provides for recovery of damages in cases where the death of
a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default.
The suit is for the benefit of the father
Gen. Stat. p. 1138.
of the deceased, as his next of kin, to recover damages for
the *' pecuniary injury resulting to him from the death of
The deceased was a boy four years and
the deceased."
four months old at the time the accident happened which
resulted in his death. The jury found a verdict for the
plaintiff and assessed the damages at $2,000.
This case was first tried in September, 1896, and resulted
in a verdict for $5,000 for the plaintiff.
Upon a rale to
should
show cause why this verdict
not be set aside this
court, June Term, 1897, held that the damages were ''absurdly excessive," and ordered that a new trial be granted
unless the plaintiff would accept the sum of $1,000, which
In October, 1897, the case was again
lie declined to do.
tried, and a second verdict for $5,000 was rendered.
This
—
p.
44
T.
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verdict was set aside on tlie ground that the damages were
excessive. Graham v. Consolidated Traction
Co., 33
Vroom 90. The case was retried January 30th, 1899, and
resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000.
The verdict was set aside on two grounds —first, that the
plaintiff had not established by a preponderance of proof
that defendant was liable; second, that the damages were
excessive. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co., 35 Id.
10.

The evidence at this trial is substantially the same as it
was at the last preceding trial.
Two additional witnesses
were examined on the part of the plaintiff, Olivett Butler
and Joseph A. Smith.
As to the amount of damages that
should be recovered the case is not in anywise altered.
With respect to the case upon the merits as presented at
the last preceding trial, the opinion of Chief Justice Magie
demonstrates that it was insufficient to sustain any verdict
in, favor of the plaintiff.
A careful examination and consideration of the testimony at the last trial, including that
given by Olivette Butler and Joseph A. Smith, the new
witnesses called by the plaintiff, leave the case substantially in the same condition, upon the weight of the evidence,
that it was in when the last preceding verdict was set
aside. The observations of the Chief Justice on the evidence at that time apply with full force to the present
case.

The rule should be made absolute on both grounds.^
t This is probably an extreme case, in one aspect of it.
Usually the court
will acquiesce in the decision of the jury if a second verdict is rendered in
substantial conformity to that which was set aside as contrary to the evidence.
Bryant v. Commonwealth Tns. Co. (1833) 13 Pick. (Mass.) 543; Monarch G.
«S S. Min. Co. V. McLaughlin
(1877) 1 Ida. 650; Van Doren v. Wright (1896)
65 Minn. 80, 67 N. W. 668.
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TATHWELL V. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS.
Supreme

Court of Iowa.
122

1903,

Iowa, 50.

Action to recover damages resulting from personal injuries received by plaintiff while driving in a street of defendant city by reason of his horse stepping into a hole in
in or beside a culvert, the result being that
plaintiff was thrown to the ground. Judgment for plaintiff on a former trial was reversed, and a new trial ordered.
114 Iowa, 180.
On this trial verdict was returned for the
plaintiff for $100 damages, which, on plaintiff's motion,
was set aside as inadequate.
From this ruling defendant
—
appeals. A firmed.
McClain, J. — There was a conflict in the evidence as to
whether the street was defective at the place where plaintiff was injured, but the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff establishes the existence of a defect and the negligence
of the city with reference thereto, and we have for consideration only this question:
Did the trial judge err in
setting aside the verdict on the ground that the damages
awarded to plaintiff for the injury were inadequate?
The
right of jury trial, as uniformly recognized under the common-law sj^stem, involves the determination by the jury,
rather than by the judge, of questions of fact, including the
amount of damage to be given where compensation is for
an unliquidated demand.
Nevertheless, the trial courts
have exercised from early times in the history of the common law the power to supervise the action of the jury, even
as to the measure of damages, and to award a new trial
where the verdict is not supported by the evidence and is
manifestly unjust and perverse. And while it is uniformly
held that the trial judge will interfere with the verdict of
the jury as to matters of fact with reluctance, and only
where, on the very face of the evidence allowing every
presumption in favor of the correctness of the jury's action, it is apparent to a reasonable mind that the verdict is
clearly contrary to the evidence, yet the power of the judge
It has
to interfere in extreme cases in unquestionable.
the highway
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sometimes been said that the judge should not interfere
where the verdict is supported by a scintilla of evidence;
but the scintilla doctrine has been discarded in this state,
and is not now generally recognized elsewhere.
Meyer v.
Houck, 85 Iowa, 319. The general scope and extent of the
judge's supervisory power with reference to the jury's
verdict as to questions of facts is well illustrated by the
very first reported case in which the power a])pears to
have been exercised — that of Wood v. Gunston, decided in
1655 by the Court of King's Bench (or, as it was called during the commonwealth, Upper Bench), found in Style's Reports, on page 466. The action was upon the case for
speaking scandalous words against the plaintiff, charging
The jury
him, among other things, with being a traitor.
five
plaintiff
one
thousand
hundred
gave
pounds damages,
whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial on the
ground that the damages were excessive, and that the jury
In opposition to this it was said
had favored the plaintiff.
in argument that, after a verdict the partiality of the jury
ought not to be questioned, nor was there any precedent
for it — '*in our books of the law," and that it would be of
dangerous consequence if it should be permitted, and the
greatness of the damages cannot be a cause for a new trial.
But counsel for the other party said that the verdict was a
"packed business," else there could not have been so great
damages, and that the court had power, "in extraordinary
The chief jus^
cases such as this is to grant a new trial."
tice thereupon said: "It is in the discretion of the court
in some cases to grant a new trial, but this must be a
judicial, and not an arbitrary, discretion, and it is frequent
in our books for the court to take notice of miscarriages
of juries, and to grant new trials upon them. And it is
for the people's benefit that it should be so, for a jury may
sometimes, by indirect dealings, be moved to side with one
party, and not to be indifferent betwixt them, but it cannot
be so intended with the court; wherefore let there be a
new trial the next term, and the defendant sliall pay full
costs, and judgment to be upon this verdict to stand for
security to pay what shall be recovered upon the next verdict." This case is especially interesting in connection
with the present discussion, because it is one in which the
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assessment of damages was peculiarly within the province
of the jury, and because the nature of the supervisory
power of the trial judge is explained as being, in effect, to
set aside a verdict for excessive damages in such cases
which seem to have been the result of passion and prejudice, and not the deliberate exercise of judgment.
That
the practice of granting new trials under such circumstances
has continued in all the courts administering the common
law from the time of the case just cited to the present time
is a matter of common knowledge with the profession, and
citation of authorities would be superfluous.
That the
power is exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice by
reason of the rendition of a verdict by the jury which is
wholly unreasonable, in view of the testimony, which is
given in the presence of the court, is universally conceded.
But the question with which we are now more particularly concerned is whether this power of the trial judge may
be exercised where the injustice consists in rendering a
verdict for too small an amount. If the case is one in
which the measure of damages is a question of law, the
court has, of course, the same power to set aside a verdict
for too small an amount as one which is excessive ; and this
is, in general, true without question where the damages are
capable of exact computation — that is, where the facts
established by the verdict of the jury show as matter of
law how much the recovery should be. In such cases the
court may grant a new trial, unless the defendant will consent to a verdict for a larger amount fixed by the court,
than that found by the jury; just as in case of excessive
damages under similar circumstances the court may reduce the amount for which the verdict shall be allowed, to
stand, on penalty of setting it aside if the successful party
Carr v. Miner, 42 111. 179;
does not agree to the reduction.
James v. Morey, 44 111. 352. It seems to have been thought
by some courts that the general supervisory power over
verdicts, where the amount of damage is not capable of
computation, and rests in the sound discretion of the jury,
should not be exercised where the verdict is for too small
an amount; at least not with the same freedom as in cases
where it is excessive. Earlier v. Dixie, 2 Strange, 1051;

Pritchard v. Hewitt,

91

Mo.

547

(4 S.

W. Eep. 437,

60

Am.
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Eep. 265) ; Martin v. Atkinson, 7 Ga. 228 (50 Am. Dec. 403).
No such limitation on the supervisory power of the trial
judge has been definitely established, and by the great
weight of authority, both in England and America, the
power to set aside the verdict, when manifestly inconsistent with the evidence, and the result of a misconception by
the jury of their powers and duties, is as fully recognized
where the verdict is inadequate as where it is excessive;
and ample illustration of the exercise of this power is
found in actions to recover damages for personal injuries
or injury to the reputation, although in such cases the
amount of damage is jDeculiarly within the jury's discretion. Phillips V. London S S. W. R. Co., 5 Q. B. D. 781;
Robinson v. Town of Waupaca, 77 Wis. 544; Whitney v.
Mihvaukee, 65 Wis. 409 ; Caldivell v. Vichshurg, 8. & P. R.
Co., 41 La. Ann. 624 (6 So. Rep. 217); Benton v. Collins,
125 N. C. 83 (34 S. E. Rep. 242, 47 L. R. A. 33) ; McNeil v.
Lyons, 20 R. I. 672 (40 Atl. Rep. 831) ; Lee v. Publishers,
George Knapp S Co., 137 Mo. 385 (38 S. W. Rep. 1107);
McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551; Carter v. Wells, Fargo
(& Co., (C. C.) 64 Fed. Rep. 1007.
Counsel for appellant urge, however, that the whole matter of granting new trials is controlled by the provisions
relating to that subject found in the Code, and that these
provisions supersede the common-law rules on the subject.
It has not been our understanding that the provisions of
the Code relating to practice are intended to entirely supersede the rules of the common law.
They are, like other |
statutory law, merely additions to or modifications of common-law rules. We have licld for instance, that, without
any statutory provision on the subject, the court may direct a verdict in a pro])er case; that new trials may be
granted in equity after the expiration of one year from the
time of rendering judgment, although the statutory provisions as to new trials after judgment limit the right to one
year; that the Supreme Court may grant a restraining
order, in the exercise of its general appellate jurisdiction,
although there is no statutory provision whatever with
These illustrations indicate that the
reference thereto.
provisions of the Code as to practice supersede commonlaw rules only so far as they are inconsistent therewith.
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The legislature has never attempted a complete codification
of the rules and principles of the common-law, either as to
substantive or remedial rights. The language of Code,
section 3446, seems to be directly applicable.
It is as follows: "The rule of the common-law, that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. Its provisions and all proceedings
under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice."
We are inclined, therefore, to the view that the sections
relating to new trial do not necessarily cover the whole
ground, nor prevent us from recognizing powers of the trial
court in this respect which have generally been exercised
under the common-law system. See McDonald v. Walter,
40 N. Y. 551.
However this may be, we think the authority is expressly
given in Code, section 3755, to set aside a verdict which is
manifestly inadequate under the evidence. It is true that
paragraph four of that section, with reference to the influence of passion or prejudice, mentions excessive damages, and that paragraph five, with relation to error in the
assessment of the amount of recovery, whether too large
or too small, refers only to actions upon contract, or for
the injury or detention of property.
But paragraph six
authorizes a new trial if the verdict is not sustained by.
sufficient evidence, and we see no reason for limiting this
]iaragraph to cases where, under the evidence, it appears
that the verdict should have been the other way. A verdict
in favor of plaintiff for $100 is as much against the plaintiff as to any right to recover damages not covered by the
verdict as though it had been outright for the defendant.
Suppose the plaintiff sues on a promissory note, and, defendant having interposed a general denial, plaintiff introduces the note in evidence (the signature not being denied

under oath), and there is no evidence whatever that the note
is not valid, or has been discharged, and nevertheless the
jury returns a verdict for defendant, could it be claimed
And yet this case
that a new trial should not be granted?
does not come under any of the paragraphs of the action
on new trial, unless it comes under the paragraph last
We think this paragraph should have a
above referred to.
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liberal interpretation, and that it covers such a case as the
one now before us.
Similar provisions in other Codes have
been construed as authorizing the setting aside of verdicts
on plaintiff's motion because the damages allowed are inadequate. Du Brutz V. Jestup, 54 Cal. 118; Bennett v.
Hohro, 72 Cal. 178 (13 Pac. Eep. 473) ; Emmons v. Sheldon,
26 Wis. 648; Henderson v. St. Paul S D. R. Co., 52 Minn.
479 (55 N. W. Rep. 53) ; McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551.
The trial judge therefore had the power to set aside
the verdict below on account of the inadequacy of the damages, and the question is whether the case is a proper one
for the exercise of such power. We interfere reluctantly
with the action of the lower court in ruling on motions for
a new trial, and especially where a new trial has been
Peebles v. Peebles, 77 Iowa, 11; Morgan v. Waggranted.
ner, 79 Iowa, 174; Hophins v. Knapp S Spaulding Co., 92
Iowa, 212; Mally v. Mally, 114 Iowa, 309; Chouquette v.
Southern Electric R. Co., 152 Mo. 257. Although it is
urged in this case that the jury allowed to the plaintiff the
actual damages sustained by him so far as they were shown
by any evidence corroborating his own testimony, nevertheless, it clearly appears that, if his unimpeached testimony
is to be credited, he was damaged to a much larger extent
than is covered by the verdict rendered by the jury. We
do not hold that the trial judge may substitute his judgment of the credibility of the witness in place of the judgment which the jury has exercised, but we do say that the
trial judge may, if he finds that the jury have failed to
allow the amount of damages shown by uncontradicted testimony, set aside the verdict as in conflict with the evidence
and award a new trial.
The ruling of the lower court was therefore correct, and
it is Affirmed.
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Vekdict Contrary to Law.

LYNCH V. SNEAD ARCHITECTURAL IRON WORKS.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

1909,

132 KentiicTcy, 241.

**********

Opinion of the court by Judge Lassing — Reversing.
Appellant complains that the jury in arriving at their
verdict wholly disregarded instruction No. 1, and returned
their verdict in favor of plaintiff in spite of it. It is urged
by counsel for appellant that, without entering into a consideration as to whether or not this instruction properly
presented the law as warranted by the facts proven, nevertheless it was the law of this case, and in disregarding it
and returning a verdict in favor of plaintiff as they did the
jury found contrary to the law, and that, for this reason,
the judgment predicated upon their verdict should be reversed and a new trial awarded.
On the other hand, it is
claimed by plaintiff's counsel that this instruction did not
fairly present the law of the case, as warranted by the facts,
but that as the jury, even though not properly instructed,
reached a reasonably fair and just conclusion, their verThe greater part
dict and finding should not be disturbed.
of the briefs of opposing counsel is devoted to a consideration of this question. The defendant did not except or object to this instruction, nor is his counsel now objecting
to same, but his complaint is that the jury disregarded this
instruction. * * *
Section 340, subsec. 6, Civ. Code Prac. makes one of the
grounds upon which a new trial may be granted ''that the
verdict or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or
is contrary to law." An examination of the authorities
discloses the fact that courts of last resort of the various
states are not by any means harmonious in the construction which they have placed upon similar code provisions,
and there is, at least, an apparent lack of uniformity upon
The superior
this point in the decisions in our own state.
court in the cases of Gausman v. Paff, 10 Ky. Law Rep.
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240; Palmer v. Jolinson, 13 Ky. Law Eep. 590; Burns v.
McGihhen, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 441, and Bertman v. Ehert's
Adm'r., 9 Ky. Law Rep. 198, held that, where a verdict is
sought to be avoided on the ground that it is contrary to
law, the complaint relates to the law as given by the court
in its instructions to the jury, and not as it should have
been given, or, in other words these decisions hold that
where a new trial is sought on the ground that the verdict
is contrary to law, the ''law" here referred to means the
"law" as declared or given by the court, and not as it
should have been given; that, even though the court was
in error and failed to give the law correctly, nevertheless
the jury was bound by the "law" as given, and, if their
verdict was contrary to the "law", this fact would authorize a reversal of the case, and the granting of a new trial.
And in the case of Curran v. Stein, etc., 110 Ky. 99, 60 S.
W. 839, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1575, this court said: "It is insisted for appellant that the court erred in giving the jury
a peremptory instruction, or in interfering with the freedom of their deliberation by requiring them to return a
verdict which they were unwilling to render. There was
r\o error of the court in requiring the jury to obey his inThe peremptory instruction of the court to the
structions.
jury, like any other order the court may make in a case,
* * *
To hold that the jury may disobey
must be obeyed.
direction
of the court would be to vest the
the peremptory
jury with power to review the decisions of the court on the
law of the case." As opposed to this idea, this court in

the case of Armstrong v. Keith, 3 J. J. March. 153, 20 Am.
Dec. 131, upheld a verdict which was admittedly contrary
to "law" where the instruction or law, as given by the
court, was erroneous, and said that the finding of the jury,
under such circumstances, was sufficient to justify a final
judgment.

* *

*

That this court had, even prior to 1830, when the opinion
in the case of Armstrong v. Keith, was delivered, committed itself to the doctrine that the jury may not disregard

the "law" as given by the court, and decide on the facts to
the contrary, notwithstanding the instruction, while not
directly decided, is incidentally established. In the case
of Sfiiith V, Morrison, 3 A. K. Marsh, 81, in passing upon
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ruling of the trial court in stopping Smith's counsel
from arguing a proposition of law seemingly contrary to
that given by the court, this court said : ''In thus restraining counsel we are of opinion the court acted perfectly
correct.
After having obtained from the court an opinion
on the legal import of the settlement, a decent regard for
that opinion would seem to forbid the same matter from
being again canvassed before the jury," * * * The decisions of other courts of last resort upon this point are not
harmonious, but the decided weight of the authorities is to
the

the effect that, where a statute authorizes a reversal upon
the ground that the verdict is contrary to the "law," the

"law"

referred to means the "law" of tliat case as given
The Supreme Courts
by the court, whether right or wrong.
of California, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Alabama, South Dakota, and
England have held that, where a verdict is returned contrary to "law" as given by the instructions of the court,
it is such a verdict as will authorize the trial court to set
aside because contrary to law. The "law" referred to in
the opinions undef consideration is invariably held to mearn
the "law" as given by the court, and not as it should or
might have been given. On the other hand, the Supremei
Courts of Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas have taken ai
contrary view, and, where the verdict is in harmony with
what the court conceives to be the "law" should have been,
rather than in harmony with the law as given by the trial
judge, the finding of the jury has not been disturbed.
In the case of Murray v. Heinze, 17 Mont. 353, 42 Pac.
1057, 43 Pac. 714, the court had under consideration the
correctness of the ruling and judgment of the trial court
because it was contrary to the "law" as given by the court.
Upon appeal it was urged that this was error because the
instruction or "law" as given by the trial court was itself
In disposing of this question the court said:
erroneous.
"But counsel for the appellant contend that, the instruction
being erroneous, the court erred in setting aside the verdict, because of the fact that the jury wliolly disregarded
Had the jury the right
it. The question presented is:
of
the court if erroneous?
to disregard the instructions
This is a most important question in the administration of
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is

'

.3,

it

must be conceded that there is a conflict of
authority on this question. Counsel for the appellant cite
a number of authorities in support of their claim that the
jury may disregard the instructions of the court, if erroneous, if the verdict is otherwise in accord with the law,
and that it would be error in the court under such circumstances to set aside the verdict. It seems from the authorities cited by appellant that Kentucky, Georgia, Texas, and
some other states have so held.
A number of the cases
cited by counsel for appellant are not exactly in point ; that
is, they are cases in which the jury did not seeminglv disregard the erroneous instructions upon vitally material issues in the case, and where the verdict was in conformity
with the charge of the court, taken as a whole. But it
must be confessed that some of the authorities cited hold
that the jury have a right to disregard erroneous instructions of the court, and that the verdict should not be set
* * *
aside in such cases if in accord with the correct law.
But let it be conceded that there is a conflict of authorities
upon the question under discussion, or let us suppose that it:
is a new question, without any adjudications or authority
It
in either event; what course should this court pursue?
the
sole
has always been held in this jurisdiction that it was
province of the jury to determine questions of fact. It
has been uniformly held that it was error for the court to
invade this special province of the jury by even commenting on the evidence. State v. Sullivan^ 9 Mont. 174, 22
Pac. 1088, and authorities cited. Our system of practice
is certainly based upon the theory that it is the province
of the jury to determine facts, and that of the court to determine and declare the law in all cases, except in prosecutions for libel. 'The jury, under the direction of the court,
shall determine the law and the facts.' State Const, art.
seems
section 30. From this constitutional clause
plain that the jury have no right to determine the law in
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius/
any other case.
has been seriously contended in this
the first time
This
court that the jury have the right to determine the law in
an ordinary suit at law and to absolutely disregard the instructions of the court on the ground that, in the oiVmion
of the jury, the instructions of the court are erroneous. If
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upheld, what may
we not anticipate as the result in the administration of the
law in this state? If the jury may rightfully invade the
l^rovince of the court, why may not the court retaliate by
invading the province of the jury in determining questions
of fact?
As counsel for the respondent suggest, if the contention of appellant is correct, then logically there is an
appeal in all cases upon questions of law from the trial
court to the jury. And as counsel for respondent further
suggest in their argument, if the jury may determine the
law, an attorney arguing the case may say to the jury:
'The court will charge you that the law is so and so, but
say to you the court is wrong.
You, the jury, are the
hidges of the law, and may determine it for yourselves.'
Would any court permit such an argument to a jury? Certainly not. But, if the jury are the judges of the law, why
should a court prohibit such an argument to them? If a
juror should state upon his voir dire that he would not be
ii'overned by the law as declared by the court, if he thought
ihe instructions erroneous, nobody would doubt that he
would not be permitted to sit in the case. Yet, if he has
the right as a juror to determine the law, we do not see
why he should be challenged for asserting that right. If
^he contention of appellant is correct, the time of this court
in hearing future appeals will be devoted to determining
whether the court or the jury were right in their views of
Authorthe law in the trial of the cause in the lower court.
ity, or no authority, we cannot give our sanction to a pracSuch a course would
tice that would lead to such results.
ultimately result in overturning our system of keeping
separate and distinct the powers and duties of the courts
and juries, confining each to its own proper province, in the
degradation of the courts, and confusion and chaos in the
administration of the law."
And in the case of Einerson v. County of Santa Clara,
40 Cai. 543, the court, in passing upon a similar question,
said: ''It matters not if the instruction disobeyed be itself
erroneous in point of law, it is nevertheless binding upon
the jury who can no more be permitted to look beyond the
instructions of the court to ascertain the law than they
be

I
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would be allowed to go outside of the evidence to find the
facts of the case."
And in the case of Barton v. Sliull, 62 Neb. 570, 87 N. W.
322, the Supreme Court in passing upon a similar question,
said: ''Without at the present time discussing the correctness of the instructions, the rule is that it is the duty of the
jury in all cases to follow the instructions given them by

if

they fail to do so,
the verdict will be deemed to be contrary to law, and should
be set aside and a new trial ordered.
The reasons for the
other
rule are obvious.
would
Any
lead to endless confusion sanctioning utter disregard of the court's opinion
of the law applicable to the pleadings and the evidence, and
render its instructions entirely impotent, except when willed otherwise by the jury. A refusal or failure to follow
the instructions of the court is sufficient ground for setting
asid-e the verdict and granting a new trial."

the court whether correct or not

And in Way

v. Chicago

;

and,

d Rock Island Bailway

Co., 73

N. W. 525, the court said: ''We will not inTowa,
quire whether the instruction is correct or not. It was
given as the law of the case, and should have been respected
by the jury. A verdict which has been found against the
instructions of a court should be set aside, even though the
disregarded instructions should be erroneous." To the
^ame effect are Bunt en v. Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Bosw. (N. Y.)
254; Flemming v. Marine Ins. Co., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 59, 33
Am. Dec. 33; Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. C. 1; Fleming v. L. & N.
R. R. Co., 148 Ala. 527, 41 South. 683; Wood v. Cox, 84
Rnglish Common Law, 280. In this case the Chief Justice,
Sir John Jervis, said: "Without discussing the merits
of the case or the propriety of the directions of the presiding judge, I think the verdict cannot be sustained. The
undersheriff directs the jury to find for the plaintiff, telling
them there is no evidence to support the plea, and they
There must be a new
persist in finding for the defendant.
trial." The authorities which we have cited are representative cases in their respective jurisdictions bearing upon
463, 35

As opposed to the views therein expressed,
this question.
the Supreme Courts of Texas, Georgia, and Mississippi,
as above indicated, have taken a contrary view, but the
reason for the rule announced in these several cases cited

New Trials

Sec. 7]

703

by counsel for appellee in support of his contention is far
from satisfactory, and the conclusion reached is opposed
to both the theory and spirit upon which our system of
jurisprudence is based, and is overwhelmed by the weight
of authority in other jurisdictions.
After a full consideration, we adhere to the rule inferentially declared in Sjuith v. Morrison, * * * and subsequently followed by the superior court in the several opinions to which we have referred, and by this court in the
later case of Curran v. Stein, that it is the duty of the trial
jury to "conform to the instructions of the court upon
matters of law." In other words, that it is the exclusive
province of the court to determine questions of law, and
that of the jury only to apply the facts proven to the
law as given by the court; and, when it is stated that the
verdict is contrary to "law," reference is had to the law
as given by the court, and not as it might or should have
been given.

Section- 7.

(a)

Newly Discovered Evidence.
Cumulative Evidence.

WINFIELD BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
V. McMULLEN.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
59

Johnston,

J. J. F.

1898.

Kansas, 493.

McMullen was elected secretary of
the Winfield Building and Loan Association, and for the
faithful performance of his duties he executed a bond in the
sum of two thousand dollars, which was signed by J. C. McMullen as surety. It was claimed that the secretary misappropriated $2,201.75 of the money of the Association,
and an action was commenced on the bond. Among other
defenses alleged, J. C. McMullen, the surety, denied the
execution of the bond, and, upon testimony offered, the
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found that he did not
and
general verdict was returned and judgexecute
ment rendered in his favor. Afterward, the Association
filed its petition, under the statute, asking the court to set
aside the verdict and judgment on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence.
The bond had been lost and was
therefore not produced at the trial. It was afterward
a special question

;

a

is

is

is

a

it

it

it

a

it,

it,

it

is

is

it

it,

it

is

a

a

it

a

it

found, and
constituted the newly-discovered evidence upon which
new trial was asked. On the application, testimony was offered as to the loss of the bond and the dilibefore the trial was had. After
gence exercised to secure
full hearing, the District Court granted
new trial and
set aside the verdict and judgment theretofore rendered.
This order was reversed by the Court of Appeals (46 Pac.
here for review.
410), and its ruling
The Court of Appeals held that the testimony was newwas material, and that due
ly-discovered evidence, that
was cumubut that
diligence had been used to obtain
lative in character; and on this ground the reversal was
based. That the bond was newly discovered evidence
It was very material.
found.
"lear.
It was lost and
When proProm the fact that its execution was denied.
duced, and submitted to the inspection of the jury, they
and from the testicould determine for themselves, from
as to the genuineness
mony offered in connection with
Whether the surety
thereon.
of the defendant's signature
signed the bond was the principal fact to be investigated;
they were
and when the jury found that he did not sign
not required, under the instructions of the court, to pursue
their investigations further, nor to determine anything as
It was therefore
to the other defenses which were set up.
controlling issue in the case; and with respect to it, the
The District
new testimony was of the utmost importance.
Court and the Court of Appeals therefore correctly ruled
was mathat the evidence was newly discovered, that
terial, and further that due diligence had been used to obcumulative, and
Was
at the trial.
tain and produce
new trial?
did the trial court err in granting
evidence
newly-discovered
that
The general rule
not sufficient ground for
merely cumulative
which
new trial but we are clearly of the opinion that the pro-
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cannot be regarded as cumulative mere"Cumulative evidence is evidence of the same kind to

posed

testimony

ly.
the same point." 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 2. The
fact that the testimony may tend to prove the same issue
upon which proof was offered on the trial, is not enough
to make it cumulative ; and whether or not it is cumulative
is to be determined from its kind and character, rather
than from its effect.
On the trial, testimony was offered
that a bond was executed, and that one of th,e signatures
thereon was that of the surety.
This was merely the
opinion of experts, which, in character, is distinctly different from the instrument itself upon which the action
Instead of taking the judgment or relying
was brought.
on the opinion of others, the jury can inspect the bond,
and, from the inspection and by comparison of the signatures thereon with other signatures admitted or proved
to be genuine, determine for themselves the point in controversy. It is a very material item of evidence, on the
turning-point in the case, wholly dissimilar in character
from that produced on the trial; and therefore cannot be
The State v. Tyson, 56 Kan. 686,
classed as cumulative.
44 Pac. 609; Cairns v. Keith, 50 Minn. 32; Knowles v.
Northrop, 4 Atl. 269; Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91
111. 174; Wilday v. McConnell, 63 111. 278; Guyot v. Butts,
4 Wend. 581 ; Piatt v. Munroe, 34 Barb. 291 ; Wayt v. B.
C. R. & N. R. Co., 45 la. 218.

**********

The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be reversed
and the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

WALLER V. GRAVES.
Supreme

Court of Errors of Connecticut.
20

Connecticut,

1850.

305.

This was a petition for a new trial of a cause, which had
previously come before this court. Graves v. Waller, 19
Conn. R. 90. For the nature of the action and the declaT. P.^5
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;
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it

it,

ration, it is sufficient, for the present purpose, to refer to
the report of that case.
On the trial of the cause to the jury, it became a material question, and one on which the determination of
the cause depended, whether the words "rapacious creditor," were in the original manuscript, when it was handed
to the editor of the New Milford Republican, the newspaper in which it was alleged to have been published, or
were inserted in the manuscript or published in the newspaper, by some person, unknown to the petitioner, and
without his knowledge; the plaintiff in that suit claiming
the former branch of the alternative, and the defendant
the latter.
The plaintif[ introduced evidence tending to prove his
The defendant on the other hand, introduced Sylclaim.
vanus Merwin, as a witness, who testified, that he drew
up in part the certificate on which the action was founded ;
that he asked Waller if he would sign it? That Waller
that he then read it over to him;
asked him what it was?
was
and said
that he made no objection to signing
true; that the words "rapacious creditor," were not in
that he did not tell Waller, that he intended to publish
to the publisher of the
it; and that he, Merwin, sent
news-paper, but did not authorize the continuance of
was
the second week; that he saw the piece soon after
was different from the
published, and discovered that
manuscript when sent to the publisher.
On the hearing of the present petition also, Merwin was
witness, and testified, that he did not authorize any one
to make any other alterations in the manuscript than such
as were necessary to make its language grammatical.

a

a

The deposition of Averill as to the alteration of the
original manuscript, was annexed, and made part of the
finding of the court in the case. In that deposition, the
weekly newsdeponent testified, that being publisher of
paper in New-Milford, entitled The New-Milford Republican, he published in that paper, in April or May 1846,
writing signed by Homer Waller of New-Milford, reflecting somewhat severely on the character and person of
Jedediah Graves, father-in-law of Sylvanus Merwin; that
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this writing came to the deponent's office in the handwriting of said Merwin; that the deponent was instructed,
by a private note from Merwin, to make such alterations
in the body of the writing, as he saw fit, to make it read
grammatically, which he did accordingly; that the words
''rapacious creditor," and some others, were inserted by
the deponent, without the consent or knowledge of Waller, or even his approbation; and that the substance of
the whole writing was materially changed from what it
was when it was received by him for publication, without
authority from Waller for so doing.
The case was reserved for the advice of this court.
Church, Ch. J. The most aggravated portion of the
libel complained of, is that by which the plaintiff. Graves,
was exposed to public reproach and contempt, as having,
in the character and spirit of a rapacious creditor shamefully abused Sylvanus Merwin, his son-in-law, and his
wife and children.
This charge was libellous, and, in a good degree, gave
sting and character to the whole publication, and was the
chief ground of the plaintiff's claim to the recovery of
damages at the trial, and upon which the issue of the
cause was supposed much to depend, as we infer from the
allegations in this petition, and found by the court to be
true.
The ground of this application for a new trial, is that
from evidence newly discovered, the petitioner Waller, can
prove, that the language ''rapacious creditor/' was never
used by him, in composing the article, nor approved by
him, but without his knowledge, was inserted by the editor
of the newspaper in which it was published, and for which
unauthorized act he ought not to be made responsible.
such is the real truth, and if the jury had so believed
upon the trial, we think the result would and should have

If

different one.
There is, and there should be, reluctance in courts to
disturb the verdicts of juries, unless in cases where it is
most manifest, that either the law has been perverted or
mistaken, or that the losing party has not had a full and
impartial hearing. It is easy for a party to claim the discovery of new evidence, and it is hard that his opponent

been a
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should be compelled to submit to the expense of a second
trial, when such claim is either unfounded, or the result
of negligence in the first preparation. We feel all this
in the present case, and with much hesitation have formed
the opinion now declared.

**********

So if the evidence now claimed to be newly discovered,
is merely cumulative evidence, we cannot grant a new
trial, unless the effect of it will be to render clear and positive, that which was before equivocal and uncertain.
By cumulative evidence is meant additional evidence of
the same general character, to the same fact or point
Watson v. Delawhich was the subject of proof before.
v.
Harmond, 386;
1
McGreiv,
field, 2 Gaines, 224; Reed
Smith V. Brush, 8 Johns. R. 84; Pike v. Evans, 15 Johns.
R. 210; The People v. The Superior Court, 5 Wend. 114;
S. C. 10 Wend. 285; Guyot v. Butts, 4 Wend. 579; Gardner V. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114; Chatfield v. Lathrop, id. 417;

Parker

v.

Hardij,

24

Pick. 246.

The fact in dispute, on the trial of this cause, was,
whether the words, "rapacious creditor," were a part of
the libellous writing, when it was signed by Waller. That
they were not, was the most material ground of defence;
and this ground was supported, by the testimony of Merwin alone, who wrote the article originally, and who swore
that these words were not then in it.
From some of the cases on this subject, it may perhaps
be inferred, that courts have supposed all additional evimerely, which conduced to establish the same ground of claim or defence before relied upon, and that none would be available, for a new trial, unBut this
less it disclosed or established some new ground.
does not seem to us to be the true rule, as recognized in
the best considered cases.
There are often various distinct and independent facts
going to establish the same ground, on the same issue.
Evidence is cumulative which merely multiplies witnesses
to any one or more of these facts before investigated, or
only adds other circumstances of the same general character. But that evidence which brings to light some new
and independent truth of a different character, although

dence

to be cumulative
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a

a

a

a

a

is,

it tends to prove the same proposition or ground of claim
before insisted on, is not cumulative within the true meaning of the rule on this subject; as in the present case,
Merwin testified only, that the libel, as printed and published, was not like the paper written by him and signed
But now appears
by Waller, in the particular referred to.
a new fact, entirely independent of the testimony of Merwin — one which did not exist, at the time Merwin speaks
of; which
that another person, without the knowledge or
consent of either Waller or Merwin, inserted the objectionable words into the article, which appeared in the newspaper.
Suppose a question on trial to be, whether the note of
deceased person has been paid, and witnesses have been
introduced testifying to various facts conducing to prove
such payment, and after
verdict for the plaintiff, the
executor should discover
receipt or discharge in full, or
he
could prove the deliberate confeshad discovered that
sion of the plaintiff of the payment of the note. There
new trial should
could be no question, in such
case, but
be granted, although the new facts go to prove the former
ground of defence.
a

We shall therefore advise
new trial.
In this opinion, Waite, Stores, and Hinmaist,
curred.

Ellsworth,

Js.,

con-

J.

a

concurred in the principles advanced in
such opinion, but did not think them applicable to the
new
present case; and for that reason would not grant

trial.

New trial to

he

granted.
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710

Peactice

[Chap. 17

GERMAN V. MAQUOKETA SAVINGS BANK.
Supreme

Court of loiva.
38

1874,

Iowa, 368.

Plaintiff claims

$1,000, alleged to be due on account of
business transacted with defendant in the years 1872 and
1873.

tiff.

The defendant denies that any balance is due plain-

Trial

to the court.

Plaintiff testified in substance that
25th, 1872, he gave defendant

on

or about Nov.

two drafts, each for $1,000,

Vaughn Bros., Chicago.
That one of these drafts was forwarded to Chicago and
That the other, under his direction, was retained;
paid.
that he gave checks against this draft to the amount of
$980.93, which was charged to his account; and that afterward he settled the account by turning out notes which
the bank discounted, and this draft was delivered up to
on

him and destroyed.

The defendant's cashier and vice-president both testi' ed that the draft
sent to Chicago was drawn on the 23d
of November, and that the bank paid over the counter
therefor $1,000 less exchange.
The plaintiff, in rebutt#l, testified that it was possible
the draft paid by Vaughn Bros, was drawn on the 23d, but
that he did not, on that day or any other day, receive from
any officer of the bank $1,000 in cash over the counter of
the defendant on that draft, or upon any draft in controversy in this suit; and that no officer of the bank ever
claimed to him before the day of trial that they had paid
cash over the counter of the bank on any draft in controversy.

Upon the testimony introduced, the court rendered judgment for the defendant.
Plaintiff thereupon moved for a new trial on the ground
of surprise and of newly discovered evidence.
The court overruled the motion on the ground that the
Plaintiff apnewly discovered evidence was cumulative.
peals.
The further material facts are stated in the opinion.
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That a new trial will not be granted because
of the discovery of evidence, which is merely cumulative,
is a general doctrine of the courts, and has been frequently
See 1 Graham and Waterman on
recognized in this state.
New Trials, 486-495, and cases cited; Alger v. Merritt, 16
Iowa, 121; Sturgeon v. Ferron, 14 Iowa, 160; Manix v.
Malony, 7 Iowa, 81.
It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to furnish a
general definition of cumulative evidence, which in a given
case will materially aid in determining whether particular
testimony offered falls within or without that class.
In 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, <^ 2, it is said: "Cumulative
evidence is e\ddence of the same kind, to the same point.
Thus, if a fact is attempted to be proved by the verbal admission of the party, evidence of another admission of the
same fact is cumulative."
And in Alger v. Merritt, 16
Iowa, 121, (127), it is said: "If the new evidence be
specifically distinct and bear upon the issue, though it
may be intimately connected with some parts of the testimony at the trial, it is not cumulative."
Citing 1 G. &
W. on New Trials. Ma:*y of the cases seem to hold that
evidence is cumulative if it goes to establish the issue
which was principally controverted upon the former trial.
These cases, we think, lay down too broad a rule. The
Day,

evidence may tend to establish the same issue, and yet be
so unlike and distinct from any testimony before produced,
as to furnish no protext for declaring it cumulative.
The
case of Gardner v. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114, furnishes an apt

illustration.

In

that case the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $5,337
on a breach of warranty as to the quality of 51,000 gallons
of oil sold him by defendant. The defendant moved for
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence by
which he could prove declarations of the plaintiff that the
It was held that this was a
oil was as good as expected.
in
before
the
case, and a new trial was grantnew fact not
ed. The same principle was recognized in Guyot v. Butts,
4

Wendell,

In

579.

this case plaintiff states in his motion for new trial,
"that he can fully prove by the testimony of William Phillips of Clinton county, Iowa, that on the 23d day of No-
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vember, A. D. 1872, this plaintiff drew a draft on Vaughn
for $1,000, at the bank of defendant;
that said witness was with plaintiff at the time, and that
he, plaintiff did not receive cash for the same, but did
check against said draft to the amount of $500, and plaintiff says he can show he drew no other draft that day.
Plaintiff also states he can prove substantially the same
by Abram Gish.
Now, whilst this testimony tends to the establishment of
the same fact as that testified to on the former trial by
plaintiff, to-wit: that $1,000 was not paid when the draft
was drawn, it tends to establish it in part, as an inference
from a new fact, not introduced upon the former trial,
viz: that a check was drawn against the draft to the
amount of $500.
It seems to us, therefore, that the case falls within the
principle of Gardner v. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114, and Guyot v.
Butts, 4 Wendell, 579, and that the evidence newly disSee
covered was something more than merely cumulative.
1 G. & W. on New Trials, 490-493, and cases cited; 3 Id.
1048, and cases cited.

Bros, of Chicago,

We think the motion for a new trial should have been
sustained.
Reversed.

BROWN V. WHEELER.
Supreme

Court of Kansas.
62

Pollock,

J.

1901.

Kansas, 676.

**********

* *

•

Is the evidence cumulative?

Does the fact that the admission made by Van A^oorhis Brown in this letter is in
writing, while his admissions shown upon the trial were
oral, take it out of the rule against cumulative evidence?
We think not. Cumulative evidence is evidence of the
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kind to the same point. Here the evidence offered
is an admission.
Oral admissions of Brown of identical
import were shown by witnesses for the defense upon the
trial. All are admissions ; hence, they are of the same kind
of evidence. All go to the same point — to show that Van
Voorhis Brown was not the owner of the property. The
fact that the admission here made is in writing may have
made it stronger, but does not change its nature as evidence; it is cumulative.
{Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v.
Ross, 142 111. 9, 31 N. E. 412; Klein v. Gibson, 2 S. W.
(Ky.) 116; Cox V. Harvey, 53 Ind. 174; The Town of Manson V. Ware, 63 Iowa, 345, 19 N. W. 275; Wayne v. Newman's Adm'r, Etc., 75 Va. 811; Wall v. Trainer, 16 Nev.
* * *
131; Glidden v. Dunlap, 28 Me. 379.)
same

LAYMAN V. MINNEAPOLIS

COMPANY.

Supreme

STREET

Court of Minnesota.
66

RAILWAY

1896.

Minnesota, 452.

Staet, C. J. The plaintiff's intestate died as a result of
collision between a wood cart, which he was driving, and
one of the defendant's street cars.
Both were going in the
same direction.
The main issues litigated on the trial of
a

the action, which was for the recovery of damages on account of his death, were the negligence of the defendant and
the contributory negligence of the deceased.
There was a
The
verdict for the defendant.
trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial solely on the ground of
newly-discovered evidence, and defendant appealed from
the order.
The verdict was general only, hence the record does not
disclose the ground upon which the jury based the verdict.
The trial court stated, in its memorandum, that evidently
the jury found that the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence, and that such finding was the basis of the verdict. It cannot be so assumed, although the evidence renders it more probable that such was the case than that the
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jury found that

the defendant was not guilty of negligence
the
in
premises. These suggestions are made with reference
to the character of the newly-discovered
evidence, which
tends to show that the deceased, as he started to turn his
team upon the car tracks for the purpose of avoiding a pile

of lumber which had been placed near the curb of the street
along which he was driving his cart, looked back in the direction he had been coming, and that there was no car then
in sight. It is undisputed that his view, in the direction
from which the car came, was unobstructed for at least
three blocks.
The defendant claims, that this evidence is
simply cumulative, that it is false, and would not change the
verdict on another trial.
The granting or denying of a motion for a new trial on
the ground of newly-discovered evidence is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court and its order
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is made to appear
that the order violated some legal right of appellant, or
was an abuse of discretion ; the presumption being that the
discretion was properly exercised. Lampsen v. Brander,
The question, then, is not
28 Minn. 526, 11 N. W. 94.
whether the trial court might have properly denied the motion, but whether the granting of it was an abuse of its
discretion for any of the reasons assigned by the defendant.
The newly-discovered evidence was not cumulative, within
the meaning of the general rule that a new trial will not be
granted where the evidence is simplj^ cumulative. Cumulative evidence, as the term is here used, is held to be evidence which speaks to facts in relation to which there wa«
evidence on the trial; or, in other words, it is additional
evidence of the same kind, and to the same point, as that
given on the first trial. But it is not cumulative if it relate
to distinct and independent facts of a different character
tending to establish the same ground of claim or defense.
ITil. New Trials, 501; Nhiinger v. Knox, 8 Minn. 110 (140) ;

H OS ford

V. Ttowe, 41

Minn.

245, 42

N. W. 1018.

On the trial there was no evidence as to whether the do
ceased looked to see if a car was ai)proaching before driving upon the tracks. The new evidence directly tends to
])rove that he did so look. This is a fact bearing upon the
The evidence,
question of liis contributory negligence.
The creditherefore, is material, and is not cumulatice.
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bility of the evidence, and whether it would probably change
the result on another trial, are questions peculiarly, but not

exclusively, for the trial judge, who saw the witnesses,
heard their testimony, followed the course of the trial, noted
the claims of the respective parties, and whose opportunity
to judge of the credibility of the newly-discovered evidence,
and the probable effect it would produce on another trial,
was superior to our own. Our conclusion, from a consideration of the entire evidence given on the trial, is that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for a new trial.

Order affirmed.

(b)

Impeaching Evidence.

BLAKE V. RHODE ISLAND COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of Rhode Island.
32 Rhode

1911.

Island, 213.

Johnson, J. This is an action of the case, brought by
Lewis A. E. Blake against the Rhode Island Company, to
recover damages for personal injuries allegad to have been
sustained through the negligence of the defendant company
in the operation of one of its street cars.
On the 29th day of June, 1906, the plaintiff was driving
an ice cart, and had just turned with said cart from Patt
street into East avenue, in the city of Pawtucket, when a
car of the defendant company, travelling from Providence
toward Pawtucket, overtook and collided with said ice cart ;
and as a result of said collision the ice cart was overturned
and the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured.
The case was tried before a justice of the Superior Court
and a jury, on the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st days of October,
1909, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff" for $9,082.50.
Thereafter the defendant duly filed a motion for a new trial
upon the grounds :
**4,

That said defendant has discovered new and ma-
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terial evidence in said case which it had not discovered at
the time of the trial thereof, and which it could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered at any time previous
to the trial of said case, as by affidavits to be filed in court
will be fully set forth, said affidavits being made a part of
this motion."
This motion was heard July 2, 1910, by the justice who
presided at the trial, and July 8, 1910, a rescript was filed
denying said motion on all grounds except that of excessive damages.

**********
* *

*

The case is now before this court on

* * *

exceptions.
The exceptions pressed by the defendant
lowing, as numbered in its bill of exceptions :

two bills of
are the fol-

"25. To the decision of said court denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence."

**********

The twenty-fifth exception is to the decision of the court
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. In support of the
motion on this ground several affidavits were filed covering
three conversations alleged to have been had with the motorman Cook on March 21, March 29, and April 1, 1910.
The affiants state that in said conversations said Cook admitted that he testified falsely at the trial of the case and
declared that he had lied and perjured himself on the witness stand. The case seems to come clearly within the
law as laid down by this court in Dexter v. Handy, 13 E.
I. 474. In that case the court, Durfee, C. J. (pp. 475-6),
said: ''The ground of the petition is that these witnesses,
after the trial was over, severally admitted that their testiThe affidavits of persons who profess to
mony was untrue.
are filed in support of the pethese
admissions
heard
have
tition, but no affidavits are produced from the witnesses
themselves either admitting that their testimony was false
or stating anything differently from their testimony, while,
on the contrary, one of the witnesses, and he the most important, has given an affidavit denying that he ever made
the

admissions.

If

another

trial were granted,

the

new
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I.
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a

a

a

a

a
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is
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ly

a

it

;

4

3

3

it,

evidence would not be admissible in proof of the issue made
by the defendant, but only to contradict or discredit the
witnesses if they were again put on the stand by the plain
tiff. A new trial is seldom granted for the introduction
of newly discovered testimony, which goes merely to impeach the witnesses of the prevailing party. We confess
that the jDetition does not commend itself to our minds. If
the affidavits introduced by the petitioner are true, the witnesses have confessed themselves perjurers ; and yet the petitioner, while he asks us to grant him a new trial on that
account has not, so far as appears, taken any steps to have
them prosecuted.
It has been decided that a new trial on
account of perjury will not be granted until after the perjured witness either has been convicted or is dead, mere
evidence of the perjury, or even an indictment for
being
insufficient.
deemed
Dyche v. Patton,
Jones Eq. 332;
Petrie,
24;
v.
Bing.
v.
Doug.
Seeley
Mayhew,
Benfield
561
Wheatly v. Edwards, Lofft. 87. Perhaps the rule laid
down in these cases may be too strict and exacting for all
circumstances, but
obviously founded in wise policy.
Certainly the talk of witness after trial ought not generalto weigh against the sworn testimony; for there wouhl
be no security for verdicts
without peril to the witnesses,
The best evithey were liable to be upset by such talk.
dence of perjury
the con\'iction of the perjurer.
It
against the petition that the petitioner can find no precedent for it. There is, however, precedent against it. In
was
CommomveaUh v. Randall, Thacher Cr. Cas. 500,
trial, conwitness after
held that expressions used by
what
he
not
said
in
are
or
court,
ground
denying
tradicting
new trial,
for setting aside the verdict and for granting
'In almost
but are evidence to convict him of perjury.
for los'it
would
be
easy
every instance,' said the court,
ing party to obtain affidavits of that description.' We
The
new trial on this ground."
must, therefore, refuse
Robin
Boherfs
v.
doctrine of this case has been followed
erts, 19 R.
H. R. R. Co., 20
349; Jones v. N. Y., N. H.
257; and State v. Lynch,
214; Timony v. Casey, 20 R.
R.
463. In the last mentioned case, the court, Doug28 R.
las, C. J. (p. 465), said: "On examination of the affidavits submitted we find that they do not divulge any evidence upon the merits of the case, but are confined to at-
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tempts to discredit the principal witness of the crime. They
consist mostly of statements which this witness is said to
have made contradictory of her story upon the stand.
Such evidence, if well fortified, is not generally admitted to
impeach a verdict, as we have frequently decided" (citing
the cases

supra).

CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS
COMPANY V. STEWART.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
203

Illinois,

RAILROAD

1903,

223.

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an action of trespass on the case, brought by
Robert Stewart against appellant, to recover damages on
account of a personal injury sustained by him on the 30th
day of December, 1899, occasioned by a collision between
appellant's locomotive engine and the street car upon
which appellee was a passenger, in the city of Chicago.
The jury returned a verdict for $1,358.40. Appellant
made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and
judgment was rendered upon the verdict. The railroad
company now prosecutes a further appeal from a judgment
of affirmance in the Appellate Court for the First District.
The only ground for reversal urged in this court is that
the court below erred in overruling the defendant's motion
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The claim for damages was for injuries to the plaintiff's
spine, shoulder and arm. During the progress of the trial
he had never received an injury before this accident. On cross-examination he was asked if
he had not been injured some years ago in an accident on

plaintiff testified that

the Santa Fe railroad, to which he replied that he did not
He was then asked to hold up
get hurt in that accident.
his left hand, which showed three fingers missing, and when
asked as to the time of losing those fingers he replied that
After the verdict was
he did not remember when it was.

Sec. 7]

New Trials

719

returned the claim agent of the appellant company made an
investigation on the Santa Fe accident, and ascertained
from the county hospital that on April 25, 1899, one ''E.
Stuart" had been taken to that hospital because of an injury to his hand. The agent then made an affidavit to
the facts ascertained by him in his investigation, and counsel for appellant presented it to the court in support of
Counsel insisted that new evithe motion for a new trial.
dence had been discovered which would tend to impeach
the plaintiff and show that he had sworn falsely when he
stated that he did not know when he received the injury to
his hand. No claim is made in this cause for any injury
to the hand, therefore the loss of the fingers was wholly
immaterial to the issue in the case. It was, perhaps, proper, in the discretion of the court, to permit the cross-examination of the witness upon that subject for the purpose
of discrediting him, but for no other purpose. The newly discovered evidence, therefore, even if it would have
been competent upon the trial, tended only to impeach or
discredit the plaintiff, and that upon a matter not material
to the issue.
It has been often decided by this court that
a new trial will never be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence merely for the purpose of impeaching a
witness who testified upon the trial.
(Friedberg v. People, 102 111. 160; Grady v. People, 125 id. 122; Monroe v.
Snotv, 131 id. 126; Bemis v. Horner, 165 id. 347; Ohicago
and Northern Raikvag Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 id.
The motion for a new trial was therefore properly
9.)
overruled.
The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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AND NEW ORLEANS RAILROAD COMPANY.

MOOEE V. CHICAGO,

ST. LOUIS

Supreme Court of Mississippi.
59

J.,

1881.

Mississippi, 243.

delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant sued the Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans
Railroad Company to recover damages for an injury sustained by him in being forcibly ejected from one of its
trains while the same was in motion. At the April Term of
the Circui*t Court of Marshall County there was a trial of
the cause which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the
The defendant moved for a new trial, which
plaintiff.
was granted, and thereupon the plaintiff excepted to the
action of the court in granting the new trial, and a bill of exceptions was signed, embodying the evidence introduced.
At the October Term of the court another trial was had, reThe plaintiff
sulting in a judgment for the defendant.
made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled; and
che plaintiff again excepted, took another bill of exceptions,
and now prosecutes this appeal, assigning for error the
action of the court below in granting the new trial asked
* *
by the defendant, and in refusing that asked by himself.
The newly discovered evidence of that of a witness who,
some days after the occurrences in which the plaintiff was
injured, had a conversation with the conductor of the defendant, who the plaintiff testified had inflicted the injuries
on him, in which conversation the conductor admitted to
the witness that he had kicked the plaintiff from the train.
It is apparent that these admissions would not have been
admissible in evidence for any other purpose than that of
)mi)eaching the credibility of the conductor, who had testified on the trial as a witness for the defendant, and had
stated that lie had had no part in inflicting the injury on the
plaintiff; for these declarations were not a part of the res
gestae, and only on that ground could they bind the deDickman v. Williams, 50 Miss. 500; 1 Greenl.
fendant.
Sisson v. Cleveland Railroad Co., 14 Mich.
113;
Evid. §
489; Smith v. Betty, 11 Gratt. 752; ThaUhimer v. Brincherhoff, 4 Wend. 394; Virginia Railroad Co, v, Sayers, 26
CooPEE,
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new trial will not be granted on the
ground of newly discovered testimony, the only effect of
which would be to impeach the credibility of a witness.
3 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 1074.
We are therefore of opinion that there is no error in the
record, and the judgment is

Gratt.

328.

But

a

Afirmed.

(c)

Necessary Diligence.

NICHOLSON V. METCALF.
Supreme

Court of Montana.
31

1904.

Montana, 276.

Mr. Commissioner Claybekg prepared the following opinion for the court :
This is an appeal by Metcalf from an order granting a
new trial. The only ground of the motion for a new trial
was_i ^wly discovered evidence. The only affidavit filed
showing that evidence was newly discovered is that of plaintiffs. This affidavit, in so far as the discovery of the evidence and the showing of diligence in that regard is con''That subsequent to the trial of
cerned, is as follows:
said cause, to-wit, on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1902,
I have discovered evidence which will establish the fact that
myself and my co-plaintiff is said action," etc. Then follows a statement of the evidence which has been discovered.
"I did not know of the exThe affidavit then continues:
istence of said evidence at the time of the trial, and could
not, by the use of reasonable diligence, have discovered
or produced the same upon the former trial. The name

I

can establish the facts herein set
of the witness by which
forth is E. A. Briggs, now residing at Centerville, in Silver Bow county, Montana ; that did not for eighteen year?
prior to the 12th day of December, A. D. 1902, know the
whereabouts of said BriggB." The affidavit of Briggs also
appears in the record, supporting the affidavit of plaintiffs as to the facts to which he would testify, and stating

I

T. p. — *6
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upon
that he was present and heard the conversation
which plaintiffs' cause of action was based.
The statute concerning new trials provides as follows:
' '
The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and
a new trial granted on the application of the partv aggrieved for any of the following causes materially affect* * *
ing the substantial rights of such party
(4) Newly
discovered evidence material for the party making the application which he could not with reasonable diligence
liave discovered and produced at the trial."
(Section
1171, Code of Civil Procedure.)
We are of the opinion that the affidavit does not contain
a sufficient showing of diligence, as contemplated by the
statute, to warrant the order appealed from.
{Rand v.
Kipp, 27 Mont. 138, 69 Pac. 714; Gregg v. Kommers, 22

Mont. 511,

Caruthers v. Pemherton, 1 Mont.
Butler v. V assault, 40 Cal. 74; Hendy v. Desmond, 62
Cal. 260; Bagnall v. Roach, 76 Cal. 106, 18 Pac. 137; Barton V. Laws, 4 Colo. App. 212, 35 Pac. 284; State v. Power,
24 Wash. 34, 63 Pac. 1112, 63 L. R. A. 902 ; Bradley v. Norris, 67 Minn. 48, 69 N. W. 624; 1 Spelling on New Trial
and Appeal, Sees. 209-218.)
Under these authorities it was incumbent upon plaintiffs
to show that they had been guilty of no laches, and that
failure to produce the evidence on the trial could not be
imputable to lack of diligence on their part. They must
make strict proof of diligence, and a general a.verment of
its existence is insufficient.
Whether reasonable diligence

Ill;

57

Pac.

92

;

has been used is a question to be determined by the court
upon the affidavits presented, and therefore these affidavits should state with particularitv what acts were performed.
They should show what diligence was used, how
the new evidence was discovered, why it was not discovered
before the trial, and such other facts as make it clear that
the failure to produce the evidence was not their own
fault, or because of want of diligence on their part. So
far as the evidence presented in this case is concerned, the
first search for evidence may have been made after the
cause had been tried.
Briggs was present at the conversation, plaintiffs must have known it. Perhaps this
fact escaped their memory at the time of the trial, but

If
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mere forgetfulness is no excuse.
{Hendy v. Desmond, 62
Cal. 2G0.)
The mere allegation that for eighteen years plaintiffs
did not know the whereabouts of Briggs is insufficient.
If
plaintiffs knew that Briggs could testify in their behalf,
they should have shown that they had exhausted the methods provided by law for obtaining the attendance of witnesses.
If they did not know that Briggs could so testify,
it is immaterial that they did not know his whereabouts.
While it is true that the granting or refusing of a motion
for a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial court,
and its action will not be interfered with on appeal unless
there is abuse of such discretion, the affidavits being defective in the showing of diligence, we are satisfied that the
court below had no authority to grant the order, and therefore abused its discretion.
We therefore advise that the order appealed from be
reversed, and the cause remanded.
Per Curiam. — For the reasons stated in the foregoing
opinion, the order is reversed and the cause remanded.

COFFER V. ERICKSON.
Supreme Court of Washington.
61

1911.

Washington, 559.

Dunbar, J. — The appellant, Erickson, was under a contract with the city of 'Seattle for the regrade of Fourth
avenue from Yesler Way north to Pike street. Fourth
avenue runs northerly and southerly, and is crossed by
Columbia street, running easterly and westerly.
At the

intersection of Columbia street and Fourth avenue. Fourth
avenue had been cut down about thirteen feet, and in order
to permit the going and coming of foot passengers upon
Columbia street across Fourth avenue, the city had authorized the appellant to construct a wooden bridge, extending
along the north side of Columbia street from the east side
of I'ourth avenue to the west side, spanning the entire
Fourth avenue. The bridge was sixty eight feet long, the
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main part of it six feet wide, with extending floors three
feet on each side, making the entire width of the bridge, so
far as protection from anything below was concerned,
about twelve feet. The appellant at the time of this accident, which was in September, 1908, had laid down two
tracks upon which he operated trains of dump cars drawn
by small locomotive engines, to carry the dirt from the
northern portion of the work southerly, and these trains
The respondpassed to and fro under this foot bridge.
ent was a timber cruiser and had lived in that neighborhood for about a year.
On the first of September, 1908,
while walking down Columbia street he stepped upon this
one of the appellant's
bridge, and while going across
engines carrying some empty dirt cars passed under the
bridge and, according to respondent's complaint, puffed
cloud of cinders, one
up or threw up on top of the bridge
of which was thrown into respondent's eye, with the effect
that, after
long treatment, the eye was lost and this action
brought for damages for said loss.

;

a

a

a

a

a

is

also assigned that the court erred in not granting
new trial on the ground of newly discovthe appellant
ered evidence. The application for new trial was based on
clerk in the office of tli'
the affidavit of John J. Jamison,
attorneys for the appellant, who swears that, as such clerk,
he had sole charge of the investigation of the facts constituting defense, and of the securing of witnesses and the
preparation of the trial for the appellant; tliat effort had
been made to obtain the names of the nurses at the hospital
at the time of respondent's sojourn there, which had failed; that tlie nurse Anna Bonen had testified that, in irricinder, about
gating tlie eye of tlie respondent,
quarter
of an inch long, had been washed therefrom into the receiving basin, and that this cinder had been discovered
by, and examined by. Sister Crescent, who was the chief
nurse; that the existence of Sister Crescent was not known
to the appellant prior to the time of this testimony, and
that immediate steps were taken to obtain the testimony
of said Sister Crescent, who was found to be in Colfax,
Washington that an affidavit had been obtained from her
which, in effect, disputed the testimony of Miss Bonen in
relation to the cinder, and that on account of this newly
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But
discovered evidence, a new trial should be granted.
this testimony was adduced early in the case. Counsel
had notice on the 2nd of February, by the testimony of the
nurse Miss Bonen, that Sister Crescent was present when
the particle was washed from the eye into the basin, and
that Sister Crescent picked up the particle and examined
and afterwards lost it. It also appears from the testimony of Dr. Burns, early in the case, that, while he was
attending the respondent at the hospital, he was advised
that this substance had been washed from the eye.
The granting of new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
question necessarily so largely in the
discretion of the trial judge that
must appear with reasonable certainty that such discretion has been abused to
the prejudice of the appellant, before the appellate court
will substitute its judgment for that of the presiding judge,
who has observed the proceeding throughout the trial. In
this case, the judge might reasonably have concluded that
due diligence had not been exercised by appellant's atThe attending physician. Dr. Burns, indicated
torneys.
by his testimony that he was at least friendly to the defense.
A consultation with him would, no doubt, have disclose*'
who the nurses were who attended on respondent while in
the hospital, and
would seem, in
case of this kind, that
due diligence would have required the ascertainment of
seem to have been any secret, for
that fact. Nor did
readily developed in the trial, by the testimony of the nurse
Miss Bonen and Sister Arthur, that Sister Crescent was
the chief nurse during respondent's stay at the hospital.
These were circumstances which the court might reasonably take into consideration, in connection with the claim
of the clerk that he had been unable to ascertain who the
nurses were. In addition to this, the appellant was informed of this transaction and of the fact that Sister Cresin the early stage of the trial, viz., on
cent witnessed
and the trial was extended over February 4;
February
notwithstanding
the fact that the affidavit sets forth
and
about three hundred and fifty
"that the town of Colfax
miles or more from the city of Seattle, and that
was utterly impossible to obtain an interview with, or the attendance of, Sister Crescent at said trial," no motion was made
continuance and no suggestion of surprise. After
for
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having knowledge of the facts comi^lained of, the appellant offered his testimony and, at the close thereof, formally rested his case. He should not be permitted to submit
his case on one set of facts and, if a verdict is found against

him, obtain another trial on another set of facts which
Such
were known to him at the time of such submission.
has been the uniform holding of this court where no continuance was asked for. Pinmis v. Puget Sound Brewing
Co., 18 Wash. 108, 50 Pac. 930 ; Woods v. Globe Nav. Co.,
40 Wash. 376, 82 Pac. 401; Reeder v. Traders' Nat. Bank
of Spokane, 28 Wash. 139, 68 Pac. 461.
Considering the whole case, we see no reason for disturbIt is therefore affirmed.
ing the judgment.
Morris, J., disRuDKiN^ C. J., and Crow, J., concur.
J.,
with
Chadwick,
Morris,
J.
concurs
senting.

WHITTLESEY V. BURLINGTON, CEDAR RAPIDS
NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of loiva.
121

McLain,

J.

&

1903.

loiva, 597.

**********

* * *

Complaint is made of refusal to grant a new trial on
account of newly discovered evidence, but it is enough
to say that such evidence related to matters of expert
knowledge in regard to railroading, and could have been
furnished by any expert witnesses, as well as by those
named in the application. The showing was not sufficient
to entitle plaintiff to a new trial in tliat respect.
The result is that judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
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Probability of Change in Result.

PARSONS V. LEWISTON, BRUNSWICK AND BATH

STRET RAILWAY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
96

Sitting: Wiswell,
Peabody,

JJ.

C.

1902.

Maine, 503.

J., Emery, Whitehouse, Strout,

J.

While the plaintiff was driving a horse
attached to a long covered vehicle on runners across the
bridge between the cities of Lewiston and Auburn, in the
direction of Auburn, he met the defendant's rotary snowplow coming towards him from Auburn ; his horse became
frightened at the appearance of the snow-plow and the
noise caused by it to such an extent as to become unmanageable; finally, the horse bolted towards one side of the
bridge, and, after striking that side, started diagonally
across the bridge to the other side, the plaintiff in the meantime was thrown out, dragged some distance and sustained
severe injuries.
'
The plaintiff, claiming that the accident was attributable
to the negligence of the defendant's employees in the manWiswELL, C.

it

it,

agement of the snow-plow, brought this suit to recover the
damages sustained by him. The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff brings the case
here upon two motions for a new trial, one, because the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the other
upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence. The plaintiff's counsel admits in argument that the jury was authorized in finding a verdict for the defendant upon the evidence introduced at the trial, so that it only becomes necessary to consider the second motion and the newly-discovin connection with the
ered testimony presented under
case as submitted to the jury.
The contention of the plaintiff at the trial was that his
horse showed signs of fright when about one hundred feet
distant from the snow-plow as the two were slowly approaching each other; that the fact that his horse was
greatly frightened nud wn« becoming unmanageable was
should have been seen, and in fact was
so apparent that
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of time before the
horse bolted, for him to have stopped his plow, and allow
the plaintiff to drive past; that by doing so the accident
would have been avoided, but that he failed to stop the
snow-plow and that this failure was the proximate cause
of the accident resulting in the injury to the plaintiff. The
'^
defendant's answer to this proposition
and was at
trial, that the motorman did stop his plow as soon as the
horse showed any signs of fright.
Defendant's counsel in
their brief say, "coincident in point of time with the first
appearance of real fright on the part of the horse, the motorman shut off the current, applied the brake, and stopa sufficient length

ti

is,

seen, by the motorman

a

it

it ly

ped the plow."
Upon this issue, the plaintiff testified that the snow-plow
did not stop until after the accident, and one witness called by him, whose means of observation on account of his
distance from the scene of the accident were not particulargood, to some extent substantiated the plaintiff, stating
as his impression that the snow-plow did not stop.
Upon the other hand, four witnesses called by the defense,
all of whom were on the snow-plow at the time, and in the
employ of the defendant corporation, and three of whom
were still in its employ at the time of the trial, all testified
in substance that the motorman stopped his plow as soon
as the horse appeared to be frightened. A jury certainly
was negligence upon the
would be authorized to find that
the
snow-plow, such as this
of
rotary
those managing
part
one was described and shown by the photographs to be,
situato continue its movement along the track, in such
tion as this, when an approaching horse displayed signs of
But, upon
great fright and of becoming unmanageable.
the other hand, the jury was authorized to find from the
testimony in the case that the motorman seasonably stopped
his plow, and did all that he could do to prevent the accident. So that the important issue of fact at the trial was,
as to whether or not the plow was seasonably stopped, in
view of the situation.
Since the trial the plaintiff has discovered three additional witnesses who saw the accident and who will testify,
with varying degrees of positiveness, that the snow-plow
These witnesses are
did not stop until after the accident.
entirely disinterested, they had no acquaintance with tho
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plaintiff, tlieir opportunities for seeing what happened were
good. The testimony of these tliree witnesses is newlj^-discovered within the well established rnle in this state, its
discovery

subsequent to the trial was accidental;

and the

a

is,

failure of the plaintiff or his counsel to be earlier aware
of its existence cannot be attributed to any negligence upon their part, because diligence upon their part would not
have been likely to have put them in possession of it.
The question then
whether the court, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, but within the rules which have been
adopted relative to granting new trials upon this ground,
should grant
new trial in this case. But first, inasmuch
is

is

as there may be some confusion as to what the true doctrine
governing the court in the exercise of its discretion
cases of this kind, growing out of the language used in two

a is

it

it

if

is

a

a

is

it

a

;

a

a

a

a

is

if

is

it

a

it

in

a

it

decisions of this court,
may be well to carefully state it.
The true doctrine is, that before the court will grant
new trial upon this ground, the newly-discovered testimony
must be of such character, weight and value, considered
connection with the evidence already in the case, that
seems to the court probable that on
new trial, with the
additional evidence, the result would be changed; or
likely
must be made to appear to the court that injustice
refused.
not sufficient
to be done
It
the new trial
that there may be
possibility or chance of different redifferent
or
sult,
jury might be induced to give
that
verdict there must be probability that the verdict would
be different upon
not necessary that
new trial. But
the additional testimony should be such as to require
different verdict.
The correct doctrine had been so repeatedly stated by
this court, that we quote the language used in numerous
earlier decisions relative to the character of the newly-discovered evidence necessary and sufficient to justify the
"A new
new trial upon this ground.
court in granting
be
introduced
to
trial to permit newly-discovered testimony
* * *
when there
reason to beshould only be granted
had been
lieve that the verdict would have different
30
Call,
Maine,
''Unless
10.
before the jury." Eaiidly v.
new
the
would
probable
should
think
evidence
the court
alter the verdict." Snowman v. Wardwell, 32 Maine, 275.
''A review will never be granted to let in additional testi-
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mony, when such testimony would not be likely to change
the result." Todd v. Chipman, 62 Maine, 189.
''Nor unless there be reason to believe that it would change the re-

sult." Trash v. Unity, 74 Maine, 208. In Linscott v.
Orient Insurance Co., 88 Maine, 497, 51 Am. St. Rep. 435,
the court stated the rule, citing various earlier cases, in
these words:
"It has long been the settled doctrine of
this court that a new trial will not be granted on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence, unless it seems to
the court probable that it might alter the verdict." In
Stackpole v. Perkins, 85 Maine, 298, nothing is said in the
opinion in regard to the new evidence being of such a character as to require a different verdict. The court does
say in that case: "If believed (the newly-discovered witness) his testimony must substantially destroy the evidence
of a witness at the trial, whose testimony may have been
A new trial was grantconsidered of controlling weight."
ed in this case, although the effect of the newly-discovered
testimony was stated by the court to depend upon the
weight given to it by the jury.
It is true that in Linscott v. Orient Insurance Company,
supra, where the correct doctrine of this state was very
distinctly stated as above quoted, and in accordance with
the previous authorities, the court, at the conclusion of the
opinion said that the question was, "whether the legitimate
effect of such evidence would require a different verdict."
The case of State v. Stain, 82 Maine, 472, was cited in supBut we do not find the rule so stated
port of this doctrine.
than
in these two, in this state. If it
in any case, other
were true that such new evidence must be of such a character as to require a different verdict upon a new trial,
then it would follow as a logical sequence that none but a
different verdict would be allowed by the court to stand.
The rule thus stated in these two cases is too strict, it
would deprive a party of the privilege of having his new
evidence passed upon by a jury, whose peculiar province
it is to decide controverted issues of fact, even in cases
whore the court is of opinion that the new evidence would
proba))ly change the result, or that injustice would be likely to be done if a new trial was not granted.
In tills case we can not say that the new evidence, in
connection with the former evidence, would require a dif-
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verdict.
After this evidence is submitted it then
becomes a question for the jury to pass upon.
But it does
seem probable to the court that the verdict will be different
when the case is submitted anew with the additional eviferent

dence.

It

is true that this evidence is cumulative, but it is not an
absolute and unqualified rule that a new trial will not be
granted under any circumstances upon newly-discovered
(Cumulative testimony.
Snowman v. Wardwell, 32 Maine,
275.
When the newly-discovered evidence is additional to
some already in the case in support of the same proposition, the probability that such new evidence would change
the result is generally very much lessened, so that much
more evidence, or evidence of much more value, will generally be required when such evidence is cumulative ; but if
the newly-discovered testimony, although merely cumulative, is of such a character as to make it seem probable
to the conrt that, notwithstanding the same question has
already been passed upon by the jury, a different result
would be reached upon another trial with the new evidence,
then such new trial should be granted.
The provision of the statute, R. S. c. 89, § 4, applicable to
petitions for review, that "newly-discovered cumulative
evidence is admissible and shall have the same effect as
other newly-discovered evidence," should have some effect
upon the value of such testimony upon a motion for a new
trial; otherwise, a party who had lost a verdict would
liave greater rights upon a petition for review after judgment than upon a motion for a new trial before.
And after all, while it is important to have general rules
in regard to the granting of new trials upon this ground,
which may be known to the profession, and by which the
court will be governed so far as practicable, each case differs so materially from every other, that the decision of
the question as to whether or not a new trial should be
granted in any particular case must necessarily depend, to
a very large extent, but of course within the limits of such
general rules, upon the sound discretion of the court, which
will always be actuated by a desire, upon the one hand, to
])ut an end to litigation when tlie parties have fairly had
tlieir day in court, and, upon the other, to prevent the likelihood of any injustice being done.
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In

the exercise of this discretion, and
laid down, the court is of the
plaintiff should have the opportunity to
case, with the additional testimony, to the
as above

a

jury.

within the rules
opinion that this
again submit his
determination of

New trial granted.

OBERLANDEE V. FIXEN
Supreme Court of California.
129

California,

& CO.
1900.

690.

The Court. — The appellant recovered judgment in the
court below for damages (seventeen hundred and fifty dollars), resulting from her falling down a negligently constructed staircase leading from the defendant's storeroom,
where she had just been employed by the defendant, to the
basement. The court granted a new trial on the ground
of newly-discovered evidence; and the grounds urged for
reversal are: 1. That the affidavits were not served or
filed in time; 2. Want of diligence on the part of defendant in preparation for trial; and 3. That the newlydiscovered evidence was merely cumulative.
The time allowed
The first point presents no difficulty.
for defendant for filing affidavits was extended by order of
court, and the affidavits were in fact filed more than thirty
days beyond the statutory time; but an extension beyond
thirty days is forbidden by the section 1054 of the Code of
Civil Procedure only with reference to the cases therein
enumerated ; among which the filing of affidavits on motion
for new trial is not included, with reference to which the
power of the court to extend is given by section 659, subdivision 1. The case of Smith v. Jordan, 122 Cal. 68, cited
by appellant's counsel, bears no analogy to the case at bar;
and the rule therein referred to — established in Flagg v.
Puferhaugh, 98 Cal. 134 — has no application.
The other points may be conveniently considered together. Under the provisions of section 657 of the Code
of Civil Procedure the requisites for a new trial on the
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gTOimd of newly discovered evidence are that the evidence
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial, and that it shall be "material for the party making the application" (subdivision

— or, as previously expressed, shall be of a character
"materially affecting the substantial rights of such party."

4)

The last requisite would seem to imply that the newly dis-

covered evidence should be of such a character as to render
a different result probable on a new trial ; and accordingly
such is held by the courts to be the established rule. (Hayne
Where these requisites ocon New Trial and Appeal, 91.)
cur they constitute sufficient grounds for new trial, and no
others can be required.
Hence the rule, so often reiterated by the courts, that a
new trial should not be granted where the evidence is
merely cumulative, must be regarded (in this state) not as
an independent rule, additional to those established by the
provisions of section 657 of the code, but as a mere application of those rules, or, as it has been expressed, as "a
corollary of the requirement that the newly discovered evidence must be such as to render a different result probable
(Hayne on New Trial and A])
on a retrial of the case."
For (continuing the citation)
peal, sec. 90, pp. 255, 256.)
"it is evident that new evidence, although cumulative,
might be of so overwhelming a character as to render a different result certain" (or probable) ; and in such case under the express provisions of the code a new trial should
The rule should therefore be construed as
be granted.
simply holding that cumulative evidence is insufficient "unless it is clear such evidence would change the result."
{Levifsky v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 41.) Hence, "a new trial
should not be refused merely because the evidence is cumulative in a case where the cumulation is sufficiently strong
That this is the
to render a different result probable."
true statement of the rule is established in the case last
cited, and in Von Glahn v. Brennan, 81 Cal. 264, and in
O'Bourke v. Vennekohl, 104 Cal. 256 — from which the above
language is quoted; and it is so in effect held in People v.
Standford, 64 Cal. 27.
Whether the evidence is of this character is not a question of law but for the judgment of the trial judge, whose
discretion will not be interfered with by this court except
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in cases of manifest abuse. Hence, where the motion is
denied, the fact that the newly discovered evidence is merely cumulative will in general be a sufficient ground for
affirmance; but where the motion is granted, the contrary
will hold. For, in either case, it is for the trial judge to
determine whether the evidence is of character probably
to affect the result on a new trial ; and unless the evidence
be of such a character as to make it manifest and certain
to this court that in the one case it would, or in the other
that it would not, result differently on a retrial, the order
will not be disturbed.
The present case, we think, comes
within the principles above laid down, and it will, therefore,
in the view we take of the case, be unnecessary to determine
whether the newly discovered evidence was in fact cumulative or otherwise.
Whether in this case the evidence could with reasonable

diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial
was also a question upon which the judgment of the court
below must be regarded as conclusive, unless it appear that
his discretion has been abused; and on this point we think
the moving party made a sufficient case.
{Jones v. Singleton, 45 Cal. 92.)
Counsel for appellant, on the construction they put on the
affidavit of A. H. Fixen, make a very strong case, and
could we agree in that construction our conclusion might
be different; but our view of the terms of the affidavit is
different. It reads: * 'I am the treasurer of the defendant
corporation and as such had particular charge of arranging defendant's defense to this action subsequent to the
trial of said cause, to-wit, on or about the first day of
June, 1896, and for some time thereafter, have discovered
evidence," etc. This is construed by the counsel as saying
that affiant had charge of the defense ''subsequent to the
trial" only. But, obviously, this construction cannot be
entertained, and we must construe the affidavit as though
"subsequent" were written with a capital initial, and a
period inserted after "action."
(Bouvier's Law DictionThus construed, the affidavit
ary, word "Punctuation.")
affiant
that
had
charge of the defense and
the
clearly states
shows that he used reasonable diligence in preparing for
it. Nor does it appear that the newly discovered evidence

I
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was of a character ''to put defendant upon inquiry."
(Heintz v. Cooper, 104 Cal. 671.)
The order granting a new trial must therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Hearing in Bank denied.

ELLIS Y. MARTIN AUTOMOBILE COMPANY.
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
77

1909.

New Jersey Law, 339.

On rule to show cause.
The opinion of the court was delivered by

Trenchard, J. The plaintiff, Alfred L. Ellis, was the
of an automobile. The defendant ran a garage,
with a repair department, at Plainfield. On June 18th,
1907, the plaintiff left his automobile at the defendant's
garage for repairs. Certain repairs, hereinafter more particularly stated, were made. Later, when the plaintiff callI 'd for the machine, the company declined to let him have
it unless he would pay the bill for the repairs, which he
declined to do. Thereupon the plaintiff caused to be issued a writ of replevin. The defendant company gave bond
The jury found
and held the car, and this suit resulted.
the
defendant obwhereupon
the
plaintiff,
for
a verdict
owner

tained this rule to show cause why a new trial should not
be granted upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence.
According to the plaintiff's testimony at the trial the
automobile was left with the defendant company only for
According
the purpose of having an old tire retreaded.
it
of
defendant
the
on
behalf
company
to the testimony
was there for general repairs.
It was undisputed that in fact the car was repaired generally by the defendant company, including repairs to, and
new parts for, the eng-ine. But it was contended by the
plaintiff that the machine was in good condition when left
with the defendant, and that no repairs were necessary
and none were ordered excepting that to the tire, and that
the repairs to, and new parts for, the engine were rendered
ncessary only by the negligence of the defendant company
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in handling the machine while in their care.
It will thus be seen that the condition of the plaintiff's
car when it was left with the defendant was material to
the issue, not only as bearing upon the value of the car, but
as tending to show for what purpose it was left with the
defendant and what repairs were ordered by the plaintiff.
In order to support his contention that it was in good
condition the plaintiff testified that he was a physician in
active practice; that he had purchased the car in April,
1907, and had used it continuously in his practice from that
time until June 18th, 1907, when he took it to the defendant
to have the tire retreaded ; that he never had any difficulty
with it ; that it was in good condition when he bought it and
was in good condition when he left it with the defendant.
On the other hand, the witnesses called by the defendant
company testified in effect that the car was badly in need
of repair when it was brought to them, and that the repairs
to the engine were rendered necessary by its condition
when they received it and not to any negligence upon their

part.

At the trial the plaintiff, after testifying that he had
owned and driven the car since April, 1907, further stated
that he had purchased it of the Manhattan Storage Company of New York.
The newly-discovered evidence is to the effect that in
fact the car was bought by the plaintiff on June 14th, 1907
(but four days before it was left at the garage), and that
it had never been in his possession before that time; that
it was then four years old and was sold as it stood on the
floor, without demonstration and without guarantee, and
that its value was much less than that stated by the plain-

tiff on trial.
With respect to this evidence it is sufficient

to say that

it

lias in fact been discovered since the former trial ; that, by
the use of reasonable diligence, it could not have been then
obtained; that much if not all of it is material to the issue
and goes to the merits of the case and is not cumulative.
Under these circumstances, the motion for a new trial
ought not to be denied. Dundee Manufacuring Co. v. Van
Riper, 4 Vroom 152; Kursheedt v. Standard Bleacher^ Co.,
ante p. 99.
Let the rule to show cause b^ made absolute.
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Effect of Statutes Enumerating

8.

ST. LOUIS

73?

&

Grounds.

SAN FEANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY
V. WERNER.

Supreme

Court of Kansas.
70

1904.

Kansas, 190.

The opinon of the court was delivered by

J. : An action was brought by Emil Werner against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company to recover damages for an alleged diminution in the
value of his property, caused by the construction of a
railroad on a city street in front of the property. The
railroad company answered that the building of the road
in the street was legallj^ and properly done, and that it
did not interfere with ingress to, or egress from, the property, and occasioned the plaintitf no injury.
A trial was
had, in which the court charged the jury as to the measure
of recovery, and, among other things, suggested that if
the value of the property was enhanced by the building of
the railroad, the increased value might be set off against
any injury sustained by reason of the obstruction to the
entrance to the property. The jury found that the value
of the property was not affected by the building of the railroad, and a general verdict was given in favor of the defendant.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial, assigning all the statutory grounds, including the one last mentioned in section
"Error
306 of the code (Gen. Stat. 1901, § 4754), to-wit:
of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the partv
The motion was overruled as
making the application."
to all the grounds stated, but because of the instruction
authorizing the jury to counterbalance damages suffered
with benefits received the court granted a new trial. In
disposing of the motion the trial court remarked that there
was evidence in the case justifying the giving of the instruction, if it had been a correct statement of the law,
but held that the instruction was not a correct declaration
of the law, and granted a new trial for that reason alone.
It appears from the record, however, that the instruction
Johnston, C.

T. p.— 47

-

Tkial Pkactice

738

[Chap.

17

in question, as weL ^s tlie entire charge, was sjiven to the
jury vvithout objection or exception. Can a party sit by
and hcTLen to the giving of an instruction without objection
or exception, and, after the case has been fully submitted
and an adverse verdict returned, obtain a new trial because
of the giving of such instruction? We think not. A new
trial m«y be allowed only on the grounds specified in the
The giving of an erroneous instruction is an
statutes.
error of law occurring at the trial ; but such error gives no
ground for setting aside a verdict unless an exception has
been taken to the giving of it.
The grounds for a new trial
provided for in the code are specific and exclusive. The
only ground having any application to the question before
us is the eighth one mentioned in section 306 of the code,
"Error of law occurring at the trial, and excepted
to wit:
To make such an
to by the party making the application."
error available there must be an exception. It has been
said that "a party has no abstract, inherent right to a new
trial. He has a right because and so far only as the stat* *
ute gives it to him
*. If he fails to pursue this mode
he loses the benefit of any errors on the trial, and is concluded as to all matters occurring at the trial."
{Nesbit
V.

Hines,

It

17

Kan.

316.)

was held in Sovereign Camp v. Thiehaud, 65 Kan.
332, 69 Pac. 348, that a trial court cannot set aside a verdict and grant a new trial arbitrarily and without reason;
and, it may be added, it can never be done except for a
statutory reason. In PuhlisJiing House v. Heyl, 61 Kan.
634, 60 Pac. 317, it was held that statutory remedies and
methods supersede previously existing ones, and, the legislature having provided a method for obtaining a new trial,
a party desiring one must conform to the prescribed reSince the plaintiff took no exception to the
quirements.
instruction given, he is deemed to have acquiesced in it;
and, assuming that it was erroneous, the lack of exception
made the error unavailable and afforded no ground for setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial. {Darrance v. Preston, 18 Iowa, 396; Valerius v. Richard, 57
Minn. 443, 59 N. W. 534; Hayne, New Trial & App. <§ § 7,
127.)

To overcome this omission jjlaintiff calls attention to a
recital in the case made that it contains all the pleadings

New Trials

Sec. 8]

739

and preceedings, ''together with all the instructions given
by the court and the objections made by either party, together with all rulings of the court and all papers filed
in said case necessary to present the question raised and
enable the supreme court to pass upon one question raised
in the record, to wit: The giving by the court of the instruction complained of by the plaintiff, and for the giving
of which a new trial was granted." The recital does not
affect the question under consideration.
The question
the
the
whether
instruction was a ground for a
giving of
new trial is presented, and assuming that the record contains all that it is said to contain, the question remains :
Did the giving of an erroneous instruction, without objection or exception, warrant the granting of a new trial ?
We think not; and, therefore, the order granting a new
trial must be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff in error.
All the justices concurring.

VALERIUS
Supreme

Court of Minnesota.
57

Collins,

J. At

V. RICHARD.
1894.

Minnesota, 443.

trial of this

cause, at the request of
defendants' counsel, the court plainly charged the jury
that, if they found a certain fact from the evidence, the
defendants could not be held liable upon the note in suit.
the

To this, counsel for plaintiff took no exception, nor was
there even a suggestion that it was erroneous.
The verdict being for defendants, a motion to set it aside, and for
a new trial, was made by plaintiff's
attorneys, on two
grounds, — those specified in 1878, G. ch. 66, § 253, subd.
5th and 7th.
Subsequently, and, as stated by the court in
its order, solely because there was no evidence which warranted that part of the charge referred to above, plaintiff's
motion was granted.

**********

The majority are of the opinion that, in civil actions, the
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power of the court to grant new trials is limited to the
grounds prescribed in section 253, and that new trials for
errors of law can only be granted when an exception has
been taken.
The statutory grounds for new trials are exclusive.
Practically, this has oftentimes been held in this
court, especially when considering motions made upon
the ground that errors of law had occurred upon the trial,
as witness the Minnesota cases before referred to.
To
permit a defeated party to have the benefit of an error of
law not excepted to would be giving him a great advantage ;
and here we are asked to go further, and allow to a party
who made no objection to the giving of the erroneous instruction, and thereby actually acquiesced in its pertinency
and correctness, the benefit of the error. Manifest injustice would be the result, for, had even a suggestion been
made that the court was not justified in this part of the
charge, we have no doubt prompt correction would have
followed. Our construction of the statute has been placed
See Hayne, New
upon others substantialy the same.

Trials,

ch. 1,

§7; Id. ch.

16.

Order reversed.

Buck, J., absent, sick, took no part.
Canty, J. I dissent. Where the trial court has mis-

&

is

it

is

is

a

is

a

if,

stated the law in his charge, or charged propositions of
law not applicable to the case, and he is of the opinion that
in fact the jury was misled thereby, it is in his discretion
in
to grant a new trial though no exception was taken,
his opinion, the taking of an exception would not have
caused him to change his mind in time to obviate the miscase the losing party has no standing at
take. In such
matter of right. It
all, as
merely an application for
equitable relief, addressed peculiarly to the discretion of
the trial court.
carried so far as to hold that, on
In New York this
review at the general term of the rulings of the judge at
not necessarily fatal,
the trial, the want of an exception
discretion,
its
reverse for erbut the general term may, in
not,
ror not saved by exception, on the ground that
strictly speaking, exercising appellate jurisdiction, but has
all the discretionary powers of the trial court. Baylies.
App, 125; Standard Oil Co. v. Amazon Ins.
New Trials
Co., 79 N. Y. 506; Mandeville v. Marvin, 30 Hun. 282;
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a

'
'

§

7,

a

it

it,

Maier v. Eomen, 4 Daly, 168; Lattimer v. Hill, 8 Hun. 171 ;
Ackart v. Lansing, 6 Hun. 476.
It is also in tlie discretion of the trial court to allow an
exception after the jury has retired. St. John v. Kidfl,
26 Cal. 267.
If he has power to allow an exception after
the proper time to take
he has power to consider
taken
for the jourpose of new trial.
This ground for new trial does not come under 1878, G. S.
ch. 66,
"Error in law occurring at the trial
253, subd.
and excepted to by the party making the application,
but
under the first subdivision of that section, ''Irregularity
in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee or prevailing
party or any order of the court or referee or abuse of discretion by which the moving party was prevented from

fair trial."

a

is

a

I

if

is

a

is

is

The discretionary power exercised by the court below
in this case
one which
trial court, having due regard
for the rights of the prevailing party will seldom exercise.
It
only when he
satisfied that in fact the particular
mistake produced
wrong result and that the failure to
except did not prejudice the prevailing party and where
he
satisfied that his rulings would have been the same
and that nothing would have been done by him or the prevailing party in time to obviate the mistake even
an exception had been taken. Even viewed by this strict rule
cannot see that the order granting
new trial was an abuse
of discretion, and hold that the order appealed from

it

is

it

it

is

a

is

a

is

it

a

it

is

should be affirmed.
Since the above was written the majority opinion has
been re-written. It
now admitted that at common law
was in the discretion of the trial court to grant
new
trial for errors to which no exception was taken, but
insisted that by the adoption of the Code this discretionary power has been cut off. It has seldom before
been held that the discretionary power of
trial court of
general jurisdiction has been cut off by the Code. The
Code
mere skeleton, and much of
merely declaratory
of the common law. Especially
this true as to its provisions regulating practice.
We do not look to
for the
discretionary powers of the District Court, as we do to
the justice of the peace practice act for the discretionary
power of that court. On the contrary,
not unusual to
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look to the great sources of authority on common law and
equity practice to ascertain what the discretionary powers
of our District Court are.
The point is also now made for the first time that the

motion for a new trial was not made on the grounds stated
in the first sub-division of section 253, but on those stated
in the fifth and seventh subdivisions. As to this will say
many able judges, in times past, have often set aside verdicts on their own motion, even before the ink was dry
on them, and without any motion or grounds of motion being made or stated by the party at all; and the right to do
so has hardly been questioned.
At common law the trial
court had the ])ower to grant a new trial, no matter how informal the application for it might be, or how much the
moving party had waived his technical rights by failing to
take the proper exception, or to put the proper grounds, or
any grounds at all, in his motion. When, as in the present
case, a formal motion for a new trial is made, stating the
grounds, it will not be presumed that it was granted on
It must affirmatively
any grounds except those stated.
appear that it was granted on some other grounds which
it does in this case. It is a new doctrine that a trial court
of general jurisdiction has no discretion to brush aside
technical informalities, and prevent injustice, by granting
It has always been held that it is in the disa new trial.
cretion of the trial court to see that injustice was not done
during the progress of a trial, or afterwards, before the
entry of judgment, either through its own mistakes or the
To sustain the position of
technical laches of the attorney.
the majority, Ilayne, New Trial, is cited several times.
This work is devoted exclusively to the practice as established by the California Code and decisions, rarely citing
He cites no case which sustains their
any other cases.
am able to find none. On
position. They cite none, and
the contrary, the authorities in the Code states agree with
the common law on this question. Thus, in Farr v. Fuller,
8 Iowa, 347, the trial court granted a new trial for errors
in i'^R charge, not excepted to. The supreme court held it
was discretionary. As in this case, the evidence was not
returned on appeal, and the appellant claimed that no error
appeared in the charge; but the supreme court held that, in
favor of the order granting a new trial, it would be pre-

I

I
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sumed that, as applied to the evidence, the charge was erroneous. It is also held in Cheatham v. Roberts, 23 Ark.
651, that it is in the discretion of the trial court to grant

new trial for error not excepted to.
The point is also now made that section 254 provides
that when the motion for a new trial is made on the fourth,
fifth, and seventh subdivisions of section 253, " it is made
either on a bill of exceptions or a statement of the case
prepared as prescribed in the next section, for any other
cause it is made on affidavit," and that, therefore, this by
necessary implication cuts off the common-law practice,
under which the court often acted on its own knowledge of
what took place in its presence during the trial, and granted
or denied a new trial without regard to whether or not such
knowledge was either supported or contradicted by any
such affidavits. If this was purely a statutory proceeding,
the position of the majority would be correct, but it is not
a mere statutory proceeding.
The provision that in some
cases a motion for a new trial shall be made on a case or
bill of exceptions and in others on affidavit, is simply declaratory of the common law. Such statutes do not cut off
^ther common-law remedies, unless such other remedies
are expressly prohibited.
Thus, on the principles laid
down by the majority, title 11 of chapter 66, prescribing
the practice on application for injunction, and providing
only for the temporary writ and the permanent writ, would,
by necessary implication, cut off the old equity power to
issue a restraining order pending the motion, but the contrary practice is well established in this state. On the same
principle, on an appeal from the clerk on taxation of costs
under 1878 G. S. ch. 67, <^ 8, the judge who tried the case
could not look into the proceedings on the trial, or beyond
But the contrary practhe affidavits used on the taxation.
The judge practically disregards
tice is well established.
the affidavits on the question of materiality when the witnesses were sworn, and acts on his own knowledge of the
proceedings had and testimony given on the trial, just as
he did at common law. It is unnecessary to multiply illustrations. The judge who tried the case is not bound, by
virtue of the statute, to know as little about the case after
trial as the average juror is required to know before it.
He is not obliged to stultify himself, and know nothing of
a
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what he saw or heard on the trial, except what the parties
see fit to state to him in affidavits.
But the judge's powers and the applicant's rights are,
in this respect, very different questions. The moving party
not only fails to save his rights for review in the appellate court, by failing to make them appear of record, and
to cover them in his grounds of motion, but he also runs
the risk of having his motion denied on technical grounds,
merely, by the trial court, which it usually will and ought
to do. But notwithstanding this, in furtherance of justice,
the trial court may relieve him from his laches, by giving
him something which he asked for, but was not in a position to demand as of right. And when it affirmatively appears that the court, in granting him a new trial, has, in
furtherance of justice, intentionally relieved him from his
technical laches and omissions, it is merely a question
whether or not, on common-law principles, it has abused
its discretion. In this case it seems to me that it has not.

BOTTINEAU LAND
Supreme

&

LOAN COMPANY V. HINTZE.

Court of loiva.
150

1911.

Iowa, 646.

Action at law on a promissory note. After both parties
had offered their evidence and rested plaintiff moved for
a directed verdict on the ground that there was a failure
of proof of the matters pleaded in defense to the note. This
motion was sustained, and a directed verdict returned for
plaintiff for the amount of its demand. Thereafter and
within three days defendant filed a motion for a new trial,
assigning as reasons therefor errors of the court in holding there was no evidence to sustain the defense pleaded,
as well as in numerous other rulings with reference to the
pleadings and the admission and rejection of evidence.
The trial court, after due consideration, sustained the motion, set aside the verdict, and ordered a new trial, accompanying tlio ruling by a written statement that some
of the material evidence had escaped its attention until
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transcribed after the verdict was returned, and that, upon a re-examination of the testimony, it
was of the opinion that the issues should have been submitted to the jury. From this ruling, the plaintiff appeals.
— Ajjirmed.
Weaver, J. * * *
1.
Counsel for plaintiff make the point that a motion
for a new trial will not lie after a directed verdict of the
the same had been

jury has

been received, and that to sustain such a motion
is reversible error, even though the order directing the
verdict was erroneously made. A ''new trial" is defined

by Code, section 3755, to be a re-examination in the same
court of an issue of fact or some part or portion thereof
after a verdict by the jury, report of referee, or a decisThe objection raised by the appellant
ion of the court.
seems to be grounded in the thought that a directed verdict
is not a ''verdict of a jury" within the meaning of this
statute, and that "decisions by the court" which may be
questioned in motions for a new trial include only such as
are made by a court in the trial of issues without a jury.
In other words it is argued that an error in directing a
verdict can be corrected only upon appeal. We think this
contention requires an altogether too narrow construction
of the statute, and tliat the establishment of such a rule
would tend to prolong litigation, and increase its hazard
There is nothing inhering in our system
and uncertainty.
and
of procedure
practice which forbids the exercise by a
trial court of power to correct its own error where the mistake is discovered and the correction made at the same
term, and while the parties and the subject-matter of conChapman v.
troversy are still within its jurisdiction.
Allen, Morris, 23; Railroad Co. v. Estes, 71 Iowa, 605;
Brace v. Grady, 36 Iowa, 352. The statute pro^^des for
new trials after a verdict by a jury. It does not attempt to
classify verdicts or draw any distinction between those
returned by direction of the court and those which are not,
and we see nothing in the nature of the case to compel
the court to ingraft such an exception upon the rule as
laid do\\Ti by the Legislature. Wlien the court submits
an issue to a jury with erroneous instructions that as a
m fitter of law plaintiff has failed to make a case or that
defendant has failed to sustain his defense, thereby com-
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pelling a particular verdict, no good reason exists why that
error may not be taken advantage of on motion for a new
trial precisely the same as if the verdict had been actually
or presumably affected by the erroneous exclusion of material evidence properly offered on the trial. The cases
cited by appellant might be considered in point were we
to recognize the distinction which counsel draw between
verdicts generally and directed verdicts, but this we can
not do, and we need not stop to consider what would be the
proper practice in the absence of statutory regulation. It
has frequently been held that power to grant new trials
is inherent in the court, and that statutes such as ours do
not abrogate or limit judicial authority in that respect.
See cases collected in 29 Cyc. 722. Were it necessary to
look beyond the provisions of our own statute and consult
precedents from other states, they appear to be in substantial accord with the conclusion here announced. Bearing in that direction, see Railroad Co. v. Goodrich, 38 Kan.
224 (16 Pac. 439) ; Chambers v. Granfzon, 7 Bosw. (N. Y.)
414; Hinote v. Simpson, 17 Fla. 444; 29 Cyc. 752.
There was no reversible error in setting aside the directed verdict, and the order appealed from is affirmed.

Section

FORT WAYNE

&

9.

On Court's Own Motion.

BELLE ISLE RAILWAY COMPANY

V. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Supreme

Court of Michigan.
110

1896.

Michigan, 173.

Montgomery, J. One Emma L. Long brought an action
against the relator for personal injury, and, on a trial
before a jury, recovered a verdict of $800. The respondent,
deeming this award insufficient, set aside the verdict, and
ordered a new trial. The relator asks for a writ of mandamus directing that this order be set aside.
The counsel for relator concede that the court might, for
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an error of its own commission on the trial, order a new
trial on its own motion, but contend that the court has no
such control over verdicts of juries, and can only vacate
such verdicts on application of one of the parties.
We
think the practice in this State has been otherwise, from
its earliest history, and although the exercise of this power
has been very rare, there have been instances of it. That
these instances must, of necessity, be infrequent, naturally
results from the recognized impropriety of a trial judge
interposing his own judgment, as against that of a jury,
except in a clear case. But in such case the court possesses
the power, at common law, to grant a new trial on its own
motion; and in our opinion the power is not limited to
cases where the error is that of the court, or where there
is misconduct of the jury, as contended by relator's counsel, and as appears to have been held by the supreme court
of Texas in Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1. As sustaining the
broader power, as a common-law power, see 2 Thomp.
Trials, § 2711, and cases cited, — particularly. State v.
Adams, 84 Mo. 313.
Having determined that Judge Donovan had the power
to set aside this verdict, it follows that his discretion must
control his action, except in a case of clear abuse of such
discretion, which we do not find in this case.
The writ will be denied.
Hooker and Moore,
concurred. Long, C. J., did not
sit. Grant, J., took no part.

JJ.,

HENSLEY V. DAVIDSON BROTHERS COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of loiva.
135

1907.

Iowa, 106.

The law of the case was settled on the former
Ladd, J.
N.
W. 975) ; and, whether right or wrong, that
appeal (103
ruling in so far as applicable to this case is a part of the
That adjudication is binding on the
irrevocable past.
parties, and it was the imperative duty of the district
The evidence was substantiallv the
court to follow it.
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same as that introduced on the former trial; the only difference being that jDlaintiff testified that she saw the defendant's team before getting out of the wagon to go to
the depot, concerning which no inquiry had been made
before, and some variance in McDaniel's testimony bearing on his credibility as a witness.
The records differ in
no important particulars, such as might be persuasive that
a different conclusion with reference to the submission of
the cause to the jury should be reached.
No objections or rulings of any kind prior to the submission of the cause to the jury are to be found in the record, and no exceptions to the instructions were saved.
when the jury returned into court with
Nevertheless,
the court ''immediately
a verdict for the plaintiff,
said
on
verdict,
set
reading
its own motion,"
upon
Plad this been done to correct some ruling in the
it aside.
course of the trial not necessary to challenge by motion in
order to be renewed, a different question would be presented; but nothing previous had occurred to which the
able counsel on either side had thought it worth while to
save an exception.
The ruling must have been owing to
some supposed error lurking in the verdict which might
have furnished the basis of a motion for new trial by the
An omission to so raise it would have
party aggrieved.
been a waiver. For all that appears from the record, such
Our statute enummight have been defendant's purpose.
which
new
shall
trials
be granted on
erates the grounds on
Section 3755, Code.
application of the aggrieved party.
But there is no provision in the Code relating to orders of
That such right exthis kind on the court's own motion.
It is one of the inherent
ists, however, is indisputable.
powers of the court essential to the administration of jusIn Rex V. Goiigli, 2 Doug. 791, Lord Mansfield detice.
clared that, even though too late for a motion, if enough
appeared, the court could grant a new trial, and in Rex v.
Atkinson, 5 Term R. 437, note, is quoted as saying that,
though too late for a motion, "if the court conceive a doubt
that justice is not done, it is never too late to grant a new
trial." In Rex v. Bolt, 5 Term R. 436, Lord Kenyon, said
he well remembered Rex v. Gough, "where the objection
to the verdict was taken by the court themselves," and
Buller J., observed, in concurring, that "after four days
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party could not be heard on motion for new trial, but
only in arrest of judgment; but
in the course of that address,
incidentally appear that justice has not been
done, the court will interpose of themselves."
In Weber
V. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766 (63 N. W. 35),
said that the
power of courts of general jurisdiction, in the correction
of errors committed by them, '*is exercised, not alone on
account of their solicitude for the rights of litigants but
also in justice to themselves as instruments provided for
the impartial administration of the law."
And such
the view generally entertained by the courts in this counAllen V. Wheeler, 54 Iowa, 628; Ellis v. Gmshurg,
try.
163 Mass. 143 (39 N. E. 800); Standard Milling Co. v.
White Line Central Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258 (26 S. W.
State ex rel. Henderson v. McCrea, 40 La. Ann. 20
704)
South. 380) Bank
Willmer v. Laivler, 78 Minn. 135
N.
W.
Com.
v. Gabor, 209 Pa. 201 (58 Atl. 278)
(80
868)
Thompson, Trials, 2411; State ex rel. Brainerd v. Adams,
84 Mo. 310.
In the last case the court, in upholding the power, pertinently inquired:
the court commits
palpable error
in an instruction to the jury, or witnesses misconduct of
members of the jury, which, on motion, would authorize
on account of the ignorto set aside the verdict, shall
ance or timidity of the aggrieved party which prevents him
from moving in the matter, render an unjust judgment on
If the jury find verdict palpably against the
the verdict
law as declared by the court,
powerless to maintain its
own dignity and self-respect, unless some one who feels
aggrieved shall move in the matter?
In several of the States the grounds on which the courts
trial are specimay act on their own motion in granting
fied by statute construed by the courts to exclude all
others!!
Townley v. Adams] 118 Cal. 382 (50 Pac. 550)
S. D. 483 (61 N. W. 1126) State ex
Clement v. Barnes,
Wliere the authority
rel. Brainerd v. Adams, supra.
of opinion seems to be
consensus
found in the statutes the
that the ruling must be entered promptly upon the return
Clements v. Barnes, supra; Gould v. Eleof the verdict.
216 (50 N. W. 969).
Co.,
N.
D.
vator
See Long v. King14
128
Old.
Pac.
P.
Co.,
Ency.
P. 932.
1063)
(47
fisher
And several courts have indicated without deciding that
of
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the order must be entered within the time within which a
That a motion theremotion for new trial must be filed.
for is pending will not deprive the court of the power to
This
order a new trial on grounds not raised therein.
must necessarily be so, for one of the controlling reasons
for the existence of the power is to enable the court to
guard the rights of parties, who, for some cause, have
proven unable to jDrotect themselves, and another to enable the court to correct its errors rather than wait for
But resort to
this to be done by the Appellate Court.
this power will rarely be required, and it should be exercised with great caution and in aggravated cases only.
Ample provisions are to be found in the Code of Procedure for the protection of litigants on their own application, and for the court to interpose, without affording
the defeated party an opportunity to elect, whether he will
accept the result, lays it open to the suspicion of partisanship.
It is preferable to leave something to the attorneys engaged in the litigation.
Especially was this true in the case at bar, as judgment
therein for the defendant on a directed verdict had been
reversed by this court, and the evidence held to be such as
to require that the issues be submitted to the jury.
Of
what force is the opinion of this court that a case is made
out for the jury if the district court can evade the ruling
by setting aside the verdict when returned, and even then
with the scant consideration evidenced by not waiting for
If this can be done once,
objection by the losing party?
it may be repeated, and through orders granting new trials
The rule
the effect of the decision entirely obviated.
which precludes this court from reviewing, revising, or reversing a decision on a former appeal is equally binding
on the district court.
McFall v. Raihvay, 104 Iowa, 50;
Bahcoch v. Railway, 72 Iowa, 199; Garretson v. Ins. Co.,
92 Iowa, 295 ; Burlington, Cedar Rapids (& N. R. Co. v. Dey,
89

Iowa,

If,

24.

then, a new trial was granted on the same ground on
which a verdict for defendant was directed on the former
trial, tlie ruling cannot be sustained.
Upon great consideration this court held in Meyer v. Houch, 85 Iowa, 319,
that the trial judge should direct a verdict whenever, considering all the evidence, it would be his duty to set aside
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the verdict if returned in favor of the party upon whom
The converse of this propthe burden of proof rested.

that is, a new trial ought not
to be granted when the evidence in favor of the party having the burden of proof is such that the cause should be
On the former appeal we held
submitted to the jury.
that the cause should have been submitted to the jury, and
this in effect was an adjudication that a verdict, if returned for plaintiff, would have such support in the evidence as to preclude the granting of a new trial on that
ground alone.
Any question of presumption ordinarily
indulged in favor of the ruling of the trial judge or discretion in the matter of granting new trials is obviated by
the record.
The record is conclusively presumed to contain everything essential to the determination of all points
raised in argument.
McGilUvary Bros. v. Case, 107 Iowa,

osition necessarily follows

17

;

King

v.

Hart,

110

;

Iowa,

618.

The order is reversed and the cause remanded for judg-

ment on the verdict. — Reversed.

Section

10.

Discretion of Court.

LOFTUS V. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY
COMPANY.
Court of Missouri.

Supreme

220

Graves,
*

*

*

J.

*

1909.

Missouri, 470.

**********
*

*

After verdict was returned the defendant filed
its motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, which
motions were by the court sustained by an order of record
''Now on this day it is ordered by the
in this language:
court that the motion for a new trial and motion in arrest
of judgment be and the same are hereby sustained because
the court erred in giving instruction *No. One P.' to which
the

plaintiff excepts."
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The further contention is made that this court
sliould not disturb the discretion exercised by the trial
In other words, that the
court in granting the new trial.
granting of a new trial rests within the sound discretion
In the broad sense, the granting of a
of the trial court.
new trial does rest within the sound discretion of the trial
judge, and this discretion, like all judicial discretions,
should not be disturbed when properly exercised.
We are
cited to the recent cases of Rodan v. Railroad, 207 Mo. 1.
c. 407, and Seeger v. Silver Co., 193 Mo. 1. c. 407, as stating
correct rules upon the question.
In the latter case. Judge Marshall said: "The rule is
now well settled in this State that this court will not reverse the action of a trial court in granting one new trial,
unless the .case is such that no verdict in favor of the party
to whom the new trial is thus granted, could, under any
circumstances, be permitted to stand."
And in the former. Judge Lamm said: "In the first
place, in limine, it must be assumed as a commonplace of
the law, arising to the level of an axiom, that the granting
of a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court; and its action in that behalf will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it appears that its discretionary power
was abused, i, e., exercised in an arbitrary or improvident
manner.
(R. S. 1899, sec. 800; and see first note under
that section, Ann. Stat. 1906, 761, where the authorities
11.

are gathered.) "
These announcements must be taken in the light of the
facts of the cases. In the Seeger case the trial court had
sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's testimony and thereby
forced a nonsuit.
Motion was made to set aside the nonsuit and that motion sustained by the court nisi, from
Upon such an apwhich order the defendant appealed.
It
peal Judge Marshall used the language above quoted.
before
court
trial
the
must be noted tliat the sole question
and this court was the sufficiency of the evidence to make
At first blush, the trial court thought
a case for plaintiff.
not, but upon considering the motion to set aside the nonThe discretion exersuit reached a different conclusion.
cised then was one as to the facts, and not one purely and
The trial
So, too, in the Rodan case.
simply of law.
filed
by defendcourt concluded, upon motion for new trial
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it had erred in giving a certain instruction, which
instruction should not have been given in view of certain
facts shown in the trial.
In other words, the court had in-'
structed the jury that in the absence of evidence that the
ant, that

did not look and listen for an approaching car,
then the jury were at liberty to presume that he did look
and listen.
A witness for plaintiff, and the only eye-witness, had testified in effect that he saw deceased leave the
sidewalk and go on across to the railroad track, paying
no attention to the approaching car.
Judge Lamm's remarks were induced by this state of affairs.
The question before the trial court, and upon which the judicial discretion was exercised, was a mixed question of law and
fact.
The trial court concluded that in view of the facts
testified to by this witness there was positive testimou}^
that deceased did not look or listen before going upon the
railroad track, and therefore there was no place for an instruction upon the ground of presumption.
So that in
this case the discretion was really exercised as to the facts
Both of those cases announce the proper
of the case.
rule in cases where judicial discretion has been exercised
as to the facts and the weighing of the evidence as to the
In such cases we will not disturb such discretion
facts.
wherein there is sufficient evidence to sustain a
a
case
in
verdict in favor of the party for whom such discretion has
But these cases are not this case. Upon
been exercised.
the facts of the case at bar a verdict for either party could
be sustained, but the discretion of the trial judge was not
directed to the facts, so far as the question now before us
is concerned. He was passing judgment upon a clear question of law, and we have concluded that his judgment on
that question was erroneous. Wlien the judicial act is directed solely to a question of law and the act is erroneous, it
does not fall within the rule of the exercise of sound, judicial
discretion. There is no discretion as to the law of a case. Nor
can there be an exercise of a sound discretion as to the law
of a case.
So that when we speak of the granting of a
new trial being within the sound discretion of the trial
judge, we have no reference to a case where the new trial
is granted solely upon the ground that the law has been
erroneously given, when in fact it has been properly given.
deceased

»******♦»♦

T. P.— 48
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YORK V. STILES.
Supreme

Court of Rhode Island.
21

1899.

Rhode Island, 225.

Assumpsit on book account.
The facts are fully stated
in the opinion.
Heard on petition of defendant for a new
New trial denied.
trial.
Tillinghast, J.
We think the ancient maximn ^^de
minimis non curat Ze.<c" may well be applied to this case.
The amount involved is only four dollars.
The action
was commenced in the District Court, where upon trial a
decision

was rendered

for the defendant.

It

was then

certified to the Common Pleas Division upon plaintiff's
claim for a jury trial.
When the case came on for trial
the defendant did not appear, and a default was entered,

and subsequently the court assessed the plaintiff's damages at the sum aforesaid.
The case is now before us on
the defendant's petition for a new trial, on the ground
that the Common Pleas Division erred in certain rulings
regarding the admission of evidence in connection with the
assessment of damages on default.
We think the petishould
be
denied.
is too trifling
amount
involved
tion
The
to warrant the court in sending the case back for another
Moreover, whatever the result of a new trial might
trial.
be, if one should be had, it is manifest that it would be to
And as rethe detriment of both parties to have one.
marked by Ames C J. in Svonner v. Leland, 5 R. I. 352, in
speaking of new trials; ''Neither courts of law or equity
when exercising, as in such cases, a discretion, exercise
No vital quesit except to some good and useful end."
The only dispute in the
tion of principle is involved.
case is as to whether the defendant had the right to deduct from the plaintiff's wages, which were seven dollars
per week, certain damages alleged to have been caused by
her in running the "extractor" in the defendant's launSuch a dispute about such an insignificant matter
dry.
does not strongly appeal to the judicial discretion of the
court.

In Buddington

v. Knowles^ 30 Conn. 26, which was a pe-
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tition for new trial on the ground that the damages, which
the jury had assessed at $66, were excessive, Ellsworth, J.,
in delivering the opinion of the court said: *'It is a sufficient objection to granting a new trial for excessive damages, that the verdict is onl}^ for $66, an amount too trivial
to warrant the renewal of the controversy, unless courts of
justice are kept open to gratify the evil passions of mankind.
To grant the defendant's request will be to punish
the defendant himself, were it certain that the damages
would be reduced on another trial, which, however, it is
either as a matter of law on the evidence before us,
Such a practice we cannot encourage, and we take this opportunity to say that a new
trial in such cases should not be asked for, unless the case
be one which involves something more than a trifling sum

Tiot,

or as a matter of fact.

if

5

Hill, 170.
Petition for new trial denied, and

road Co.,

is &

is

it

it

is

is

it

a

a

is

1

2

3

1

2

a

is

a

it,

of money."
In Hyatt v. Wood, 3 Johns, 237, the court said: ''It has
frequently been decided in this court, that in cases where
the damages are trifling, a new trial will not be granted
after a verdict for the defendant, merely to give the plaintiff an opportunity to recover nominal damages, and when
no end of justice is to be attained by
though there may
the
misdirection
of
have been
judge. The principle stated
of
by the judge in this case was incorrect, but the action
new trial merely for that
too little importance to grant
reason." See also to the same general effect, Macroiv v.
Hull, Burr. 11; Burton v. Thompson,
Burr. 664; FlemJohns, 520; Hill. N. Tr.
ed. 483-4; Robing V. Gilbert,
Taunt. 493.
erts V. Karr,
A motion for new trial practically an appeal to the
material and
sound discretion of the court to prevent
And
never to be granted
the
palpable wrong.
court can see that substantial justice has been done, notNor
withstanding irregularities may have occurred.
to be granted when the failure of justice has not been
palpable; nor where the wrong done, however palpable
16 Am.
Eng. Ency. L. 503.
may be,
trivial in extent.
not to be applied
The maxium above quoted, however,
in case of the positive and wrongful invasion of another's
Seneca Road Co. v. Railproperty or personal rights.
case remitted

to the
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756

[Chap.

Peactice

17

rommon Pleas Division with direction to enter judgment
on the decision.

NORTH CENTER CREEK MINING & SMELTING
COMPANY V. EAKINS.
Supreme

Court of Kansas.
23

1880.

Kansas, 317.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action appealed from a jusBrewer, J.:
tice of the peace, for labor done in and about certain zinc
The question was as to the liability of
smelting works.
question
being made as to the fact of the
the defendant, no
work or its value.
The verdict was against the defendUpon a motion for a new trial, the court ruled that
ant.
it should be granted, upon the payment within thirty days
of all costs in the district court, and in default of such payment, that it should be overruled, and judgment entered
on the verdict.
The defendant alleges error.
The grounds of the motion for a new trial were, that
the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, that
the court erred in admitting testimony, and in other rulNo claim was made on account of accident, surings.
The claim of the
prise, or newly-discovered evidence.
defendant therefore was, that there was error on the part
The court, by susof the court or jury to its prejudice.
taining the motion, even conditionally, in effect found that
such claim was correct ; and yet it refused any relief to deNow when the
fendant, except upon payment of costs.
claim for a new trial is based upon accident, or newly-discovered testimony, grounds which concede the correctness
of the trial already had, there is often fairness and justice
in requiring a payment of the costs of such trial as a conFor if the victorious party is withdition of a new one.
out fault and the proceedings without error, it is a hardship on him to be compelled to relinquish what he has obtained and venture upon a new trial, simply on account
of the intervention of some new fact in behalf of his op-
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is often just to make tlie party who has thus
an opportunity to relitigate his case, pay the
fruitlessly expended costs of the first trial.
But a different rule prevails where the new trial is claimed and
awarded, not on account of the intervention of some new
fact, but because of wrong conduct on the part of the successful party, or because the court or jury has at his instance and upon his solicitation committed error. In such
case, if the error is a material one, the moving party has a
He is the party withclear, legal right to a second trial.
out fault, and his adversary the wrongdoer; and the new
We are aware of
trial should as a rule go without costs.
the statute which provides that the "costs of motions and
the like shall be taxed and paid as the court in its discretion
We
may direct."
(Comp. Laws 1879, p. 682, § 588.)
also know that often in trials both parties are in fact in
some
fault and the motions for new trials cover all
grounds, so that it is not always possible to determine
But what
upon what grounds the motion is sustained.
we have suggested is, as to the rules which should control
the discretion of the court in the matter of costs upon
Now as we have stated, the rulmotions for new trials.
ing of the court was an exj)ression of its opinion that there
had been error prejudicial to the rights of defendant, an
opinion with which, after examining the record, we fully
The essential facts are, that a tripartite written
concur.
agreement was entered into between L. D. Boone, the
owner of certain zinc works, the defendant, and Louis
Vogle, and Louis Goes, doing business under the name of
the Consolidated Zinc Mining & Smelting ComjDany, by the
terms of which Boone was to put his works in repair and
The defendant was to furnish zinc ore for
lease them.
smelting and the C. Z. M. & S. Co. were to hire all needed
employes and run the works, smelting the ore furnished by
the defendant, and after paying one stipulated portion of
the product to Boone for the rent of the works and another
stipulated portion to the defendant for ore, take the balEvidently from the terms of
ance for its compensation.
this agreement, no partnership was contemplated between
these parties, but simply an arrangement for the rent of
buildings and machinery and the reduction of ore to minSo the court .instructed the jury, and the instruceral.

ponent.
obtained
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tion was correct.

The court also .correctly instru-cted as
to the circumstances under which one not in fact a partner
might become liable as partner to third parties by reason
of his conduct in respect to the partnership affairs, and
charged that if the plaintiff did not at the time of doing
the work understand that defendant was a partner or responsible for the work, he could not hold the defendant unless it was in fact a partner.
Turning now to the testimony, we find the plaintiff, after testifying that he hired
to the Consolidated Zinc Mining & Smelting Company,
stating, "I did not know at the time I hired with Mr. Vogle
that he was in partnership with the North Center Creek
Mining & Smelting Company, nor did I know it at the
Indeed, the defendant was
time I brought this action."
not a party at the commencement of the action, but made

one subsequently by amendment.
As the defendant was
not in fact a partner and as the plaintiff did not suppose
it was a partner, it is difficult to see upon what ground a
recovery against it can be sustained.
The court was
right in ruling that it was entitled to a new trial, and the
error was in making the payment of costs a condition
precedent.
It should have been granted without condition.
Without fault on its part the defendant had been
brought into court and compelled to litigate an unjust demand, and should not have been required to pay any costs
the plaintiff had made as a condition of protection in its
defense.
The judgment in the district court will be reversed, and
the case remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.
All the Justices concurring.

BROOKS V. SAN FRANCISCO & NORTH PACIFIC
RAILWAY COMPANY.
Supreme

Court of California.
110

1895.

California, 173.

Searls, C. — This was nn action to recover damages sustained by tlie infant plaintiff for personal injuries received
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while a passenger upon the railway train of the corporation defendant.
The cause was tried before a jury and a verdict rendered
in favor of plaintiff for five thousand dollars.
Judgment
was entered thereon February 26, 1894.
Defendant in due time moved for a new trial, which was
granted "upon the payment by defendant to plaintiff of
the sum of three hundred dollars for counsel fees and expenses necessarily incurred in said motion."
This order
was made June 25, 1894.
On July 2^, 1894, defendant gave notice of an appeal
to this court from the order of the court below granting a
new trial upon the condition specified in the order, and,
on the same day, gave notice of an appeal from final judgment entered in the cause February 26, 1894.

That a nisi pritis court has the power to impose terms
as a condition of making an order for a new trial is too
well settled to need argument in its support.
In Rice v. GasMrie, 13 Cal. 54, which in view of the fact
'hat the motion was founded upon errors of law occurring
it the trial, and hence at first blush would seem not to have
^
been a case involving turpitude on the part of the losing
party, the court below granted a new trial upon condition
that the moving party should pay the costs.
Upon an appeal by the moWng party this court, speaking through Baldwin, J., said: ''The terms upon which a
court will grant a new trial are peculiarly a matter within
This must necessarily be so, for so many
its discretion.
reasons relating to the conduct, management, and peculiar
circumstances of the trial may exist that it would be im-

If
possible to prescribe any general rules on the subject.
a
intervenes,
party
may
take
his exceptions
error at law
and prosecute his appeal without motion for a new trial;
but if he makes his motim and relies upon that for redress
against an improper verdict, he must subject himself to
the equitable power of the court.
''The verdict may have gone against him in some degree
or wholly, by his own neglect or default, or even the rulings
of law be chargeable to his own laches or want of diligence.
In sucli cases it may bo proper to grant him a new trial,
We cannot interfere with
yet only upon equitable terms.
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this exercise of discretion unless upon a clear showing that
it has been abused, or that the terms were grossly unrea-

sonable."

In

the present case the motion for a new trial was based,
**
insufficiency of the
among others, upon the ground of the
evidence to justify the verdict."
This is a ground appealing peculiarly to the discretion
And wherever the conditions are such
of the trial court.
that the court below is authorized in its discretion to impose terms as a condition to granting a new trial, this
court will interfere only in those cases where it manifestly appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion.

The following cases in this court recognize and uphold
the right of the trial court in one form and another to impose terms and conditions in granting and refusing motions for new trials: Sherman v. Mitchell, 46 Cal. 578;
Gillespie v. Jones, 47 Cal. 264; Chapin v. Bourne, 8 Cal.
294; Harrison v. Peahody, 34 Cal. 178; Dreyfous v. Adams,
48 Cal. 131; Benedict v. Cozzens, 4 Cal. 381; Corher v.
Morse, 57 Cal. 301; Gregg v. San Francisco etc.. By. Co.,
59 Cal. 312; Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13.
In the case last cited the iury had found a verdict in
favor of plaintiff for fifteen thousand three hundred dollars.
Defendant moved for a new trial.
The trial court made an order that, if plaintiff should
consent that the judgment be reduced to nine thousand
dollars, the new trial would be denied, and that otherwise
Plaintiff consented to the reduction,
it would be granted.
and the motion was thereupon denied.
Defendant ay>
pealed from the order.
Counsel for appellant attacked the power of the court to
make such an order, and contended that if the court
thought the verdict excessive its duty was to grant a new

trial.
This court, speaking through McFarland,
mitting that the position of appellant was

J., after
a

ad-

strong one,

the weight
added:
''But whatever might
of reason and foreign authority on the question above
stated, if it were it .9 integra here, the right of a court to
do what is complained of in the case at bar is too firmly esbe considered
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tablished in this state by a long line of decisions to be now

questioned."
The principle involved in that case is the same as that
underlying the present one, and goes to the power of the
court to impose terms in granting and refusing motions
for new trials.
A review of the record fails to disclose any basis for concluding that there was an abuse of discretion in imposing
terms as a condition to granting the motion for a new trial.
It follows that the order appealed from by defendant
should be upheld.

COHEN V. KRULEWITCH.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
Neiv York.
1902.
77

Appellate Division, 126.

Ingraham, J.:
The action was brought to recover commissions for procuring a purchaser of certain property belonging to the
defendant.
The plaintiff testified that he was employed
by the defendant to procure a purchaser of this property;
that he procured a purchaser therefor upon terms satisfactory to the defendant; that the defendant subsequently
refused to complete the purchase and thereby the plaintiff became entitled to his commissions.
The defendant
denied the emplo}Tnent ; denied that the plaintiff ever procured a purchaser of the property, or that he ever promThe case was subised to pay him any commissions.
mitted to the jury who found a verdict for the plaintiff,
whereupon the court, on motion, set aside the verdict and
ordered a new trial upon the ground that there was no evidence that the purchaser was ever ready to sign the contract to purchase the defendant's property and no evidence
that the contract between the defendant and the purchaser
was ever in fact prepared, and, therefore, no evidence that
the plaintiff had done what he contracted to do — obtain a
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person who was ready and willing to make an exchange
with the defendant for the property that was satisfactory
to the defendant, and also upon the ground that the weight
of evidence was against the plaintiff, and as the plaintiff
had the burden of proof the jury should have found for the
defendant in the case and not for the plaintiff.
We think the court was entirely justified in setting aside
the verdict for the reason assigned by the trial judge, and
that the jury were not justified upon the evidence in finding a verdict for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff insists, however, that the court should have imposed costs upon the
defendant as a condition for granting the motion to set
aside the verdict.
Where a motion is made to set aside a
verdict upon the ground that the plaintiff has failed to
prove his case, there is no rule that requires that costs
should be imposed as a condition for granting a new trial.
In such a case a new trial is not granted as a matter of
discretion, but as a matter of right, and we do not think
the court would then be justified in imposing costs as a
condition for granting a new trial.
Wliile it is proper for
the court to impose costs upon granting a new trial where
there was a proper case for the submission of the question
to the jury, but where for some reason the court is satisfied that the verdict was not a fair determination of the
question submitted to them or that justice requires that
the case should be submitted to another jury, this is not
such a case.
Upon this record we think the court below
was required to grant a new trial without the imposition of
any costs upon the defendant.
It follows that the order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., O'Brien and McLaughlin,
concurred; Hatch, J., dissented.
Order affirmed, with costs.

JJ.,
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STAUFFER V. READING.
Supreme
206

Court of Pennsylvania.

1903.

Pennsylvania State, 479.

Before Endlich, J.
Appeal from jury of view.
From the record it appeared that the city of Reading appropriated one and one-half acres of plaintiff's land for
The boulevard was so lothe purpose of a boulevard.
cated as to cut off three acres of plaintiff's land to the
north, leaving about seven acres to the south of the boulevard.

Verdict for plaintiff for $3,295.83.
On a rule for a new trial the court made the following
order:
November 10, 1902.
The rule to show cause is discharged, on condition that the plaintiff within thirty days
from the date of entry of this order convey to the defendant, for park purposes, the tract h^ng north of the boule^'ard; otherwise, upon the expiration of said period, the
rule to become absolute.

Plaintiff appealed.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Mitchell, July 9, 1903:
The granting or refusing of a new trial except for causes
like errors of law by the judge or misconduct of the jury,
where it may be matter of right, is an exercise of judicial
discretion by the court in furtherance of right and justice
according to the circumstances of the case.
Hence it is
well settled that the court may impose terms upon either
or both of the parties as conditions of the grant or refusal,
and the latitude allowed to the discretion of the court to

this end is very great.
As each case must be determined
on its own circumstances the causes cannot all be specified
or enumerated before hand, but in general as is said by
the most prominent writer on the subject, "it may be safely
asserted that no case can occur presenting circumstances
timely addressed to the discretion of the court, in which
the rights of the parties may not be fully protected by the
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a
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it

a

it

is,

imposition of conditions meeting the exigency:"
Graham
on New Trials, 610.
Large as the discretion
judicial discrehowever,
tion and must be used with reference to the rights involved
in the controversy.
The conditions imposed therefore
must have some direct relation to the issue between the
parties in the case.
The condition complained of in the present proceeding
The conveyance of the three
transgresses this limit.
acres was not asked for by the city nor offered by the apjust or wise settlement
pellant.
Whatever its merits as
was
desired by
parties,
apparently
between the
not
either, and was certainly no part of the issue which they
In imposing
as
brought into court to have decided.
new trial therefore, the court
condition of the refusal of
exceeded its discretionary authority.
The condition was erroneous also from another point of
view as tending to deprive appellant of his property in
jury pass upon its value.
violation of his right to have
In this respect the case goes further than LeJir v. Brodverdict
heck, 192 Pa. 535, where the jury having found
for defendant contrary to the instructions of the judge, as
to part of the goods sued for, the court directed the acsum less
ceptance of an offer by the defendant to pay
plaintiff
refusal
and
on
of
claimed,
to
accept,
plaintiff
than
It was held that this was error. In
refused new trial.
''The ])laintiff
the opinion our Brother Dean said:
claimed that the value of her goods wrongfully seized and
And whether this was the value or not,
sold was $335.

as the
evidence tending to establish
right to the
As
suitor under the law she had
value.
opinion of the jury on the evidence; and the court at the
It however now directs her arbitrial thought so too.
trarily to strike from her claim $85.00 and as penalty for
See also
refusal in effect says she shall have nothing."
Bradwdl v. Pittsburg, etc., By. Co., 139 Pa. 404.
Judgment reversed, and record remitted with directions
to reinstate the rule for new trial and proceed to dispose
of
according to law.

it

a

a

it

offered
a

she had
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GILA VALLEY, GLOBE

& NORTHERN RAILWAY
COMPANY V. HALL.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona.
13

1911.

Arizona, 270.

Campbell, J.
Appellee was in the employ of appellant as chainman. On April 23, 1907, he was engaged with
another emploj^ee, named Ryan, in measuring distances,
locating mile-posts on appellant's line of railway.
For
that purpose they used a three-wheeled velocipede furnished by appellant.
This velocipede was of the kind ordinarily used in work of this character, with a gasoline
engine for motive power.
It had two wheels on the righthand side, over which was the engine, and a seat for the
use of the operator, and a seat in front for another person.
The third wheel was a small wheel on the left-hand
side, nearly opposite the front wheel on the right-hand
side, and fastened to the machine by a bar extending
across the track.
On the day mentioned, Hall and Ryan
were upon this velocipede on plaintiff's line of railway,
Rvan operating the mahcine and Hall sitting in front.
While the velocipede was going at a speed of from eight
to twelve miles an hour, it suddenly left the track, going
to the left, the side on which was situated the one small
wheel.
Hall was thrown in front of it and run over, sustaining severe in.iuries.
This action was brought against
the railroad company to recover damages for the injuries
so received, it being alleged that the flange on the third 6r
small wliool was worn and cracked, and that by reason of
such condition the machine left the track, and that the
company was neg]i2"ent in furnishing such velocipede. Appellant answered, denying the negligence alleged, pleading
contributory negligence, and that Hall knew^ or might have
known the condition of the velocipede and assumed the
risk of the in.iuries resulting from the alleged defect. The
jury returned a verdict for $10,000.
A motion for a newtrial was made, and prior to its determination Hall voluntarily remitted $5,000 from the amount of the verdict.
Thereafter, the court denied the motion for a new trial
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and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiif for $5,000
and costs.
From this judgment and from the order denying the motion for new trial, the railway company appeals.

**********

The remaining important question in the case is whether
the court erred in rendering judgment for the amount of
the verdict less the sum remitted by the appellee.
It is
insisted by appellant that the court should have granted
a new trial for the reason that it is beyond the power of a
court to permit a remittitur where the damages are unliquidated and the verdict excessive.
The question has
Southern
heretofore been before this court in two cases.
racific Co. V. Tomlinson, 4 Ariz. 126, 33 Pac. 710, was an
action to recover damages for death by wrongful act, under a statute permitting the jury "to give such damages
as they may think proportioned to the injuries resulting
from said death."
A verdict for $50,000 was returned,
from the which the plaintiff remitted $31,998, and judgThe power of the
ment was entered for the remainder.
trial court to permit the remittitur was questioned, but it
was held: ''A trial court has the power, where excessive

damages have been allowed by the jury, and where the motion to set aside the verdict is based upon this ground, to
make a remission a condition precedent to overruling the
The exercise of this power rests in the sound
motion.
This doctrine is affirmed in the
discretion of the court.
case of Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 74, 9 Sup. Ct. 458,
32 L. Ed. 854; also in Railroad Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S.
Of course, if it is ap642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755.
parent to the trial court that the verdict was the result of
passion of prejudice, a remittitur should not be allowed,
In passing upon this
but the verdict should be set aside.
question, the court should not look alone to the amount of
damages awarded, but to the whole case, to determine the
existence of passion or prejudice, and to determine how
far such passion or prejudice may have operated in influencing the finding of any verdict against the defendant.
AVlicn the circumstances, as they may appear to the trial
court, indicate that the jury deliberately disregarded the
instructions of the court, or the facts of the case, a remittitur should not be allowed, but a new trial should be
If they do not so indicate, and the plaintiff vol
granted.
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imtarily remits so much of the damages as may appear to
he excessive, the court, in its discretion, may allow the reIn Southern
mission and enter judgment accordingly."
Pacific Co. v. Fitchett, 9 Ariz. 128, 80 Pac. 359, the verdict
was for $1,000 for ''injuries to feelings," from which the
plaintiff, upon the suggestion of the trial court, remitted
This court held that it was apparent that the jury
$600.

it

is

it

it

a

is

is

is

a

a

a

is

a

is

9

9

6

it,

was influenced by passion or prejudice, and that therefore
a new trial should have been granted.
We further sought
to distinguish the facts in that case from the Tomlinson
case, suggesting that in the latter the damages were susWe
ceptible of accurate computation from the evidence.
now
to
the
views
not
to
adhere
so
prepared
expressed.
are
In the one case
Both are cases of unliquidated damages.
not less than the other, the jury's verdict represents the
damages "proportioned to the injuries resulting" in the
opinion of the jury, based upon evidence that affords no
If there is a difference, it
basis for exact computation.
is one of degree rather than one of kind.
There is authority for the position that in no case of unliquidated
^damages should the court permit a remission where the
verdict is excessive, without the consent of the defendant,
but as we now view
the great weight of authority supNorthern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Herbert,
ports the practice.
116 U. S. 642,
Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755; Arkansas Cat130 U. S. 69,
Mann,
Sup. Ct. 458, 32 L. Ed. 854;
tle Co. V.
Sup. Ct. 696, 33 L. Ed.
Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22,
110; 29 Cyc. 1022, 1023, and cases cited.
It argued that to permit remittitur, or to require
new trial,
condiiton of refusing
to substitute the
as
jury, to the latter of which
court's judgment for that of
entitled.
But
to the jury's judgthe defendant
ment that defendants object when they appeal to the court
for new trials on the ground of excessive verdicts.
The
trial court has undoubted power to determine whether the
not excessive, and in considering the quesor
verdicts
tion usually determines in its o-wn mind the maximum
verdict could with propriety be peramount for which
AVliere
stand.
there has been no error of law
to
mitted
committed which would require a re-trial, and
appears that the excessive verdict has resulted from too liberal views as to the damages sustained, rather than from
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prejudice or passion, to permit a remission of tlie excess,
instead of putting the parties to the expense of a new trial,
Of
promotes justice and puts an end to the litigation.
course, il it appears that the verdict is tainted by prejudice or passion, and does not represent the dispassionate
judgment of the jury upon the question of the right of the
But
plaintiff to recover, a new trial should be granted.
we think that the trial court is in a better position to determine whether the verdict is so tainted than is this court,
and that unless it clearly appears from the record that the
excessive verdict resulted from prejudice or passion,
rather than from that liberality which jurors sometimes
exercise in cases which appeal to men's sympathies, we
should accept the trial court's determination.
The trial
court in this case has determined that the jury was not influenced bv passion or prejudice, and we see no reason for
not accepting its conclusion.
Other rulings of the court are assigned as error and have
received our consideration, but thev are not of sufficient
importance to warrant discussion here.
We find no reversible error in the record, and affirm the judgment of
the district court.

Kent,

C.

J.,

and Lewis and Doe,

Section

11.

JJ.,

concur.

Notice of Motion.

HANSEN V. FISH.
Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.
27

1871,

Wisconsin, 535.

Lyon, J. * * *
The action was tried at the December term, 1869, of that
court, and the plaintiff had a verdict. The verdict was returned on the 15th day of that montli, and immediately the
attorney for the defendants, in the absence of the attorney
for the plaintiff, made a motion orally for a new trial upon
This motion was not entered
the minutes of the judge.
On
in the minutes of the clerk at the time it was made.
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return of the attorney for the plaintiff into court soon
after, the judge informed him that such motion had been
made.
However, the attorney for the plaintiff, underthe

standing that the motion was not to be entertained, remitted a part of the verdict, and procured the judge to sign an
order for judgment for the residue thereof. The judge
did not understand that such motion was not to be pressed
or entertained, and signed the order for judgment inadvertently.
The counsel for plaintiff proceeded to give notice of
the adjustment of tlie costs, had the same adjusted, and, on
the 22d day of December, perfected the judgment and left
the court.
On the next day, December 23d, the court, in the
due course of business, heard the motion for a new trial
made on the 15th, no one appearing thereon for the plaintiff, and after due consideration and on the same day
granted the motion.
At the next term of the court the plaintiff moved the
court, on due notice, to set aside and vacate the order of
December 23d, granting a new trial; and the court denied
the motion, and an order was duly entered to that effect.
From this last mentioned order the plaintiff appeals.
The principal question presented by this appeal is,
whether the opposite party is entitled to formal notice of
a motion made upon the minutes of the judge to set aside a
verdict, or a verdict and judgment, if judgment has been
entered, and for a new trial.
Such motions must be made at the same term at which
the cause is tried.
R. S. ch. 132, sec. 16. "A trial is the
judicial examination of the issues between the parties,
whether they be issues of law or of fact." Sec. 5 of the
same chap. This judicial examination of the issues is not
by the jury alone. The judge has something to do with it.
Hence such examination is not complete when the jury have
returned a verdict.
It is then for the judge to say whether they have decided
correctly, and if he finds upon *'an examination of the issues" that they have not, or if he finds that his rulings during the trial have been wrong, on a motion for that purpose
founded on his minutes, and made at the same term, he
will set aside such erroneous verdict and grant a new trial.
It seems quite clear to my mind, that such motion and
the decision thereof is a part of the trial, and is covered by
T. P.—49

'
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of all the usual motions
which may be made in progress of a trial intermediate the
verdict and the judgment, such as motions for stay of proceedings after verdict and motions for judgment, which
may involve to some extent an examination of the issues.
I do not understand that there is any law or rule of court
which requires notice to be given of such motions when
they are made at the same term at which the cause is tried.
And I think a motion for a new trial on the minutes of the
In practice I never knew
judge is of the same character.
They
a formal written notice of such motion to be given.
are usually made orally, decided by the court, and the motion and order granting or denying it entered in the minIn the ninth circuit it is not the pracutes by the clerk.
tice to hear argument upon such motions, except in special
So
cases the judge indicates a desire that they be argued.
to
a
prevails
this
greater
exfar as I know,
or less
practice
tent throughout the state, and I think has its origin in the
generally received opinion of the courts and the bar, that
these motions and the decision of them are parts of the
trial, and do not require any formal notice to the adverse
* * *
party, but are covered by the notice of trial.
We find no error in the proceedings of the circuit court,
and are therefore of the opinion that the order appealed
from should be affirmed.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.

the notice

so

BOAEMAN V. HINCKLEY.
Supreme Court of Washington.
17

1897.

Washington, 126.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Reavis, J.— Action by plaintiff, respondent here, against
Verdict of
defendant for damages for breach of contract.
jury for defendant. Within two days after rendition of
the verdict the plaintiff filed and served on the defendant
grounds relied upa motion for a new trial, specifying the
The court, upon hearing the motion,
on in the motion.

New Trials

Sec. 11]

771

a

a

is

a

a

a

a

a

<§.

granted a new trial, from which order the defendant appeals.
The first contention of appellant is that no notice of intention to move for a new trial was filed within two days
after rendition of the verdict, as required by the statute
(Code, Proc,
404), but the motion itself specifying the
new trial was filed and served on
grounds assigned for
the defendant within the time required by statute.
The
cases cited by appellant from California and Montana are
In those cases, either no notice or motion
inapplicable.
was filed within the time required by statute, or else the
new
specifications of the reasons relied on for asking
the
usually
not
The
construe
were
stated.
courts
trial
new trial filed
form of
notice fairly. The motion for
by plaintiff in this case fully advised the defendant of
new trial, and specified
plaintiff's intention to move for
The motion itself here fulfills the function
the grounds.
of the notice required by the statute. The power to grant
one of discrenew trial by the court hearing the cause
the
order
appealable has not
tion, and the statute making
changed the established principles controlling the granting
new trial. Only abuse of such discretion
or refusal of
will be reviewed. We perceive no abuse of its discretion
by the superior court in the order made, and its order i»
affirmed.
Scott, C. J., and Anders, Dunbar and Gordon,
concur.

JJ.,

5

Supreme Court

Corliss,

J.

of

ANDEKSON V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GRAND
FORKS.
North Dakota.

1895.

North Dakota, 80.

* * *
*

#

it

a

It was urged on the argument that the order denying
new trial should be affirmed, for the reathe motion for
son that
appears that the notice of intention to move for
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a new trial was not served within the statutory time. But
an examination of the record satisfies us that the time in
which to serve such motion was extended by the coart, and
that the notice was served within the time as so extended.
Nor do we think there is any force in the contention that
the paper so served was not a notice of intention.
It is
true that it was in bad form, in that it embodied a notice,
not only that plaintiff intended to move for a new trial on
the grounds therein stated on a statement of the case, but
that he would bring his motion for such new trial on to a
hearing at a specified time and place. The notice of intention and the notice of motion are two distinct and utterly different notices, and it is not good practice to emSections 5090, 5092,
brace both elements in one paper.
Comp. Laws. The notice of intention should not state
when and where the motion for a new trial will be heard.
As a general rule, the person who desires to make such motion is not in position to notice his motion for a hearing at
the time he serves his notice of intention, for it often happens that at that time the bill or statement has not been

settled.

The order is reversed, and a new trial is granted.

All

concur.

KRAKOWER V. DAVIS.
Supreme

Court of Neiv York, Appellate Term.
20

1897.

Miscellaneous, 350.

BiscHOFF, J. The plaintiff's claim was for commissions
earned in a transaction involving the sale of certain real
estate, owned by the defendants as tenants in common, and
tlie trial resulted in a verdict in his favor ''for one-eighth
of the commission claimed."
This verdict was set aside, at the time of its rendition,
and a now trial was ordered, from wliich order the defendant Levy, the sole litigating defendant, appeals.

The first objection which the appellant raises to the va-
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lidity of the order is based upon the fact that no notice of
the motion was given, the order having been made directly
upon the rendition of the verdict.
The statute provides (Laws 1896, chap. 748): ''Notice
of such motion of not less than five days nor more than
eight days shall be given to the adverse party or his attorney, within five days after the rendition of the verdict, or
the entry of the judgment," and it is contended that the
justice was without power to make the order in question because such notice had not been given.
This statutory requirement of notice was for the adverse
party's benefit only, and so could be waived by him (Re
Cooper, 93 N. Y. 507), and his consent to the court's entertaining the motion at the time when it was made, in his
presence, "^as to be inferred from his failure to object upon
the ground that insufficient notice had been given (Mayor,
etc. V. Lyons, 24 How. Pr. 280), if, indeed, the statute is to
be construed as calling for such notice where the motion
is made upon the return of the verdict.

**********

Order affirmed, with costs.
Daly, P. J., and McAdam, J., concur.
Order affirmed, with costs.

SIMPSON V. BUDD.
Supreme

Court of California.
27

De Havex,
*

J.

1891.

Pacific, 758.

* * *

The only question for decision is whether the
statutory,'' time for giving notice of intention to move for a
new trial and the preparation of bills of exception can be
extended by a stipulation of counsel not filed within the
statutory time, and of this we entertain no doubt. An attorney has authority to bind his client in any of the steps
of an action or proceeding by his agreement in writing, filed
with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court.
Section 283, Code Civil Proc. The service and filing of
* *
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notices of motion for a new trial and proposed bills of exception are steps in an action within the meaning of this
section, and the stipulation is filed in time if it is on file,
with the consent of the adverse attorney, when the court
is called upon to act upon the matter affected by the stipulation. Section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure does
not limit the authority of attorneys, as given by section 283
of the same Code, nor prescribe the exclusive mode by
which the time for giving notices or the service of proposed
statements or bills of exception may be extended, but it
only imposes a limitation upon the power of the court to
extend such time without the consent of the adverse party.
It is undoubtedly true, as has often been decided by this
court, that the right to move for a new trial is statutory,
and, unless the prescribed steps are taken within the time
allowed, the right does not exist as against a party who
stands upon the statute and insists upon strict compliance
with every provision of the law relating thereto, and intended for his benefit ; but it has never been held that such
provisions may not be waived by the party otherwise entitled to claim their benefit. On the contrary, it has been
assumed in many cases, if not directly decided, that the
time for giving notice of motion for a new trial, as well as
every other step to be taken in relation thereto, may be
waived or extended by consent. Hohhs v. Duff, 43 Cal.
485; Brichman v. Ross, 67 Cal. 602, 8 Pac. Rep. 316; Patrick V. Morse, 64 Cal. 462, 2 Pac. Rep. 49; Gray v. Nunan,
63 Cal. 220; Schieffertj v. Tapia, 68 Cal. 184, 8 Pac. Rep.
878; Curtis v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 390, 11 Pac. Rep.
652. We are of the opinion that the parties may, within
the time allowed by law to give notice of intention to move
for a new trial, stipulate that the time for giving such notice may be extended, and that such stipulation has effect
without any order of the court ratifying the same. The
question in such cases is one which most immediately concerns the parties to the action, and attorneys may be safely
intrusted to look after the rights of their respective clients
*
*
*
in such matters.
We concur: Beatty, C. J.; Sharpstein, J.; Harrison,

J.

;

Patterson,

J. ;

Garoutte,

J.
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Time of Motion.

CITY OF ST. JOSEPH V. KOBISON.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
125

Missouri,

1894.

1.

Burgess, J.
This is ejectment for the recovery of the possession of a
small parcel of ground which plaintiff claims as a part of
a street, and to which defendant

claims to have acquired
a
to a jury and judgment rendered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
The verdict was rendered on the sixth day of November,
1891, and the motion for a new trial was filed on the sixteenth day of November next thereafter.
The motion was
filed out of time, and the bill of exceptions can not be considered by this court. It should have been filed within four
days after the verdict (R. S. 1889, sec. 2243), and could not
be filed thereafter.
It was so held in Maloney v. Railroad,
122 Mo. 106.
The judgment is affirmed. All of this division concur.^

title by limitation.

There was

trial

1 This was the common law rule.
Tidd says: "The motion for a new trial
must be made, in the King's Bench, within four days exclusive after the entry of a rule for judcrment (Doug. 171) ; and it cannot be made after the four
2 Tidd 's Practice,
days, though by consent of the parties (1 Glut. 382, 3)
In the United States the time is usually fixed by statute or rule of
*912.
court.
When not so fixed it is a matter within the discretion of the court.
Thus, it was said in Conklin v. Hinds (1871) 16 Minn. 457: "At common
law and in the chancery, the time for making it [the motion for a new trial]
was matter of practice regulated by rule of court.
It remains so unless
And since it has not done so in this
the statute has regulated the practice.
instance, and the district court has adopted no general rule in this respect,
it must be for the judge, before whom such motion is made, to decide in each
instance, whether or not it was made too late, a decision which we should not
review, unless an abuse of discretion appeared."

"
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BAILEY

V.

17

DRAKE.

Supreme Court of Washington.
12

[Chap.

Washington,

1895.

99.

a

it

a

it,

HOYT, C. J.
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial.
The verdict which was set aside by said order was rendered
on the 1st day of December.
The motion for a new trial
was not filed until the 4th day of December.
On account
of the delay in its filing the appellant objected to its being
h«ard. Upon such objection being made the court, on motion of the respondent, made an order extending the time in
which the motion for a new trial might be filed so as to include the said 4th day of December, and, having done so,
proceeded to the consideration of the motion and, for reasons satisfactory to
set aside the verdict and ordered
new trial.
Appellant relies upon two grounds to reverse the order:
That
was beyond the power of the court to extend
(1)
new trial aftef^
the time in whicli to file the motion for
* * *
the expiration of thejime fixed by the statute.

*

*

*

is

*

is

The appellant cites numerous cases to support his first
contention, but none of them have any force under our
statute, which, unlike those of the states in which the decisions relied upon were rendered, specially confers the power upon the court to enlarge the time for the making of any
motion or giving notice thereof, after the expiration of the
statutory time as well as before. The language of sec. 24,
of ch. 127 of the Laws of 1893 (p. 414), upon this subject
as follows:
a* *
^jj^ |-j^g court may enlarge or extend the time,
to
for good cause shown, within which by statute any act
or
be done, proceeding had or taken, notice of paper filed
served, or may, on such terms as are just, permit the same
to be done or supplied after the time therefor has expired.
* * M

And there fan l)o no ('Sf';\]v^ from the conclusion that the
legisTaTi iic intciidcl ])y its ciiactincnt to confer authority
the
upon the coui'ls tu extend the time in which acts of
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Kind under consideration conld be done after the expiration
of the statutory time, as well as before.

**********

Scott, Dunbae, Anders and Gordon,

JJ.,

Affirmed.
concur.

HAYES V. IONIA CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Supreme

Court of Michigan.
125

1900,

i

^

'

^^
i

M#^
,

Michigan, 277.

by Mary A. Hayes to compel Frank D. M.
Davis, Circuit Judge of Ionia county, to strike a motion
for a new trial from the files, and to vacate an order extending the time in which to settle a bill of exceptions or move
for a new trial.
Submitted October 30, 1900. Writ denied
November 13, 1900.
Mandamus

Moore,

J.

The provisions of law in relation to new trials in civil
^"^uses are to be found in 1 Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 205, and
Cir. Ct. Rule No. 21.^ It will be observed that there is no
such limitation of time as there is in the rule relatmg to the
The provisions do not
settlement of bills Of exceptions.
interfere with the common-law discretion of the court.
They only fix a time beyond which no one could move for a
new f Hal as a matter of right. In People v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 20 Mich. 220, it was said :
'*It is not clear that motions for a new trial based on
newly-discovered evidence would come within the rule fixing a time, for the facts may not be ascertained until afterwards.
It is not desirable to compel parties to resort to
courts of equity to obtain new trials, where it can be avoided ; and in such cases the courts of law should act on equit1 Circuit Court "Rule 21 reads as follows:
"Motions for a new trial and
motions in arrest of judgment, with the reasons on which they are founded,
shall be filed and a codj thereof served on the opposite party within five days
after the rendition of "a verdict, in the case of a trial by jury, and within
a like time after the decision of the court, when the cause has been tried by
the court, or witlin f»uch further time as shall be allowed therefor by the
court or judge."

778
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able principles, and do, if they can, what justice requires."
See, also, Van Rensela&r v. Whiting, 12 Mich. 449 ; Campau V. Coates, 17 Mich. 237.
In Manufacturers' Mut. tire Ins. Co. v. Gratiot Circuit
Judge, 79 Mich. 241 (44 N. W. 604), an ex parte order extending the time in which to move for a new trial was entered. This court declined to interfere with the action of
In the case of Reynolds v. Sweet, 104 Mich. 252
the court.
(62 N. W. 356), a judgment was entered in the circuit court
March 21, 1894. The case was brought to this court, and
decided February 26, 1895. The judgment of the court
below was affirmed, and a remittitur was sent to the clerk
of the circuit court. The judgment was paid in March.
December 20th following, a year and nine months after the
original judgment was entered, a motion was made for a
Upon an applinew trial, and the new trial was granted.
court
to interfere.
declined
mandamus,
this
cation for a

Reynolds v. Newaygo Circuit Judge, 109 Mich. 403 (67
N. W. 529). In Fort Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 110 Mich. 173 (68 N. W. 115), the circuit judge upon
his own motion granted a new trial, and it was held he had
the right to do so. The counsel for the relator cite the
case of Frazer v. Judge of Recorder's Court, 112 Mich. 469
That case was a criminal case. The
(70 N. W. 1042).
a
new trial in criminal cases limited the
statute authorizing
time in which the application must be made. The case is
not applicable here.
It is urged that, if the circuit judge may grant a new
trial after the time for settling a bill of exceptions has expired, unreasonable delays will be caused, abuses will
arise, and parties will obtain by indirection what they cannot obtain directly. We are not at liberty to assume that
circuit judges will not do their full duty, or will grant a
new trial except where it ought to be granted in furtherance
of justice. Should such a case arise, a proper disposition
can be made of it.
The application for the writ is denied.
The other Justices concurred.
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ROGGENCAMP V. DOBBS.
Supreme

Court of Nebraska.
15

Maxwell,

1884.

'

^
^.

^

H^^

"^"WU

J

Nebraska, 620.

J.

This is an action of replevin

by the plaintiff
:i gainst
the defendant to recover certain hogs belonging to
the plaintiff, which the defendant as pound master of the
village of Bennett had taken up. On the trial of the cause,
the jury found for the defendant, and that he had a special
interest in the hogs in question for $10.50. The verdict was
rendered on the seventh of June, 1882, and judgment rendered thereon on the twelfth of that month . On the eighteen th, or six days after judgment was rendered, the plain-''^
tiff asked leave to file a motion for a npw trial
Thm apjolication was accompanied by affidavits setting forth neglect of the plaintiff's attorney to file the motion, and that
the plaintiff placed reliance upon liim. etc.
A motion for
The application was over"a new trial was also tendered.
ruled, and there being no motion for a new trial a motion is
now made to quash the bill of exceptions.
Unless equitable grounds exist for granting a new trial,
as where a parly' is pfeveiiTed from making his defense by
circumstances beyond his control, in which case equity may
m a proper case grant relief, a motion for a new trial m ust
TInyji r. Quoru^ 4
be filed within the time fixed bv law .
Neb. 108; Leiby v. Heirs of Ludlow, 4 Ohio, 493; Vannerson V. Pendleton, 8 S. & M. 452; Peebles v. Ralls, 1 Little,
24.
Unless equitable grounds exist, such as will warrant
a court of equity in granting relief, the motion for a new
trial must be made at the term the verdict or decision is
rendered, and, except for the cause of newly discovered
evidence, shall be within three days after the verdict or
Code,
decision is rendered, unless unavoidably prevented.
evidently
The words ^'unavoidably prevented''
sec. 316.
refer to circumstances beyond the control of the party de^
siring to file the motion. The law requires diligence on"
The part of clients and attorneys, and the Digj'e_neglect_of_
It
pjfhpr will not entitle a party to relief on that ground.
brouo^ht

V^^
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might be different in case of the deliberate betrayal of a
ient by an attorney.
But such case probably will not
^l
occur, and is not shown in this.
There being no sufficient
cause shown for filing the motion for a new trial, there was
no error in denying the same.
As none of the errors assigned in the petition in error can be considered, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
The other judges cOHCur.

HELLMAN V. ABLER

&

SONS CLOTHING

COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
60

SULLXVAN,

1900.

Nebraska, 580,

J.

This proceeding in error has for its object the reversal
of a judgment denying Maria liellman's application for a
new trial based upon an alleged discovery of material evidence after the adjournment of the term at which the case
of David Adler S Sons Clothing Co. v. Maria Hellman was
The final decree in the case mentioned was rendecided.
It was adverse to the defendant,
dered in February, 1895.
and she appealed to this court, where the decision of the
It appears from
district court was affirmed June 9, 1898.
the record that the petition for a new trial was dismissed
because it was not filed within the time limited by section
It was filed October
318 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
27, 1898; more than three years after the final judgment
was rendered in the district court, but within one year after
Counsel for
the judgment of affirmance was pronounced.
the plaintiff in error contend that their application was seasonably made, because the final judgment contemplated by
the limitation law is the ultimate decision rendered in the
case, whether such decision be given by the trial court or
We think counsel are wrong.
by this court.
The policy of the legislature with respect to the re-examination of the issues of fact once tried and determined
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is clearly indicated in article 6 of the Civil Code.
A party
claiming a new trial must show diligence; he must move
promptly.
Any needless delay, any inertness, on his part,
which hinders the court in bringing the litigation to a
speedy conclusion results in a forfeiture of the statutory
right.
Section 316 is as follows: "The application for a
new trial must be made at the term the verdict, report or
decision is rendered, and, except for the cause of newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial, shall be within three days after the
verdict or decision was rendered, unless unavoidably prevented."
Section 318 provides: ''T\niere the grounds for
a new trial could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
discovered before, but are discovered after tlie term
report of referee, or decision
at which the verdict,
made,
or
the application
was rendered
be
may
made by petition filed as in other cases | * * *
but no such petition shall be tiled more than one year after
It is quite clear from
the tinal Judgment was rendered."
new
that,
sections
if
is discovered
the
evidence
quoted
the
during the term at which the cause was decided, although
after the decision was rendered, the application for a new
trial must be made at that term.
Under these circumstances the law exacts of the unsuccessful suitor a high degree of diligence as the price of a new trial.
Why should
it be less exacting after the adjournment of the term at
which the cause was decided ?
If a defeated litigant elects
to abide by the .judgment of the district court, the time
within which he may move for a new trial is certainly limited to one year from the date of such judgment.
Wliy
should he be given a longer period because he is disposed
Wliy should be he permitted to lengthen
to be litigious?
instituting
by
the time
an appellate proceeding and conWe can not believe that
ducting it leisurely to judgment?
the legislature would have required a party to be expeditious and diligent in applying for a new trial at one stage
of the case if it intended to allow him to take his own
time at another stage.
The period of limitation should,
it would seem, begin to run from the date of the decision
in the district court, for the trial there may, and frequently
does, suggest the possible existence of other material evi-
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The trial in this court, however, reveals nothing
with respect to the facts of the case that was not known

dence.

before.

The petition for a new trial, if presented in apt time,
may be entertained by the district court although the cause
Such is the obvious
be pending in this court for review.
meaning of the statute, and such is the construction given
like statutes in other jurisdictions.
Cook v. Smith, 58 la.
A party desiring to ob607 ; Gibson v. Manly, 15 111. 140.
a
jnovisions
new
under
of section 318 of the
tain
trial
the
Code has, therefore, the right in every case to make his
application within oneyear from the date of the judgment
in the district court, and that court has autliority to entertain his petition and grant the relief demanded, although
the cause may be pending for review in this court.
The
legislature did not intend to say that the remedy which it
provided should be available under all circumstances for
one year, and might, at the option of the complaining
party, be made available for an indefinitely longer period.
This conclusion is in harmony with the dictum of Chief
Justice Maxwell in Bradshaw v. State, 19 Neb. 644.
The judgment is
Affirmed}
iln Henry v. Allen (1895) 147 N. Y. 347, 41 N. E. 694, the appellant
moved for an order that the case be remanded to the supreme court, where
the case had been tried, in order to enable him to move for a new trial.
It was denied on the ground that the pendency of the appeal was no
The court said:
the
bar to a motion in the court below for a new trial.
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its discretion, grants the motion for a new
trial, the legal effect will be the vacating of the judgment from which the
appeal has been taken to this court, and a motion to dismiss the appeal would

"If

then be proper."

HERZ V. FRANK.
Supreme

Court of Georgia.
104

Simmons, C.
*

*

J.

*

*

1898.

Georgia, 638.

*

This court has in numerous cases decided, rz
effect, that where a motion for new trial is made in term
*
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and an order taken for it to be heard in vacation, the term
of the court, for that particular case, has not adjourned but
is still open. In the case of Stone v. Taylor, 63 Ga. 309,
Bleckley, J., in treating this subject, said: ''The order
taken in term, to hear the motion in vacation, put the judge
in full possession of the case at the time appointed, and
continuances from time to time were had, so that there
It was as if the first day had been
was no gap or break.
lengthened, or all the sittings had taken place at different
*
*
*
hours of the same day.
He had exactly the same
in
as
he
had
been sitting in term- and
if
that respect
power
so had he in respect to adjourning over from one day to
When a court is once on foot in a regular, legitianother.
mate way, it requires no consent of parties to run it.
The
The motion for a new trial
law makes it self-supporting.
did not perish on the judge's hands, but kept its vitality
until he passed judgment refusing to grant it.
To that
a
error
lies."
In
writ of
judgment
many other cases the
court has held, that where an order is taken to hear a motion upon a certain day in vacation, unless the judge continues it by another order on that day, he loses jurisdiction
of the case.
In the case of Arnold v. Hall, 70 Ga. 445, a
motion for new trial was set for hearing on a particular
day, and four days thereafter the judge approved the brief
of evidence and granted a new trial.
This court held that
the judge had no jurisdiction to pass the order approving
the brief of evidence or to grant the new trial.
The reasons for these decisions must have been that, when the
judge failed to act upon the day set in the order, the term
of court expired as to the case set for that day.
An order, taken in term, to hear in vacation a motion for a new
trial, operates, in our opinion, to keep the regular term of
the court open as to that particular case until it is passed
*
*
*
upon by the judge.
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PEOPLE V. BANK OF SAN LUIS OBISPO.
Supreme Court of California.
159

California,

1910.

65.

a

a

a

is

a

it,

it,

Henshaw, J.
Under the Banking Act of 1903, (Stats. 1903, c. 266).
action was begun in the name of the people of the state of
California by the attorney-general, as contemplated by the
provisions of the act, for a decree declaring the defendant
Bank of San Lnis Obispo insolvent, ordering it into involuntary liquidation and restraining it from the transaction
This action proceeded to judgof a banking business.
ment in accordance with the complaint of the People and
a receiver was appointed by the court to administer its
affairs in liquidation.
On appeal to this court the judgment of the trial court was in all respects affirmed {People
V. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 154 Cal. 194, 97 Pac. 306), and
On Juno
this judgment became final in September, 1908.
19, 1908, the trial court denied the defendant bank's motion for a new trial and from this order an appeal was
taken to this court.
Pending the decision on this appeal
from the trial court's order refusing to grant the motion
for a new trial, the Banking Act of 1903, (Stats. 1903, c.
266). under the authoritv of which this action was prosecuted and these proceedings had, was repealed by the
Banking Act of 1909, (Stats. 1909, c. 76), which latter act
made no provision for continuing in force any pending proceedinsrs or litigation under the repealed act.
The Bank of San Luis Obispo now moves this court to
and
vacate and set aside the judgment given against
to direct the trial court to dismiss this action upon the
ground that the repeal of the Banking Act of 1903 put
an end to all litigation pending under
and that within
the meaning of the law the action of the People of the
State of California against the Bank of San Luis Obispo
was litigation pending and undetermined.
The principle
which appellant invokes has thus been stated: ''When
repeal of the
founded on
statute,
cause of action
statute before final judgment destroys the right, and
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judgment is not final in this sense so long as the right of
exception thereto remains."
(1 Lewis' Southerland, Stat-

**********

utory Construction, 2d ed., p. 285.)
*

*

*

In

of

*

*

*

statute conferring civil rights or
powers, the repeal operates to deprive the citizen of all
such rights or powers which are at the time of the repeal
inchoate, incomplete and unperfected.
In the case of
statutes conferring jurisdiction, the repeal operates by
causing all pending proceedings to cease and terminate at
the time and in the condition which existed when the repeal
became operative.
In cases of judgment pending upon
appeal, the rule of decision is that the proceedings abate
and the judgment falls.
But the general expressions to
this effect employed in the decisions, are to be read in
each case in the light of the facts w^hich are there disclosed.
Here the wise admonition of Chief Justice Marshall in
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 399, (5 L. Ed. 257), applies
with peculiar force: ''It is a maxim not to be disregarded,
that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken
in connection with the case in which those expressions are
If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
used.
but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit,
when the very point is presented for decision.
The reason of this maxim is obvious.
The question before the
court is investigated with care and considered in its full
extent, and other principles which may serve to illustrate
are considered in their relation to the case decided, but
their possible bearing on all the other cases
seldom comIn every case where, after judgpletely investigated."
ment, the proceeding has been declared to be "pending"
there will be found a direct appeal from the judgment,
which direct appeal either suspended the judgment so that
was not final and enforceable, or, as in Schooner General
Pinhiey v. United States, U. S. 281,
L. Ed. 101), worked
removal of the cause to the appellate court, where
was
to be tried de novo.
The reason given why the proceeding must abate under these circumstances
that, because
of the suspension of the judgment by appeal,
without
finality; that to give
finality the court of appeals must
itself pronounce its judgment, and that in pronouncing its
judgment
must be governed by the existing law. Therea

it

it

T. p.— 50

is

it

is

a

it

(3

9

it

is

it,

case
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fore, when it finds that by the existing law the previous law,
under which alone validity could be given to the judgment, has been repealed, the sole prop and foundation for
support of the judgment has been removed, and of necesNo case, however,
sity it must be declared null and void.

a

a

it

is

it

is

(3

a

a

is

a

is

is is

a

:

a

is

is

a

a

it

it,

has been found, and we venture to say none can be found,
where a judgment which has been affirmed after direct appeal, and has by such affirmance become final during the
existence of the statute supporting
where the judgment
itself has been in the process of execution within the law,
and where rights have arisen by virtue of this legal execution of the judgment, has ever been held to be destroyed
because the colrepeal of the statute supporting
by
lateral proceeding of an appeal from an order denying
pending without supersedeas or stay-bond.
new trial
And to this consideration we now come.
* * *
In Harris v.Banihart, 97 Cal 5^6, {32'PaG.5S9),
discussed and the conclusions of the court
the matter
A motion for new trial,
may be summarized as follows
in the absence of an order of the court to that effect, does
final judgment. An
not stay or suspend the operation of
action, under section 1049 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
to be deemed pending while an appeal from the judgment
pending, or until the time for such an appeal has expired, but when the judgment upon appeal has been determined by an affirmance of the judgment, or when the time
admissible in evifor appeal has expired, the judgment
in bar of
an
estoppel
to
raise
dence as res adjudicata and
pending
The same ruling as to the effect of
the action.
judgment
new trial upon the finality of
motion for
Am.
St. Rep.
declared in Young v. Brelie, 19 Nev. 379,
rule
of
the
intimated
soundness
892, 12 Pac. 564), and the
bv the supreme court of the United States in Euhhell v.
United States, 171 U. S. 203, (18 Sup. Ct. 828, 43 L. Ed..
may well be doubted
said: ''Indeed,
136), where
new trial would inwhether the pendency of motion for
terfere in any way with the operation of the judgment as

estoppel."
said: ''Under
Tn Spnnagal v. Bellinger, 38 Cal. 284,
our system, from the entry of the verdict or filing of the
kind of
findings of the court, the motion for new trial
collateral proceeding —
certain sense,
episode, or in
a

a

a

a

is

is

it

an
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proceeding not in the direct line of the judgment; for the
judgment may be at once entered and even executed, while
a motion for a new trial is pending in an independent line
of proceeding, which ends in an order renewable on an inThe motion may be heard and decided
dependent appeal.
and an ap])eal taken on its own independent record, while
the proceedings on and subsequent to the judgment may
be still regularly going on, and even an independent appeal taken in that line." And this language is quoted with
approval by this court in the later case of Brison v. Brison,
90 Cal. 323, (27 Pac. 186); while to the same effect is
Houser d Haines Co. v. Hargrove, 129 Cal. 90, (61 Pac.
660), and Knoivles v. Thompson, 133 Cal. 247, (65 Pac.
A broad difference exists between the operation
468).
and legal effect of a direct appeal from a judgment (which,
while the appeal is pending, in the generality of cases operates to stay the- judgment absolutely, and in all cases operates to destroy for it any claim of finality), and the
"collateral proceeding" of an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial taken after the judgment itself has become an enforceable finality by reason of its
In the former case the
affirmance upon direct appeal.
courts, when the law which alone will support the judgment given has been withdrawn, have felt and expressed
themselves as unable to proceed further with the litigation,
since they themselves must pronounce a judgment, and
can pronounce it only under the authority of existing law.
In the case of appeal from an order refusing a new trial
wliere no stay has been granted and where, as here, the
judgment has become a finality, the decision which the
court renders is not upon the judgment appealed from, but
upon the order appealed from, and while the effect of its
reversal of the order will, of course, be necessarily the setting aside of the judgment, this, after all, is but an incident to the ruling which it makes, which ruling goes not
at all to the sufficiency or finality of the judgment, but only
as to whether, within familiar rules and limitations, the
Herein our motion for a
judgment was fairly given.
from
the common-law motion
essentially
new trial differs
which was always heard and determined before entrv of
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judgment,^ so that the appeal from the judgment embraced
all questions.
Under our system, the appeal from an
order denying a new trial is a separate and independent
appeal, which, if prosecuted in time, may be taken after
the judgment has become final.
Excepting when ordered
by supersedeas or permitted by stay-bond, it in no way suspends the judgment nor interferes with its finality.
It is
in this respect more in the nature of an equitable bill of
review which, while countenanced in proper cases, even
after a judgment of affirmance upon appeal, never operated in and of itself to suspend the decree.
Indeed it has
1 The common law rule is in force in several jurisdictions
in the United
States.
Thus in Whitney v. Karner (1878) 44 Wis. 563, the court said:
"The learned circuit judge who heard and decided this motion, seems to have
entertained the opinion that the entry of judgment was no objection to entertaining a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial upon the merits;
and it is quite probable that such opinion prevails to some extent amongst the
circuit judges and members of the bar; but it is in direct conflict with the
decision of this court.
the case of Hogan v. State, [36 Wis. 232], the present learned chief
is certain that at common law, motions for a new trial must
justice says:
be made after verdict and before judgment.
It would be no greater absurdity to move for a new trial at common law before verdict, than after
And in the case of Scheer v. Keown, [34 Wis. 349], Chief Jusjudgment.'
tice Dixon says: 'The practice, as indicated by several cases which have come
before this court, and so far as we understand, has always been, if the party
wishes to move at a subsequent term, on a case or bill of exceptions' made or
settled, to obtain a stay of proceedings, so as to prevent the entry of judgment until after the motion could be heard and determined.'
would seem to be irregular to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict
and for a new trial after judgment entered, at the term at which the same was
entered, unless such motion was joined with a motion to vacate the judgment
also. ' '
But the better rule seems to be the contrary, permitting the motion to be
Thus in Woodward Iron Co. v.
made regularly after judgment entered.
Brown (1910) 167 Ala. 316, 52 So. 829, the court said: "Common law courts
have inherent power to grant new trials, and at common law the judgment
was not rendered until the motion for new trial was disposed of (29 Cyc.
722, 727), but the usage in our courts and others is to enter the judgment
when the verdict is returned, and the party has during the term of the court
The effect of the motion is to suspend
to make the motion for a new trial.
the judgment until the motion is disposed of, and if it is granted, it 'wipes
out the verdict; no judgment can be rendered on it.'
Hilliard on New

"In

'It

"It

Trials,

p.

59."

Conklin v. Hinds (1871) 16 Minn. 457, the court said: "But the statute
gives the right to move for a new trial upon the report of the referee or decision of the judge, and allows no opportunity to make such motion before
The party aggrieved must therefore necessarily have the right
judgment.
to make it after judgment."
In some jurisdictions, by reason of statutes, no proceeding for a new trial
Thus in McTntyre v. MacGinniss (1910)
can be instituted before judgment.
41 Mont. 87, 108 Pac. 353, the court said: "Proceedings on the motion for a
new trial were first instituted by MacGinniss by serving his notice of intenThese protion after the decision was made, but before entry of judgment.
Under the statute, a i>arty intending to move for
ceedings were premature.
a new trial may do so by serving his notice within ten days after the notice
of entry of judgment, but not before.
(Revised Codes, sec, C796.)

In

"
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tliis court in Foivden Admr.

Cal. 151, 154, (86 Pac. 178).
We conclude, therefore, that as the judgment had be^'ome final wliile the statute authorizing the action was in
force, its finality is not disturbed by a pending motion for
a new trial which does not operate in any way to stay the
execution of the judgment; that as the statute authorizes
the people upon the relation of the attorney-general to proceed in equity to have the bank declared insolvent, leaving
the proceedings governing the action those which generally obtain in the practice of this state, the repeal of the
statute did not destroy the right of the appellant to be
heard upon this motion for a new trial ; that if the appeal
from the motion for a new trial should be granted, it would
necessarily hav.e the effect of vacating the judgment, and
that by virtue of the repeal the action could then no longer
be prosecuted; that if, however, the appeal from the order
denying the motion for a new trial should be denied and
the order affirmed, the repeal of the statute would not affect any proceeding taken under it and under the judgment
heretofore affirmed.
149

**********

Wherefore the motion to vacate and annul the judgment
and dismiss the proceedings is denied, and the order denying defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed.
Shaw, J., Lorigan, J.. Melvin, J., and Sloss, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.

SEWAED V. CEASE.
Supreme

Court of Illinois.
50

Illinois,

Mr. Justice Lawrence
Court

It

1869.

228.

delivered

the opinion of the

:

is very seldom that a court of chancery will interfere
to grant a new trial at law, though its jurisdiction to do so
In this case, a bill was filed for that puris undoubted.
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pose, and the case having been heard on a motion to dis
miss the bill, the relief prayed was refused.
We are of
opinion, however, that the motion shonld have been overruled, and if, after the canse is at issue and proofs taken,
the case made by the bill is sustained, a new trial should
For the present, we must take the allegabe awarded.
tions of the bill as true, and they show, not merely that
the only evidence upon which the judgment at law was obtained was false, but that the witness who gave it has voluntarily made an affidavit of its falsity before a magistrate,
stating his desire to retract the same, and this affidavit is
made an exhibit with the bill.
This, then, is not a case of
An unrighteous judgment has been
conflicting evidence.
obtained upon perjured testimony, and the perjury is
shown, not by uncertain admissions of the perjurer, but by
his own oath voluntarily made for the purpose of repairA stronger case could hardly arise.
ing his wrong.
The
motion to dismiss should have been overruled, and the defendant required to answer.
After the answer is filed and
the cause is at issue, it will be incumbent on the complainant to take the testimony of the witness, when the defend
ant will have an opportunity of cross-examining, and if the
witness adheres to the statements of his affidavit, and there
is no evidence he has been subjected to corrupt influences,
the court will award a new trial.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded.
Decree reversed}
1 ' ' Applications to courts
of chancery, for the purpose of granting new
trials at law, and the interposition of the Chancellor, whenever a proper
case is made out, may be warranted as well upon the score of principle as of

precedent.

"An injunction to f-tny jtroceedings upon an unjust judgment, and for a
new trial, is a remedy recognized and approved by courts of equity.
These
remedies are to l)e enforced under the operation of established forms and
rules of proceeding, instituted as they are for th- development of truth and
justice.
"Anciently, courts of equity exercised a familiar jurisdiction over trials at
law, and compelled the successful party to submit to a new trial, or to be
perpetually enjoined from proceeding on his verdict.
(Floyd v. Jayne, 6
John. Ch. Eep. 479.)
"But this practice, except in cases the most extraordinary, has long since
gone out of use; because courts of law are now competent to grant new
trials, and are in the constant exercise of that right to a most liberal extent.
Anciently, courts of law did not grant new trials; and in those days, courts
of equity exercised that jurisdiction over trials at law, and compelled the successful party to submit to a new trinl when justice required it.
But, even
in that age, the Court of Chancery proceeded with great caution.
A new
trinl was never rrrnnted. unless the application
was founded upon some
clear case of fraud or injustice, or upon some newly discovered evidence,
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or industry of his, have

' '
In general, where it would have been proper for a court of law to have
granted a new trial, if the application had been made while that court had
for a court of equity to grant a new
1 ower to do so, it is equally proper
trial, if the application be made on grounds arising after the court of law
ceased to have power to act.
' '
The general rule is, that courts of chancery will not interfere after verdict and judgment at law, except in cases of fraud, or in extraordinary
cases
where manifest injustice would be done; nor where the party might have defended himself fully at law and neglected it.
Great abuse would be made
of a contrary doctrine, by drawing within the jurisdiction of equity, as by a
side wind, almost all causes decided at law.
The high powers intrusted to
Chancery, to promote the purposes of justice, should not be abused to the
solemn decisions of other courts,
vexation of citizens, and the unsettling
where it is always to be presumed that full justice has been done."
3 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 1455 et seq.
For a further discussion of this subject see: Black on Judgments, $ 357;
Freeman on Judgments, § 485; 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, $ 1365;
Yancy v. Downer (1824) 5 Littell (Ky.) 8, 15 Am. "Dec. 35; Wynne v. Newman's Adm'r (1881') 75 Va. 811; Kansas & Arkansas Valley R. R. Co. v.
Fitzhugh (1895) 61 Ark. 341, 33 S. W. 960.
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MEMPHIS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY
JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

V.

1905.

114 Tennessee, 632.

Mr. Justice Shields delivered

opinion of the Court.
by W. B. Johnson against the
the

This action is brought
Memphis Street Railway Company to recover damages for
personal ini'iiries sustained by him, through the negligence
of the defendant, while plaintiff was a passenger on one of
its cars.
The case was submitted to a jury, and a verdict found
The motion of the defendant for a new
for the plaintiff.
The defendtrial was overruled, and judgment entered.
bill
this
of
exceptions
a
of
to
action
the court,
ant tendered

which was signed and filed, and the case is now before us
upon appeal in the nature of a writ of error.
The errors assigned are predicated upon the refusal of
the trial judge to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant
the defendant a new trial because of the admission of cer-
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tain evidence offered by the plaintiff over the objection of
the defendant, and his refusal to give in charge to the
jury certain written instructions submitted by counsel for
the railway company at the conclusion of the charge in
chief.

For the defendant in error it is insisted that these

ascourt be-

signments of error cannot be considered by this
cause the errors complained of were not properly set out
and relied upon as grounds for a new trial in the motion
made by the plaintiff in error in the trial court for that
purpose, as required by a rule of that court, and passed
upon by the presiding judge.
The rule of the circuit court of Shelby county in relation
to motions for new trials, which is in the record, requires
all grounds upon which a new trial is asked to be stated
and set out separately in a written motion and entered
upon the minutes of the court; and all errors not so set
out are presumed to be waived, and will not be considered
on the hearing of the motion.
The plaintiff in error attempted to comply with this rule,
and the grounds for a new trial upon which these assignments are based are stated in its motion in these words :
''(1) For error in the admission and exclusion of evidence.

The court erred in refusing the special instructions asked by the defendant."
The jurisdiction of this court is exclusively appellate,
and it can only pass upon matters which the record shows
have been considered and adjudged by the trial court from
The errors reviewed
which the case has been appealed.
and .corrected by it are of two classes : Those which appear upon the face of the record proper, as erroneous rulings in sustaining or overruling motions, and demurrers
challenging the sufficiency of pleadings; and errors committed in allowing or overruling motions for new trials upon
grounds brought into the record by bills of exceptions, as
for improperly refusing a continuance, the admission of
incompetent evidence, or the rejection of competent evidence, error in instructing the jury, or refusing further instructions seasonably requested in proper form, for want
of evidence to sustain the verdict, or other similar ground.
It does not act directly upon errors of the latter class,

''(2)
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which are not a part of the record without a bill of exceptions, but upon the action of the trial judge for refusing a
new trial because of such errors committed by him, or other^vise occurring in the progress of the case, as they may
be waived or corrected before verdict.
Therefore, before
the jurisdiction of this court can be invoked and refief had
on account of errors of the second class, they must be considered and acted upon by the trial judge in the disposition of a motion made by the losing party to set aside the
verdict of the jury and allow him a new trial.
Another
reason why all errors which may affect the integrity of the
verdict should be brought to the attention of the trial
judge in a motion for a new trial is that he may have an
opportunity to correct them, if necessary, by granting a
new trial, and thus save the inconvenience, delay, and expense attending appellate proceedings.

**********

We are now to determine whether or not the grounds
upon which these assignments of error are predicated are
sufficiently set out in the motion for a new trial.
It seems
to be well settled that the statement of the grounds in the
motion must be sufficient to direct the attention of the court
and opposing counsel to the error or irregularity relied
upon to vitiate the verdict.
In the work on Pleading & Practice last quoted from, it
is further said: ^'The general rule is that the grounds (for
a new

trial) must

be stated so specifically

as to direct the
attention of the court and opposing counsel to the precise
A mere statement of the grounds,
error complained of.
without further specifications, will therefore be insufficient.
The purpose of the rule is to direct the attention of the
trial judge to the alleged erroneous rulings, and present to

tlie appellate court the precise question involved.
The
safest course is to assign each error with the same particularity of an assignment of error in appeal. * * * But
this is not the practice in most of the States; the courts
holding that it is sufficient merely to assign error in giving: a certain construction or admitting certain e\'idence,
without stating why such ruling was erroneous.
If the
grounds for a new trial are not stated in the motion, it may
be overruled by the court, and disregarded on appeal. All
errors known at the time of filing the motion must be in-
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eluded therein, or the errors omitted will be deemed to have
been waived."
Ency. of Plead. & Prac., vol. 14, pp. 882,
883.

Mr. Elliott, in his work above cited (volume

2,

section

991),^ says: "The law presumes the verdict to be correct.
Hence on a motion for a new trial the party must set forth
the grounds upon which he intends to rely, or the objections will be considered as waived.
The motion should be
in writing, and should specify with reasonable certainty
all the rulings deemed to be erroneous.
It is to be kept in
mind that it is the objections specified in a motion, and
those only, that are brought up for review, for all others
properly arising on a motion for a new trial are deemed to
be waived.
It is on a motion — as it is written — that the
appellate court acts, for, as to objections not properly presented, the presumption is in favor of the regularity and
legality of the rulings of the trial court.
It is the business
of the party who takes exceptions to show that the decision
is wrong.
It is not sufficient that he succeeds in mystifying it by adopting language which subjects the judge to the
suspicion that he did not understand the safest ground on
which to place it.
In order to show that rulings are
wrong it must appear that they were probably injurious to
the party who makes complaint, since a mere harmless error will not warrant a reversal."
The text in both of these works, which are of the highest
authority, is supported by numerous decisions of other
States, many of which are predicated upon the general
rules of practice of courts of law.
"We are of the opinion that the grounds set out in the motion should be as specific and certain as the nature of the
Thus, if the error conerror complained of will permit.
sists in the admission or rejection of evidence, the evidence
If it be for affiradmitted or rejected should be stated.
mative error in the charge, or for failure to give an instruction properly and reasonably presented, it should set
out the portion of the charge complained of, or the instruction refused, or otherwise definitely identify the instrucIf it be for misconduct of the opposite party or that
tion.
of the jury, the facts constituting it should be stated. This
The testimony admitted and
was not done in this case.
1

Elliott

on

General

Practice.
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that excluded is not stated — not even the name of the witness given — and the instructions requested are not set out
or sufficiently identified.
We do not think that it is necessary to state why the ruling complained of is erroneous as fully and with all the
strictness required in assignments of error in this court,
hut a fair statement of the error complained of, sufficient
to direct the attention of the court and the prevailing pariy
required.
all that
to
Nor was necessary for the successful party in the court
lielow to there object to the form of the motion, because
rules of this character are made in the interest of the public, and for the purpose of enabling the courts to speedily
and correctly dispose of the cases pending in them, and
they cannot be waived by litigants.
We are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds for
new trial because of the admission of incompetent or rejecfailure to give in charge
tion of competent testimony, or
to the jury instructions submitted by the defendant, were
in the circuit court, and
stated in the motion made by
that there
therefore nothing upon which these assignments of error on the action of the trial judge in refusing
new trial can be predito set aside the verdict and grant
cated and, under the practice of his court, in cases coming
from those courts having rules like that in this record, not
to consider the assignments of error upon any ground not
appearing in the motion for new trial, these assignments
of error are insufficient, and must be overruled.
The other assignments of error filed by the plaintiff in
error were disposed of in an oral opinion.

Supreme

Court
206

J.

*

The motion for

*

a

W()()l)S0^^

V. GILSON.
of

KING

Missouri.

1907,

Missouri, 264.

*

new trial was filed on March 27, 1906,
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and one of the grounds assigned therefor is in words as

follows

:

Because, since the trial of this cause, the defendants have discovered new and important evidence material
to the issues submitted to the jury, which evidence is not
cumulative in character and which evidence was unknown
to defendants at the time of the trial.''
On the same daj^ the court granted defendants ten days
in which to tile affidavits in support of motion for new
trial; and within that time they filed the affidavits of Dr.
Waterhouse, Arthur Marshall, Edward Unwin and J. H.
Orr, one of the attorneys for the defendants, the three latter stating what diligence they had used in trying to discover all the witnesses and evidence in the case.
The plaintitfs contend that the action of the court in
granting a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence was erroneous.
The motion for new trial does not disclose or set out the
newly-discovered evidence or its nature, nor does it give
the names or addresses of the witnesses by whom the newly-discovered evidence was to be given, nor was there any
•affidavit filed with the motion.
'
The motion simply states that, ''since the trial of this
cause, the defendants have discovered new and important
evidence material to the issues submitted to the jury, which
evidence is not cumulative in character, and which evidence was unknown to the defendants at the time of the
**11.

trial."

has been before this court repeatedly, and
new to be said upon it.
State v. David, 159 Mo. 1. c. 535, this court
trial was also asked upon the ground of
evidence, but the evidence was not set
newly-discovered
The mere fact, asserted in the motion,
out in the motion.
that the newly-discovered evidence was material, did not
It should have been set out in order
prove it to be so.
For these
that the court might pass upon its materiality.
reasons, besides others unnecessary to mention, this question cannot be considered by this court."
And in the case of State v. Welsor, 117 Mo. 1. c. 582, the
laAV applicable to this question was stated in the following
"In the case of State v. Ray, 53 Mo. 349, Judge
language:

This question
there is nothing
In the case of
said: ''A new
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Sherwood, in delivering the opinion of the court, says :
*In the State v. McLaughlin, 27 Mo.
this court adopts,
with most cordial approval, the rules as laid down in
Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, by Judge Lumpkin, in respect to
new trials, on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, as
follows: ''The application must show, first, that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; second,
that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it
did not come sooner; third, that it is so material that it
would probably produce a different result if the new trial
were granted; fourth, that it is not cumulative; fifth, that
the affidavit of the"witness, himself, should be produced, or
its absence accounted for; sixth, that the object of the testimony is not merely to impeach the character or credit of
'
a witness."
See, also, to the same eifect, State v. Rockett, 87 Mo. 666 ; State v. Butler, 67 Mo. 63 ; State v. Carr,
1 Fost. (N. H.) 166."
In the case at bar, the affidavits were not filed in support of and in proof of the newly-discovered evidence
stated in the motion for a new trial, because, for the very
obvious reason, there was no such evidence stated therein ;
but the object and purpose in filing them was to bring the
evidence itself and not the proof thereof to the attention of
The law requires such evidence to be set out
the court.
in the motion; and the mere fact that it is so stated does
not prove it to be true, and for that reason its truthfulness
is required to be established by affidavits.
But here the
defendants are trying to make the affidavits serve a twofold purpose; first, a ground for a new trial, and, second,
This
proof of the statements constituting that ground.
done.
The
motion
for
a
new
trial
be
must
be
filed
cannot
within four days after the trial, and the court has no power
If the evidence is set out
to extend the time for filing it.
in the motion, then this court has repeatedly held that the
trial court may give the parties time in which to file affidavits in support thereof.
The defendants state in their motion that they have discovered new evidence; that it was material to the issues;
that it was not cumulative, and that if admitted in evidence
probably a different result would be reached if a new trial
If tliey knew such evidence existed at the
was granted.
time the motivon wfis written, why did they not incorporate

Ill,
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it,

it into the motion and later file the affidavits in support
thereof?
If such a practice as is contended for in this case was
permissible, it would enable the parties to supplement and
add to their motion for a new trial after the expiration of
the four days allowed for filing
and thereby open the
door to temptation and fraudulent conduct in bolstering
up motions for new trials.
[Affirmed on other grounds.]

Court

6

Supreme

of

RUTHERFORD

Wade, C.

V.

TALENT.

Montana Territory.

1887,

Montana, 112.

J.

a

a

a

a

a

a
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motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that
new trial was given, and
no sufficient notice of motion for
new trial was filed.
that no motion for
The Code, section 287, provides that the party intending
new trial must file with the clerk, and serve
to move for
notice of his intention, designatupon the adverse party,
ing the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and
whether the same will be made upon affidavits, minutes of
the court, bill of exceptions, or
statement of the case.^
This

a

is

a

2.

1.

a

a

a

a

is

is

4,
§

1.

a

1

Various methods have been devised by which the data necessary for the
determination of
motion for
new trial may be presented to the court.
The minutes of the court may be ui^ed.
These being deemed already in
existence and before the court, a party moving upon them is required to prepare no abstract or statement of the proceedings in the case, upon which to
base his claim for relief.
5090, Comp.
"The term 'minutes of the court,' as used in subdivision
evidently used in
Laws, seems to have no well-defined legal meaning, but
that section a;i referring to such minutes as the judge may make of the eviof the same, and
evidently intended to redence, and to his recollection
statement or bill of
lieve a partj from the expense and labor of preparing
new trial upon the minutes
To require the party moving for
exceptions.
transcript of the stenographer's notes, and cause
of the court to procure
greater burden than
the same to be filed, would, in effect, impose upon him
Bistad v. Shanklin, 11 S. D.
preparing a bill of exceptions or statement."
It muy he mnde upon a hill of (Xeeptions or statement of the case.
statement of the evidence and other proceedings had upon
By this means
written
the trial, bo far as material to the questions raised by the motion,
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:

''Said motion will be made and based upon the following grounds:
"1. That the findings or decision of the court is against
the law and the evidence.
"2. Errors of law occurring at the trial, and then and
there duly excepted to by the defendant, to wit : The court
erred in sustaining plaintiff's motion to strike out the evidence of Patrick Talent, the defendant, including the letters of defendant to plaintiff, and plaintiff's letters to defendant ; the court erred in refusing to allow defendant to
prove that he was the trustee of the property mentioned in
the deeds from Adam Rutherford to defendant and from
defendant to plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was the sole
Said motion will be made
beneficiary of said property.
and based upon the minutes of the court, the statement of
the case, and bill of exceptions."
There was a statement of the case, and it was stipulated
by the attorneys of the respective parties that the statement might be used on the motion for a new trial.
If this notice was defective in not making known whether

the motion for a new trial would be made upon affidavits,
minutes of the court, bill of exceptions, or statement of the
'Case, as required by the statute, this stipulation that the
statement of the case might be used on the hearing of such
motion would cure the defect.
The office of the notice is to inform the adverse party of
the grounds of the motion, and the errors relied on for obThe notice in question performs that
taining a new trial.
office.
It sufficiently designates the errors complained
of, and the adverse party, by his own agreement, has stipulated that the statement of the case might be used upon
the consideration of the questions raised by the motion for
He is not, therefore, in a situation to coma new trial.
plain that the notice does not give him all the information
that the law provides that he shall have.
out at larpe, ami Fettled as correct by the attorneyp or the court, and thereupon such statement becomes the exclusive source of information as to Tvhat
took place upon the trial, and the sole foundation for the motion so far as it
relates to the trial itself.
This method is to be employed when
3.
It may he made vpnn affidavits.
at the trial are to be brought to the attenmatters outside the proceedingrs
It is commonly used in couion of the court as a basis for the relief asked.
paction with, and supplementary to, the other two methods.
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If

the notice designates the grounds npon which tlie motion for a new trial can be based, it is not necessary to
make a formal, written motion, repeating the errors assigned in the notice.
If this notice
A motion is an application for an order.
is what the law requires, and has been duly served on the
adverse party, no formal, written application, in addition
to the notice, is necessary in order to bring the motion for
a new trial to a hearing.
The notice is the only written motion required by the
statute, and we know of no rule of court requiring such
motion to be in writing.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.

Section

14.

Affidavits.

VOSE V. MAYO.
United States Circuit Court for the District of
1871.
Maine.
3

Clifford,

484.

Clifford, Circuit Justice.

verdict before judgment and grant
a new trial is vested in the circuit courts "in cases where
Power to set aside

a

there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new
trials have usually been granted in the courts of law," and
the correct mode of applying to the court for the exercise
of that power is by a motion for new trial, which, under the
rules of the circuit 'COurt in this circuit, must be made in
writing, and must, unless the time is enlarged by leave of
Such
the court, be filed within two days after the verdict.
a motion must assign the reasons for the application, and
when the motiou is grounded on facts not within the knowledge of the providing justice, and not appearing in his minutes, it must be verified by affidavit, unless the requirement
is waivod by the opposite party. No affidavit of merits,
however, is required wlicn the motion is properly addressed
to the minutes of the presiding justice, as wliere the motion is to set aside the verdict for error of ruling in admit-
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ting or rejecting evidence, or for refusing to instruct the
as requested, or for misdirection, or because the verdict is against law, or against the evidence or the weight
of the evidence, as the theory of the motion in all sucli
that all the matters of fact alleged in the motion
cases
are within the knowledge of the presiding justice, or that
they may be verified by reference to his minutes taken at
Where the motion
for new trial on account
the trial.
where the motion
discovered
or
newly
evidence,
of
grounded on the charge that tlie oj^posite party or the jury
jwere guilty of misconduct in respe^ct to the trial, the rule
prelimidifferent, as the motion in such cases presents
nary question whether the facts and circumstances disthe duty of the court to order
closed are such as to make
notice to the opposite party, and to direct the mode in
which the proofs shall be taken, and in all such 'Cases the
motion must be in writing, and must, unless the requireJohnson v.
ment
waived, be supported bv affidavit.
Root (Case No.
409); Hill. New Trials, 393, sec. 35;
Macy V. De Wolf (Case No.
933).
8,

7,

is

it

a

is

is

is

is,

jury

Supreme

Court
58

Sullivan,

J.

V. TAYLOE.
of

DEAPEE

Nebraska.

1899.

Nebraska, 787.
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Immediately after the court announced its findings and
rendered its decree Draper and King, each for himself,
new trial based in part on
claim of
motion for
filed
Each motion was supported
newly-discovered evidence.
representing the parties
attorney
by the affidavit of the
and was in substance the same as the affidavit previously
Both
filed in support of the motion to re-open the 'Cause.
Draper
assigns this action of
motions were overruled, and
contention
His
that he made
for
error.
the court
showing of newly-discovered evidence which ought to have
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procured for him a new trial of the issue.
Without deciding whether there was a sufficient showing of diligence,
and without discussing the character of the new evidence
and its probable influence as a factor in another trial, we
think the district court made no mistake in refusing to vacate its decree.
It^is our understanding of the rule that
not only must counsel_uot have kuown of the evidence upon
which the application is based, but the applicant himself
must have been ignorant of its existence.
To be sure the
affidavit states that ''neither defendants nor their counsel,
*
*
*
were
by reason of the nature of the evidence,
able sooner to discover said evidence," and "because
knowledge of the existence thereof could be but very indefinitely known to any of the parties to the action except
No affidavit was filed by Draper or King,
the plaintiff."
and how their attorney could know that they were ignorant
of the facts set out in his affidavit is something we are not
At best his statement in requite able to comprehend.
gard to the matter is the merest hearsay.
(14 Ency. PI.
& Pr. 823; Hilliard, New Trials (2d ed.) 499; State v. Kellerman, 14 Kan. 135 ; Broat v. Moor, 4:4: Minn. 468 ; State v.
There should also have been preCampbell, 115 Mo. 391.)
sented in support of the motion the affidavit of the new witness stilting the facts to which he would testify, or there
should liave been a satisfactory reason given for not ob.taining such affidavit.
{Hand v. Langland, 67 la. 185;
Quinn v. State, 123 Ind. 59 ; McLeod v. Shelly Mfg. Co.,
108 Ala. 81; 14 Ency. PI. & Pr. 825).

s

UA

PHILLIPS V. ETIODE ISLAND COMPANY.

r

JL ^Q

Aij^/Vc

Supreme

Court of Rhode Island.
32

^ V\^\

J.

JOHNSOI^,
This is an action

1910.

Rhode Island, 16.

of the case, brought by Samuel PhilIsland Company, to recover damThe
Rhode
lips against
ages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained
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through the negligence of the defendant company in the
operation of one of its street cars.
On April 21st, 1905, the plaintiff was driving a heavy
wagon, loaded with oats, drawn by one horse, and was proceeding in an easterly direction from Promenade street
across Canal street into Steeple street, in the city of ProviCanal street running north and south intersects
dence.
Steeple street running east and west, and Promenade street
runs into Canal street nearly opposite Steeple street. The
defendant company had a single track running through
Steeple street into Canal street, which track, just before
reaching the intersection with Canal street, curved in a
southerly direction towards the corner of Steeple and
Canal streets and extended across Canal street.
At the
time in question the plaintiff's wagon, going in an easterly
direction, had just crossed the tracks in Canal street — fifteen or twenty feet westerly from the crosswalk at the foot
of Steeple street — in order to proceed easterly on the
Near the crosswalk on
^,outherly side of Steeple street.
Steeple street his wagon came in contact with a car of the
defendant company which came down Steeple street towards Canal street, and the plaintiff was thrown to the
ground and sustained the injuries complained of.
The
case was tried in the Superior Court with a jury on th€
21st, 24th, and 25th days of January, 1910, and a verdict
was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-five
Thereupon the defendant moved for a
hundred dollars.
new trial, alleging as grounds therefor:

Fourth : That certain members of the jury before whom
said cause was tried were guilty of misconduct in this, that
during the progress of said trial, and without the consent
of the court, without the knowledge and consent of the attorneys for the defendant, did take an unauthorized view
of the premises where the accident occurred, concerning
which said action was brought and prosecuted.
That certain members of said jury during the
Fifth :
progress of said trial did take an unauthorized view of the
premises where the accident occurred, concerning which
said action was brought and prosecuted, without the knowledge and consent of the defendant, and under such circum-
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stances as to be calculated to lead a jury into error in the
determination of said case.
Certain affidavits were filed by the defendant in support of said motion.
The defendant's motion for a new
trial was denied by the justice who presided at the trial,
and the case is now before this court on the defendant's
bill of exceptions.
The exceptions pressed by the defendant are to the denial of its motion for a new trial upon the several grounds
stated therein, the other exceptions stated in the bill being
waived.

From an examination

of the evidence, which was conjury was not justified in returning a verdict for the plaintiff, or that the

flicting:,

we are not able to say that the

damages are excessive.
Upon the question of unauthorised views alleged to have
been taken by two of the jurors, the affidavit of one juror
was introduced stating that in coming from the restaurant
where he had been to dinner, he paced the distance from the
'•estaurant to the corner of Canal street, and measured in
liis mind the distance from the south ^curbing on Steeple
street to the car track and thought it was not enough for a
car and team to pass.
An affidavit was also introduced
stating that another juror had told the affiant that he, said
jnror, on Monday, January 24th, went alone to the place
of the accident, to see how near his eye measurement would
come to that stated in court; that he walked down Steeple
street, on the south side of the street, and as he was walking along he thought in his own mind that the distance
from Allen & Northup's restaurant to the corner of Canal
street was about what was stated in court ; that as he was
walking towards the corner of Canal street he had a good
view of the space from Steeple street south curbing to the
car track, and thought in his own mind that the distance
was less than that stated in court; that he thought it would
be a close squeeze for a car and team to pass each other
when tlie car was on the curve; that he thought in his own
mind tiiat if the car was on the straight track on Steeple
This
street that the team could have passed all right.
juror, by his affidavit on file, denied making the statements
attributed to him by said affiant, and stated that the only
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view he had of the place of the accident was when the jury
took a view, January 21, 1910.

It

is well settled in this State that the affidavits of jurymen as to what takes place in the juryroom are inadmissible to impeach their verdict.
In TticAer v. Town Council of South Kingstoivn, 5 E. I. 558, 560, the court, speaking
by Ames, C. J., said: ''The affidavits of the jury-men as to
what took place in the jury-room, or as to the grounds upon
which they found their verdict, and which were read de
bene at the hearing,. must be rejected; a rule of policy, well
settled both in England and in this country, excluding, for
the security of verdicts, this mode of impeaching them. ' '
The general rule that the affidavits of jurors as to their
own misconduct during the trial are inadmissible to impeach their verdict is, we think, supported by the great
weight of authority both in this country and in England.
In Owen v. Warhiirton, 4 Bos. & Pull. 326, where the affidavit of a jur^Tnan, that the verdict was decided by lot,
was offered, Mansfield, Ch. J. (pp. 329-330), said: "We
have conversed with the other judges upon this subject,
and we are all of the opinion that the affidavit of a juryman
cannot be received.
It is singular that almost the only
evidence of which the case admits should be shut out ; but,
considering the arts which might be used if a contrary rule
were to prevail, we think it necessary to exclude such eviIf it were understood to be the law that a jur^Tnan
dence.
might set aside a verdict by such evidence, it might sometimes happen that a juryman, being a friend of one of the
parties, and not being able to bring over his companions
to his opinion, might propose a decision by lot, with a view
afterwards to set aside the verdict by his own affidavit, if
In State v. Freethe decision should be against him."
court,
by Hosmer, C. J. (p. 351),
man, 5 Conn. 348, the
has
been
the practice to admit such
state,
it
said: "In this
testimony; but, said Ch. J. Swift (1 Dig. 775.), 'In England, and in the courts of the United States, jurors are not
permitted to be witnesses respecting the misconduct of the
jury; for it is a great misdemeanor; and this is most unquestionably the correct principle; for otherwise, a juror,
who should be disposed to set aside a verdict, would give
information to the party for that purpose; if not so dis-
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posed, he could suppress the information ; and, in that way,
any of the jury could command the verdict. '
"The question before us regards a point of practice;
and as this cannot have any consequences antecedent to
this case, it is competent for the court to decide, unshackled by precedent, and change the rule, if justice re*
*
*
quires it."
the question depended merely on equitable grounds,
as relative to the immediate parties to the suit, the testimony in question, perhaps, ought to be received.
But
there are higher considerations to be resorted to.
On a
principle of policy, to give stability to the verdicts of
jurors, and preserve the purity of trials by jury, the eviThe reasons assigned
dence ought not to be admitted.
by Sir James Mansfield, in Owen v. Warhurton and by Ch.
J. Swift, in his digest, are of great weight. The sanctioning of the testimony of one juror, relative to the misbehaviour of the rest, would open a door to the exercise of
the most pernicious arts, and hold before the friends of one
By this
of the parties, the most dangerous temptation.
capacity of penetrating into the secrets of the jury-room,
an inquisition over the jury, inconsistent with sound policy, as to the manner of their conduct, and even as to the
grounds and reasons of their opinions, maght ultimately be
established, to the injury and dishonour of this mode of
trial; imperfect, undoubtedly, but the best that can be deAnd under the guise of producing equity, there
vised.
might be generated iniquity, in the conduct of the jurors,
more to be depored than the aberration from law, which,
undoubtedly, sometimes takes place.
"The opinion of almost the whole legal world is adverse
to the reception of the testimony in question; and, in my
opinion, on invincible foundations."
In the cases cited supra, the affidavits of the jurors were
Wliere
offered as to their misconduct in the juryroom.
the affidavits of jurors have been offered as to their misconduct outside of the juryroom to impeach their verdict,
the same rule of public policy has generally been applied

"If

Thus in Chadbourn v. Franklin, 5 Gray
by the courts.
312, where defendant moved for a new trial, and in support of the motion offered one of the jurors as a witness to
show that on the Sunday intervening, while the trial was
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juror went to the place where the collision
Dccurred, and examined it for the purpose of informing
i

ii progress, said

himself upon the subject-matter of the trial, and the judge
below ruled that the juror could not be permitted to testify, in support of this motion, to these acts tending to

it-

show his own misconduct, and the defendant excepted, the
court, Shaw, C. J. said: ''The modern practice has been
uniform, not to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict
on the ground of error, mistake, irregularity or misconduct
of the jury, or of any of them, on the testimony of one or
rests, we think, on sound consideramore jurors; and
In Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mass.
tions of public policy."
41, 42, the court, by Morton, C. J. said: ''The same considerations of public policy protect the communications of
jurors with each other, whether in or out of the jury-room,
during the pendency of the case on hearing before them."
See also Commonivealth v. White, 147 Mass. 76, 80.

In Saniiary District

v.

Cullerton,

147

111.

385,

the affi-

a

is

:

'

'

davits of three of the jurors were offered touching tlie conduct of others of the jury, and the bailiff in charge, tending
It was complained that after they
to impeach the verdict.
had finished viewing the premises some of the jurors drank
intoxicating liquor.
This court,
The court, p. 390, said
in an unbroken line of decisions from the case of Forrester
committed to the doctrine that the
V. Guard, Breese, 44,
jurors
can
not
of
affidavits
be received for the purpose of
There may
showing cause for setting aside the verdict.
contrary rule,
be dicta in some of the cases intimating
been
has
before the
but in every case where the question
court, and determined, the principle has been adhered to;"
and again, p. 391: "In trials in the courts of justice not
only should there be absolutely nothing improper permitted, but, to the end that respect for the administration of
the law may be maintained, the very appearance of evil
should be avoided, and the courts are clothed with ample
power to punish, appropriately, the misconduct of jurors,
and of others in their presence, and no court ought to hesitate to impose adequate penalties and set aside verdicts
where there has been conduct by which the jury may have
been improperly influenced, or the verdict has been the reBut to
sult of improper conduct on the part of jurors.
be
heard, showing that
permit the affidavits of jurors to

80B

Teial Peactice

[Chap.

17

verdict to which they, on tlieir oaths, consented, was
the result of improper influence or corrupt practice, 4s
condemned by the clearest principles of justice and public
But few verdicts in important cases would be
policy.'
Litigants, in whose favor verdicts
permitted to stand.
might be rendered, would be placed at the mercy of corLitigation would be increased, the widest
rupt jurors.
door thrown open to fraud and perjury, and the adminis' '
tration of the law brought into contempt.
In Eeldmaier v. Relior, 90 111. App. 96, the court, at p. 98,
said: "Upon motion for a new trial, affidavits were presented, stating that two of the jurors admitted after the
trial, that, during its progress, they examined a stonewagon to ascertain whether the boy could have been rolled

the

under such a wagon as appellee's testimony tended to show
The wagon
This was a controverted point.
he had been.
said to have been so examined was not that by which the injury was inflicted. It is claimed that by reason of such alleged misconduct of the jurors the verdict should have been
set aside. The affidavits purport to show that the jurors expressed themselves after the verdict, as satisfied, from
that there was ample room for the
such examination,
under
These
the platform of such a wagon.
boy's body
jurors
themselves,
the
denot
by
but
are
by
the
affidavits
It is settled law in this state that the
fendant and others.
affidavits of jurors can not be received for the purpose of
Sanitary Disshowing cause for setting aside a verdict.
If
tract V. Cullerton, 147 111. 385, and cases there cited.
affidavits of jurors themselves can not be so received, it
is apparent that affidavits setting forth statements made
by jurors after the close of a trial, must be equally inadIf these affidavits could be considered and were
missible.
to be accepted as stating facts, the judgment of the two
jurors in question would appear to have been influenced
by incompetent evidence which could not have been adThe jury are required to rely on the
mitted at the trial.
evidence introduced in court and are not permitted to obBut to permit the introduction of affitain it outside.
davits to impeach the conduct of jurors upon hearsay statements said to have been made by them, or even upon their
own affidavits, after their connection with the case has terminated and they have been discharged, would open the

New Teials

Sec. 14]

801'

door to endless attacks upon verdicts, invite fraud, and
place litigants at the mercy of jurors dissatisfied, or open

corrupting influences."
In Clark v. Famous Shoe Etc. Co., 16 Mo. App. 463, the
court, p. 467, said: ''We have also examined the defendant's complaint founded on the alleged misconduct of a
That misconduct consisted, as the record shows,
juror.
juror
going to the building where the accident ocof the
curred, after the trial began, inspecting it and making
some measurements, for the purpose, as he says, of verifying the correctness o'f the plats offered in evidence, and of
seeing whether the place was dangerous.
The general
rule undoubtedly is that the triers of the fact should derive
their information from the evidence offered on the trial of
the cause and the law as given to them by the court. They
are sworn to do so and are guilty of misconduct if they vioIf the misconduct of the
late their oaths in that regard.
juror in this case would have been substantiated by anything beyond his own testimony, we would have felt at libit,

to

it

a

it,

a

is

it

and determine whether
erty to consider
was such as to
deprives the plaintiffs who were wholly innocent of the benefit of their verdict.
But the only evidence found in the
record of the alleged misconduct of the juror,
his own
testimony given in court upon the hearing of the motion
for new trial.
This testimony we are not at liberty to
consider, nor should the trial court have considered
because under the rule now prevailing in this state, the testijuror tending to impeach his verdict, can not be
mony of
seems to make no difference in that regard,
received, and
whether the alleged misconduct took place in or out of the

jury-room."

**********

Deacon v. Shreve, 22 N. J. L. 176, the court said, at
page 182: "The principle
now well settled, that generally the affidavits of jurors shall not be received as to what
took place in the jury-room, or elsewhere, to show misbehaviour, or on the delivery of the verdict to show mistake,
for the purpose of correcting or destroying the verdict,
though
seems their affidavits are admissible for the purpose of exculpation.
The rule stands on the ground of
public policy, courts being unwilling to permit
dissatisa

it

is
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fled juror by such means to destroy a verdict to which he
liad given a public assent."

In Doivner
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a

;
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a
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v. Baxter, 30 Vt. 467, after the case had beer
given to the jury, the officer in charge allowed the jury t^
separate, and they went to their respective boarding-houses
for dinner, returning thence to the juryroom and resuming
the consideration of the case.
The affidavits of all the
jurors were read, stating that after they were impanelled
to try the cause they had no conversation with any one
touching
except among themselves.
The court, p. 475,
said: ''An objection was taken to the competency of the
affidavits of the jurors and their admissibility raises
legal question which we are called upon to decide.
We
think the true rule
that the affidavits of jurors may be
readto^^culpate themselves' and sustain their verdict, but
not O-impeach it.
In this case they were offered to show
that the jurors had no conversation with others, nor heard
any in relation to the cause."
In Siemsen v. Oakland, etc., Electric R. Co., 134 Cal. 494,
where an unauthorized view was alleged, the court said, p.
set497; ''However the rule may be in other states,
juror may impeach
tled in this beyond controversy that
his own verdict upon no other ground than that designated
It
sought by respondent,
by the code (citing cases).
distinction between the misupon this motion, to make
juror before retiring, and the misconduct of
conduct of
may be said, in the
juror during retirement but to this
language of Boyce v. California Stage Co., 25 Cal. 463: 'In
conclusion, upon this branch of the case we may add that
line of judicial decisions which struggles to multiply explain and simple rule founded on consideraceptions to
not to be favored on the contions of the wisest policy,
trary, the struggle should be to bring every case within the
rule, lest the rule itself become shadowy, and in time wholly
" See also Pickmultitude of exceptions.'
disappear in
ens V. Boom Co., 58 W. Va. 19; 29 Cyc. 982, 983, and cases
cited: Thompson and Merriam on Juries, sec. 440 and
cases cited.
In some States affidavits of jurors as to their own misconduct outside the juryroom during the trial are adPierce v. Brennan, 83
mitted to impeach their verdict.
Minn. 422; Peppercorn v. Black River Falls, 89 Wis. 38;
^
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V. Bachman, 5 Lea. 153.
In Iowa it has been held
of
jurors
affidavits
that
may be received, for the purpose
^{ avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during
he trial, or in the juryroom, which does not essentially
Wright v. I. £ M. Tel. Co., 20
inhere in the verdict itself.
Iowa, 195. This was a case of misconduct in the juryroom.
This rule has been followed in Kansas, — Perry v. Bailey,
12 Kan. 539.
We are not, however, convinced by the reaWe are of the opinion that the
soning of these cases.
affidavits of jurors as to their own misconduct in or out of
the juryroom during the trial are inadmissible to impeach
tlieir verdict.
The objection on the ground of public policy is just as strong in the one case as in the other.
The
affidavit of the juror in this case was inadmissible as
to his own misconduct in taking an unauthorized view, to
impeach the verdict, and therefore can not be considered.
An affidavit to the declaration of a juror impeaching the
verdict, besides contravening the same rule of policy, is
condemned by the ordinary rule of evidence, excluding
hearsay testimony.
The defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case
is remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter
judgment upon the verdict.

Roller

-^^
MATTOX Y. UNITED STATES.
Supreme

Court of the United States.
146

Jal)
1892.

United States, 140.

This was an indictment charging Clyde Mattox with the
murder of one John Mullen, about December 12, 1889, in
that part of the Indian Territory made part of the United
States judicial district of Kansas by section two of the act
of Congress of January 6, 1883, (22 Stat. 400, c. 13,) entitled "An act to provide for holding a term of the District Court of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and
for other purposes."
Defendant pleaded not guilty, was put upon his trial,
October 5, 1891, and on the eighth of that month was found
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guilty as charged, the jury having retired on the seventh
to consider their verdict.
Motions for a new trial and in
arrest of judgment were severally made and overruled, and
Mattox sentenced to death.
This writ of error was thereupon sued out.

In support of

his motion for new trial the defendant offered the affidavits of two of the jurors that the bailiff
who had charge of the jury in the case after the cause had
been heard and submitted, "and while they were deliberating of their verdict," "in the presence and hearing of the
jurors or a part of them, speaking of the case, said 'After
you fellows get through with this case it will be tried again
down there.
Thompson has poison in a bottle that them
And at another time, in the
fellows tried to give him.'
presence and hearing of said jury or a part of them, referring to the defendant, Clyde Mattox said: 'This is the
third fellow he has killed.' "
The affidavit of another
juror to the same effect in respect of the remark of the
bailiff as to Thompson was also offered, and in addition,
the affidavits of eight of the jurors, including the three just
mentioned, "that after said cause had been submitted to the
jury, and while the jury were deliberating of their verdict,
and before they had agreed upon a verdict in the case, a
certain newspaper printed and published in the city of
Wichita, Kansas, known as The Wichita Daily Eagle, of
the date of Thursday morning, October 8, 1891, was introduced into the jury room ; that said paper contained a
comment upon the case under consideration by said jury,
and that said comment upon said case so under consideration by said jury, was read to the jury in their presence and
hearing; that the comment so read to said jury is found
upon the fifth page of said paper, and in the third column
of said page, and is as follows :

**********

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the

case,

deliv-

ered the opinion of the court.
The allowance or refusal of a new trial rests in the sound
discretion of the court to which the application is addressed, and the result cannot be made the subject of review by writ of error, Bciulerf^on v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11;
Newcomh v. Wood, 97 TJ. S. 581 ; but in the case at bar the
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District Court excluded the affidavits, and, in passing upon
the motion, did not exercise any discretion in respect of
the matters stated therein.
Due exception was taken and
the question of admissibility thereby preserved.

It will

that the jurors did not state what
influence, if any, the communication of the bailiff and the
reading of the newspaper had upon them but confined
their statements to what was said by the one and read from
the other.
In United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366, affidavits of
two jurors were offered in evidence to establish the reading of a newspaper report of the evidence which had been
given in the case under trial, but both deposed that it had no
Mr, Chief Justice Taney, deinfluence on their verdict.
livering the opinion of the court, said: ''The first branch
of the second point presents the question whether the affidavits of jurors impeaching their verdict ought to be received.
It would, perhaps, hardly be safe to lay down any
general rule upon this subject.
Unquestionably such evidence ought always to be received with great caution. But
cases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse them without violating the plainest principles of jusIt
tice.
however, unnecessary to lay down any rule in
this case, or examine the decisions referred to in the arguBecause we are of opinion that the facts proved
ment.
proved by unquestioned testimony, would
by the jurors,
new trial.
There was nothing in the
for
no
ground
be
newspapers calculated to influence their decision, and both
of them swear that these papers had not the slightest inThe opinion thus indicates that
fluence on their verdict."
public policy which forbids the reception of the affidavits,
depositions or sworn statements of jurors to impeach their
verdicts, may in the interest of justice create an exception
to its own rule, while, at the same time, the necessity of
enforced.
great caution in the use of such evidence
is,
however,
recognized distinction between what
There
be established by the testimony of
may
not
may and what
verdict.
jurors to set aside
thus put by Mr. Justice Brewer,
This distinction
speaking for the Supreme Court of Kansas in Perry v.
Bailey, 12 Kans. 539, 545: ''Public policy forbids that
matter resting in the personal consciousness of one juror

a

is a

a

is

a

if

is,

be perceived
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should be received to overthrow the verdict, because being
personal it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives
to the secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of twelve; its tendency is to produce
bad faith on the part of a minority, to induce an apparent
acquiescence with the purpose of subsequent dissent; to
induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the
verdict.
But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the
knowledge of all the jurors ; if one affirms misconduct, the
remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the action
of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for the
eleven may be heard.
Under this view of the law the
affidavits were properly received.
They tended to prove
something which did not essentially inhere in the verdict,
an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not
alone within the personal consciousness of one."
The subject was much considered by Mr. Justice Gray,
then a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, where
numerous authorities were referred to and applied, and
the conclusions announced, "that on a motion for a new
rial on the ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors,
'he evidence of jurors as to the motives and influences
which affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either
But a juryman may
to impeach or to support the verdict.
testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how
So a juryman
far that influence operated upon his mind.
may testify in denial or explanation of acts or declarations
outside of the jury room, where evidence of such acts has
See, also, Ritchie
been given as ground for a new trial."
Driver,
1 Cox (N. J.),
Chews
&
v.
R. 458;
V. Holhrook, 7 S.
166; Nelms v. Mississippi, 13 Sm. & Marsh. 500; Hawkins
V. Netv Orleans Printing Co., 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whitney V. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405 ; Hix v. Drury, 5 Pick. 296.
We regard the rule thus laid down as conformable to
right reason and sustained by the weight of authority.
These affidavits were within the rule, and being material
A brief extheir exclusion constitutes reversible error.
amination will demonstrate their materiality.

**********

The judgment is reversed,

and the cause

remanded to
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United States for the District of
Kansas, with a direction to grant a new trial.
the

the

WOLFGRAM V. TOWN OF SCHOEPKE.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
•123

1904.

Wisconsin, 19.

Action for personal injuries from a hole in a country
highway, left by the town authorities in original construction by merely covering the same with poles.
Special verdict of twenty questions returned by jury, finding all material facts in favor of the plaintiff except that question
No. 16, ''Was plaintiff guilty of any want of ordinary care
which .contributed to injury he received?" was answered
"Yes."
Plaintiff produced affidavits of all twelve jurors
to the effect that all the jurors agreed that plaintiff was
not guilty of any want of ordinary care, and that the insertion of the answer ''Yes" instead of the word "No"
was a mistake.
The foreman, agreeing with these facts,
states that he intended to write answer to the sixteenth
question so as to find that said plaintiff was not guilty of
any want of ordinary care which contributed to his injury.
Upon these affidavits the plaintiff moved, first, that
the answer "Yes" to the sixteenth question be stricken
out, and the answer "No" be inserted in lieu thereof, and
for judgment upon the verdict as so amended, basing the
request also on the contention that there was no evidence
to sustain the affirmative answer to that question.
That
mo+ion was denied, from which denial the plaintiff appeals.
Thereupon plaintiff moved on minutes and said affidavits for a new trial.
Defendant moved to strike out
jurors' affidavits.
The court entered its order reciting
that the motion was based on a mistake in the verdict and
on the lack of support from evidence, whereby it denied defendant's motion to strike out said affidavits, "excepting
that said affidavits be received and considered only as tendina- to show that there was a mistrial by reason of a mistake by the jury in writing the answer to question No. 16,"
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but rejecting said affidavits in as far as they "tend, generally, to impeach or contradict said special verdict." The
court entered further order granting plaintiff's motion to
set aside the verdict and awarding a new trial, no costs beFrom that order the deing imposed on either party.
fendant appeals.
*
*
*
Dodge, J.
*

*

It

is, however, probably true that the new trial was
granted because the court was convinced by the jurors'
affidavits that the written verdict did not express the conclusion of the jury, and that the peril of injustice from entry of judgment for defendant was so great that, in exercise of the discretion vested in him, a new trial ought to be
This view presents the question whether the affihad.
davits of jurors could be received as evidence of the facts
The general rule is very ancient, and often
they state.
reiterated, that the statements of the jurors will not be
received to establish their own misconduct or to impeach

Edmister

Garrison, 18 Wis. 594, 603.
An excellent collection and analysis of decided cases will
From
be found in Woodivard v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453.
this it appears that the early idea was that of secrecy in
their deliberations, and, further, the impropriety of receiving jurors' statements as to their mental processes, whethThis rule, in its
er to impeach or support their verdict.
application, has been subjected to much of refinement and
qualification by different courts, involving conflict of dicta
and of actual decision which it would not be profitable to
The necesreview in detail nor possible to harmonize.
sity of some limitation to the general rule against receiving statements of the jurors is declared in McBean v. State,
In some cases the rule is
83 Wis. 206, 209, 53 N. W. 497.
limited to things which transpire in the jury room or in
court, but it will be found in most of those cases also limited to matters involved in reaching the verdict. This limitation was recognized and applied in Hempton v. State,
111 Wis. 127, 145, 86 N. W. 596; Roman v. State, 41 Wis.
312; Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365, 99 N. W. 593; Peppercorn V. Black River Falls, 89 Wis. 38, 41, 61 N. W. 79;
Mattox V. V. S., 146 U. S. 140, 13 Sup. Ct. 50. _ In line with
the same idea are a number of decisions drawing a distin^ctheir verdict.

v.
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tion between the proceedings involved in reaching and
agreeing upon the verdict and the mere act of expressing
either orally or in writing.
The following cases recog
nize such distinction, and hold that the reasons excludin.L'
jurors' testimon}^ as to their conduct in the former stage
do not exclude their evidence as to what really was the verdict agreed on in order to prove that
has not been correctly expressed, through mistake or otherwise: Cogan v.
Ebden,
Burrows, 383; Roberts v. Hughes,
W.
Mees.
399; Little v. Larrahee,
Greenl. 37; Weston v. Gilmore,
63 Me. 493; Peters v. Fogarty, 55 N. J. Law, 386, 26 Atl.
855; Jackson v. Dickenson, 15 Johns. 309; Dalrymple v.
Williams, 63 N. Y. 361; Hodgkins v. Mead, 119 N. Y. 166,
23 N. E. 559; Capen v. Stoughton, 16 Gray, 364; Pelzer
Mfg. Co. V. Hamburg-B. F. his. Co., 71 Fed. 830.
Several
of these cases were cited with approval of this very distinction in McBean v. State, snpra.
Against their doctrine we find Polhemus v. Heiman, 50 Cal. 438 Murphy v.
S. Dak. 316, 47 N. W. 142, and McKinley v. First
Murphy,
Nat. Ba7ik, 118 Ind. 375, 21 N. E. 36. Of these, the first two
seem to be controlled by local statutes, and are therefore
The Indiana case, however, squarely denot persuasive.
nies the admissibility of jurors' testimony to prove that the
written answer to special question was the reverse of the
This view
based on the rule
agreement in fact reached.
But
that jurors cannot "impeach their own verdict."
own
their
verdict?
That dean attempt to impeach
used.
Is the
pends on the sense in which that word
written paper filed, or the agreement which the jury reach,
We think the latter
what
intended
the verdict?
it.
impeach
former,
cannot
jurors
the
The
say
when we
but the expression or evilike most records or writings,
Hence
may well be
dence of some mental conception.
writing
not
such
that
not
showing
correct
said that
The repudiation of
impeachment of the verdict itself.
mistake,
they fail to exwritten expressions, when, by
concept,
familiar in the
mental
press the intention or
contract when
fails to express
writing
not
law.
that on which tlie minds of the parties met, and courts
freely exercise power to correct mistakes when the proof
leaves no doubt that the real contract was something else.
the
That which derides the rights of parties litigant
T. p.— 52
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Each party is enunanimous agreement of the jurors.
as
results
from
such
that agreement.
judgment
to
titled
Any other is presumptively unjust, and any rule that necessitates it is unreasonable, unless supported by considerations of public policy, or of such danger from opening
the door to investigation that wrong is likely to be done
We are persuaded that
oftener than the right promoted.
the reasons which should exclude a juror from showing
that he made a mistake in reaching his conclusion (see
Murdoch v. Sumner, 22 Pick. 156) do not extend to a showing that the words used in conveying it to the court, or
enrolling it on the records, by mistake of the person uttering
or writing them, fail to express the conclusions reached by
Of course, the showing of the latter fact
all the jurymen.
must be clear beyond peradventure ; at least to warrant a
change in the written verdict and final judgment thereon.
If the slightest doubt lurks in the mind of the court, he
should confine relief to the granting of a new trial, which,
of course, he may always order when there is reasonable
cause to believe that the judgment will do injustice. Some
courts incline to the view that a new trial is the only relief
Little v. Larrahee, supra;
after the jury have separated.
63
Me.
493.
But the clear weight of
Gilmore,
Weston V.
authority is that, upon sufficiently clear showing of the
mistake, and of what was the verdict agreed on and intended to be expressed, the court may substitute a true
expression for the incorrect one, and enter judgment acSee Cogan v. Ehden, supra; Peters v, Fogarcordingly.

Dalrymple v. Williams, supra; Hodgkins v.
Mead, supra; Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Eamhurg-B. F. Ins. Co.,
supra.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly received and considered the affidavits of the jurors in this
case ; that they at least sufficed to satisfy the court of great
danger of injustice being done by entry of judgment in accordance with the written verdict, and therefore justified
him in exercising his discretion to relieve plaintiff from
the predicament in which he stood by awarding him anWliothor such affidavits made so plain a case
other trial.
as to entitle plaintiff to correction of the verdict and
judgment in his favor is a question not open to plaintiff on
Plaintiff might probably have raised it had
this appeal.
ty, supra;
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from motion for new trial and appealed from
in defendant's favor.
When, however, he
made the latter motion, he appealed to the court's discretion to relieve him from the adverse situation which, while
lot due to his fault or mistake, was due neither to any misconduct of the jury nor error of the court.
He had no
absolute right to such relief, but merely to have the court
exercise a judicial discretion whether it ought to be accorded him.
The situation does not fall within any of
those where it is held proper to grant the relief without
terms, under the authorities on the subject above cited.
We are brought to the conclusion, therefore, that the court
committed no error in awarding new trial; but, whether it
he refrained
a judgment

was granted because the verdict, as filed, was against the
weight of evidence or was impugned by the affidavits of the
jurors, error was committed in failing to imj^ose reasonable
terms as a condition.
What those terms should be is a
subject for consideration primarily by the trial court.
—
Upon
B^ the Court. Plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
defendant's appeal the order is reversed, and cause remanded with directions to embody in the order granting
new trial the payment of reasonable terms by plaintiff as
a condition.

CHAPTER XVIII.

TRIAL AND FINDINGS BY THE COURT.
FOWLER V. TOWLE.
Supreme Judicial Court of Neiv Hampshire.
49

This was

1870.

New Hampshire, 507.

writ of error, brought by Cyrus Fowler and
others against Elias Towle.
The writ of error is dated
a

October 1, 1869.

The original action was replevin, for a meeting-house
bell, in favor of Towle, against Fowler and others.
The
plea was non cepit, with a brief statement, giving notice of
title to the bell in the defendants and others.
By consent
of the parties, the action was tried by the court at Freedom, after the adjournment of the May term, 1868. Neither
r»arty requested the court to report the facts found, nor
'he conclusions of law upon them.
At the close of the
'rial, the cause was reserved for consideration upon written arguments, and the finding of the court was subseThe finding, after givquently filed in the clerk's office.
ing a description of the action, concludes as follows :
"The case was well tried, and the evidence and law were
well argued by the respective counsel engaged, in writing.
The court, after a mature examination and consideration
of the facts and evidence, and the law applicable thereto,
has 'Come to the conclusion, that the said Elias Towle recover of said defendants one dollar, for his alleged damages for the alleged caption and detention of said bell mentioned in his declaration; and also that plaintiff be restricted to the recovery of one dollar in full of all costs
Gr. W. N., Jus. &c.
whatsoever in this suit.
''The finding of the court is also upon the further limitation and condition, that if the defendants shall undertake either by transfer of the action to the full court or
otherwise, to delay immediate judgment according to the
aforesaid finding of the court, then the plaintiff by way of
820
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penalty, shall be allowed to recover the whole amount of
his legal costs from the beginning, and also if the plaintiff
shall attempt to transfer this action as aforesaid or otherwise disturb the aforesaid finding of the court, then, in
such case, the court orders that, by way of penalty, the
aforesaid finding shall be wholly reversed and annulled,
and that the said defendants recover as damages against
said plaintiff the value of the bell, being three hundred dollars, with interest from the 5tli day of July, A. D. 1867,
and full costs of court.
G. W. N., Jus. &c.
"The action on the docket having been continued nisi
judgment is therefore ordered as of the last term for plaintiff for one dollar debt, and one dollar costs, and the clerk
will enter it up accordingly.
G. W. N., Jus. &c."

**********

In the assignment of errors in this case the plaintiffs in
error pray that "the judgments aforesaid may be reversed
and held for nothing, and that they may be restored to all
things they have lost by reason thereof."

**********

The defendant in error moved to quash the writ of error
upon its return into court, and the parties agreed that
"pleas may be filed and argued without prejudice to defendant's motion to quash in the same brief in which said
motion is argued."
No plea has been furnished, and the
defendant in error relies solely upon his motion to quash.
Sargent, J.
The first ground taken by defendant in
error, on his motion to quash is, that in this class of cases,
That the proceeding being entirely
error does not lie.
by force of special statute, is not a proceeding according
to the course of the common law, and therefore that certiorari should have been the form of proceeding instead of
error.
Wliat are the statute provisions applicable to this case?
Sees. 1 and 2 of chap. 189, (lenl. Stats., prescribe the jurisdiction of this court at the law terms, while sec. 3 does the
"At the trial terms
same at the trial terms, as follows:
they shall take cognizance of civil actions and pleas, real,
personal and mixed, according to the course of the common law," etc. Sec. 4 then provides that "in civil actions
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try the facts in controversy and assess the
damages, if the parties so elect, and judgment rendered on
such trial shall be conclusive as if rendered on the verdict
of a jury;" and sec. 5 provides that "the decision of the
court in such case, shall be in writing, if either party so
requests, stating the facts found and the conclusions of
law upon them, which shall be filed and recorded, and
either party may except to any ruling or decision of the
court in matters of law in the same manner and with like
the court shall

a

it,

effect, as upon a trial by jury. ' '
Now the question is, whether the substitution of the
court for the jury, to settle the questions of facts, by agreement of parties, so far changes the nature of the whole proceeding, that it is no longer ''a civil action or plea" prosecuted "according to the course of the common law?" The
writ is the same; the service the same; the entry in the
court the same; the defendant's appearance the same; the
pleadings the same; the issue joined is the same; and, after verdict, the judgment must be the same; and shall have
the same effect, as though rendered upon a verdict of the
jury; and provision is made, that either party requesting
shall have the decision in writing, and may except to any
ruling or decision of the court in matters of law, in the
trial by
same manner, and with the same effect, as upon

jury.

it

is

it

When all these facts are considered, and also the fact
only by agreement of the parties, that this change
that
can be made, and that all the proceedings, both before and
after trial, are to be the same in both cases, we are satisfied that this arrangement of the parties as to the trier of
the facts, does not change the nature of the proceeding any
does the form, and was not designed to
more than

if

it

it

a

it

3,

it

a

a

is

a

is

change either.
by
sufficient answer to this suggestion, that
It
this agreement of the parties, and this trial of the facts
changed
jury, the proceeding
by the court instead of
according
or
to
"civil action
plea
so as to be no longer
the course of the common law," then the court at the trial
term would no longer have jurisdiction of the case, beclearly does not come under any of the other heads
cause
continues to be what
and unless
enumerated in sec.
civil action or plea acwas commenced, viz.,
was when
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cording to the course of the common law, the court would
cease to have jurisdiction of the same at the trial term, because it is only as such an action or plea, that the court at

that term has any jurisdiction of the case.
This position
of the defendant in error is not well taken.
A writ of error would be the proper remedy in a case
tried by the court, under sees. 4 and 5 in all cases, where
it would be the remedy if the same case had been tried by
the jury, instead of the court.
The court was substituted
for the jury in this case, to try the facts, by express agreement of the parties; but while the court thus settles the
questions of fact, in the capacity of a jury, still the judge
retains all his powers as judge in questions of law, and
may exercise the same discretion in allowing or limiting
costs, that he might before, so that while acting as a jury,
to try the facts, he has no power over the costs, either
to allow or disallow, or limit, yet as judge, he may pass
upon the question of costs.
And while the judge who thus acts in the double capacity
of judge and jury has, and may exercise all the powers
both of the judge and jury, still he has no powers in addition to those which the court and jury have in any ordinary case. Having premised thus much, in relation to the
powers and duties of the judge, who acts as judge and
jury both, in the trial of a cause, let us look at the verdict
in this case, and see how much of it is a finding upon questions of fact, and what part of it is simply a ruling upon
questions of law, or the exercise of the discretion vested
in the court.
So far, as the limiting of the original plaintiff's costs
is concerned, that was a matter within the discretion of
the court, as a court, and had nothing to do with the finding of the facts, and no exception would lie to the ruling
of the court, upon a matter like this, which is placed by law
in the discretion of the court, and it seems equally well settled, that a writ of error will not lie in such a case.
Rochester v. Roberts, 29 N. H. 360, 368.
To this part of the verdict, then, there could be no exception, and there was no error. And if there had been
error in this, the plaintiffs in review being the original
defendants, would liardly insist upon having that corrected, and being compelled to pay full costs, instead of
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the limited amount fixed by the judge who tried this cause.
That is not one of the errors assigned in this case.
The other part of the verdict (omitting now the conditional portions of it) is "that said Towle recover of said
Fowler & als. one dollar as damages for the caption and
detention of said bell mentioned in his declaration."
As
there was no request to state in writing either the facts
found, or the conclusions of law upn the facts in the case,
by either side, we think this finding is plain, intelligible
and explicit enough, to answer the requirements of the
law.
In order to reach that conclusion, the facts found must
have been, that the bell in question belonged to Towle,
and as he had taken the bell into his possession upon
the replevin writ, all he could recover would be the damand
ages for the wrongful taking and detention of
that is, what he does recover by this verdict and judgment.
finding that judgment may be properly
such
This
rendered upon it.

Let us next consider the remaining or conditional portion of the verdict in this case. It will be observed, that the

signed separately.

is

is

is

it

it

is

a

is

a

;

is

in three separate and distinct parts
finding of the court
the first and third relate to the same subject-matter; the
first, the finding of one dollar damages and the limiting
judgment on
the costs to one dollar; the third, ordering
that finding, according to its terms. These, too, are consistent with each other, and are perfect in themselves, and
signed separately, and neither of them contains
each
anything, as matter of fact, which the presiding judge
jury, or as
might not properly find, acting in place of
matter of law, which the same judge acting as court, might
not properly do and order.
all
But the second or conditional part of the verdict
all conditional,
inconsistent with the other findings,
not upon the law or facts of the case, but upon the future
conduct of the parties, and was intended to be held over
would seem, in ierrorem, in order to inboth parties, as
duce them to abide by the first award, and submit to the
This portion of
judgment, which was ordered thereon.
entirely separate from all the rest, and
the verdict
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Whence did the presiding judge, who tried this cause,
derive his power to make orders as to the future conduct
of these parties? The power to deprive them of rights
which the law had given them, the power to punish them
for resorting to those remedies which the law has provided for all good citizens ? He could not derive this power
from the agreement of the parties, because this agreement
was simply, that the court should act in the place of the
jury in finding the facts in the case, and gave the court no
additional powers as a court. After that agreement, the
presiding judge, had just the powers he had before as
presiding judge, and in addition, the power and authority
to find the facts in the case, upon legal testimony, and
that was all.
A jury may mistake their province, and undertake to
find something, that was not in issue, but such part or
parts of their verdict would be rejected as surplusage, and
only such part as was confined to the issue raised by the
pleadings, could stand as a verdict.
Tucker v. Cochran,
47 N. H. 54.
So far, then, as he acted as a jury, the presiding judge, had no authority or power to undertake to
regulate the future conduct of these parties, and so far
While acting as
the verdict can have no force or effect.
in
his discretion,
judge, he had the power to limit costs,
and to order judgment upon the verdict he had rendered,
still he had no more power than he would have had if
the jury had found the verdict upon the evidence. In such
case, he would have the power to set aside the verdict
if a proper case was made, or to order judgment upon
or to continue the cause, but he had no power or jurisdiction to put the parties under bonds for good behavior,
without the proper complaint on oath, nor had he the
power to say that they should not avail themselves of all
their legal rights and remedies, after the judgment which
he might properly render, was entered up.
part of the verdict, upon the facts, this portion
As
would be merely surplusage, and would all be rejected,
part of the judgment,
and as an order of the court, or
was extra-judicial, was without authority, and without
mere nullity, not voidable merely but absolegal effect,
is

lutely void.
no doubt, therefore, that the second judgment
There
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were brought before
the court at the proper time and in the proper way. But
tlie question here is, whether
the proper
writ of error
way to bring the matter before the court at this time. When
this case was brought forward, and the new judgment was
rendered,
was at
regular term of the court, when
counsel were present, as
was their duty to be, and had
All the objections
every opportunity to take exceptions.
existed then that exist now, and
the proper exceptions
had been taken to the rulings and orders of the court at
that time, the judgment must inevitably have been reversed.
No reason or excuse
given or offered, or pretended to
exist, why objection was not then made, and exception
* *
taken.
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's in error, having had ample opportunity to take any and all exceptions,
seasonably, and have them considered just the same as
writ of error, and having neglected to take any such
upon
* *
be
exceptions at the proper time, they cannot now
*
heard to raise exception
We find no ground, therefore, upon which this writ of
error can be sustained, and are of opinion that the motion
to quash the writ should be granted.
Writ quashed.
the question

UTAH NATIONAL BANK OF SALT LAKE CITY V.

Utah,

Court
;

Supr^eme

of

NELSON.

111

Utah.

1910.

Pacific, 907.

a

a

a

Action by the Utah National Bank of Salt Lake City,
judgment for plainUtah, against Joseph Nelson. From
tiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Plaintiff,
corporation organized and existing under
the laws of Congress, brought this action to recover from
promissory note. The complaint alleges,
defendant upon
That the defendant, on January 22, 1908,
in substance:
and
at Salt Lake City, Utah, for value received, executed
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delivered to plaintiff his certain promissory note, and
thereby promised, on 30 days' demand after date, to pay
to the order of plaintiff $13,250, with interest at 6 per cent,
per annum from date until paid, and to pay 10 per cent,
additional as attorney's fee if the note slionld be placed
in the hands of an attorney for collection; that payment
of the note was demanded September 11, 1908, bnt the defendant refused to pay the same, or any part thereof; that
the note was placed in the hands of attorneys for collection.
The answer, admitted each alleia^ation in the complaint, with the exception that it denied that the note was
The answer also contained
G^iven ''for value received."
the following affirmative allegation, namely; ''That the
nromissory note signed by the defendant and delivered
^y him to the plaintiff, as alleged in said complaint, was
without consideration, and that no consideration what"ver passed or was given for the said promissory note;
* *
that neither the plaintitf nor any other person ever
')aid any sum of money or any other thing, or ever suffered
->r received any detriment
as a consideration for the signof the said promissory note; and that
■ns^ and delivery
-^aid note was whoTv without consideration."
The case
was tried to the court without a jury. * * *
The court, among other things, found, so far as material
liere: "That, for a valuable consideration received by defendant, he executed and delivered his promissory note
* * *
that all of the alle(the note in question) to plaintiff;
gations contained in plaintiff's complaint filed herein are
true, and all the denials and allegations of said defendant
in his answer are untrue, except as to the admissions thereAs a conclusion of law the court found
in contained."
that plaintiff was entitled to judo-ment against defendant
for the principal of the note. $13,250, and interest thereon
amounting to $1,104.1^, and for attorney's fee amounting
in favor of plaintiff for
+0 $1,325, and rendered judgment
To reverse the
the sum of $15,679.16 and costs of suit.
iudgment defendant has brought the case to this court on
appeal.
McCarty, J. (after stating the facts as above). Appellant, in his assignment of errors, alleges "that the court
erred in that it failed to find the facts, if any there were,
constituting, or which could constitute, any consideration
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for tlie contract or promissory note," and insists that the
finding made by the court, namely, "that for a valuable

consideration received by said defendant he (the defendant) executed the promissory note mentioned," was a
mere conclusion of law and not a finding of fact at all * * *
In Spelling, New Tr. & App. Pro. <^ 593, the author says ;
"If an issue be tendered in general terms and met by a
denial in the same form, a finding in the same general form
will be sufficient; but, where the pleadings are so framed
that the controversy turns upon a particular fact, the finding should conform to the issue thus presented and be specific. Accordingly, when only general facts are averred, and
the controversy related to the settlement of a long standing
account consisting of numerous items, it was held that a
general finding of a balance in favor of plaintiff was sufficient" — citing with approval the case of Pratalongo v.
Larco, 47 Cal. 378. The action in that case was, as stated
in the opinion, "for money lent and advanced and paid,
laid out, and expended by the plaintiff to and for the use
of the defendant and for money had and received by the
defendant for the use of the plaintiff.
The answer is a
general denial and a counterclaim in which the defendant

Livers that the plaintiff is indebted to him for money had
and received, lent and advanced, and paid, laid out, and expended." So in this case it is alleged in the answer, in
general terms, that the note in question "was without consideration, and that no consideration whatever passed or
The general findwas given for the promissory note."
ing that the note was executed "for a valuable consideration received by said defendant" negatives the affirmative
allegation of the answer and is therefore sufficient. Moreover, the authorities seem to hold that findings are sufficient
when the facts found are stated in the same way as they
are alleged in the pleadings.
In Hayne on New Trial, sec. 243, the rule is stated as
follows: "Facts may be stated in the findings in the same
way they are stated in the pleadings. It is not necessary
that the findings should follow the precise language of
the pleadings; but the only purpose of findings is to answer the questions put by the pleadings, and it seems to
be tho received idea that it is sufficient if the answers are
as the question, and that the
^-'•iven in the same language
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two njodes of statement are governed by the same general

rules."

In 8 Eney. PI. & Pr. 939, it is said: ''It is not necessary
that the findings should be in the exact language of the
pleadings or in any particular form." The finding complained of in this case, while of course not in the exact
language of that part of the answer in which want of consideration is alleged, nevertheless is directly responsive
thereto. And, furthermore, the doctrine is elementary that
the findings should, be a statement of the ultimate facts
in controversy and not of the evidentiary matters from
which the ultimate facts are to be deduced or found. In
8 Ency. PL & Pr. 941, it is said:
''The findings of the
court should be statements of the ultimate facts only, and
not probative facts * * * The findings should contain a
concise statement of the several facts found by the court
from the evidence and not the evidence from which they
are found."
Murphy v. Bennett, 68 Cal. 528, 9 Pac. 738, was an action
to recover damages for the tearing down of a barn and
converting the materials thereof. It was alleged in the
complaint that the plaintiff was the owner of the barn
The answer denied
at the time of the alleged conversion.
the ownership of the plaintiff and set up two affirmative
The court found
defenses in justification of the taking.
that the plaintiff was not, and that the defendant was, the
owner of the building, but omitted to find on the affirmative
defenses. It was contended that the finding was a conclusion of law. On appeal the Supreme Court held that
the finding on the issue of ownership was sufficient, and
that the failure to find on the affirmative defenses did not
prejudice the plaintiff. In the course of the opinion the
court said: "Here the allegation in the complaint is that
the plaintiff 'was the owner of a certain frame building,
The answer denied that plaintiff was the
situate,' etc.
"Wliether plaintiff did own the
owner of the building.
building or not was then the ultimate fact to be determined,
and upon the issue thus raised the court found against
We think it clear that the findings referred
the plaintiff.
to are findings of fact, and not conclusions of law."
In the case of Kahn v. Central Smelting Co., 2 Utah, 371,
it is said in the syllabus: "A finding 'that there was no
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partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, is not
a conclusion of law, but is a finding of fact." And in the
course of the opinion Mr. Justice Emerson, speaking for
the court, says:
''The fact that there was a partnership
is the ultimate fact alleged in the complaint.
There are
certain facts and conditions and circumstances set out in
the complaint from which this ultimate fact is deduced;
in the complaint much detail of mere evithat
there
dentiary facts.
The material issue of fact is, however:
Was there partnership? And the finding responds to this
issue. This was the ultimate fact to be ascertained, and
none the less
finding of fact because drawn as
conclusion from other facts."
This case
cited with
approval and the doctrine therein announced reaffirmed
by this court in the case of Snyder v. Emerson, Auditor,
19 Utah, 319, 57 Pac. 300, wherein
held that ''the finding that W. F. Critchlow was duly appointed as night jailer
conclusion of law, but
finding of an ultimate
not
fact which was an issue."
As
test for determining whether the finding in quesfinding of an ultimate fact,
conclusion of law or
tion
let us suppose, for example, that the court had, in the
language of the defendant's answer, found "that the promissory note signed by defendant and delivered by him to
the plaintiff, as alleged in said complaint, was without
consideration, and that no consideration whatever ever
passed or was given for the said promissory note." Could
finding be successfully assailed on the ground that
such
statement of an ultimate
conclusion of law and not
the only finding that
fact? Certainly not, because
had
found
on this issue in
the court could have made
favor of the defendant, and that, too, notwithstanding this
issue was presented by the affirmative allegations of defendant's answer and the burden was upon him to prove
Now,
that the note was executed without consideration.
finding that the note was executed without considerajudgment in
sufficient finding to support
tion would be
finding
necessarily follows that
favor of defendant,

a

is

a

a

is

a

valuable conthat the note was made and delivered "for
judgment for
sufficient finding to support
sideration"
])laintiff. We are clearly of the opinion that tlie finding
finding of an ultimate fact, and,
made by the court
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it is directly responsive to the affirmacontained in the defendant's answer.

as we have stated,

tive allegations

**********

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.

DARLING V. MILES.
Supreme Court of Oregon.

1911.

57 Oregon, 593.

This is an action by Thomas Darling against S. A. Miles
to recover damages suffered by reason of the fraudulent
representation made by defendant in the sale of certain
lots.
alleges that on "the 20th day of July,
herein did, with intent to cheat and
defraud the plaintiff, falsely and fraudulently represent to
the plaintiff that he was the absolute owner in fee, free
from incumbrance, of lots six (6) and seven (7) in block five
(5), in Pleasant View addition, * * * in the city of Portland,
and that lot six (6) was 46.9 feet by 100 feet, * * * when
in truth and in fact the defendant at that time was not,
and well knew that he was not, the owner of the south
fifteen (15) feet of said lot six (6) free from incumbrance,
and plaintiff alleges that the public then had a right to
use the said 15 feet as a highway, and the defendant then
knew it; that plaintiff herein relied upon the truth of the
statement of the defendant and believed the same, and on
July 20, 1906, he did, by reason of such reliance and belief,
* * *
and received from the defendant his warpurchase
ranty deed, wherein and whereby the grantors certified
that the said premises were free from all encumbrances

The complaint

1906, the defendant

* * *

) >

All

these allegations are denied by the answer, except
that defendant admits the execution and delivery of the
deed, with covenants and warranty, as alleged in the com-

plaint.
The action' was tried by the court without a jury.

At
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the close of the testimony the court made the following
finding of facts:
''The court finds that on or about the 20th day of July,
1906, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant lots 6 and
7 in block 5, Pleasant View addition, Multnomah County,
Oregon, for a valuable consideration, and received from
the defendant a general warranty deed therefor.
That
the south 15 feet of said lot 6 is subject to a right of way
of the public to use the same for a highway, and said sale
was made without any fraud on the part of the defendant^f
and without any fraudulent representations in regard
thereto."
Judgment was rendered thereon in defendant's favor,
from which plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Me. Justice Eakin delivered the opinion of the court.
1.
Plaintiff contends that the findings of fact do not
support the judgment, and to this we agree. Section 158,
B. & C. Comp., provides that when an action is tried by
the court, without the intervention of a jury, the decision
shall state the facts found, and such decision shall be entered in the journal, and judgment entered thereon accordingly. The finding that ''the sale was made without * * *
any fraudulent representations" only states a conclusion
of law. To justify a conclusion to that effect it was necessary for the court to find whether or not defendant represented that he was the owner of the lot, free from incumbrance, and that its dimensions were as stated, with knowledge on defendant's part that the representations were
false or were made recklessly as of his own knowledge,
without any knowledge of their truth; and if the court
finds that the representations were so made it must also
find whether plaintiff relied thereon to his injury : Caivston
Finding adverse to
V. HUiTfiis, 29 Or. 331 (43 Pac. 656).
plaintiff on at least one of these matters is necessary to
support the conclusion that there were no fraudulent repre
sentation, or to support a judgment to that effect.
This court has held in many cases that findings of
2.
fact must be made on all material issues necessary to supSee Wright v. Ramp. 41 Or. 285 (68
port the judgment.
Pac. 731); Henderson v. Reynolds, 57 Or. 186 (110 Pac.
979), and cases therein cited.
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for defendant urges that the proof fails

to establish the elements of fraudulent representations alleged, but the case is not before us upon the evidence. The
only means we have of knowing what was proved is from
the findings of fact which are silent as to the elements

urged here.
4.
It is said in Drainage Dist. No. 4 v. Crow. 20 Or. 536
(26 Pac. 846), after quoting from said Section 158, B. & C.

Comp:

"The

object of this statute was to enable the parties to
have placed upon the record the facts upon which the right
litigated depends as well as the conclusion of law. * * *
The facts found are conclusive upon the appellate court,
but the conclusions of law are reviewable here on appeal."
The facts found must justify the conclusions of law.
Otherwise, they are abstract statements and not conclusions.

The judgment
trial.

is

reversed

and remanded

Justice Moore did

Me. Chief

for

a

new

Reversed.
not sit in this case.

SLAYTON V. FELT.
Supreme Court of Washington.
40

Crow,
Charles

Washington,

1905,

1.

J. — This

action was commenced by appellant,
J. Slayton, against respondent, D. W. Felt, to recover a broker's commission on the sale of real estate in
the city of Seattle. Upon the trial before the court without
a jury, appellant presented findings of fact in his favor,
which the court declined to make. Judgment was entered
* * *
dismissing the action.

**********

Appellant also contends that the trial court erred
in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
(2)

separately stated, or at all, and asks that the judgment be
T. p.— 53

-
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reversed by reason thereof.
Appellant urges that under
Bal. Code, Sec. 5029, it was the duty of the trial court to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately
stated. Respondent contends that, as the final judgment
was one of dismissal, findings of fact were unnecessary,
citing, Thome v. Joy, 15 Wash. 83, 45 Pac. 642, and Noijes
V. King County, 18 Wash. 417, 51 Pac. 1052.
Both of said
cases were actions in equity.
This court has heretofore
announced the rule that findings of fact and conclusions!
of law are not necessary in equitable actions, but we are not
aware of any such announcement being made as to actions
at law. We see no reason why findings of fact and conclusions of law are not just as essential, if properly requested, in an action at law when the same is dismissed,
as where an affirmative judgment is entered.
This being
an action at law, the cases cited by respondent do not sustain his contention.
The question then arises whether the
action of the trial court in failing to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law amounted to such prejudicial error
In Wilson v.
as would entitle appellant to a reversal.
Aberdeen, 25 Wash. 614, 66 Pac. 95, this court said:
"We come now to the consideration of the appellants'
contention that the judgment must be reversed because of
the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact and
Our statute provides that 'upon the
conclusions of law.
of
fact by the court, its decisions shall be
trial of an issue
In giving the
given in writing and filed with the clerk.
decision, the facts found and the conclusions of law shall
Judgment upon the decision shall
be separately stated.
Bal. Code § 5029; 2 Hill's Code,
be entered accordingly.'
§ 379. This provision of the code is in form mandatory,
and this court has several times held, in effect, that in
actions at law tried by the court without a jury, findings
of fact and conclusions of law are necessary to support the
See, Bard v. Kleeh, 1 Wash. 370, 25 Pac. 467:
judgment.

Kilroy v. Mitchell, 2 Wash. 407, 26 Pac. 865 ; King County
V. Hill, 1 Wash. 404, 25 Pac. 451; Sadler v. Niesz, 5 Wash.

182, 31 Pac. 630. 1030; Potivin v. Blasher, 9 Wash. 460, 37
Pac. 712. But in more recent cases it has been decided
that a judgment will not be reversed on appeal for want of

findings of fact and conclusions of law, where it is not
any request
made to appear by the record that there was

;
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for such findings and conclusions, or any objection raised
upon that account. Washington Rock Plaster Co. v. Johnyon, 10 Wash. 445, 39 Pac. 115; Remington v. Price, 13
\Vash. 76, 42 Pac. 527."
It is true that appellant did request the trial court to
make findings of fact in favor of himself, upon the issues

i

*

is

a

[

I
<

S
i

,

j;
\
1

if

requested, but which, necesthe court would have signed
sarily, would have been against appellant upon the issues
joined. Such an appeal could not have benefited appellant
in any manner whatever. In view of this fact, and, also,
the further fact that appellant failed to request the court
to make findings in accordance with its view of the evidence, we think no error prejudicial to appellant has been
committed. In an action at law, either party has the right
to request
.trial court to make such findings of fact as

T A

a

if

The only privilege of which the appellant has been deany, has been to bring an appeal to this court
prived,
statement of facts based upon such findings as
without

j

pense.

'
'

it

it

§

it,

raised by the pleadings, the same being claimed by him
to be warranted by the evidence admitted.
The court, not
thinking the evidence warranted such findings, refused to
sign the same. It do«s not appear, however, that appellant
at any time requested the court to make such findings of
fact and conclusions of law as it might determine to be
proper or warranted by the evidence. We think this re(piest should have been made, before appellant would be
entitled to base a successful assignment of error upon the
refusal of the court to make any findings whatever. The
findings requested by appellant are shown in the record,
and afford him an opportunity, of which he has availed
himself, to assign error upon the refusal of the trial court
to make the same.
He has been deprived of no legal or
This court in Bard v.
valuable right in that direction.
Kleeh, 1 Wash. 370, 25 Pac. 467, 27 Pac. 273, construing
said Bal. Code, § 5029, there mentioned as § 246, said:
for the protection of court
246
**As we regard
and parties. To the court
gives an opportunity to place
upon record its view of the facts and the law in definite
written form, sufficiently at large that there may be no
furnishes the means of having their
mistake. To parties
causes reviewed, in many instances, without great ex-
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it may deem proper, upon all the issues involved, or upon
I any particular issue, which such party may deem materI ial or important, and such findings should then be made.
I" A mere request, however, to make certain findings in favor
of such party only, is not in itself sufficient. Of course,
it is the proper and correct practice for a party to request
findings in his own favor, to which he may think himself
entitled, so that he may make proper exceptions to their
refusal. But such findings in his favor having been re-fused and excepted to, he must, if he desires to assign error
on a failure to make any findings or conclusions whatever,
also request the court to make such findings as it thinks
the evidence warrants. This was not done by appellant in
:

this action.
We find no prejudicial error in the record. The judgment
is affirmed.
Mount, C. J., Eoot and Hadley,
concur.
FuLLEKTON and DuNBAK,
concur in the result.

JJ.,

JJ.,

GRAHAM V. STATE, EX REL. BOARD OF COMMISSIGNERS.
L^^WdU
^jjJ^J^^^^"^^
^

^.

u.<
^^

(P^lSupreme

Court of Indiana.

66

1879.

Indiana, 386.

WoRDEN, C. J. — This was an action by the appellee,
against the appellant, which resulted in a trial by the court,
and a finding and judgment for the plaintiff, for the sura
of two thousand dollars.
The action was brought against Graham, as a surety on
tlie official bond of Rufus Gale, as the auditor of Jefferson
county. The bond was in the usual form of such bonds, but
was in the penalty of five thousand dollars. Breaches of
the bond were assigned, alleging, among other things, that
Gale, during his term of office, had, as such auditor, drawn
numerous warrants or orders upon the county treasury,
payable to himself, for large amounts, and had presented
them to the treasurer for redemption, who had paid the
amount thereof to said Gale in redemption thereof; that

I
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drawn without any order of the board of
of the county, or authority of law.

the orders were

commissioners

*********

*^*

motion for a venire de novo, because the facts were not sufificiently found. And it is said
in the brief of counsel for the appellant, that ''The failure
of the court to find one way or the other, upon the facts,
as to two of the breaches alleged in the complaint, leaves
the issues as to those breaches untried, just as the verdict
of a jury on one paragraph of a complaint consisting of
several paragraphs leaves the issues on the other paragraphs untried, and in such a case a venire de novo is

The defendant filed

a

a

it

it

p

a

a

a

a

is

it,

awarded."
This makes it necessary to consider to some extent the
nature and office of a special verdict or finding.
The statute provides that ''A special verdict is that by
which the jury find the facts only, leaving the judgment
thereon to the court." 2 R. S. 1876, p. 171, sec. 335. The
next following section provides that ''the court shall, at
the request of either party, direct them" (the jury) "to
give a special verdict in writing upon all or any of the
,
issues."
JBy section 341, 2 E. S. 1876, p. 174, it is provided that
upon trials of questions of fact by the court, if one of the
parties request
"the court shall first state the facts in
writing, and then the conclusions of the law upon them."
There
no difference between
special verdict and
special finding by the court, except that the special verdict finds the facts only, and the court afterward pronounces, or rather applies the law to the facts found, and
renders judgment accordingly; while, in
special finding,
the court states the conclusions of law upon the facts
found, so that the parties can except to the conclusions.
special finding can do more
Neither
special verdict nor
in relation to facts than to find or state them. But what
facts are to be thus found or stated? Clearly tJiose that
roved upon the trial, and none ot her.
When the
are
has
found
the facts proved on the trial,
speciaTvei-'dict
office;
its
entire
and when the special findperformed
has
has pering has stated the facts proved on the trial,
formed its entire office, so far as the facts are concerned.
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Of course the facts may

be proved by circumstances or
otherwise, as in any other mode of trial.
But suppose there are issues in the cause concerning
which no evidence is given. There is nothing in such case
in relation to those issues for the court or jur}^, in finding
specially, to pass upon. No fact in relation to them has
been proved, and, hence, no fact in relation to them is to
,
be found or stated, because, as we have seen^ the special
1^
or finding is confined to the facts proved.
t<^^4«tverdict
In the case sui:)posed, it would seem that, in rendering
*dC^
judgment, the issues concerning which no facts are found
should be regarded as not proved by the party on whom the
burden of the issue or issues lies.

The judgment below is affirmed, with costs.

CITY OF OWNESBORO V. WEIR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
95

1893.

Kentucky, 158.

Judge Hazelrigg delivered the opinion of the court.
The question involved in this appeal is the liability of
the appellant, City of Owensboro, for the fee of the appellees — attorneys at law — for services rendered by them at
the employment of the mayor of the appellant acting without the authority of the city council.
The circumstances of the employment are set forth in
an ''agreed case" and in the record in which the services
were rendered.

**********

But, say the appellees with earnestness, there was no
statement by the court of its conclusions of fact found, separately from its conclusions of law.
Section 332 of the Civil Code provides that ''upon trials
of questions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary
for the court to state its findings, except generally for the
plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties request it,
with a view of excepting to the decision of the court upon
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of law involved in the trial; in which case,
the court shall state in writing the conclusions of fact
found, separately from the conclusions of law."
Now upon an agreed state of fact, what could the court
do in the way of stating "in writing the conclusions of
fact found separately from the conclusions of law?"
Simply copy or re-state the agreed state of fact! Clearly
the court's judgment on the law only was asked. There
was no trial of questions of fact. The case of Harris v.
Ray, 15 B. M. 629, cited by counsel, simply determined
that the provisions' of the Code regulating applications for
the questions

a new

trial applied to judgments by default.

It

has no

bearing on the section quoted.

GAINES

&

COMPANY V. WHYTE GROCERY
COMPANY.

Kansas City Court of Appeals.
107

1904.

Missouri Appeal, 507,

Smith, P. J. — The plaintiff and defendant are both business corporations, the former organized under the statute
of this State and the latter under that of the State of Kentucky. The plaintiff in its petition alleged, (1), that it was
and is the owner of a special trade-mark for "Old Crow"
whiskey, which defendant had infringed and was infringing; and (2), that by the use of the words "Old Crow"
upon bottles containing whiskey other than the genuine
"Old Crow" whiskey produced by plaintiff which it offered
to the trade, defendant thereby carried on such unfair
trade and competition as entitled plaintiff to the injunctive
process of the court. The defendant's answer, in addition
to a general denial, interposed the defenses of laches and
the statute of limitation.
There was a trial and decree
for plaintiff and defendant appealed.
The defendant's final contention is, that the trial court
erred in its refusal to make special finding of the facts

«

840
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and conclusions of law thereon. The statnte (section 695)
doubtless applies to both legal and equitable actions, but
while this is so, we do not think the failure to make a
special finding in an action of the latter kind constitutes
a reversible error, because the supervisory courts are authorized on appeal to try and determine such actions upon
the pleadings and evidence de novo. The findings of the
trial court, if any, may be entirely disregarded by the
former tribunal and such findings and decree entered
therein as seems to it to be meet and proper. The Legislature did not, by the enactment of the statute already referred to, intend to abrogate the well and long-established
practice of the appellate courts in supervising the findings
of trial courts in equity cases, or to deprive the former of
the jurisdiction to determine for themselves the correctBlount v. Spratt, 113
ness of the findings of the latter.
Mo,
294 ; Benne v. SchnecMo. 48 ; McElroy v. Maxiuell, 101
ko, 100 Mo. 250. If the supervisory courts are not bound
by the findings of the trial courts, or their conclusions of
law in equity cases, but may review the whole evidence
and determine for themselves what the findings of fact
and conclusions of law should be, it is difficult to see how
a party could be prejudiced by the failure of the trial
court to make special findings of fact, in such cases.
The failure, therefore, of the court in the present case
to make special finding of facts was not such an error as
requires a reversal of the decree; and especially so since
it was, as we think, clearly for the right party and the
only one that could have been given in the cause.
Accordingly, our conclusion is that the decree should be
affirmed. All concur.
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CITY OF BUFFALO V. DELAWAKE, LACKAWANNA
& WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY.
Court of Appeals of New York.
190

1907,

New York, 84.

The object of this action was to secure a judicial determination that a portion of the river front in the city of
Buffalo is a public street and to compel the defendant to
The main issue
remove certain obstructions therefrom.
raised by the answer was whether the locus in quo, called
Front street, was a public street when the action was commenced.

* * *

The trial justice found the following facts, among
others: * * *
"Eighteenth.
That said dock and wharf from the time
of its erection down to the commencement of this action,
and since, has been open to travel by vehicles and pedestrians, except when such travel was temporarily obstructed
by freight stored upon said dock or wharf, and the said
dock or wharf has been used during the said times by
vehicles and pedestrians, more largely by the latter than
the former; that the greater number of persons using said
dock or wharf for foot or vehicle traffic did so for the,
purpose of reaching the stores and warehouses abutting
on said wharf, and for the purpose of delivering supplies
to the vessels lying thereat, or receiving passengers from
such vessels, or transacting other business with said
vessels. But it is equally true that many of the people
using said dock and wharf, both for foot and vehicle traffic, used the same as a way of communication between
Main street and points east of Washington street, and
that many pedestrains constantly used said dock and wharf
who had no business with the abutting stores and warehouses, or the vessels lying at said dock."
After finding the facts as thus stated the trial court
found the following, which were designated as ''conclusions
of

law:"

"Third:

That for a period of six years and more prior
to the commencement of this action the said premises

Tkial Peacticb
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herein designated as 'Front street,' ceased to be traveled
or used as a public highway, and ceased to be a highway

**********

for any purpose.

The trial court rendered judgment against
Vann, J.
the plaintiff on the theory that, although Front street became a public highway as early as 1826 through tender of
dedication by the owners and acceptance by the municipal
authorities, still it had ceased to be a public highway because it had not been traveled or used as such for a period of more than six years prior to the commencement of
the action. While facts were found which sustain the conclusion of law that Front street became a public highway
through offer and acceptance, no finding of fact, classified
as such, was made that the street had not been traveled
or used as a public highway for the statutory period re{City of CoJioes v. Delaquired to effect an abandonment.
ware (& Hudson Canal Co., 134 N. Y. 397 ; Matter of Hunter,
163 N. Y. 542, 548; L. 1861, ch. 311; L. 1890, ch. 568, § 99.)
It is claimed that the third conclusion of law contains
the finding of fact needed to support the judgment and
that, although it is classified as a conclusion of law, since
it is really a finding of fact the same effect should be given
to it as if it had been so designated in the decision.
The finding in question is one of fact or law. If it is
the latter, the facts found do not support the judgment,
because a street once in existence is presumed to continue
until it ceases to be such owing to abandonment or some
We think,
other lawful cause. {Cohoes Case, supra.)
however, that the finding, except the last clause thereof, is
not one of law but of fact. The cessation of user and
travel upon a street for the period prescribed involves
a question of fact.
Traveling upon a street is an act or a
The use
series of acts which can be seen and described.
of a street for traveling purposes requires that something
should be done thereon which is apparent to ordinary observation.
One may travel on a street by walking, riding
or driving. Each method involves action and an act is a
fact, as that word is known to jurisprudence.
An error in the classification of findings by the trial
court does not prevent an appellate court from classifying
them for itself in accordance with their actual character.
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Giving a wrong name to a finding does not change its nature and if it is placed under the head of ''conclusions of
law," when it is a finding of fact, it will be treated on
appeal as what it really is, at least for the purpose of upholding a judgment. {Berger v. Varrelmann, 127 N. Y. 281,
288; Christopher & Tenth Street R. R. Co. v. Tiventy-third
Street R. R. Co., 149 N. Y. 51, 57.) As we have already
seen, the judgment appealed from cannot stand unless the
finding under consideration is a finding of fact, and it

now remains to be seen whether it can stand even on that
theory, since it is claimed that such finding of fact is inconsistent with other findings of fact, and hence must
yield thereto at the election of the appellant in aid of his
It was upon this ground that one of the
exceptions.
learned justices below based his dissent.
What is the situation according to the findings when
properly classified? About 1826 a public highway existed
on the river front between Washington and Main streets.
It still existed in 1838, when a dock was built by the abutting owners over and upon the land owned by them constituting said highway, covering it for its entire width and
length. From that time to this the abutting owners have
used the dock for dock purposes and the general public
have used it for highway purposes, neither use excluding
the other altogether, although doubtless interfering with it
to some extent. Under these circumstances what became
of the street when the dock was built? Can abutting owners destroy a street in this way? Did the construction of
There is no statute
the dock annihilate the highway?
which gives it that effect, and according to the common
law the street leaped from the ground to the do«k and
staid there. It is there now unless it has been abandoned
* * *
by nonuser as we read the authorities.

private dock is built over a public street upon
of
navigable waters, the dock becomes part of the
the shore
street and the public has a right to travel over it. Ownership of the dock is not inconsistent with the existence of
the street any more than ownership of the land over which
the street extended. Assimiing that the defendant or its
predecessors could lawfully build a dock over their own
land in order to reach the river, still, as their land was
When

a

Trial
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a

a

it

it

it,

it

it^

it,

a

a

it,

subject to the right of the public to travel upon
they
could not unreasonably interfere with that right nor witli
the existence of the street which was the foundation thereof. Two rights co-existed.
The defendant, as owner of
the river front, had the right to reach the water. As there
was
street along the river front over the defendant's land
the public had the right to use the street.
The building
of the dock changed neither right. Both continued to exist,
although under changed conditions.
They met but did not
merge, nor did either destroy the other.
The defendant
had the right to use its dock, as
private dock, subject to
the right of the public to travel over
as they had pre\dously traveled upon the land over which
was built. The
city had no right to use the dock for dock purposes, but
its citizens had the right to use
for street purposes. While
the street followed the dock, and covered the whole of
that did not authorize the city to collect wharfage; and
although the dock was private property the same as the
land beneath it, that did not authorize the defendant to
prevent the public from using
for the same purpose that
they had previously used the land.
The easement for
travel still existed, but
was over the dock which took
the place of the land constituting the street.
The public
had the right to travel in the same place and in the same
direction that they had before, but instead of traveling
upon the surface of the land, they were obliged to travel
and had the right to travel upon the structure that the defendant had placed on the land. That structure became
street for the purpose of travel and
private dock for
use as such, with
superior right in the public in case of
conflict through reasonable use of the respective rights.
a

**********

We have thus laid down the law applicable to the facts
found independent of the fact appearing in the third
clear that the latter, treated as
conclusion of law. It
finding of fact that Front street had not been traveled or
public highway for more than six years,
used as
inconsistent with the eighteenth finding of fact that the public used the dock continuously from the time
was built,
way of communication
both for foot and vehicle traffic, as
between Main street and points east of Washington street.
The learned trial justice evidently regarded the street as
a

it

a

is

a

is

as
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no longer in existence after the dock was built, and hence
found that travel had ceased upon the street, although he
found that it continued upon the dock which took the place
of the street. He may thus have been misled into making
the inconsistent findings.
**
While an appellate court should harmonize inconsistent
findings when it is possible to do so, if they prove irreconcilable it is the duty of the court to accept those most favorable to the appellant, and he is entitled to rely upon
them in aid of his exceptions."
{Israel v. Manhattan Ry. \\
Co., 158 N. Y. 624, 631 ; Nickell v. Tracy, 184 N. Y. 386.
The finding that the street has been abandoned can390.)
not be reconciled, according to our view of the law, with
the finding that the dock has been used and traveled upon
continuously as a street. We are, therefore, compelled to
reject the former and to accept the latter, with the same
force and effect as if it was the only finding upon the subject appearing in the decision. This leaves the conclusion
of law that the defendant is entitled to the exclusive use,
possession and occupancy of Front street, and that the
plaintiff is not possessed of any right, title or interest
therein, without any finding to support it. The exception
to this conclusion of law, as well as to the direction for
judgment against the plaintiff, raised reversible error and
requires us to reverse the judgment appealed from and to
order a new trial, with costs to abide the event.
CuLLEN, Ch. J., Gray, O'Brien, Werxee. Wh.lard BartLETT and Chase,
concur.
Judgment reversed, Etc,

JJ.,
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